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AUSTRALIA AND THE COLONIAL QUESTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS
PRECIS:
The purpose of this thesis to examine and seek 
to explain the response of Australia to anti-colonial 
activity at the United Nations.
It deals with such activity in three categories:
(l) attempts to apply extensive United Nations supervision 
of non-self-governing territories under the authority 
of Chapter XI of the charter; (2) attempts to have 
interpreted very rigorously the supervision rights of 
the United Nations over trust territories; and (3) attempts 
to force the pace of decolonisation in some territories 
by seeking United Nations intervention in situations 
claimed to comprise threats to peace.
At the writing of the charter in 19^5» Australia 
sought to have it allow the United Nations to be 
informed about and, to a limited degree, involved in, 
dependent territories. Essentially Australia was seeking 
an extension of the mandates system to ensure the humane 
and progressive administration of dependencies.
However, anti-colonial feeling led to activity in the 
United Nations designed to maximise international 
supervision of dependent territories and, more to the 
point, to accelerate political development in them so
as speedily to accomplish their self-government or 
independence.
Throughout the late 1940 s and the 1950s, 
Australia, herself an administrator of trust and 
non-self-governing territories, consistently opposed 
attempts in the United Nations to interfere with 
administering Powers' exclusive control of their 
territories. On only one issue, that of Indonesian 
independence, did any Australian government of the 
period support forceful anti-colonialism.
She took up this position partly in sympathy 
with western allies under Cold War attack ana partly 
because of inherited constitutional attitudes, but 
mainly because experience had led her to see control 
of the non-self-governing territory of Papua and the 
trust territory of New Guinea as vital to her own 
security. Only in the case of Indonesian independence 
did other considerations outweigh the New Guinea interest 
and take Australia into the company of her mainly 
anti-colonial Asian neighbours.
In the 1960s, it is seen, she dropped her former 
intransigence because of resignation to the success 
of the anti-colonial cause in respect of Papua-New Guinea 
and because of the diplomatic price of isolation.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
2I.
There are a number of terms which, especially in the 
vocabulary of politics, present usage difficulties because 
of two shared characteristics: they are terms heavily laden
with emotional content, much of it hostile; and, neither 
in public, political dialogue, nor in academic writing is 
there agreement on their meaning or proper application*
One such term is * imperialism’, of which W.K, Hancock has 
said:
Xt is a pseudo-concept which sets out to make 
everything clear and ends by making everything 
muddled; it is a word for the illiterates of 
social science, the callow and the shallow who 
attempt to solve problems without mastering a 
technique•^
Another term of this sort is Colonialism*. Thus, United 
Kingdom control of, but negligible settlement in, a small 
island group 12,000 miles away in the Pacific is said to be 
an example of colonialism. But so, it is held, is the 
Soviet Union*s re-subjection of the contiguous Baltic states 
to Muscovite hegemony, the ‘Russification* of central Asia 
and China* s exercise of effective control over neighbouring 
Tibet. Some would say that the role of United States
1 W.K. Hancock, Wealth of Colonies. Cambridge, 1950, P*17* 
There have been continuing attempts to clarify the cnncept 
by historical analysis of its usage (c.g., Richard Koebner 
and Helmut dan Schmidt, Imperialism. The Story and . 
Significance of a Political Word. 1840-1960, Cambridge, 1964) 
and by discussion of its contemporary significance (e.g., 
A.G.L. Shaw, *A Revision of the Meaning of Imperialism* 
in Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. VII 
(1961), No. 2 (Nov.), p.198sq.).
3investment interests in parts of Latin America has been 
2colonialist, Some, too, see the continuing exercise
of influence by former metropolitan Powers in new states*
3affairs as a form of colonialisms neocolonialism.
Political interest has caused some of the confusions
for Stalin, what under the Tsars had been a Russian empire
was, under communism, * that remarkable organization for the
4collaboration of nations,.,*. Again, what a Frenchman 
might once have seen, and what a Portuguese might still see, 
as provincial government in a geographically separated state, 
an Indian would be likely to see as a constitutional 
fiction inadequately disguising colonialism. Similarly, 
some students of international politics see colonialism as
5necessarily involving the government of ’backward* areas, 
while others virtually ignore the notion of tutelage; 
some assume geographical separation between governing and
governed,^ while others allow for ‘contiguous colonial
7 8areas*'; some stress the settlement factor, and others
2 The reference here is to the ’budget regimes*, as 
they have been called (W.R. Crocker, Self-Government for 
the Colonies, London, 19^9» p.10).
3 See, e.g,, Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London, 
1963, p.xvi, -
4 J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1953» p.78*
5 Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations,
New York, 1955, P.181.„
6 Ibid.
7 G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, London, 1951» P*^9*
8 Rene Maunier, The Sociology of Colonies, Vol, 1, London, 
19^9» p. 19.
kemphasise rather the aspect of power domination; some 
distinguish between colonialism and imperialism, while 
others seem to regard the terms as interchangeable.9 10
Despite such conflict over definitions, there is, 
however, one manifestation of colonialism which almost 
universally is recognised as such: the control by states
of western Europe, or states of western European ethnic 
origin, of areas in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and 
Oceania. It may not be the only important manifestation, 
as some defensive western Powers insist when they speak 
of ’the salt water fallacy’, but it is one manifestation. 
Further, it is, in terms of the numbers of people involved 
and of the international consequences of its recent 
and contemporary undoing, perhaps the most important 
manifestation. Thus, when it is suggested that 'the 
most pregnant phenomenon of the present time will, in 
retrospect, appear to have been neither the harnessing 
of atomic power nor the emergence of Russia to the status 
of superpower...but the emancipation of subject or
9
9 Thomas R. Adam, Modern Colonialism: Institutions
and Policies, New York, 1955» p»3»
10 For a failure to distinguish, see, e.g., Walter 
Kolarz, Communism and Colonialism, London, 19^4, P*18.
For attempts to distinguish, see Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations, New York, 19^9» P»27; Philip W. 
Bell, ’Colonialism as a Problem in American Foreign 
Policy' in World Politics, Vol. V (1952-3) > No.1 (Oct., 
1952), p.86; and, more particularly, Kenneth J. Twitchett, 
'Colonialism: An Attempt at Understanding Imperialism,
Colonial and Neo-Colonial Relationships' in Political 
Studies, Vol. XIII (1965), No. 3 (Oct.), p.300sq.
511colonial peoples...», or when i t  is  said that »few
political and constitutional processes are at present so
greatly affecting human well-being as the transition
from political dependency to independence’ , the
emancipation or transition referred to is  that of
African, Middle Eastern, Asian and Oceanic societies
from the authority of western states and their emergence
as at least nominally independent actors on the inter-
1 3national stage. The colonial question concept, then, 
will be used in this work to denote the mass of issues 
which has arisen in the process of the alienation of 
Afro-Asian-Oceanic societies from explicit western
11 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, »Some Reflections on the Rising 
of Subject Peoples* in Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 6 5 (1950), No.2 (June), p.193•
12 J.W. Davidson, »The Transition to Independence:
The Example of Western Samoa* in Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Vol. VII ( 1 9 6 1 ), No. 1 (May),p.15*
13 Concerning the use of the term western, the essential 
basis of the dichotomy in what generally are thought of 
as colonial relationships often enough has been traced
to the colour factor (see, e.g., John Gange, »The 
Colonial Question in Some British and American Overseas 
Possessions* in World Polit ics . Vol. I l l  (1950-1), No.1 
(Oct., 1950), pp.132-3)• This allows an easy distinction 
between white western and coloured colonial generally 
characteristic of at least the questions dealt with in 
this work. There are what might be called intra-group 
exceptions (Japan-Pacific Islands, Denmark-Greenland, 
United Kingdom-Gibraltar), which will be considered only 
as they have arisen in forms relevant to the major 
Afro-Asian-Oceanic questions involving western Powers.
6authority or, to use the French—derived expression,
1 Atin the process of decolonisation.
The decolonisation process has affected Australia 
in two principal ways. In the first place, the process 
has had a marked effect on international politics at 
large. The number of newly emergent states, their 
actual or potential power, their vigorous international 
activity and their often ambivalent position in the 
general East—West conflict, as well as the problems posed 
by their own internal difficulties, have complicated 
immensely the diplomacy of the older states, and not 
least that of Australia. Australia has faced an 
additional problem in that her regional company mainly 
comprises former dependencies, one of the more politically 
lively of them being her immediate neighbour. This 
has made difficult for her the implementation of the 
almost inevitably desirable milieu^ policy of friendly 
relations with Asia, of rapport between a white dependency- 
administering Power and still sensitively nationalistic 
and at times aggressively anti-colonial Powers. In 
the second place, the decolonisation process has touched 
territories which she administers, which are adjacent
14 For the origin of the term, see C.E. Carrington, 
’Decolonization? The Last Stages1 in International Affairs, 
Vol. 38 (1962), No.1 (Jan.), p.29.
13 The usage is that of Wolfers, who distinguishes 
between milieu and possession policy goals (Arnold Wolfers, 
Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore, 1962, pp*73-5)»
7to (indeed, virtually contiguous with) her metropolitan 
territory and which have been highly valued by her in 
security terms, Australia may have been slow to see 
herself as a colonial Power: there has been for an 
Australian some unreality about a reference to ‘four 
colonial powers••.Britain, France, Australia and Belgium*• 
But, until very recently, it will be seen, there has 
been little uncertainty or inconsistency about her 
view of the importance to her of control of Papua and 
New Guinea - the former and closer, a colony or, in 
United Nations charter terms, a non-self-governing 
territory under Australian sovereignty; the other a 
mandated and now a trust territory. The decolonisation 
process has touched both territories as well as Nauru, 
a small, phosphate-producing island adjacent to New 
Guinea and administered by Australia under Anglo- 
Austral ian-New Zealand trusteeship • It has magnified 
Australia* s local administrative problems and affected 
Australia* s relations with other Powers,
The scope of this work is restricted to colonial 
questions in the United Nations context. Not all
16 Christian Science Monitor editorial, Oct, 29 » 19^6
8colonial questions have engaged the United Nations 
(Indo-Chinese independence, for example) and not all 
questions regarded as colonial by the United Nations or 
substantial sections of its membership are, given the 
criteria applied above, relevant to this work.1  ^ And 
there is some division of opinion on the role that has 
been played by international organisation in the 
decolonisation process in areas relevant to this work, 
on the significance of the League of Nations and the 
United Nations as emancipating midwives. The view that 
’the new nations demand admission to the world of history 
and gain it, for the first time in orderly fashion, 
through the United Nations, which has become the gateway 
to participation in global history’^  may rhetorically 
exaggerate the significance of the role of international 
organisation. But the chapters which follow will show 
many ways in which the United Nations has been made to 
play some part in the decolonisation process, in 
accelerating its accomplishment. In Goodwin’s words:
17 More is said of this in the opening section of Chapter 7 below.
18 For a modest view, see Harold Karan Jacobson, ’The 
United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal* 
in International Organization, Vol. XVI (1962), p.55; 
for a somewhat less modest view, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., 
Swords into Ploughshares, New York, 1963» p-370.
19 Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of 
Global History. New York, 1962, p•150, quoted by Robert 
Strausz-Hupe in Orbis, Vol. VI (1962), No.3 (Oct,), p.47^*
9The growth of extra-European nationalism and the 
contraction of Western Europe are, of course, 
long-term phenomena which preceded the creation 
of the United Nations...But... the United Nations 
at least in its early days, has functioned as 
a powerful instrument in speeding up the process 
by which the destinies of non-European peoples 
have passed from European hands. It has served 
as a focus of discontents, a standard by which 
to measure the shortcomings, real or imaginary, 
of the colonial Powers.^
Australia, it will be seen, has been deeply
involved in the working out of colonial questions at the
United Nations, of which she is a foundation member,
by arrangement with which she administers New Guinea
and to which increasingly she has had to refer in her
21administration of Papua. The nature of colonial 
questions, moreover, has been such that they have brought 
into focus conflict always likely to appear between an 
extra-national body and its component states, conflict 
involving jurisdiction, accountability and security.
An examination of the Australian record on colonial 
questions at the United Nations is likely to contribute 
to discussion of Australia* s experience of international 
organ!sation.
20 Geoffrey Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations,
New York, 1957, pp.257-8.
21 Australia* s effecting of an administrative union 
between Papua,and New Guinea, as well as other Powers* 
success in effecting developments in the application of 
Chapter XI of the United Nations charter leading finally 
to the i960 Declaration on Colonialism, have tended to 




It will be seen in chapters which follow that 
the Australian position on colonial questions at the 
United Nations has not been static but has varied 
according to changed external circumstances. When 
the United Nations charter was negotiated at San Francisco 
in 19^5» Australia took up an independent position 
in some respects more radical than that of her 
administering allies. She was in a vanguard in seeking 
to lower traditionally cherished domestic jurisdiction 
barriers and, despite motives to the contrary, to create 
conditions under which decolonisation was likely to 
progress much more rapidly than formerly. It will be 
suggested, however, that her policy in 19^5 should not 
be read in post-19^5 terms. Her policy essentially 
was humane and gradualist: backward peoples should receive 
a fair deal and this was to be guaranteed by international
22 It will be suggested that praise for Australian policy 
in 19^5 bestowed subsequently by anti-colonialists like 
Frazao (Sergio Armando Frazao, international Respon­
sibility for Non-Self-Goveming Peoples* in Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 296 
(195*0 » Nov., p.56) and Benson (Wilfrid Benson, * The International Machinery for Colonial Liberation* in 
Arthur Creech Jones, ed., New Fabian Colonial Essays, 
London, 1959» p.229) probably was inappropriate in that, had the Australian delegation foreseen the attainments of 
the anti-colonial movement, it would almost certainly have 
been a good deal less adventurous.
accountability, but tutelage was a continuing need and 
the sovereignty of administering Powers was inviolate.
It will be seen that, almost immediately after
19^5 > the tide of anti-colonial events in the United
Nations went in directions and forms inimical, in the
judgement of successive Australian governments, to
Australian interests. Faced with the unexpected and
often associated phenomena of the Cold War and militant
anti-colonialism, Australia ceased taking initiatives
and adopted a generally conservative posture in defence
of her own rights as an administering Power and in
defence of allies* rights. With the sole significant
exception of the Indonesian independence issue, Australia
in the late 19^0s and throughout the 1950s resisted the
anti-colonial process in almost all its courses in
23the United Nations. Irrespective of the complexion of
23 This is not necessarily to gainsay the statement by 
the then Australian Minister for External Affairs,
R.G. (now Lord) Casey, in 1957 that 'it is a satisfaction 
to see a colony turned into a nation...* (GAOR, 12th S., 
687th Pl.Mtg., Sept.25, 1957, p.135)* Whatever the various 
Australian attitudes to the attainment of independence by 
various states, it will be argued here only that the 
particular courses taken by supporters of decolonisation 
in the United Nations roused, for one reason or another, 
Australian opposition. It is relevant to the man and 
his times that Casey went on to cite two Commonwealth 
examples (Ghana and Malaya) and mourned 'a nation 
turned into a colony, like Hungary'.
12
pk
parties in power in Canberra, Australian delegations 
in this period held rigidly to the le t te r  of the charter 
in opposition to members concerned to spur on the 
decolonisation process with political or emotional 
argument. The sort of attitude expressed by U Thant 
at the height of the West Irian dispute, when he said 
that * the political and emotional aspects of the problem 
were more significant than a ll the o th e r s . . . ' ,2  ^ in 
general was anathema to Australian delegations.
The degree and diplomatic price of Australian 
intransigence is  well illustrated  by an event occurring 
at the end of the period and just before a marked switch 
in Australian policy. This was the adoption by the 
United Nations General Assembly on December 14, i 9 6 0 ,
of a resolution entitled ‘Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'•
24 Some observers have sought to distinguish between
Australian policy under the Labor Government and policy 
under i t s  post-1949, non-Labor successors: for example,
Jacobson (op.c i t . » p.43) and Sady (Emil J. Sady, The 
United Nations and Dependent Peoples, Washington, 1957, 
p . 6 6 ) . I t  wi l lbeseen  in la te r  chapters of this work 
that such a distinction is  scarcely valid.
25 GAOR, 12th S., 1st Ctee., 909th Mtg., Nov. 25,
1957, p .2 2 6 .
13
Mooted originally during that Assembly session by the
Soviet Union but adopted in the form of a resolution
sponsored by forty-three Afro-Asian members, the
declaration proclaimed ’the necessity of bringing
to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its
forms and manifestations’. Its operative paragraphs
included the provision that ’immediate steps shall be
taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories or
all other territories which have not yet attained
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of
these territories, without any conditions or
r e s e r v a t i o n s ^  This resolution, which placed a seal
on a number of processes at work in the United Nations
over the previous fifteen years and marked a final effort
to hasten the disappearance of western colonialism, was
adopted with the affirmative votes of eighty-nine 
27members. They included formerly or currently 
dependency-administering Powers (Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand); other western states (Sweden, 
Canada, Ireland, Norway, Austria); Commonwealth states 
(Ceylon, Malaya, Ghana, India, Pakistan); all the Asian
26 GAOR, 13th S., Annexes, Vol.2, Ag.It.87, p.8.
27 GAOR, 15th S., 947th Pl.Mtg., Dec.14, 1960, pp.1273-2*.
and all the non-western African members; all the communist
members; and, with one exception, the Latin American 
28members. No member voted against the draft, but
nine states abstained from voting - a response which,
in the Assembly at least, usually may be taken as a
2 9’diminutive negative’. These abstaining states
comprised; the Dominican Republic, a small Caribbean
30state of negligible stature; Portugal, perhaps the most 
obtuse of the colonial Powers; Spain, the nature of 
whose government had in former years been described as 
a potential menace to international peace by Australia, 
which had played a leading part in effecting its censure 
by the United Nations; South Africa, the only member 
fully to support Portugal in the United Nations and a 
state whose internal racial policies and some external 
policies had for some time appalled most members;
28 Undeniably western in many senses, Latin America in 
this work will be allowed a separate, non-western identity.
29 Thomas B. Millar, ’The Commonwealth and the United 
Nations' in International Organization, Vol. 16 (1962), 
P.745. *
30 This was a year before the assassination of its 
president, Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo.
31 For a speech by the then Australian Minister for 
External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt, see SCOR, 1st Yr., 1st 
Ser., No. 2, 44th Mtg., June 6, 1946, pp.312-21.
15
France, which recently had lost a constitution because of
her inability for a time to find an answer to her Algerian
colonial question; Belgium, a state whose reputation had
been jeopardised by her answer to her Congo colonial
32question; a probably reluctant United States; and.
Britain and Australia.
Australia took up a position hostile to that of 
many United Nations members in the 1940 s and 1950s because
this seemed best designed to serve her interests, or at
least some of them. She was apparently prepared to risk
alienating Afro-Asian opinion in the causes of retention
of control of Papua and New Guinea and, to a less extent,
33western solidarity. Her role tended to be that of a
strong defender of national interest boundaries against
34international encroachments.
32 For the view that the United States abstained in
response to British pressure, see N ew Y o rk Tim e s, Dec.15» 
i9 6 0 , Manchester Guardian, Dec.23, 19^0, and the testimony
of Senator Wayne Morse, a member of the United States 
delegation, cited in David W. Wainhouse, Remnant s of 
Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism,
New Yo rk, 19 6h , p .11.
33 Only in the case of Indonesian independence did an 
Australian government in this period see support for an 
anti-colonial cause as being in the best national interest, 
outweighing Papua-New Guinea considerations and the 
benefits of solidarity with her western friends.
34 Australia was not utterly consistent in this. Thus, 
Evatt took a permissive view of domestic jurisdiction in 
relation to Spain, but not in relation to South Africa.
His non-Labor successors took a permissive view in relation 
to communist countries (Hungary, for example) but not in 
relation to others (France, for example).
1 6
I t  i s  not seen as a purpose of this work to draw
ethical conclusions about the rightness or wrongness of
Australia’s ac t iv i t ie s  or those of anti-colonial Powers,
any more than about colonialism as such. I t  i s  taken for
granted that for the most part in the United Nations
’a l l  Members follow fa i th fu l ly . . . the code of power 
35p o l i t i c s . . .* ;  i t  is  assumed that states formulate and 
seek to further what they regard as the ir  i n t e r e s t s . '0 
"Whatever one’s views of the adequacy of their reasoning, 
Australian governments for many years, i t  will be shown, 
equated control of Papua and New Guinea with the pre­
servation of Australia’s metropolitan te r r i to r ia l  security. 
This, and other considerations (an inherited tendency to 
see constitutional issues in s ta t ic  terms, identity of 
interest with friendly states facing similar d if f icu l t ie s ,  
individual pe rsona l i t ies) , led Australia to take up a 
conservative position; given the New Guinea premise i t  was 
scarcely possible for Australia to feel a ’ sense of d is­
interested detachment which makes i t  possible for Canada to
37
follow a policy of judging individual cases on their  merits’ .
35 Bin Cheng, ’International Law in the United Nations’ 
in Year Book of World A ffa irs , Vol.8 ( 195*0» p.195*
3 6  The par t icu lar  Australian interest here, that of 
t e r r i to r i a l  defence and security, was rather a special 
in terest:  what P i t t  called the f i r s t  law of nature for any 
sovereign state (Schwarzenberger, op . c i t . , p. 1*4-9) •
37 F.H. Soward and Edgar Mclnnis, Canada and the United 
Nations, New York, 1 9 5 6 ,  p . 2 0 7 •
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I f ,  during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, 
Australia generally opposed the increasingly successful 
efforts of anti-colonial Powers to effect United Nations 
attempts at interference in the affairs of members' 
dependencies, she changed her policy quite dramatically 
from 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 . At times explicitly rejecting legal 
argument, Australia not only tended now to accept 
extensive United Nations interference, but actually 
supported by word and vote the anti-colonial majority. 
There had developed what has been seen as an 'an ti­
colonial consensus' in the General Assembly, and 
continuing intransigence would have taken Australia 
into the diplomatically hazardous company of South Africa 
and Portugal.^8 The conservative cause of the surviving 
administering Powers by then was manifestly lost and 
with i t ,  apparently, Australian hopes for indefinite 
authority in Papua-New Guinea.
The chapters which follow examine the Australian 
recordchronologically but under subject headings. There 
is  f i r s t  a chapter on the development of Australian 
policy on the colonial question during World War II
38 See Edward T. Rowe, 'The Emerging Anti-Colonial 
Consensus in the United Nations' in Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. VIII (1964), No. 3 (Sept.), p.209sq.
18
and the policy of the Australian delegation at the 
San Francisco conference in 1945. This is  followed by 
a brief indication of the three main avenues taken 
in the United Nations by promoters of decolonisation.
Two of them - extension of the scope of Chapter XX 
of the charter (non-self-governing territo ries) and 
contentious application of Chapters XXI and XIII 
(trusteeship) - are then dealt with in pre- and 
post-1949 periods. This serves to break up otherwise 
excessively long sections and to allow comparison 
between the record of the Australian Labor Government, 
which was defeated in late 1949» and that of i t s  
Liberal-Country Party coalition successors. The third 
avenue - the raising of colonial questions as political 
questions involving alleged threats to peace - is  
broken up into appropriate geographical divisions. 
Concluding chapters examine some pertinent aspects of 
the Australian recordi dependence on legal considerations; 
diplomatic consequences of her position; the Papua- 
New Guinea orientation of her policies.
The source material available for almost 
contemporary diplomatic history is  restricted to a 
limited range of public documents. However, i t  is 
hoped that sufficient has been gathered from these
19
sources to allow not only an adequate description of the 
Australian record but also reasonably convincing 
explanations of its principal features.
NOTE ON REFERENCES
The records of various United Nations bodies’ 
deliberations often comprise condensed versions of 
delegates’ speeches re-phrased to appear in the third 
person. For this reason, many quotations in the body 
of this work include verbs and participles in the past 
tense. A statement by a delegate that ’my government 
cannot accept this draft because it goes beyond the 
provisions of the charter’ appears in the record and 
must be quoted as 'his government could not accept this 
draft because it went beyond the provisions of the 
charter’. In some instances, of course, the record 
comprises a verbatim account of what was said and 
quotations from it consequently read in the present 
tense and first person.
C H A P T E R  1
A U S T R A L I A
A N D  T H E
C H A R T E  R
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I .
International organisation on a large scale,
and the emergence of colonial questions from an utterly
domestic to, at least in some cases, an international
context, largely were products of World War I .  The
desire for an organisational and peaceful resolution of
international conflict, rather than haphazard military
resolution, took concrete form in the League of Nations.
The desire in some quarters to avoid the stigma
associated with terr i to r ia l  plunder and to reduce the
area of potential conflict over colonial possessions
had effect in the submission of terri tories detached
from the vanquished Powers to the League’s mandates
system. This involved only sixteen terr i to ries ,  a small
proportion of the world’s dependencies, and, of the
sixteen, only five (the ’A’ mandates) were seen
explicitly as proceeding towards independence when,
as Article 22 of the Covenant put i t ,  ’they are able
to stand alone’ ; for the other eleven terr i tories
under ’B’ and ’C’ mandates, the League Covenant at
1
best only implied ultimate self-determination.
1 Of the five 'A' mandates, only Iraq achieved 
independence in time to enjoy League membership. Syria 
and Lebanon achieved full national status in 1944 and 
Jordan in 1946. Palestine’s problems took longer to solve. 
For a view of the self—determination goal, see H. Duncan 
Hall, Mandates. Dependencies and Trusteeship, London,
1948 ,  p . 9 4 .
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Outside the mandates system, a number of dependent 
territories moved slowly towards independence in variously 
antagonistic relationships with their metropolitan 
Powers; others seemed indefinitely becalmed in subject 
status.
Prior to World War IX, Australia was an apparently
secure colonial Power in Papua, which she inherited from
Britain in 1906, and which she administered in a
relatively humane but financially modest way. She
2was a mandatory Power in contiguous New Guinea and 
3adjacent Nauru as a result of her participation in
2 Terms are easily confused here. The island of New 
Guinea has since the late 19th century comprised three 
territories* a western half formerly administered by the 
Netherlands and, since 1963» by Indonesia (and known 
variously as Dutch New Guinea, West New Guinea and now 
West Irian or Irian Barat); a south-eastern quarter 
annexed by Britain in 1884 and known as British New 
Guinea until it passed to Australia in 1906 and became 
Papua; and a north-eastern quarter annexed by Germany in 
1884 and, with hundreds of off-shore islands, awarded to 
Australia as a mandate in 1920 (and known first as German 
New Guinea, then as the Mandated Territory of New Guinea 
or, colloquially, as Australian New Guinea, and now as 
the Trust Territory of New Guinea). In this work, the 
term New Guinea will refer to the whole island or, if 
the context allows adequate clarity, the Territory of 
New Guinea, that is, the north-eastern quarter.
3 Australia administered Nauru under a mandate awarded 
jointly to Australia, Britain and New Zealand.
2 3
World War I. In i t ia l ly  as Britain's agent, she took 
over these terri tories by force of arms from Germany 
in 1914. Subsequently, she was a foundation member of 
the League and, unable i  the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919 to negotiate the right to annex the terr i tories,  
she obtained the right to administer them under the 
very permissive terms of *C * mandates supervised by 
the League. During the inter-war years, Australia was a 
conscientious, i f  reserved, member of the League and a 
conscientious, i f  conservative, interpreter of her
4
mandates. Her motives for seeking control of Papua
and New Guinea had been based on terr i to ria l  security
5
postulates; the comforting fact of possession, the
4 The Australian Labor Party, the Opposition party in 
Australia's federal parliament for most of the inter­
war period, tended to isolationism and an early dis­
enchantment with the League (see H.Wolfsohn, 'Foreign 
Policy' in Alan Davies and Geoffrey Serie, eds., Policies 
for Progress, Melbourne, 1954, pp.163-4). The parties 
which formed most of the governments of the time paid lip 
service to the League ideal but were sceptical of i t s  
value as a security instrument and, anyway, preferred to 
see Australia's external relations principally in terms 
of political and emotional links with Britain. On 
Australia's interpretation of her mandates, see W.J. 
Hudson, 'Australia's Experience as a Mandatory Power'
in Australian Outlook, Vol. 19 ( 1 9 6 5 ) » No. 1 (April) , 
pp.35-46.
5 The security aspect of Australia's interest in her 
dependencies is discussed in detail in Chapter 10 below.
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distraction of domestic economic problems and a widely-held 
belief in the extreme backwardness of the territories’ 
indigenous inhabitants meant that Australia paid them 
little attention. Public, or at least parliamentary, 
interest was roused only by occasional allegations of 
brutal treatment of the indigenes and fear of German 
pressure to have the mandated territory returned to her.
The limited activities of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission in supervising Australia’s observance of the 
New Guinea and Nauru mandates caused her little 
embarrassment•
It is not proposed here to repeat familiar 
discussions of the effects of World War II on colonialism, 
on attitudes about its propriety and future, but simply 
to stress that, until World War II, there was, outside 
the very limited mandates context, no forceful, 
international legitimisation of anything even approaching 
hostility to the colonial idea. Yet, with the signing 
of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco in 1945, 
there was achieved a considerable degree of such 
1egitimisation. And, only a decade later, it was
observed:
25
• ••it has come to be widely assumed that, even 
if accompanied by a substantial measure of home rule, colonial status is an interim 
political arrangement which must necessarily 
be replaced by 'independence*, that is, the 
absence of any formally legitimate element 
of external control,
The point which now may be seen as having led on to the 
United Nations charter, to the beginning of the hastened 
end of colonialism, was the signing of the Atlantic 
Charter in 19^1« This statement of Allied Powers’ 
ideals declared in the words of its third clause 
that 'they respect the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of governirmt under which they will live'. Just 
as Smuts during World War X helped give currency to 
the mandates idea which was then applied to the defeated 
Powers' colonial areas instead of to the European 
societies he had had in mind, so at least one of the 
Atlantic Charter's sponsors, Churchill, had in mind 
primarily the right to self-determination of European 
and not colonial peoples* ' Whatever the intentions of its 
sponsors, however, the Atlantic Charter became a slogan,
6 Kenneth Robinson, 'Alternatives to Independence' 
in Political Studies, Vol. XV (1956), No* 3* p*225«
7 For a discussion of the differing views of Churchill 
and Roosevelt, see Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E* 
Ridinger, 'The Anti-colonial Policies of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt'„in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 70 
(1955)i No. 1 (March), pp.1-8.
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a term of reference for the development and justification
of anti-colonial attitudes.
A statement by the then Australian Minister for
External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt, in September, 19^2,
explaining the Labor Government's view of the application
in the Pacific area of the previous year* s Atlantic
Charter and its self-determination clause, comprised
the Government's, and Evatt*s, first expression of policy
8on colonialism. Evatt applied the clause in an immediate
9way to China and India.' Of other, more truly dependent 
territories, he said that the age of unfair exploitation 
had now passed, that the United Nations must be the agent 
in effecting changes in the government or administration 
of peoples, and that 'we must found future Pacific policy 
on the doctrine of trusteeship for the benefit of all 
Pacific peoples'. He did not explain what this 'doctrine
8 At this time, the A.L.P.'s platform had nothing to say 
about colonialism. Only in 19^8 was a paragraph inserted 
to refer in mild terms to the need to assist economic 
and political development in the Pacific area (see 
Australian Labor Party Federal Platform and Objective -
as amended by federal conference, Canberra, September, 19^8 
Brisbane, 19^8, p.7)*
9 Of the former, Evatt said 'it is elementary that the
future development of the people of China will no longer 
be obstructed by such restrictions on their self-respect 
and their right of self-government as are involved in the 
almost exploded doctrine of extra-territoriality'. Of 
the latter: 'we look forward to the people of India
developing into a truly self-governing nation* (CPD,
Vol. 172, p•82 - Sept. 3f 19^2).
10 Ibid.
2 7
of trusteeship’ meant to him until, in a speech in New
York in the following April (19^3)» he referred to two
sorts of obligation owed by a trustee Power: an
obligation to world society and an obligation to native
peoples. These would include within their ambit a
political responsibility to educate colonial peoples
’along the road to self-government*, The significant
content of his policy to this point comprised an apparent
application of trusteeship to a ll territo ries , an
assumption that self-government was the ultimate end
for a ll  dependencies and a rejection, made clear in the
New York speech and in the previous year*s Canberra
statement, of the widely-held pre-war belief (strongly
maintained by Australian governments in their administration
of New Guinea) in colonial economic self-sufficiency.
Of the two sorts of obligation seen by Evatt
in 1 9 ^3 * he continued to stress that towards indigenous
peoples. Thus, la te r  in 19*0» he referred to colonial
1 2peoples and 'the ir  steady advancement•• .p o litica lly *,
He did so again in a press statement issued on January 21,
19*+*+» the day of the signing of the Australian-New Zealand 
1 3Agreement, And, when he reported to parliament on the
11 Current Notes, Vol. 14, pp.147-8 (May, 19*+3)«
12 CPD, Vol. 176, p.574 (Oct. 14, 19^3).
13 Current Notes, Vol. 15» p*25 (Jan. , 19***+)»
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colonial aspect of the agreement, he spoke of 'assistance
to island peoples in their difficult task of learning
14to handle theirown affairs'• He said:
We reached agreement that, in applying the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific, 
the doctrine of 'trusteeship' must be fully 
accepted in regard to all colonial territories, 
and that the nain purpose of the trust is the 
welfare of the native peoples and their social, 
economic and political development.
In unambiguous language, he went on to approve 'the
increasing participation of natives in administration
with a view to their ultimate attainment of the right
1 5of self-government'.
To this point, nothing further had been said about 
the obligation to the world community of Powers 
administering dependencies. In 1945, however, the 
Australian Department of External Affairs reported on 
policy formulated at conferences with New Zealand 
Government representatives in Canberra in January, 1944, 
and at Wellington in the October and November of that year, 
quoting a statement of the New Zealand Prime Minister,
Mr Peter Fraser, as expressing Australian policy:
14 CPD, Vol. 177, p.74 (Feb.10, 1944).
15 Ibid., pp.77-8.
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We feel that there should be set up as part of the 
general International Organization an inter­
national body analogous to the Permanent Mandates 
Commission, to which colonial Powers should 
undertake to make reports on the administration 
of their colonial territories. This body should be 
empowered to visit dependent territories, and to 
publish reports of its deliberations. We believe 
that this is a natural implication of the spirit 
of trusteeship’ for dependent peoples, and, for 
our part, we are willing to subscribe to a 
general undertaking to that effect as regards 
both Colonies and Mandated Territories.
As the 19^5 San Francisco conference drew near,
Australia, then, was adopting a three-pronged policy on
colonialism, each prong being somewhat radical:
substantial metropolitan government investment in
dependencies; international accountability in a form
a little more rigorous than that known under the League’s
mandates system and (very radical, this) on a universal
basis; and ultimate self-government for dependencies.
However, it would be erroneous to exaggerate the
significance of this last aspect cr to see policy on
colonialism separate from other foreign policy goals of
the Labor Government of the day. The policy on colonialism
was in part, perhaps, a result of the ’socialist distrust
17of European imperialism* and, in part at least, a 
’conscious application of the important principles of
16 Current Notes, Vol. 16, pp.67-8 (April, 19^5)»
17 Norman Harper and David Sissons, Australia and the 
United Nations, New York, 1959» P*72.
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18Australian Social Democracy*. A great deal of its
exposition was due to Evatt and reflected the * dominant
1 9influence exerted by a personality* who, it would seem, 
combined an appreciation of the ruder realities of power 
and a humanitarian impulse to further the interests of 
the under-privileged, whether the unemployed of nations 
or the unenfranchised of nations* dependencies. Nevertheless, 
it should be stiessed that policy on colonialism was inter­
woven with policy on security,
Evatt strongly supported regionalism as a basis
for post-war security arrangements, not, as the American
20State Department professed to fear, to the detriment
of a universal security system, but as an integral part 
21of it. For Australia, this necessarily involved
18 Wolfsohn, op.cit., p.l66.
19 Lloyd Ross, * Some Factors in the Development of Labor*s 
Foreign Policies’ in Australian Outlook, Vol. 3 0  949),No. 1 (March), p.43* On Evatt*s freedom from interference, 
see L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, Melbourne, 19^3» p.287, and 
Chifley*s statement in CPD, Vol. 182, p.2234 (May 30, 1945)«
20 See the view of the United States Secretary of State 
(Cordell Hull) on the Austrailan-New Zealand Agreement 
and a subsequent joint call for a regional conference in 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1944, Vol. Ill, Washington, 1965, p.177.
21 See Evatt*s reply to Hull (ibid., p.186).
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regional arrangements with New Zealand and the United
States and with colonial Powers, the survival of* whose
regimes was assumed, even welcomed. In 1943, indeed,
Evatt felt it necessary to balance his statements urging
recognition of a universally applicable trusteeship
principle with an assurance that ' of course we have no
desire...of prejudicing the sovereignty of the Netherlands,
22France and Portugal' as colonial Powers in the Pacific.
In a special way, Evatt supported Portuguese and French
23sovereignty in the area, and referred in glowing terms
2kto the Dutch East Indies Government. The connection 
between the two ideals, progress of indigenes towards self- 
government and the restitution of colonial regimes, almost
22 Published initially in a Daily Telegraph article, but 
cited in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, Sydney, 
19^5, p.132.
23 The Portuguese aspect emerged the following year, when 
Evatt declared Australian support for the return of Timor 
to Portugal in a way suggesting that Australia had little 
choice, a curiosity of expression unexplained until almost 
two years later when he announced that Portugal in 1 9^3 
had agreed to allow Britain to establish a base in the 
Azores provided Churchill could obtain an Australian 
assurance that she would not attempt after the war to 
interfere with Portuguese sovereignty in Timor. Evatt 
refused to say how long he envisaged the agreement remaining 
operative (CPD, Vol. 186, pp.625-6 - March 26, 1946).
Of the French, Evatt said that 'Australia...is publicly 
pledged to do its utmost to maintain the sovereignty of 
France in its present South Pacific possessions' (Foreign 
Relations cf the United States, 1944, Vol. Ill, as above, 
p.187).
24 CPD, Vol. 179, p.235 (July 19, 19^*0*
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certainly was indicated, by the report of a United States
diplomat in Canberra to the Department of State in
Washington on the Australian-New Zealand Agreement and,
in particular, on clauses 28-31 of the Agreement:
The implications of this section of the Agreement 
cover also the natives of territories outside 
Anzac jurisdiction and we have been told that 
the reason for concern of welfare of natives 
outside their jurisdiction is that the improve­
ment of welfare of natives everywhere in the 
Pacific would render them ’fitter components*
O  K.in the outer defense bastions.
Some of the concepts used by Evatt were ’of the
times themselves* rather than part of a uniquely
Australian c o n t r i b u t i o n . W r i t i n g  of the regionalism
concept, one observer declared in 1943 that ’it is like
a great scientific discovery, which occurs to many men
simultaneously... the •regional grouping” of particular
colonies. . .will, possibly with ’’partnership” , replace
’’trusteeship” as the stock colonial cliche in the House
27of Commons or in letters to the ’’Times” ’ .
25 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. 
Ill, as above, p .176. It is interesting to note that, 
writing before the recent publication of these documents 
in the United States, Wolfsohn saw Evatt's assertion of 
Australia's regional obligations as ’based upon the 
recognition that the social advancement of colonial 
peoples in the region was a vital factor in Australia’s 
future security’ (Wolfsohn, op . c11 ., p.165)•
26 K.H. Bailey, ‘Dependent Areas of the Pacific: An 
Australian View* in Foreign Affairs, Vol.24 (1946),
No.3 (April), p.511»
27 Henry Swanzy, ’Colonial Groups’ in Political 
Quarterly, Vol.XIV ( 1 9^ 3)? No. 3 (July-Sept. ), p • 27 6.
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However, even if Evatt’s terms were not notably original,
it remains that he developed them and sought to give them
a degree of concrete application to the point where they
became the cause of considerable Anglo-Australian conflict
28before and during the San Francisco conference,
XI.
In an official statement in February, 1940, the 
British Government accepted the notion of trusteeship and
29abandoned the concept of colonial economic self-sufficiency; 
this was two years before Evatt announced similar policies 
on Australia’s behalf. Inter-colonial co-operation on a 
regional basis was blessed by the British Government in 
1942, and constantly thereafter. But expressions of 
British intent in terms of the practical implications of 
trusteeship did not progress far.
28 A less public conflict also developed with the United 
States, as will be seen below.
29 See Round Table, Vol. 35, pp.24-5. For a discussion 
of the origins of the concepts of trusteeship and account­
ability, see Charmian Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship 
System of the United Nations, London, 1956, pp.5-17*
30 See, e.g., Current Notes, Vol. 14, p.24l (No. 7 of 1943)» 
and the report of the then Australian Prime Minister,
Mr John Curtin, on attitudes to regionalism at the 1944 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in CPI), Vol. 179» 
p.4o (July 17» 1944). (The then Australian federal 
opposition parties were hostile to regionalism and especially 
to the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, which Mr Harold Holt, 
for example, saw as ’independent local action weakening 
to the Empire*.)
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Evatt saw in trusteeship the seeds of self-govern­
ment and, by implication, independence; in 1942, 
succeeding British Colonial Secretaries, Cranborne and
Stanley, explicitly disowned independence for British 
31dependencies. At about the same time, the term 
’trusteeship’ tended to be discarded in favour of ’partner­
ship' in British statements, and Lord Hailey, who largely 
was responsible for sponsorship of the latter, certainly 
in 1942 advocated a Pacific council which would, among 
other things, be 'charged with the periodic review of the
progress made in the promotion of self-governing institutions
32in the dependencies...'. But, such was the vaguness of his
31 Current Notes, Vol.l4, pp.17-18 (No.1 of 1943)*
32 E d . anon., War and Peace in the Pacific (A Preliminary 
Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperation
of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East,
Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December, 1942), New York, 1943» 
p p .13-14. It has been argued (in R.N. Chowdhuri, 
International Mandates ana Trusteeship Systems, The Hague, 
1955» p .29) that Hailey' s success in floating the notion 
of partnership was such that the new concept, endorsed 
by Stanley, somehow developed into the idea of regional 
collaboration, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission 
being apparently seen as an effect. In fact, on 
Chowdhuri's own evidence, the Commission was established 
two months before Hailey's 'partnership speech' and more 
than a year before Stanley's endorsement. The link 
between metropolitan-dependency relationships and 
metropolitan-metropolitan relationships involved in 
regional co-operation is, anyway, difficult to see.
35
subsequent rhetoric at an Institute of Pacific Relations 
conference that the United States delegation* s reaction 
was to wonder how seriously Britain took the Atlantic 
Charter, and an Australian delegate’s reaction was to ask 
the British Government to state clearly just where it 
stood.
On the question of external accountability, too, 
British policy lagged behind that of Australia. At an 
Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Hot Springs 
in the United States early in 1945» an Australian delegate 
proclaimed his country*s acceptance of * the doctrine of
34accountability in respect of all dependent territories*. 
But it was noted that year that ’during the last two 
years...a reactionary trend has been manifest in the 
declarations of British statesmen about colonies*
33 Hailey spoke of Britain’s ’new outlook', about the 
seniority and juniority of partners in 'a situation which 
must adjust itself as the experience and capacity of the 
junior partner grows’, about a ’much more dynamic view
of our responsibilities', about-'high purpose' and 'high 
hopes’, about the need not to forget realities ’while we 
keep our eyes on the heights* (War and Peace in the Pacific, 
as above, pp.12, 15)* An Australian delegate at this
semi-official conference said: 'British opinion has to be
clarified, emphasized, discussed and made clear again and 
again, preferably by Winston Churchill himself’ (ibid., 
p.123).
34 Ed., anon., Security in the Pacific (A Preliminary 
Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Hot Springs, Virginia, January, 19^5)» New York, 
1945» p.12. The Australian delegate was K.H. Bailey.
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The movement is towards rejecting any obligation of
accounting to an international authority for the
administration of our colonies; and in place of it
establishing regional councils for consultation and
3 5co-operation.••*• It was thought that Britain might go 
further and seek the abolition even of the limited mandates 
area of accountability. The possibility seemed to be mooted 
in a speech made by Stanley in New York in January, 1945» 
when he appeared to assert the desirability of regional 
co-operative organisation, not only for colonial areas 
but also for what had been mandated territories. As
35 Norman Bentwich, rColonies and International
” Accountability” » in Political Quarterly, Vol. XVI (19^5)» 
No. 3 (July-September} , p• 2 5 7 * See also A Chatham House 
Study Group, The Pattern, of Pacific Seuurity, London, 1946, 
p.4o. It has been suggested to the writer that Evatt, 
too, saw a regional council as a malleable local alter­
native to an international authority where the determination 
of Papua-New Guinea questions would, perhaps, be less 
within Australian control, but there seems to be no 
evidence sufficient to support the suggestion.
36 An informed London observer wrote that, while the
mandates system had not gone far enough and the new 
regionalism idea had much to recommend it, ‘there is no 
good reason for jettisoning the first in favour of the 
second, as there now seems a tendency to do in influential 
British circles1 (Rita Hinden, in New Statesman and Nation, 
April 21, 1945).
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37Bailey' wrote later, ’many people inferred that, so far 
from making general the system of accountability 
established under the League Covenant, the British
o QGovernment intended to propose its total abolition*.J
Of a meeting of British Commonwealth delegations 
held in London as an immediate preliminary to the San 
Francisco conference, little is known of the discussion of 
colonial questions except that common ground seems to 
have been difficult to find. Discussion seems to have 
been centred on three topics: the scope of the discussion 
desired at San Francisco; how a mandates system should be 
applied; how the trusteeship concept should be applied.
On the first, Britain apparently wanted discussion at 
San Francisco limited to general principles, while the 
Australian and New Zealand delegations argued that,
37 K.H. (since Sir Kenneth) Bailey, originally an 
academic lawyer, was a member of the Australian delegation 
at the San Francisco conference in 1945* Appointed 
Solicitor-General in 1946, he became Australian High 
Commissioner to Canada in 1964.
38 Bailey, op.cit., p.498.
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given the interest shown in the colonial question by 
United States leaders, this would not be possible.^
On the second, it seems that agreement was reached on at 
least the first two of the three Yalta categories, 
that is, that territories under League mandate and 
territories detached from World War XI enemies might be
39 For a time United States views, official
and unofficial, on colonialism tended towards extreme 
radicalism. In 19^ +3» For example, the State Department 
proposed the setting of independence target dates for 
colonies (Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-19^5» 
Department of State Publication 3580, 1950, pp.6o6-7» quoted 
by Richard J. Kozicki, ’The United Nations and Colonialism* 
in Robert Strausz-Hupe and Harry W. Hazard, eds., The Idea 
of Colonialism, London, 1958, p.386). A number of 
academics, journalists and politicians showed a similar hostility to the indefinite survival of colonialism 
(see Chowdhuri, op.cit., pp.27-9» For a brief account of 
the personalities involved and the British reactionto 
their views)• As the San Francisco conference drew 
near, however, service departments in Washington came 
into conflict with the radicalism of the State Department; the former stressed the American strategic interest in 
retaining effective control of Pacific areas (see, e.g., 
Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, New York,
1951» p.33). For a treatment of the United States 
interest, see especially Ernst B. Haas, ’The Attempt to 
Terminate Colonialism; Acceptance of the United Nations 
Trusteeship System’ in International Organization,
Vol• VII (1953), pp.5-10.
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submitted to an international system of* accountability, 
Major disagreement evidently occurred on the third, 
Australia’s delegation argued that metropolitan states
40 The Big Three decided at Yalta in February, 19^5» 
that a trusteeship system might apply to old League 
mandates, to dependencies of defeated World War II Powers, 
and to territories voluntarily submitted (it seems, too, 
that Roosevelt had trusteeship in mind for French Indo- 
China, and that Roosevelt and Stalin had trusteeship in 
mind for Korea - see New York Times, March 17» 1955)*
Forde (F.M. Forde, Deputy Prime Minister and formally head 
of the Australian delegation) and Evatt claimed that a few 
months before the London meeting Britain had circulated 
’certain proposals’ among the Dominions and that these 
had been such as to suggest a 'hard area of agreement’ 
between Britain and Australia, In London, however, 
they found that Britain had in the meantime discussed 
trusteeship with the Soviet Union and the United States 
and had so changed her position that 'it became necessary,,, 
to discuss afresh the policy to be followed', Evatt and 
Forde protested that 'no decision on this matter should 
be carried into effect without the Dominions having been 
consulted'; see Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, United Nations Conference on International 
Organization Held at San Francisco, U,S.A,, from 25th 
April to 26th June, 19^3* Report of the Australian Delegates, 
The Right Honourable F.M, Forde, M.P., (Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for the Army , and The Right 
Honourable H.V. Evatt, K,C,, M.P, (Attorney-General and 
Minister for External Affairs), Canberra, 19^5» P * 10 
(in CPPj 1945-6, Vol. Ill, and hereafter referred to as 
the Forde-Evatt Report)• The press at the time also 
reported that Britain's 'revelation that trusteeships 
were discussed at the Crimea Conference is understood 
to have come as a surprise to the Australian Government' 
(Australian Associated Press in Sydney Morning Herald,
April 10, 19^5)*
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had a duty to look to the welfare of native peoples and, 
further, that this duty ’should be accompanied by an 
obligation to submit reports regularly to an expert and 
competent advisory body’. Any other course would be ’a 
derogation of the principle of the Atlantic Charter’.
The conference decided that Britain and the Dominions 
could not agree and were free to make what proposals they
h 1wished at San Francisco.
III.
Renewed emphasis on the mandates concept at Yalta 
and London seemed to complicate the issue for Australia, 
which had been postulating something more rigorous and 
universal than the old League mandates system or the Yalta 
proposals: more rigorous than the former and more
certainly universal than the latter. The San Francisco 
conference opened on April 25» 19^5» but it was not until
May 10 that the Australian position vis-a-vis that of other
4l Forde-Evatt Report, as above, p.10. A statement that 
Britain refused at this meeting to allow for the 
application even of a trusteeship principle to her 
dependencies and that Australia expressed dissatisfaction is 
contained in M.C. Setalvad, 'India and the United Nations' 
in India Quarterly, Vol. VI (l950), No. 2 (April-June), 
pp.108-9^ An account, not altogether documented, may 
also be found in Lalita Prasad Singh, Policies of the 
Commonwealth Countries in the United Nations Towards 
Problems Relating to Political Development of Trust 
Territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories (19^5-59)» 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New Delhi, 19^1, pp.17-19»
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interested Powers became clear. In the meantime, Forde 
made a plenary speech in which he accepted the first two 
Yalta categories but rejected the third (voluntary 
submission) in favour of submission of territories by an 
unexplained ’appropriate action* while, outside the 
conference, Evatt began to distinguish between a 
universally applicable trusteeship principle and account­
ability for particular territories to be specified by
44the still unexplained ’appropriate action'; and the 
Australian delegation submitted written proposals which 
still failed adequately to explain 'appropriate action* 
and seemed to reflect only a shadow of Australia* s 
pre-conference policy.
Because the United States, British, Soviet Union 
and Chinese delegates who had met at Dumbarton Oaks in 
the previous August-October to work on preliminary drafts 
as a basis for discussion at San Francisco had ignored 
colonial questions, and because the Big Three’s decision
42 When Evatt addressed Committee II/4.
43 Current Notes, Vol.16, p.102 (May, 1945)»
44 For reports of Australian views before and during
the early days of the conference, see Sydney Morning 
Herald, April 21, May 2 and 5, and Age, April 13 and 
May 5» 1943*
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at Yalta to discuss such questions with the Big Five
(that is, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union,
plus China and France) before the San Francisco conference
45had not been implemented, the San Francisco conference’s
46trusteeship committee had to guide it only a plenary 
instruction to ’prepare and recommend...draft provisions 
on principles and mechanism of a system of international
trusteeship for such dependent territories as may by
47subsequent agreement be placed thereunder’. However,
45 This was evidently due to United States domestic 
conflict between the trusteeship-minded State Department 
and defence interests anxious to maintain United States 
bases of power in the Pacific. Roosevelt's death
and the accession of President Truman delayed final 
approval of the ’strategic areas’ compromise (whereby 
territories designated as such would come under the 
ultimate authority of the Security Council wUere the 
United States could exercise veto rights) by the White 
House until April 18, leaving an insufficient week until 
the conference opened (see Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field 
Haviland, Jr, Organizing for Peace, London, 1954, pp«304- 
5; and James N. Murray, Jr, The United Nations Trusteeship 
System, Urbana, 1957» p p .28-30^.
46 Conference activity was divided first into four 
commissions, the second of which dealt with General Assembly 
questions. These commissions acted virtually as plenary 
bodies, with day-to-day negotiations conducted in 
technical committees of the commissions• In Commission 11, 
there were four such committees, the fourth (officially so 
numbered) dealing with dependent (non-self-governing, as 
the conference jargon soon had it) territories. This was 
known as Committee II/4. See notes by Huntington Gilchrist 
(Commission XI ’ s executive officer) in International. 
Conciliation, No.4l3 (Sept. , 19^ +5) > pp .451 - GO.
47 UNCIO Docs., Vol.10, P.423.
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the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China,
France and Australia, in the absence of Dumbarton Oaks
proposals for possible modification or amendment, each
submitted a draft for a trusteeship chapter for inclusion
48in a United Nations charter.
4qThe Australian draft, submitted on May 5, ' was 
50short, less detailed than the other drafts and less 
clear in its meaning. It uegan with a declaration that 
all United Nations members administering dependencies 
would recognise that ' the main purpose of administration 
is the welfare of the dependent peoples and their 
economic and political development*. This was the extent 
of the recognition given to the Atlantic Charter* s self-
48 The Soviet Union’s contribution comprised amendments to the United States draft.
49 There is some conflict, interesting only in relation to 
subsequent Anglo-Australian haggling for the credit for 
responsibility for the universal trusteeship principle 
declaration, on publication dates. The conference documents 
date the drafts thus; Australia, France, the United States, 
May 3; Britain, May 6; China, May 10; the Soviet Union,
May 11. Gilchrist, quoting the assistance of Eugene Chase, 
Committee II/4* s secretary, agrees that the Australian, 
French and United States drafts were submitted on May 3s
see Huntington Gilchrist, 'Colonial Questions at the San 
Francisco Conference* in American Political Science Review, 
Vol. XXXIX (19^5), No. 3 (Oct.), p.985. A British source, 
however (the Royal Institute of International Affairs' 
Bulletin of International News, Vol. XXIX (19^5)» P*^39)» 
says the British draft, and not the Australian, was 
published on May 3*
30 The phrase 'almost contemptuous brevity' has been 
applied; see J.D. Plant, Australia and Trusteeship at San 
Francisco, 1943» Seminar Paper, Department of International 
Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, Nov.5» 
1963 (typescript), p.14.
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determination clause, which formerly had been so stressed 
by Australia. Accountability would be through the 
submission of reports by administering Powers to an expert 
and advisory body which would keep the United Nations 
informed through the Economic and Social Council. On 
the content of these reports, the Australian draft said 
no more than that they would cover Administration*, 
presumably political as well as other facets. Account­
ability was to apply to territories voluntarily submitted 
or to territories designated by the General Assembly 
after consideration of specially convened conferences of 
administering Powers. This latter course, it now appeared, 
was what had been meant by ‘appropriate action*, but the 
new expression was as ambiguous as the old. Read in one 
way, it suggested use of the Assembly to bring reluctant 
administering members to heel; read in another, it seemed 
to keep the administering members in control; read in 
any way, its effect would depend on majority Assembly 
attitudes and there was no indication of how Australia 
estimated those attitudes. For the rest, League 
mandates and territories detached from World War XX 
Axis Powers were covered in that the Assembly could 
authorise member states to administer territories under 
United Nations mandate, the terms of which must include
45
acceptance of the trusteeship principle and the reporting 
obligation; power bases could be excepted from the 
reporting obligation; and the fortifications ban could 
be removed from the old mandate terms,^
Except that Britain also proposed a declaration of 
the trusteeship principle, the other drafts concentrated 
much more than Australia on the mechanics of a system 
applicable in terms of the Yalta categories, that is to 
such mandated territories, Axis territories and other 
voluntarily submitted territories as might be brought 
within the system. Whereas the Australian draft saw 
accountability almost solely as involving reporting of 
unstated frequency, all the other drafts made reporting 
annual. In addition, the United States allowed for a 
trusteeship council to accept petitions and institute 
investigations, and the Soviet Union, besides, allowed 
for council inspections of trust territories. And, 
while Australia and Britain seemed to have in mind 
something similar to the old Permanent Mandates Commission, 
essentially a receiver, digester and transmitter of 
information, the others sought a council representing
51 UNCIODocs., Vol. 3, pp.548-9
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member states rather than expertise alone and divided
in some way between administering and non-administering
52members•
Evatt explained the Australian draft at length 
to the trusteeship committee on May 10. He said nothing 
of trusteeship machinery beyond what had been conveyed 
in the written submission*, an expert body would receive 
administering Powers* reports on their administrations, 
make recommendations and report itself to the United 
Nations. However, he did make clear what had not been 
clear in the written submission: Australia not only wanted 
a trusteeship principle universally accepted, but also 
wanted a check on its application, a system of account­
ability (even if amounting to no more than reporting 
of vague content and unspecified regularity) universally 
accepted, or imposed if necessary. Given that some 
dependent territories were near self-government, so 
that not all dependencies automatically should come 
within the reporting system, there would, if administering 
states failed voluntarily to submit territories to the 
system, be need for the * appropriate action* referred to
52 It is not proposed here to present an analysis of the 
various drafts, an analysis available in a number of 
secondary works. For the British draft, see UNCIO Docs., 
Vol. 3, pp.609-14; for the United States, pp.607-8; 
for the French, pp.6o4-6; for the Chinese, pp.615-7; 
for the Soviet Union*s, pp.618-9»
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earlier; the Assembly would decide which states should
fall within the system. Evatt was quite clear that the
voluntarism of the third Yalta category was unacceptable;
a universally applicable trusteeship principle had to be
universally applied in fact, and that involved a universally
applied trusteeship system from which no administering
member could be allowed to except itself:
...it has actually been asked...’What power is 
there to ask nations to report...?' Well...it is 
quite easy to answer. It can be made a 
condition of this charter that the system of 
trusteeship to be inaugurated will be applied 
to members of the organization under certain 
conditions to be laid down by the organization... 
Members get certain rights and those members - 
certain obligations are assumed by them - and 
this could easily be one of them.
, ....let the Assembly...state in what territories 
reports should be required, if that territory 
has not already been brought voluntarily under 
the system. What objection can there be to it?
• • •
The good faith of this conference and the United 
Nations would be questioned if we adopted any 
artificial distinction between the needs of the 
people of detached territories, and the needs of 
similar people in other areas.
• • •
._^.we agree with almost every paragraph of that 
/United Kingdom/ proposal, except that we think 
the application of the system of reporting to a 
trusteeship council or similar body should not 
be limited to voluntary action by the sovereign 
state concerned.. .That /United States proposal^ 
is also based on voluntary action...
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I don't feel enthusiastic about a system which 
is purely voluntary in character because it would 
not be a satisfactory thing if this world 
organization created a system of voluntary 
trusteeship and it was later discovered that 
not a single power had put any territory under such a system,^
This brought Australia into open conflict with Britain
which could not accept ’the principle of compulsion,
54which finds a place in the Australian proposal..,*.
Discussion then shifted to a working paper prepared 
by a United States delegate, Mr Harold Stassen - *this so- 
called working paper', as Evatt called it.'*'* Based on the
53 Verbatim Minutes of the Committee on Trusteeship,
Vol• 68 (May5-18), 2nd Mtg. , May 10, Running Numbers
16,17,21,23»24,26 in unedited typescript in English 
(hereafter referred to as Verbatim Minutes)• In view of his 
position later in the controversy on South-West Africa, 
it is important to note that, while Evatt wanted every 
dependency in a trusteeship system of the modest sort 
he had in mind, and argued that the League’s mandated 
territories were no exception, he also argued that mandatory accountability was sufficient for his purpose 
and that a mandatory Power could not be forced to 
submit to the envisaged United Nations system (ibid., Vol. 69 
(May 22-June 1), 8th Mtg., Running Number 3 M •
54 Ibid. (Vol. 68), 4th Mtg., Running Number 19«
55 Ibid., 5th Mtg., Running Number 12. Evatt was 
irritated because the United States had not consulted 
Australia, he said, in preparing the paper (ibid.,
Running Number 13)*
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various submissions, but mainly on that of the United
States, it conceded to Australia and Britain the statement
of principle which emerged finally as the declaration
in Chapter XI of the charter. Its separation into
Parts A (leading to Chapter Xl) and B (leading to
Chapters XXI and XIIl) conveyed the clear distinction
made in the British draft between acceptance of a
principle and the institution of a system of supervision
of its enforcement in given cases. The application of
the enforcement system was in Yalta terms; its machinery -
a trusteeship council representing states, accepting
petitions etc, - had little in common with Australian
proposals. In an apparent effort to have at least some
sort of obligation involved as a consequence of
acceptance of the trusteeship principle, Australia
submitted a Part C which, unlike Parts A and B, was
exclusively the one Power* s submission, and in which
Australia would have all United Nations members
administering dependencies send regularly to the United
Nations secretariat technical information relating to
56social and economic conditions in the dependencies.
The way was still left open, however for the Assembly 
to specify territories in regard to which this information
56 UNCIO Docs., Vol. 10, p.695
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would also cover political conditions. The Australian 
delegation seemed to be bowing to the inevitability of a 
possibly non-universal system and to be trying to achieve 
some universality of a degree of accountability, in
however weak a form, by adding less objectional conse-
57quences to acceptance of the trusteeship principle. In 
this, Australia was partly successful: what emerged as 
Article 73e asked for the submission of technical 
information, though subject to the discretion of admini­
stering Powers. But provision for Assembly action to 
determine what territories should be involved did not 
appear in the charter.
To recapitulate, Australia began at San Francisco 
by seeking to apply a light form of accountability 
universally and compulsorily, that is, to apply universally 
and by compulsion, if necessary, a trusteeship principle 
and an accompanying obligation to report on each
58territory’s administration to an expert and advisory body.
57 On Australia’s accommodation, see e.g., Ruth B.
Russell, assisted by Jeanette E. Muther, A History of the 
United Nations Charter (The Role of the United States 
19^0-19^5), Washington, 1958. p.825.
5b Evatt, in a sense, denied this in that, in a statement 
made to the press outside the conference, he denied having 
sought the subjection of British colonies to a trusteeship 
system, but this denial was issued in the heat of political 
battle in which attempts were being made in Canberra to 
pin to him an anti-British label and when, anyway, the 
system looked likely to be more rigorous than he had 
envisaged earlier in the conference (see Sydney Morning 
Herald, May 25, 19^5).
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Other Powers sought successfully to apply a heavier form 
possibly less universally and without compulsion.
Australia was then successful in having at least non­
political reporting solely for information purposes 
applied to the territories not covered by the heavier 
form, that is, not covered by the trusteeship system, 
inclusion of territories in which was to be left to 
the discretion of administering Powers. As Frazao wrote 
later:
The fundamental purpose of the Australian 
delegation, at that time, was to attribute the 
same status to and consequently submit to the 
same international control all dependent 
territories. The abandonment of that proposition 
appears in the comprehensive 'wording paper1 
prepared by the American delegation, finally 
crystallizing in Chapters XI, XII and XIII, 
in the distinction between the two types of 
dependent territories, ^
And as Frazao concluded: ’the opposition met by the
Australian proposition focused chiefly upon the extension 
of the juridical discipline of the trusteeship system 
to all dependent territories'Evatt accepted failure 
(’under Commander Stassen's guidance’) gracefully.
Referring to the gap between what Australia initially 
had proposed and what finally the conference approved,
59 Frazao, op.cit.t p.63.
60 Ibid., pp.63-4.
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he said ’it does not go as far as that but it goes a good 
way in the d i r e c t i o n . Forde, too, was not altogether 
dissatisfied:
Although our proposal to include an obligation to 
report to the United Nations on administration 
in colonial territories has not been agreed to, 
a very important step which we suggested as an 
alternative has been adopted, namely: an 
obligation to transmit to the Organization 
statistics and other information of a technical nature relating to the economic and social 
development of the inhabitants of non-self- 
governing territories. 2
One can, at this stage, only speculate on why 
Australia failed to fj^ it as hard as she might for 
a universal system of accountability as extensive in 
form as that which she had described as desirable
before the San Francisco conference and which other 
Powers were prepared to apply to the old mandates, 
territories detached from Axis Powers as a result of 
World War II and voluntarily submitted territories. 
Russell says of the Australian volte-face that it was 
’a change accounted for by outside consultations'. ^
61 Verbatim Minutes, as above, Vol. 70 (June 8-30),
13th Mtg., Running Numbers 34-6.
62 UNCIO Docs.. Vol. 8, p.136.
63 Russell, loc.cit. Russell notes that the Philippines 
also began by favouring a trusteeship system for all 
dependent territories but registered no objection to a 
voluntary basis for submission of territories to the 
system once it was clear that the United States and 
other Powers preferred voluntarism.
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The role of the United States delegation has been 
64
hinted at; so, too, has the effect of the British 
65reaction. I t  is  likely that there were some factors 
domestic to the Australian delegation: the importance
Evatt attached to other questions at the conference
and his consequent distraction from the trusteeship
66issue; the effect of political and journalistic 
host il i ty  to his trusteeship proposals registered at
zf ry
San Francisco and at home. This hostility, in large part 
partisan, was based on three claims; the Australian 
delegation's activity was anti-British; Papua-New Guinea 
was being surrendered; the delegation’s, and especially
64 See United Nations Secretariat, Note on the Origins 
of Article 73 of the Charter, 1947» pp.4,11; also
Sir Frederic Eggleston, 'The United Nations Charter 
Critically Considered; The Trusteeship Provisions' 
in Australian Outlook, Vol. 1 (1947)» No.1 (March), p.44,
65 Ibid.
66 This is  the firm view of Dr Ralph Bunche (expressed 
in an interview with the writer). The dating of Evatt*s 
speeches seems to bear i t  out.
67 I t  has been suggested to the writer by a close 
colleague of Evatt that the la t te r  fe l t  especially 
criticism from Mr John McEwan, than an Opposition 
front bench member, and Mr Harold Cox, of the Melbourne 
Herald. Both were in San Francisco - McEwan as a 
delegation member and Cox as a reporter.
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68Evatt's vigorous activity lacked propriety. Of these
claims, the first was, in a literal sense, correct:
Anglo-Australian conflict occurred at London and San
69Francisco over trusteeship. The degree of the conflict
68 The first and third of these claims was expressed 
with particular feeling by the Sydney Morning Herald, one 
of three Australian papers to send its editor to report 
on the conference. During the conference, it published 
four editorials on trusteeship alone. It objected 
bitterly to the Australian delegation’s ’vague humani- 
tarianism* and ’idealistic schemes’ in a matter sensitive to Britain (May 1). It mourned that ’the idealistic 
enthusiasm of the Australian delegation seems to have outrun discretion...there is no call for Australian views on the governance of colonies to be thrust on other 
Powers, including Britain* (May 11). It charged that 'our 
delegation seems to have been more concerned with giving 
its humanitarian impulses an airing than with offering
a united front to nations which are all too ready to 
denounce British ‘’Imperialism’" (May 15)» Most of the 
Australian press was out of sympathy with Evatt, though 
in less vitriolic terms; only the Daily Telegraph was 
inclined to applaud the gusto of Evatt's performance.
69 Sensitivity to the British interest and personal
animosity towards Evatt characterised the responses of 
the then Opposition leader, Mr R.G. (since Sir Robert) 
Menzies: see, e.g., CPD, Vol.181, p.1261 (May 2, 1945);
Vol.l82, p.2323 (May 31); Sydney Morning Herald, May 17*
His statement that ’most Australians would derive very 
little comfort from having Australia lined up with South 
American republics... against Great Britain’ typified his attitudes. Mr Paul Hasluck, a member of the Australian 
delegation, seemed to express similar feelings when he 
wrote later that 'Australia...campaigned in rather strange 
company to outwit and defeat••.nations, such as the 
United Kingdom' (Paul Hasluck, 'Australia and the Formation 
of the United Nations’ in Royal Australian Historical 
Society Journal and Proceedings, Vol.XL (1954), PartIII,
p.164)* Evatt himself told the press that there was Anglo- 
Australian conflict at San.Francisco on the issue of 
periodical reporting of the sort written into Chapter XI 
of the Charter (Sydney Morning Herald, May 18, 1945)«
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and its significance is difficult to estimate; for
groups hostile to the Government it served as convenient
political ammunition. The third claim rested entirely
on subjective and, again, mainly partisan canons. The
second, that Australian control of Papua-New Guinea
was being jeopardised, was, in view of the Pacific
War still being fought and the cost in anxiety and
lives to Australians in Japan's invasion of the
territories and threatened invasion of Australia itself,
understandable, but unjustified. The Labor Government's
attitude was identical with that of its predecessors
on one point at leasts Australian control of the
70territories was vital to Australian security. Articles 
26 and 27 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 19^ 
stated that the signatories would not accept any change 
in sovereignty in the Pacific area except by their 
consent. This, however, is not to say, as some have 
done, that Evatt was 'kite-flying* or bidding for the 
support of other middle and small Powers in seeking
70 There was little to choose between the 'Monroe 
Doctrine' of W.M, Hughes in 1919-20 and Evatt: *.•.we
have a primary and principal responsibility in deter­
mining the future of the particular region in which we 
live. No Australian Government worth the name should 
fail to make this claim' (Evatt, op.cit., p.176).
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universal trusteeship and accountability, having no
intention of submitting Papua to a trusteeship system.^ ^
Nor is Australia* s subsequent failure to submit a
trusteeship agreement for Papua evidence of Evatt*s
bad faith at San Francisco. Evatt said nothing designed
to weaken the sovereignty of administering Powers and
his policies at San Francisco were not calculated to
interfere with, for example, Australian sovereignty 
72in Papua. His notion of a trusteeship system as 
advanced at San Francisco comprised a mild form of 
international accountability and contained, given 
experience only of the League's enforcement of accounta­
bility in the mandates context, no threat to control 
of Papua. But this was not the sort of system established
71 The view expressed by Harper and Sissons (op,cit.t 
p.78) that it was most unlikely that the Australian 
Government ever intended to place Papua within the 
trusteeship system seems to be based on an inadequate 
appreciation of the difference between the trusteeship 
system envisaged by the Australian delegation and the 
system actually established (more is said of this in 
chapters below)•
72 It has been said with some authority (Millis, op.cit., 
p.33) that at one point well before the conference, the 
Australian Government suggested that it should annex 
island territories south of the equator as a quid pro quo 
for United States annexation of formerly Japanese-held 
islands north of the line. Haas (op.cit.. p.6) accepts 
this, but without additional documentation.
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under Chapters XII and XIII of the charter. Where Evatt
had sought to have established an expert body dealing
only indirectly with the United Nations General Assembly,
the charter established a politically-structured body
harnessed directly to the Assembly; whereas Evatt had
suggested formally nothing more than reporting and,
by inference, public justification of administrative
policy, the charter allowed for a much more elaborate
trusteeship system. His failure to achieve a mild,
a political form of accountability, plus the rapid
evaporation of war-time euphoria, the appearance of
anti-colonial pressure and conflict over a United States
71power presence in the South Pacific, together explain 
Australia’s disinclination to submit Papua to the
73 A former subordinate of Evatt has suggested to the 
writer that Evatt was willing to see Papua in a trusteeship 
system because he assumed a post-war United States power 
presence on Manus, a mandated island adjacent to New Guinea. 
This did not eventuate becauee post-war United States Navy 
economies made the Manus base expendable and because Evatt 
tried unsuccessfully to use the initial United States 
interest in retaining the base as a lever with which to 
obtain United States involvement in a regional security 
arrangement (see R.N. Rosecranee, Australian Diplomacy and 
Japan, 19^5-1951» (Melbourne, 1962, pp.57-66; and Henry 
S. Albinski, Australia* s Search for Regional Security in 
South-East Asia,unpublished(microfilmed)Ph.D. thesis, 
Minneapolis, 1959» pp.l48-6l). A senior member of the 
Australian ministry of the time has told the writer that 
conflict developed in Cabinet over this issue, with Evatt 
prepared to concede greater jurisdiction rights to the 
United States on Manus than his colleagues would allow.
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trusteeship system. It will be seen in succeeding chapters 
that Evatt tried later, despite the charter, to have 
established practices such as to give some effect to 
his San Francisco proposals. He was at times unsuccess­
ful because other Powers sought to ’politicise’ them
74in ways objectionable to him.
The Australian delegation earned for itself at 
San Francisco a reputation for sympathy for colonial 
peoples and for a degree of effectiveness on the trustee­
ship question. On the former, one contemporary view, 
admittedly expressed in the early days of the conference, 
was that ’no delegation....has come out so vigorously 
and consistently for the interests of the subject
75peoples of the world as the delegation from Australia’.
On the latter, Bundle later wrote:
Although not a member of the five-power group, 
Australia had also submitted to the Conference 
a trusteeship proposal which was very broad in 
some of its provisions and which at a late stage 
of the Conference Committee on Trusteeship con­
tributed no little to the provisions of Chajiter 
XI of the Charter. /t;
74 This applied particularly in the context of Chapter XI.
75 New York Heraid-Tribune, quoted in A g e , May 5j 1945»
76 Ralph J. Bunche, U.S. Department of State, Organizing 
the United Nations: Trusteeship and Non-Self-Goveming 
Territories in the Charter of the United Nations,
Washington, 1946, p .21 (United States-United Nations
Information Series No. 6).
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More will be said in succeeding chapters of the nature of 
Australiern sympathy with colonial peoples and how far 
she was prepared to go in expressing it. Of her effective­
ness at San Francisco, this, as Bunche said, was felt
77mainly in Chapter XI of the charter. With Britain and 
the United States, she played a significant part in 
having written into the charter its Article 73« This 
article was important in that it contained a progressive 
undertaking by charter signatories to promote the 
political and social development of their dependent 
territories to the point of self-government. As a 
result of Australian activity, this article also 
obliged signatories to provide information of a limited 
nature to the United Nations about conditions in their 
dependent territories, Australia, too, was successful 
in having written into Article 73 a number of humani­
tarian injunctions and a reference to educational 
advancement taken from her Part C of the Working Paper,
She had tried to effect more than this by having political 
as well as economic and social information submitted to 
an expert body for examination rather than merely to a
77 Hasluck (op.cit., p.175) says that the Australian 
delegation worked hard to create the Trusteeship Council, 
but there is little documentary evidence of this activity.
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secretariat clearing house. What she did achieve or 
help to hcive achieved - a mild form of universally 
(within United Nations membership) applicable account­
ability and a partial translation of the whole colonial 
issue from a purely domestic to an international setting
was to have profound consequences
C H A P T E R  2
T H R E E
A N T I - C O L O N I A L
A V E N U E S
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In view of Evatt* s plans for Pacific regional 
organisations involving metropolitan Powers, the nature 
of his submissions at San Francisco, his apparent 
impatience with the ’self-government or independence* 
debate at San Francisco, his failure to place particular 
stress in his statements on anything more than ultimate 
self-government, it seems clear that he did not 
anticipate anti-colonial activity which developed
psubsequently in the United Nations. His undoubted
3sympathy for the colonised ’underdog*' should not too 
glibly be associated with anti-colonialism of the urgent 
and comprehensive sort which quickly was to manifest 
itself. One of his own departmental officers much 
later was to write that ’intended as primarily a peace-
1 He said that he saw no distinction (Sydney Morning 
Herald. May 25, 19^5).
2 Evatt was not alone in this. Bunche told the writer 
that when, in 19^6, he was helping to establish the trustee­
ship office in the United Nations secretariat, it was 
assumed that the office would be busily employed for fifty 
or seventy-five years, not twenty or twenty-five.
3 See Bailey’s view of the Labor Government as a whole:
’It is moved more by sentiment than by doctrine, and 
desire for the improvement of the lot of the underdog
is in truth its strongest motive’ (Bailey, op.cit.. p.51l)*
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keeping organisation, the U.N. has in recent years
become largely a machine for ’de-colonisation1 and the
4extraction of economic aid*..'. But Evatt’s proposals 
at San Francisco suggest strongly that he was seeking 
rather to bolster and extend the native welfare provisions 
of the old *B‘ and ’C’ mandates than to construct a 
framework designed to facilitate the rapid accomplishment 
of colonial independence. Certainly, he welcomed the full 
emancipation of states like India and the Philippines; 
for the rest, he seemed to assume indefinitely continuing 
protection and tutelage for what he called 1 peoples...who
5are unable to stand by themselves in the modern world..•’•
Evatt demanded accountability for truly
dependent territories but, at San Francisco at least,
he demanded it in forms reflecting Australian experience
of the old mandates area of accountability:
We say that there should be a system of 
reporting of the character which was instituted 
under the permanent Mandates Commission of the 
League of Nations in regard to territories 
placed under the cogtrol of certain powers 
after the last war.
4 W.D. Forsyth, ’Whither U.N.?* in Australian Journal
of Politics and History. Vol. IX (1963)» No.1 (May), p.49*
5 Verbatim Minutes, as above, Vol. 68 (May 5-18),
2nd Mtg., Running Number 13*
6 Ibid., Running Numbers 13-14.
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And, whatever the coincidence of Pacific security 
considerations, a humanitarian motivation of the sort 
uppermost in the supervision of mandates was clearly
apparent in his statements at San Francisco - for example:
Reports and analyses by an independent expert 
body, including technicians in the field of health, education, anthropology and colonial 
administration, would undoubtedly assist 
more energetic action to improve the conditions of dependent peoples.'
There was nothing here, as has already been stressed,
to threaten the Australian position in Papua or New 
Guinea. Evatt’ s proposals seemed clearly to envisage a
continuation and wider application of the League practice 
whereby little pressure besides publicity could be 
marshalled against an administering Power whose direct 
dealings were with a panel of more or less sympathetic 
expert s•
In fact, the * courtly traditions of Western
8 -diplomacy1, apparent in a League dominated by western 
European Powers, rapidly disappeared as the Cold War 
developed and new, formerly dependent states exerted
7 Ibid., Running Number 21. Jacobson has made the point: 
•The League was chiefly concerned with improving standards 
of colonial rule, while the UN’s aim has been to liquidate 
colonialism’ (Jacobson, op.cit., p.47)* Evatt*s attitude 
seemed to be coloured principally by the former.
8 C.D. Rowley, ’The United Nations, Colonialism and 
Australia’, in Australian Outlook, Vol. 7 (1953)»
No. 2 (June), p.123*
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their influence. As an Australian observer has said, 
many of these states brought with them into the United 
Nations a sense of recent injustice, a naive faith 
in social mechanics, a doctrinaire view of politics
Qand resentments based on culture and colour. Some 
were quick to see themselves in a crusader* s role; 
a Philippines delegate told the General Assembly at 
its first sessions
The Philippine Republic did not pretend to 
be the self-appointed champion of those people; 
they had their own great leaders whose voices 
would be sooner or later heard in the Councils 
of the United Nations. Nevertheless, until 
that time, the Philippine Republic delegation 
felt morally bound to give utterance to the 
thoughts and aspirations of those voiceless 
millions.  ^^
The result was a quickly apparent battle line, with 
administering Powers on one side, Communist and most 
recently and many less recently dependent Powers on 
the other, and a number of Powers, like Canada, the 
Scandinavian states and the few less committed Latin 
American members, coming down sometimes on the one 
side and sometimes on the other. The appearance of a 
battle line was virtually inevitable because it also
9 Ibid., pp.124-5.
10 GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., 16th Mtg., 
Nov.7, 1946, pp.82-3*
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quickly became apparent that the communist and many
formerly dependent Powers, in Jacobson’s words, ’viewed
the task of supervising colonial administrations
principally in terms of bringing those regimes to 
1 1a close’. Something of their attitude was expressed 
by Mr V.K. Krishna Menon during the midst of the anti­
colonial campaigns of the 1950s when he said that
’India would never concede that people were not ready
12 13for self—government’ • These Powers, then, were 
active agents of the decolonisation process and, in 
furthering the process, they followed mainly the three 
avenues already indicated: the interpretation of
Chapter XI of the Charter not merely as a declaration 
of intent, with the lightest of consequent, concrete 
obligations involving the United Nations, but as the 
basis of an accountability system increasingly similar 
to the trusteeship system of Chapters XXX and XIII; 
the trareformation of Chapters XII and XIII so that 
the Trusteeship Council more and more became sub­
servient to the General Assembly which, in turn,
11 Jacobson, lo c .c i t .
12 Hindu, March 2 3 » 1955 *
13 The identities and roles of the anti-colonial 
Powers are discussed in detail in Chapter 11 below.
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increasingly sought to apply pressure and itself issue 
instructions rather than simply examine and comment on 
the results of administrative policy already applied; 
and the raising of independence or self-government 
issues ostensibly within the context of a 'threat 
to international peace and security*•
11 uChapter XX, in its finally negotiated form, 
declared simply that 'Members of the United Nations 
which have or assume responsibilities for the admini­
stration of territories whose peoples have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government recognize 
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of 
these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred 
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost...the 
well-being of the inhabitants of these territories...'. 
The latter aspect of the declaration, the obligation, 
involved an undertaking to ensure the general advance­
ment of the peoples of dependent territories, to develop 
free political institutions and to protect dependent
14 For an unromantic view of these negotiations ('every 
principle...was examined to make sure that it would not 
pop up at some future time to prevent a Power from 
getting those things - like control of certain terri­
tories - which it felt vital to its own security...'), 
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 14, 19^6.see
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peoples from abuse. The only obligation going beyond
a statement of intention to an actual contract directly
linking the administering Power and the United Nations
was that contained in clause ’e’ of the declaration’s
Article 73s 1 to transmit regularly to the Secretary-
General for information purposes, subject to such
limitation as security and constitutional considerations
may require, statistical and other information of a
technical nature relating to economic, social, and
educational conditions in the territories, , .ether than
1 5those...to which Chapters XII and XIII apply’.
As it stood, Chapter XI might not have seemed likely 
to serve very easily the anti-colonial cause. Members 
administering dependencies undertook publicly and 
solemnly to be humane and progressive in their govern­
ment of them, and to keep the United Nations informed.
But no mechanics were provided by which to check their 
fulfilment of their undertaking, and the reporting did 
not extend to political affairs and, anyway, was of
15 A second article, Article 7^ > is merely a lightly 
worded survivor of the anti-discrimination and ’open door* 
provisions of some of the early May San Francisco drafts. 
It is derived mainly from the alternative British ’good 
neighbour' provision.
6 9
unspecified frequency and subject to administering
Powers’ views on security  and const i tu t ional  l imita tions*
How, then, was the Assembly to seek, as i t  did, * to
apply to colonies the same methods that govern t ru s t
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  and to read in to  A rtic le  73^ the p r inc ip le
that the Administering Powers were obliged to account
16
to the United Nations for th e i r  policy and ac t ions’?
The essen t ia l  p rerequ is i te  was not to accept
the ch a r te r  as too sacred and f ina l  an instruments
in  the Indian view, fo r  example, ' the division of
dependent areas in to  non-self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s
and t ru s t  t e r r i t o r i e s  was merely an accident of h is to ry * ••
there was no reason why the s ta tus  of one*..should be
d if fe ren t  from that of the other* The demands of the
people of a l l  dependent areas were e ssen t ia l ly  the
same and i t  was des irable for  the world community
to exercise more or le s s  the same kind of influence
1 7
in  the administration of a l l  these t e r r i t o r i e s ' •
A view of th is  sort was in  accord with that  of the 
Australian delegation at San Francisco, but i t  was 
not in accord with the charter* Given th i s  a t t i tu d e
16 London Times, Nov* 14, 1951*
17 Study Group of the Indian Council of World A ffa irs ,  
India and the United Nations, New York, 1957, p * 1 0 1 .
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and given majority acceptance of' it, charter revision
by Assembly resolution, as Evatt described the phenomenon,
could easily enough be accomplished} regular transmission
of information could be made annual transmission;
transmission to the non-partisan Secretary-General could
be made transmission to a partisan committee of a
partisan Assembly or Fourth Committee of the Assembly;
the determination of limitations could be made an
Assembly rather than a sovereign member’s function;
information transmitted could be made to include
political information on the grounds that, while clause
’e’ did not mention it because a majority at San Francisco
did not want it, political advancement was mentioned
in 73a; an attempt could be made simply to impose
accountability. This largely summarises what occurred.
After only two Assembly sessions, Evatt was able to
supply a description which held good for developments
over succeeding years:
The Colonial Powers have always taken the 
view that this chapter is a ’declaration 
of trust’, i.e. a statement of the policies 
to which.they have voluntarily subscribed 
and intend of their own volition to pursue. 
Accordingly, it claimed that the declaration 
in its Article 73 is in no sense a series 
of specific undertakings to the United 
Nations the implementation of which that 
body is entitled to supervise in detail.
The ’accountability’ of the States responsible 
is, in their view, of a general nature and the
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Declaration a recognition of the general 
in terest  of world opinion in the policies 
these States follow.. .The Colonial Powers 
have repeatedly made i t  clear that they never 
placed these te r r i to r ie s  and their  admini­
stration under the supervision of the United 
Nations. They have therefore always maintained 
a clear distinction between Chapters XX and 
XIX and XXII constituting the International 
Trusteeship System in which international 
supervision is  established but res tr ic ted to 
such te r r i to r ie s  as are brought within that 
system by trusteeship agreements. The Colonial 
Powers. . .  regard the administration of their 
t e r r i to r i e s . . .  as matters of domestic jurisdiction. 
• « •
Other members. . .  have taken the view that 
Chapter XX brings administration as well as the 
general policies applicable to dependent 
te r r i to r ie s  within the scope of the Charter 
and thus within the fie ld  of action of the 
General Assembly. The Soviet and Arab groups 
and the Asiatic countries (notably India and the 
Philippine Republic) have been prominent 
exponents of this view and they have had 
important support from Latin American countries 
in what the Colonial Powers regard as uncon­
sti tut iona l  pressure to 'widen the scope of the 
Charter* and 'rewrite the Charter by Assembly 
resolution*. They have had an advantage in the 
fact that the States responsible, of whom there 
have been up-to-date only eight, have always 
been a small minority in an assembly of over 
f i f ty  States.
He went on to refer to ’the tendency, running through
the dealings of the Fourth Committee since i t s  inception
at the f i r s t  meeting of the General Assembly, to attempt
18 Report of the Work of the Australian Delegation to
the Second Annual Session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, New York, 1bth September-29th November,
19^ 7» by the Rt. Hon. H.vY Evatt, K.C., M.P., Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for External A ffa irs , as tabled 
in the House of Representatives, March 1 1 , 19^ -8 ( typescript)
pp.88-90 (hereafter referred to as Evatt Report. 1947)»
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to constrain colonial powers to take action expressly 
stated in the Charter to be voluntary.,.1 ,1^
Chapter XII of the charter dealt with an inter­
national trusteeship system. This system, ’for the 
administration and supervision of... territories’ , 
would apply to ’such territories in the following 
categories as may be placed thereunder by means of 
trusteeship agreements: a. territories now held under 
mandate; b. territories which may be detached from enemy 
States as a result of the Second World War; and c. 
territories voluntarily placed under the system by 
States responsible for their administration’. The terms 
of trusteeship were a matter for agreement among ’the 
States directly concerned’ and approval by the General 
Assembly or, in the case of designated strategic areas, 
by the Security Council. The objectives of the 
trusteeship system were similar to those applied in 
Chapter XI of the charter to the administration of 
non-self-governing (that is, non-trust) territories 
except that independence, and not merely self-government 
or free political institutions, was listed as an end.
Chapter XIII of the charter dealt with the 
Trusteeship Council which would be established under the
19 Ibid., p.95.
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authority of the Assembly. Its membership would comprise
representatives of members administering trust
territories, non-administering permanent Security
Council members and as many other members elected for
three-year terms by the Assembly as would be necessary
evenly to divide the Trusteeship Council between
administering and non-administering members. The
Council, according to Article 87 > was to function under
the authority of the Assembly and each might consider
reports from administering Powers, accept and examine
petitions, and send visiting missions to trust territories.
Conflict in the trusteeship system context of Chapters
XII and XIII did not occur in the simple form of
attempted charter revision manifest in the context
of Chapter XI. Informal charter amendment did appear
in attempts to read an element of compulsion into
Article 77 of Chapter XII - the South-West Africa affair
20being the notable illustration.’" More significant 
than this, there emerged a two-fold conflict over roles; 
the role of the Assembly in relation to that of the 
Trusteeship Council, and the role of the United Nations
20 Article 77> after listing the categories of old and 
new mandates and territories voluntarily submitted 
said quite explicitly: 'It will be a matter for subsequent
agreement as to which territories in the foregoing 
categories will be brought under the trusteeship system 
and upon what terms.'
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as such. In the former, the administering Powers sought
p 1
to have the Assembly respect the primacy of the Council.'" 
In the la t te r ,  the administering Powers sought to retain 
a sort of chronological primacyj they objected to Assembly 
or Council instructions or recommendations on what they 
should do in the future; they preferred to be judged on 
actual, and therefore past, performance. Casey spoke 
for them when he said;
We make no complaint about there being a proper 
scrutiny of the way in which our obligations 
as an Administering Power are carried out, but 
we cannot accept that there exists in the 
United Nations the power to direct the speed 
of development, the rate of expenditure or the 
basic policies which we consider appropriate....
As in the case of Chapter XI, the anti-colonial Powers
largely were successful; increasingly, they had the
Assembly instruct the Council and the Assembly instruct
the administering Powers and hold them to account for
planned as well as implemented policy.
The third avenue has been outside the context 
of these chapters, dealing with emancipation from 
colonial rule in the case of specific areas rather than 
with the application of measures designed to play a part
21 The administering Powers were not on strong ground 
here. Article 8 5  (2 ) makes clear the subservience of the 
Council to the Assembly, and most subsequent trusteeship 
agreements implied an obligation to act on Assembly 
recommendations.
22 GAOR, 9th S . , 479th Mtg., Sept.27, 1954, p.77.
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in the general emancipation. In part, at least, this 
path has been taken as a way around the domestic 
jurisdiction claims of administering Powers. The 
technique involved has been to claim the existence 
of conflict such as to threaten peace and justify 
United Nations activity. This conflict may be between 
states (as in the issue of West Irian), between 
metropolitan Powers and dependencies (as in the issue 
of Indonesian independence) or between power centres and 
provinces (as in the issue of Algeria). For a time, 
this course was taken or attempted in the Security 
Council but, in the 1950s, preference was shown for 
the Assembly arena where the anti-colonial Powers 
were better able to muster the numbers to have an item 
placed on the agenda, discussed in committee and referred 
back to the Assembly in plenary session. J
23 This is not to say that every question submitted 
to the United Nations survived the General (Agenda)
Committee or that the Assembly has always accepted that 
committee’s recommendations for inclusion. Nor has 
initial success with an item necessarily been maintained: 
it was for a time almost an annual event for the West 
Irian issue to survive the General Committee’s scrutiny 
and a challenge in the Assembly, go to the First (Political) 
Committee and back to plenary session of the Assembly 
where invocation of the ’two-thirds’ voting rule would 
defeat the proposals cf the First Committee.
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A characteristic of this third avenue is that
24it has involved, or has had to seem to involve, crises.
Once the almost ritual claims of domestic jurisdiction
have been made, therefore, the reaction of the administering
Powers and their friends has been to deny the reality
of the crises or to doubt the good faith of those
on the anti-colonial side. This has been a major feature
of the Australian response which, except in the case of
Indonesian independence, usually has been to defend
the administering Power under attack. As Casey said
on the West Irian issue, for example:
Situations are sometimes said to be threats 
to the peace simply because people wish to 
regard them as such...it is only a short move 
from this attitude of mind to the actual 
stimulation of disorder and tension.^5
24 Benson, after finding that ’the main colonial issues
of the United Nations are channelled to the First Committee 
where they are treated as political questions involving 
international peace and security and where each question 
is one of crisis', observes that 'the effect of a denial 
of the right of the United Nations to discuss the normal 
evolution of colonies and dependencies towards self- 
government and self-determination has not prevented such 
a discussion; but it has meant that the discussion takes 
place on issues and in circumstances unfavourable to 
international co-operation' (Wilfred Benson, 'The 
International Machinery for Colonial Liberation' in 
Creech Jones, op.cit., p.238).
25 GAOR, 9th S., 479ttPl.Mtg., Sept.27, 1954, p .76
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And as an Australian delegate, Dr E.R. Walker, said on
the Algerian question;
Certain delegations used the United Nations 
as a propaganda forum, not merely for the 
purpose of gaining general sympathy for the 
rebels - which certainly constituted inter­
vention in French domestic affairs - but ^ s o  
in order to encourage resort to violence.
From i960, the first and second avenues described 
above tended to merge under the Declaration on Colonialism.
This Declaration, it will be seen, finally blurred 
distinctions between non-self-governing and trust 
territories; in 1961, machinery was established for the 
implementation of the Declaration, especially of its 
sharp call for independence for surviving dependencies, 
in respect of both categories of territories. Because 
of this, and because only three territories (New Guinea, 
Nauru and the Pacific Islands) then remained in the 
trusteeship system, the system’s significance in large 
part disappeared and dependencies came to be dealt with 
very much as comprising a single category. This 
represented a marked achievement for the anti-colonial 
Powers, an achievement which, from 1961, Australia 
mainly accommodated.
26 GAOR, 12th S . , 1st Ctee., 924th Mtg., Dec.5» 1957» P»328
C H A P T E R  3
N O N - S E L F  -  G O V E R N I N G
T E R R I T O R I E S
( p a r t  i  1 9 4 6 - 1 9 4 9 )
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1Chapter XI of the charter is short and vague.
It is the only chapter which carries a heading amounting
to more than a simple label, and that heading
(’Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories')
is ambiguous: the term ’declaration' implies a cloudy
distinction between Chapter XI and the rest of the
charter, as though the former is an affirmation of intent
rather than an enforceable undertaking by the signatory
state; nowhere in the chapter is a non-self-governing
2territory defined. Apart from these deficiencies, 
which became bases of conflict in interpretation of the 
chapter, Chapter XI emerged from the San Francisco 
conference in a form unsatisfactory to anti-colonial 
Powers in that it provided for only one point of contact 
between an administering Power and the United Nations: 
the submission of a specialised kind of information 
about non-political aspects of conditions in non-self- 
governing territories. Even this was subject to safeguards
1 For a comprehensive analysis of Chapter XI and conflicts 
arising in its interpretation, see J.A. de Yturriaga,
'Non-Self-Governing Territories: The Law and Practice 
of the United Nations' in Year Book of World Affairs,
Vol.18 (1964), p .178 sq.
2 There is a distinction drawn between trust territories 
and others, but the criterion of non-self-government is 
applied to peoples and not to territories; hence the 
'Belgian thesis' that Chapter XI could be applied to 
backward tribal or ethnic groups in independent states - 
India, Burma and some Latin American states, for example.
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in the interests, security and constitutional, of the 
administering Power. Such material would be submitted 
with unspecified regularity to the Secretary-General 
'for information purposes'. This scarcely amounted to 
accountability.
Australia sought at San Francisoo to have 
established a system of accountability. Administering 
Powers would report to a body which would examine 
the information submitted. This information, apparently, 
would comprise political as well as other aspects of 
administration. The General Assembly would decide 
what, for this purpose, qualified as a non-self- 
governing territory. The immediate endeavour of anti­
colonial Powers from 19^6 very largely was tonake good 
in practice what Australia and others had failed to 
achieve at San Francisco. They went further than 
Australia was prepared to follow, and their preoccupation 
with political ends clashed with Australia's primary 
interest in humanitarian ends. The issues they raised 
basically were : (l) to whom to report; (2) what to
report; (3) when to report.
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I.
Australia tried initially at San Francisco 
to have administering Powers report to an expert 
committee, failed, and submitted a draft of what 
became Article 73® as a more generally acceptable 
alternative. She seemed for a time in 19^ -6 to be 
trying to achieve in the practical implementation of 
Chapter XI something of what she had failed to have 
written into it. The Australian delegation at the 
first Assembly session made the running in trying to 
have a somewhat torpid Fourth Committee suggest 
’arrangements* and 'machinery* for the implementation 
of the Assembly's functions under Chapter XI, despite 
the failure of that chapter even to hint that the 
Assembly had any functions to implement. Australian 
representatives stressed the distinctions between 
Chapter XI and the trusteeship system of Chapters XII 
and XIII, but evidently more as a device to hasten 
activity on the former than to prevent an unwarranted 
duplication of the latter.'* At the first (early 1946)
3 The rapporteur of a Fourth Committee sub-committee 
established to hammer out draft resolutions for submission 
to the Assembly noted that 'the sub-committee had adopted 
the suggestion of the Australian delegation that 
attention should be drawn to the fact that Chapter XI 
was independent from the setting up of the Trusteeship 
Council and was therefore already in force* (GAOR, 1st 
S., 1st Pt., 4th Ctee., 10th Mtg., Feb.4, 1946, p.33)*
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part of the first session, it was not made clear just 
what arrangements Australia wanted made or how she saw 
the Assembly’s functions. The Australian delegation 
submitted to the Fourth Committee a draft resolution 
asking that the Secretary-General report on 'the 
manner in which the United Nations should exercise 
the functions that pertain to it under Chapter XX, 
including the manner in which the information...trans­
mitted to him by Members under paragraph (e) of
Article 73 of the Charter, should b6 communicated to
4other Members and to the General Assembly’. This
reference to Assembly functions and the need for the
information in some way to come within the cognisance
of the Assembly as opposed merely to being available
to members went beyond what at those early meetings was
5majority opinion. The Fourth Committee preferred a
4 Ibid., Annex 6 , pp.51-2.
5 Discussions at these first meetings of the Fourth 
Committee necessarily were exploratory; delegates were 
feeling their way. On the reporting question, one of a 
host discussed, the United States delegate, for example, 
felt that the Chinese draft adequately covered the imple­
mentation of 73e (ibid., 27th Pl.Mtg., Feb.9> p.368);
The British delegate, Creech Jones, talked of machinery 
in terms of Chapter XI and the trusteeship system but 
without further elucidation in the case of the former 
(Ibid., pp.373-6).
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Chinese draft which took Article 73© very simply and 
only asked the Secretary-General to include in his 
annual report a summary of information received. "
This question was raised again in the second 
(late 1946) part of the first session when it emerged 
that the Secretary-General had, in fact, submitted a
report of the sort envisaged in the Australian proposal 
rejected earlier in the year. He noted that information 
submitted would be very detailed and, while he could 
provide a factual summary, a committee appointed by 
the Fourth Committee might be better able to isolate 
’points of interest and importance...with greater 
authority... before the next session of the General
7Assembly...’, Bailey reacted with guarded approval:
8examination of the submitted information by experts
’might help to ensure an enlightened discussion in
9the General Assembly’. The issue was then referred with
6 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 10th Mtg., Feb.4, p.33» This 
proposal was incorporated in a draft which also covered 
trusteeship system matters and which was adopted by the 
Assembly as Resolution 9(l) by unanimous vote, 41-0-0 
(Ibid., 27th PI.Mtg., Feb.9, p.376).
7 GAOR, Ist S . , 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., Annex 14, pp.246-7.
8 Bailey spoke of experts, but the Secretary-General 
had not. He had spoken of representatives of governments 
assisted by experts from the specialised agencies 
(ibid., p.247). In the secretariat’s draft discussed
by the sub-c omini tt ee, however, the proposal was for a 
Committee of Experts.
9 GAOR, Ist S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee.,
1946, p.94.
18th Mtg., Nov.11 ,
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others to a Fourth Committee sub-committee which had as
a basis for discussion a draft submitted by the
secretariat. This called for the creation of an ad hoc
committee of experts to be appointed by governments
nominated by the Assembly and assisted by representatives
of the relevant specialised agencies. This committee would
examine the Secretary-General's summary and the information
on which it was based 'with a view to aiding the General
Assembly in its consideration of the summary'; it
10would also recommend procedures for the future. Three 
views emerged in the sub-committee's discussions: China
and the Soviet Union regarded the Trusteeship Council 
as the appropriate examining body; others (India,
Egypt, Cuba, Brazil, Poland, Philippines) agreed that 
the Council was the appropriate body, but noted that 
it did not yet exist and, anyway, it might be held to 
lack competence, so that an ad hoc committee was a 
desirable alternative; others (administering Powers: 
Denmark, France, Britain, Belgium, United States) 
objected to use of the Trusteeship Council which, they
10 Ibid., Part III, Annex 2a, p.88
said, would be incompetent in the context of' Chapter XI,
and objected to an ad hoc committee either as uncon­
s t i tu t iona l  or unnecessary. Bailey agreed with the 
administering Powers that i t  v/ould not be proper to 
use the Trusteeship Council; the distinctions between 
Chapter XI and the trusteeship system should be maintained. 
Unlike them, he found 'nothing insidious or unconsti­
tutional '  in the suggestion of an ad hoc committee:
' the General Assembly was empowered to establish any 
subsidiary organs which i t  deemed necessary'. However, 
i t  would be necessary to sett le  terms of reference for 
such a committee and this would be d if f ic u l t .  He 
preferred a joint D'enmark-Netherlands-Britain-United 
States draft,  which would have the Secretary-General 
analyse and classify,  as well as summarise, information
received, the Assembly to review this procedure, i f
1 1i t  wished, the following year. His preference was
shared by the majority which defeated a Chinese draft
favouring use of the Trusteeship Council and a Cuban
draft favouring an ad hoc committee, and adopted the
1 2jointly sponsored draft.
11 Ib id . , 6th Mtg., Nov.25, p.32-3.
12 The Chinese draft was defeated 9-10 (ib id . , p.35) 
and the Cuban 8-10, with one abstention (ib id . , 7th Mtg., 
Nov.26, p . 3 8 )» the joint draft was adopted 10-4, with 
five abstentions (ibid.., p.39)»
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In the Fourth Committee, however, Cuba re­
introduced the draft which she had submitted unsuccess­
fully in the sub-committee. In a short debate, Syria 
joined Cuba’s supporters, and Canada joined the 
administering Powers opposed to the Cuban proposal. 
Supporting the joint draft adopted by the sub-committee, 
the British delegate argued that, while information 
submitted should be studied by experts, there were 
available in the secretariat experts whose competence 
and objectivity were beyond dispute. As for the view 
put by a secretariat representative in the sub-committee 
that the secretariat should not be expected to involve 
itself in political questions, he argued that this
difficulty would not arise because Article 73e excluded
1 3political questions from information to be submitted.
The Cuban draft, put as an amendment to the joint 
draft, was adopted by the Fourth Committee and the 
A s s e m b l y , A u s t r a l i a  did not address the Fourth 
Committee or the Assembly, but her position was 
reserved after the Fourth Committee vote and her
13 GAOR, Ist S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., 21st Mtg.,
Dec.8, 1946, pp.124-7«
14 The Fourth Committee vote was 21-12-4 (ibid., p.127) 
and, in the Assembly, 28-15-7 (ibid., 64th PI.Mtg.,
Dec.14, p .1369)•
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delegate voted against the relevant paragraphs put
15separately in the Assembly.
When the ad hoc committee, comprising representa­
tives of eight reporting Powers and eight others elected 
by the Assembly, reported at the following (1947)
Assembly session, it recommended the creation of a 
special committee. Like the ad hoc committee itself, 
this committee would be comprised equally of representa­
tives of reporting and non-reporting Powers, but the 
latter would be elected by the Fourth Committee. Its 
purpose was less tentatively expressed than had been 
the ad hoc committee’s. The ad hoc committee’s 
function had been to examine the Secretary-General’s 
summary of information transmitted so as to aid the 
Assembly in its consideration of that information 
and to recommend future procedures. The special committee’s 
function was to be to examine information submitted and 
report on it to the Assembly, and to submit appropriate 
procedural and substantive recommendations. It was to 
be free to seek expert advice from specialised agencies,
15 Ibid., Annex 78» p.1564, and Ibid., 64th Pl.Mtg.,
Dec.14, p.1369. The resolution as a whole, Resolution 
66(l), was adopted in the Assembly by a vote of 27-7-13»
New Zealand, which abstained, was the only administering 
Power not to vote against the key, Cuban-sponsored 
paragraphs.
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establish liaison with the Economic ana Social Council
and ask reporting Powers to provide what additional
16information it might think necessary. Surprisingly,
1 7this was acceptable to the administering Powers.
In the Fourth Committee, however, India followed 
Cuba’s example of the previous year by trying to have 
achieved there what she had failed to have accepted 
in the ad hoc committee. She sought to amend the ad hoc 
committee's proposal by having the special committee 
up-graded in stature: the non-reporting members were to
be elected for two-year terms and by the Assembly 
itself. c The Australian view of this, shared by the 
other administering Powers, was that it 'tended to make 
the proposed special committee rather a new principal
16 GAOR, 2nd S., 4th Ctee., Annex 4a, p.214.
17 This involved them in contradictions. The United
States delegation, for example, had opposed creation of 
the ad hoc committee because it comprised 'a modification 
of the Charter' (GAOR, Ist S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., 21st 
Mtg., Dec.8 , 1946, p.125) and because the secretariat
was better qualified to do the job than a superflu ous 
committee (ibid., 64th PI.Mtg., Dec.14, p.1368). Yet that 
delegation accepted the notion of a special committee 
because, while it 'went somewhat beyond the strict letter 
of Article 73e', it was 'within the spirit of Chapter XI' 
and would 'contribute to the well-being of dependent 
peoples by aiding Member States in preparing the 
information...and the Secretary-General in summarizing 
and analysing it' (GAOR, 2nd S., 4th Ctee., 35th Mtg.,
Oct.2, 1947, p.29).
18 Ibid., Annex 4e, pp.215-6.
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organ of the United Nations than a subsidiary and
1 9limited body such as that originally proposed’.
The Fourth Committee adopted the amendment and the
20ad hoc committee’s proposal as amended. In the 
Assembly, however, the United States was successful 
in invoking the 'two-thirds’ voting rule, the Fourth 
Committee’s (Indian-amended) draft was defeated,
21and the original ad hoc committee’s draft was adopted.
The records show that Australia voted for the application
of the two-thirds rule and against an Indian amendment,
designed to lessen the importance of the issue and
avoid the application of the rule, to have the special
22committee described as experimental. The status 
of the committee thus was kept virtually to that of 
a sub-committee of the Fourth Committee.
19 Evatt Report, 1947, p.93»
2° GAOR, 2nd S., 4thCtee., 42nd Mtg., Oct.11, 1947, 
p.78* The vote was 23-19»
21 Ibid., 108th PI.Mtg., Nov.3, p.744. This draft of 




The committee duly met before the Assembly's 
third (1948) session, considering reports on fifty-nine 
territories, and it recommended its reappointment 
for a further year. In the Fourth Committee, Brazil 
sought to have the committee given a further term of 
three years, and Poland sponsored a withdrawn Venezuela- 
Cuba proposal (withdrawn because the limited Brazilian 
amendment seemed more likely to succeed) urging that
2kthe committee be established on a permanent basis.
Australia opposed both on the somewhat light grounds
that, regarding the former, there was no particular
virtue in three as a number and, regarding the latter,
it was better 'to consolidate...progress' than risk
25a motion unacceptable to the Assembly. Her delegate,
J.D.L. Hood, voted against the Polish amendment,
which was defeated only in a deadlocked vote of 17-17-18,
23 This committee began as the Special Committee on 
Information Transmitted under Article 73(e) and, in 1952, 
became the Committee on Information from Non-Self- 
Governing Territories. It will be referred to in this 
work simply as the information committee.
2k GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt., 4th Ctee., Annexes, p.4.
23
25 Ibid., 59th Mtg., Oct.16, 1948, p.77
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and against the Brazilian amendment. The information
committee's own proposal for a further one-year term
27was then adopted.
At this Assembly session, the Soviet Union
submitted in the Fourth Committee a resolution draft
alleging that the information committee had failed
adequately to judge the content of the reports which
it had examined, urging the administering Powers to
28include political information in their reports,
and asking that direct personal contact be allowed
between the information committee and the inhabitants
29of dependent territories. This, while close to what 
Australia had once postulated except that Australia had 
assumed apolitical membership of an examining body, 
was opposed by Hood on the grounds that it was not 
allowed for in Chapter XX, and:
26 Ibid., p.78* The Brazilian amendment was defeated 
11-19-21.
27 This draft which became Resolution 219(m) was 
adopted by a vote of 44-7-0, Australia voting with the 
majority (ibid., 155th PI.Mtg., Nov.3» p.393).
28 More will be said of this aspect below.
29 Ibid., 4th Ctee•, 54th Mtg. , Oct.11, pp.22-3.
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• ..although nothing 3-ess than what is 
written in the Charter in regard to dependent 
peoples should be achieved, on the other 
hand nothing more should be required of those 
with whom the responsibility rp^ts for 
implementing those principles.
Australia joined other administering powers in majorities
voting against the principal clauses of the Soviet
draf t .^ 1
In 19 +^9 » the information committee rejected
the view of China, Egypt, India and Venezuela that
it should propose its own permanence, and the Belgian
view7 that it should propose a one-year renewal of
its mandate, and adopted a United States suggestion
32that it recommend a three-year re-appointment.
In the Fourth Committee, India submitted a draft 
resolution which replaced the information committee’s 
as a basis for discussion. This also proposed a three-
30 Ibid. , 37th Mtg., Oct.14, p.53.
31 Paragraphs alleging the inadequacy of the information 
committee's work were defeated 8-29- 10, a recommendation 
for the submission of political information by 15-25-8 ,
a recommendation that data from official sources be 
included in summaries of information by 8-28-12, a 
recommendation that communications from indigenes should 
be examined by 8-25-14, and a recommendation that United 
Nations representatives visit non-self-governing 
territories annually by 7-33-75 Ibid., 5bth Mtg., Oct. 
15* pp.66-8. The Communist bloc received significant 
outside support only on the question of the submission 
of political information when all six Asian members 
and the two African members voted in favour.
32 GAOR, 4th S., Supplement No.l4, Annex 2, p.17* 
Australia tried unsuccessfully to have the information 
committee leave the question of its renewal entirely to 
the Assembly.
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year term but, in addition, sought to have the committee's
status heightened by having its non-reporting members
'3 3elected by the Assembly. Czechoslovakia submitted an 
amendment to have the committee made a subsidiary
34organ of the Assembly, and thus a permanent body.
Mexico submitted an amendment to have the committee
examine submitted information 'in the spirit of
paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 1 and of Article 35
3 5of the Chafer'.' " Australia did not contribute to 
the debate, but her delegate voted with a majority 
against the Czech amendment.' He voted with a minority 
against the Mexican amendment but, as the delegation 
tended to do on other issues in 1949* he took
33 GAOR, 4th S., Annexes, Ag.It.35» pp.113-4. India 
agreed to drop the status proposal, which had failed 
the previous year, before a vote was taken.
34 Ibid., p .114.
55 Ibid., p.115» Article 1(3) notes that the purposes 
of the United Nations include international co-operation 
for social and economic ends and promotion of respect 
for fundamental freedoms; 1(4) would have the United 
Nations a centre for harmonising members' actions to 
these ends. Article 55 covers similar ground, but 
also speaks of 'respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples'. Mexico 
claimed to be trying to give the committee terms of 
reference, an absence of which had been used by some 
administering Powers in their criticism of it (ibid., 4th 
Ctee., 122nd Mtg., Nov.10, 1949, p.169).
36 Ibid., p.170
95
Australia from the company of most of her administering 
colleagues to vote for the draft (to have the committee 
continue for three years) as amended by Mexico, ‘
o  O
The amended draft was then adopted by the Assembly.
It will be seen from the preceding narrative 
that Australia followed only hesitantly in the path 
taken by the anti-colonial Powers. In 1946, she 
began by giving some approval to the idea of an ad hoc 
committee, but finally voted against it and for the 
alternative course of leaving the examination of 
submitted information in the hands of the secretariat.
In 1947» she accepted the Special Committee but would 
not agree to its being given the status desired by 
India. In 1948, she opposed a permanent or three-year 
term for the committee but approved its re-appointment 
for one year. In 1949» she still opposed permanence 
but approved a three-year term. In this, Australia 
noticeably was leaving the vanguard of reform in which 
she had found herself during World War II and even at 
San Francisco. Early in 1946, she was still taking 
the lead in trying to have machinery established and
37 Ibid., p. 171.
38 Voting on the draft, which became Resolution 332(lV), 
was 44-5-4 (ibid., 263rd Pl.Mtg., Dec.2, p.46l).
in affirming a role for the Assembly in the implementa­
tion of Chapter XI of the charter; from late in 19^6, 
she was evidently settling into the administering 
Powers’ camp where the main endeavour seemed to be 
to impose restraints on the anti-colonial Powers’ 
initiative s.
The reasons for the Australian course are
not difficult to see. At San Francisco and early
in 19^6 , there was manifest a sense of urgency in the
interest shown by many Powers in the colonial question;
late in 19^6 , there appeared comprehensive and sharp
criticism to which the Australian delegation reacted
39with some shock, though not altoge.ther negatively.
It will be seen that conflict between the administering 
Powers and their allies and the anti-colonial Powers
39 According to private diplomatic papers seen by the 
writer, the Australian delegation warned that ’hyper­
critical and often ill-informed and intemperate opinions' 
expressed at the late 19^6 Assembly session, as well 
as pressure exerted by strong groups of Powers in the 
context of Chapter XI, called for the close attention 
of the Australian Government. It would be necessary to 
see that the ad hoc committee took a ’constructive view of 
its task’. At the same time, it urged that, in view of 
the temper of the United Nations, Australia should 
vigorously pursue enlightened canons of administration 
so that she could maintain a reputation for ’up-to-date 
and progressive policies’ and should also disseminate as 
widely as possible information about the peculiar 
difficulties which she faced in her administration.
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showed itself late in 19^ -6 on a wide range of issues,
including trusteeship agreements of sensitive interest
to Australia. In this setting, the secretariat’s
assumption of the probability of politics becoming
involved in the use of information submitted under 73e
4owas bound to cause disquiet. That Australia and other 
administering Powers accepted a Special Committee after 
opposing the establishment of the ad hoc committee, 
and despite discomfort experienced in the ad hoc
41committee, was rational. Enjoying equal representation
with the non-reporting Powers, the administering Powers’
experience of the ad hoc committee suggested that they
4-2could modify the activities of such a body. Given
40 The secretariat’s action in submitting a draft at 
all caused some disquiet; that it launched the idea 
of an ad hoc committee and assumed political problems 
caused more (expressed, particularly, by the British 
delegate). For a view of the secretariat’s role in 
general, see Jacobson, op.cit., p.39»
41 The ad hoc committee’s rapporteur (G. Perez Cisneros, 
of Cuba) wrote that the 'situation in Non-Self-Governing 
Territories and the problems existing there were the 
objects of much critical comment on the part of the 
representatives of China, Egypt, India and the Soviet 
Union...representatives of Members responsible...main­
tained their position that many of these criticisms were 
unfounded, and that some of these questions were outside 
the competence of the Committee’ (GAOR, 2nd S., 4th Ctee., 
Annex 4a, p.206).
42 The form of the ad hoc committee's proposal for the 
establishment of the Special Committee, for example, was 
the result of a United States-India compromise (ibid., p.
21 1). With Latin American support, too, Australia and 
several other administering Powers were able to have the 
ad hoc committee decide that the analysis of voluiiarily 
submitted political information was outside the 
committee's competence (ibid., p.205)»
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their minority standing in the Assembly, there was, 
too, an inclination to co-operate to some degree with 
the strong anti-colonial groups.
the expert body desired at one time by Australia, 
but as a highly political body. Had it been more 
apolitical sind had Australia and her administering 
colleagues been under less pressure from the anti­
colonial Powers, the Indian view that ’the Committee 
constituted a guarantee that the Administering 
Authorities were seriously discharging their obligations 
under Article 73© of the Charter’ ' might still also 
have reflected Australian policy. As it was,
Australia viewed the information committee with 
wariness and, as will be seen below, at times with 
hostility.
43 GAQR, 4th S., Supplement No.l4, p.12. This kind 
of view was near the middle of the spectrum of views 
expressed. Further to the left, as it were, was the 
Polish view that ’the General Assembly was entitled to 
acquire the necessary information in order to ensure 
the well-being of dependent peoples and their eventual 
attainment of self-government’ (GAQR, 4th S., 4th Ctee., 
113th Mtg., No.2, 1949, p .118). Further to the right
was the British view denying to the United Nations even 
the slightest right to supervision or accountability 
in more than a most general way; ’it was within the 
rights of the General Assembly to establish a committee 
to perfect the techniques of submission and nothing 
more’ (GAQR, 4th S., Supplement No.14, p.12).
The information committee emerged not as
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Article 73© of the charter allowed the 
international society to learn of conditions in non­
self-governing territories by means of information 
to be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations by administering members. Two questions 
were subsequently raised; what kind of information 
should the administering Powers submit, and was the 
submission of information by administering Powers to 
comprise the United Nations' only source of knowledge 
about conditions in the territories.
Members raising the question of what kind 
of information should be transmitted almost invariably 
have had in mind what they have seen as the desirability 
of having political information transmitted. Article 
73© refers only to 'statistical and other information 
of a technical nature relating to economic, social 
and educational conditions in the territories...'.
At San Francisco, Australia seemed initially to want 
the charter to have administering Powers report on 
all aspects of their administrations and, from the 
beginning, she has each year submitted political 
information in her reports on her own non-self-governing 
territory of Papua. Australia, however, has still
II.
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insisted that, as Article 73 stands, there is no 
obligation on administering members to provide such 
information.
The contrary view of the anti-colonial 
Powers has been that, while 73© does not mention 
political information and says that information is 
transmitted only for information purposes, the 
United Nations does have a duty to see that administering 
members meet their undertaking to seek to achieve the 
objectives of administration listed earlier in the 
article, and these include political development.
This function of the United Nations, they have argued, 
cannot be fulfilled if they are not informed of 
political developments in the territories. They 
have argued besides that economic, social and 
educational matters cannot usefully be considered 
outside a political context.
This question was raised almost at the outset 
of Assembly discussions about the implementation of 
Chapter XI of the charter. In 19^6, China and India, 
for example, argued that, while there was no formal 
obligation on the administering Powers to provide 
political information, the submission of such information
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was very desirable. The Soviet Union went further 
and argued that the United Nations could not adequately
45fulfil its functions without political information. J
Putting the Australian view, Bailey agreed that the
submission of political information was desirable,
but that it must remain optional:
...Chapter XI was a declaration of trust, 
voluntarily made by certain Members of the 
United Nations, and declaring the policy 
they would themselves follow in the admini­
stration of their Non-Self-Governing 
Territories. The obligation to transmit the 
information mentioned in Article 73(e) was 
the sole specific obligation undertaken 
vis-a-vis the Organization, and was clearly 
limited.46
Britain, France and Belgium expressed the same view. 
Indeed, when the rapporteur of a Fourth Committee sub­
committee noted what he took to be general approval
for the Assembly declaring the desirability of
political information being submitted, Britain forced
hia vote on tne paragraph and had it deleted.
In 19^ +7» the ad hoc committee described 
above noted in its report that some Powers were
44 GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., Part III, p.12.
h5 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p.13.
47 Ibid., 4th Ctee., Annex 21, p.202.
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submitting political information and stated that this 
practice was entirely in conformity with the charter,
Xn the Fourth Committee, the Soviet Union succeeded 
in having this amended so that the draft, as it left 
the Fourth Committee, conveyed subtly that Powers 
which had submitted political information had fulfilled 
an obligation and had the Assembly recommend that other
48administering Powers do likewise, Xn the Assembly,
Australia was among a majority which rejected the
Fourth Committee draft as amended by the Soviet union
and adopted in its place the original ad hoc committee 
4qdraft. In 1948, when Forsyth, for Australia, allowed 
that the Assembly was competent to express a wish to 
have political information submitted but not to
48 GAOR, 2nd S., Annex 14, pp.1547-8•
49 In the Fourth Committee, where the Soviet amendment 
was carried by only one vote, Australia somewhat 
surprisingly abstained. In the Assembly, however, 
Australia voted with a majority against the Soviet- 
amended draft and for the original ad hoc committee 
draft (see Evatt Report, 1947, p. 92) , which became 
Resolution 144(II) on its adoption by a vote of 44-2-5 
(GAOR, 2nd S., 108th PI.Mtg., Nov.3, 1947, p.732). Australia here parted company from Britain which,
with Belgium, voted against both the Soviet-amended 
draft and the milder draft which became Resolution
144(11).
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50criticise Powers which did not submit it, the
Fourth Committee and the Assembly adopted an information
51committee draft acceptable to the administering Powers.
This merely asked the Secretary-General to invite
administering members to provide information 'in relation
to the geography, history, people of, and human rights
in the Territories concerned.'.
In 1949, the Soviet Union again tried in the
information committee to have accepted a draft making
the submission of political information obligatory,
but failed to enlist sufficient support. In the event,
the committee adopted an Indian draft which expressed
the hope that administering members which had not so
52far submitted political information would do so.
Amended by Cuba to include a recommendation that the 
submission of information on territories' geography, 
history, social composition and observance of human
50 GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt., Supplement No.12, p.8.
51 This draft, which became Resolution 2l8(lll), was 
adopted by a vote of 41-6-2, Australia and other 
administering Powers voting with the majority (ibid., 
155th PI.Mtg., Nov.3, 19^8, P.393).
52 To this point, only Australia, New Zealand and
the United States voluntarily were submitting political 
information.
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rights be made obligatory when next the standard form
53was revised,' this draft was adopted by the Fourth
54Committee and the Assembly. Debate on these drafts,
to which Australia did not contribute, was interesting
in that new views were expressed. India, for example,
accepted the administering Powers' legal argument
that they were not bound by the charter as it stood
to submit political information, but argued that a
convention could be validly established without formal
55charter amendment. And Britain expressed publicly 
her disinclination to see administering Powers made 
to supply political information which could be
56misused in the United Nations.
The second question mentioned above, that 
of alternative sources of information, was raised 
in 1946 when the Philippines proposed in the Fourth 
Committee that there should be a conference of dependent 
peoples outside the trusteeship system. It would be 
authorised by the Assembly, and it would be convened 
by the Economic and Social Council which would assess
53 This standard form, of United States origin, was 
adopted by the Assembly in 19^7» It included a so-called 
'optional category' in which, in 1948, was included 
information on the geogr<^hy, history, etc., of territories.
54 The Assembly adopted the draft, which became 
Resolution 327(lV), by a vote of 33-9-11 (GAOR, 4th S., 
263rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, 1949, p •461).
55 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 117th Mtg., Nov.5, 1949, p.139*
56 Ibid., p.138.
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information provided by conference participants and
submit recommendations to the Assembly. The Assembly
would then take ’appropriate action, to effectively
ensure the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by
the metropolitan powers in the declaration.embodied
57in Chapter XI of the Charter'. This proposal to 
obtain information from a source not provided for 
in the charter aid to have the Economic and Social 
Council acting almost as a Trusteeship Council (the 
conference serving in the stead of petitions and 
visiting missions) was referred to the Sixth Committee. 
To avoid almost certain legal objections, therefore, 
the Philippines delegation drastically re-wrote the 
draft resolution so that it merely called on the 
Assembly to recommend to administering Powers that
58regional conferences of dependent peoples be held.
This was given a legal clearance by the Sixth Committee
59and was adopted by a Fourth Committee sub-committee.'
In the Fourth Committee, the Soviet Union sought to 
recapture something of the spirit of the original 
Philippines notion with an amendment having the
57 GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., Annex 21, p.290.
58 Ibid., pp.290-1.
59 Ibid., Part III, p.79*
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Economic and Social Council organise the holding of 
conferences at which dependent peoples would have 
a chance to express 'their wishes and aspirations'
The Australian view put by Bailey was that the Soviet 
amendment was objectionable because, among other things:
...it did not mention whether the Economic and 
Social Council would act through the inter­
mediary of the Governments administering 
non-self-governing territories or whether it 
would by-pass them in calling the conferences. 
The second assumption would involve a violation 
of the Charter.0 '
Despite the administering Powers' objections, the 
Philippines draft, as amended by the Soviet Union, 
was adopted by the Fourth Committee. In the Assembly, 
Cuba sought to make the draft more acceptable by 
submitting an amendment with the effect of again having 
the Assembly simply recommend regional conferences; 
the sovereignty of administering Powers would not be 
impaired by the intrusion of a United Nations body 
and there was now no question of official United
63Nations activity as a result of such conferences.
60 Ibid., 4th Ctee., Annex 15a> p.248.
61 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 21st Mtg., Dec.8, 1946, p.130.
62 Ibid., P.131.
6 3 Ibid., 64th PI.Mtg., Dec.14, 1946, p.1356.
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The Cuban amendment was carried. So innocuous
was the draft resolution thus amended that Assembly
president P-H. Spaak told his Belgian delegation to
64vote for it because it was 'so conciliatory... ’ .
The amended ^resolution draft was adopted; the one 
delegation to vote against it was the Australian.
If information could not be obtained directly 
from dependent peoples for use in and by the United 
Nations, there remained other possible sources than 
the administering Powers. In what looked to be a 
rare attempt by the administering Powers to take the 
initiative, Australia, the United States, Britain, 
France, the Netherlands and Denmark, supported by 
Uruguay, in 19^7 had the ad hoc information committee
64 Ibid., p.1357.
63 This amended draft, which became Resolution 67(1), 
was adopted by a vote of 31 - 1-21 (ibid.). Most of the 
abstentions were by Communist and Latin American 
members showing their preference for the stronger draft 
accepted in the Fourth Committee. The administering 
Powers' vote was split: Belgium, Denmark, New Zealand,
Britain and. the United States voted for the draft, 
and France and the Netherlands abstained. According 
to private diplomatic papers seen by the writer, the 
Australian delegation was intransigent on this question 
because it felt it should be on record as opposing a 
resolution in conflict with the charter (that is, that 
acceptance would compromise the Australian view that 
Chapter XI left administrative policy exclusively with 
the responsible Powers), and because it wished to avoid 
any implication that the United Nations might have some 
supervisory authority in relation to the South Pacific 
Commission.
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provide in its procedural suggestions for the use of 
information allowing comparisons between dependent 
territories and sovereign states.^ In the Fourth 
Committee, India moved for the deletion of this 
provision, and the Soviet Union proposed its replace­
ment with an authorisation of comparisons between 
territories and their metropolitan states. India’s 
argument was that 'good government was no substitute 
for self-government’; she and her supporters feared 
that administering Powers would try to justify their 
regimes by pointing to the existence of worse in 
independent states. If comparisons were to be made, 
India preferred the Soviet alternative. After a 
long debate, to which Australia did not contribute,
the Indian move failed, but the Soviet proposal was
68carried. In the Assembly, however, western Powers
obtained sufficient Latin American support to have
the Soviet proposal defeated so that the draft adopted
by the Assembly fundamentally was that suggested
originally by the ad hoc committee at the behest of
69the administering Powers.
66 GAOR, 2nd S., 4th Ctee., 1947, Annex 4a, pp.209-10.
67 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 36th Mtg., Oct.3, 1947, p.30.
68 Ibid., 41st Mtg., Oct.10, pp.70-1.
69 This draft, which became Resolution 143(h ), 
adopted 44-0-0 (lOöth PI.Mtg., Nov.3, p-719).
was
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In 19^8» the Assembly adopted a draft based
mainly on an information committee suggestion that
the Economic and Social Council should provide what
relevant information it might have and that the
Secretary-General collate material available from the
70specialised agencies. The following year, 19^9» 
saw these developments taken much further; Australia, 
to the mystification of her administering colleagues, 
helped spur them on.
The first followed from an information committee 
proposal inviting administering Powers to abolish
71discrimination in their territories’ education systems. 
This was amended by Cuba in the Fourth Committee to 
read even more like a Trusteeship Council recommendation 
in that it would have the administering Powers submit 
data on relative costs where schools were not integrated. 
The orthodox opposition to this sort of proposal was 
expressed by the British delegate:
70 This proposal was adopted by the Assembly in the
form of two drafts, which became Resolutions 220 and 
22l(lll) and each of which was accepted by a vote of 
44-0-7 - Australia voting for both (GAOR, 3rd S.,
1st. Pt., 155th PI.Mtg., Nov.3, 1948, pp.393-M•
71 GAOR, 4th S., Supplement No.l4, Annex 2, pp.16-17*
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...the draft resolution suggested that the 
General Assembly was in a position to invite 
Member States to adopt a certain policy in 
the Non-Self-Governing Territories for which 
they had exclusive responsibility. A very 
important issue was involved, far wider than 
just the question of discrimination in education. 
If the draft resolution was adopted, the 
Committee would be interfering in a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction, arrogating to itself  ^
an authority which it does not in fact possess.
Australia abstained in the Fourth Committee voting on
the amendment as such, but voted for the draft as
7 Qamended, whereas Britain (alone) voted 'against'.
The second sprang from an information committee 
proposal that UNESCO be asked to collaborate with 
administering Powers in studying how indigenous languages 
might be preserved and used as languages of instruction 
in schools. In the Fourth Committee, Yugoslavia sought 
to amend this so as to have UNESCO asked also to study 
how the use of local languages in schools might be 
accelerated, and Syria submitted an amendment recommending 
to the administering Powers that they promote the use 
of local languages and that they report on the scope 
and results of such promotion. The reaction of some
72 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 117th Mtg., Nov.5, 1949, p.141.
73 Ibid., p.142. This draft, which became Resolution 328(iv), was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 
44-1-7 (ibid., 263rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, p.46l).
administering Powers was to argue that a request for 
UNESCO interest should come from themselves; as 
the British delegate put it, ’neither the Assembly 
nor the Committee had the requisite legal competence 
to give instructions to the Administering Powers on 
questions that were essentially within the latter's
74province'. Britain, with France and Belgium, 
voted against the draft as amended, but Australia
75was content with an abstention.
A third, similar proposal from the information 
committee was that UNESCO be asked to advise admini­
stering members on the eradication of illiteracy in 
their territories. Britain, again, expressed hostility 
to encroachment on an area felt to be the exclusive
ry S
concern of administering Powers. Britain and Belgium,
among others, abstained in the Fourth Committee, but 
Australia voted for the draft as amended by Cuba 
to have UNESCO report to the United Nations on the 
extent to which its services had been used by the
74 Ibid. , 4th C tee., 119th Mtg., Nov.8, p.152.
75 Ibid., p . 157. This draft, which became Resolution 
329(lV), was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 
34-4-13 (ibid., 263rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, p.46l).
118th Mtg., Nov.7, p.144.76 Ibid. , 4th Ctee. ,
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77administering Powers. A fourth proposal emanating
from the information committee was that the Assembly-
should stress the need for close co-operation between
specialised agencies and the administering Powers in
meeting the developmental problems of te r r i to r ie s .
Britain scorned this proposal as unnecessary and
redundant and voted against a draft giving i t  effect;
78
Australia voted for i t .
A f i f th  proposal came from Australia. 
Supplementary to the fourth draft just described, 
i t  provided merely for the Secretary-General to keep 
the information committee informed of the nature of 
technical assistance afforded dependent te r r i to r ie s  
by specialised agencies. Australia tr ied to raise 
this  matter in the information committee but, while 
India had been enthusiastic, Britain had been uneasy 
about the implications of an introductory paragraph 
in the Australian draft noting 1 the special interest
7 7  Ib id . , p.148. This draf t,  which became Resolution 
330(IV) , was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 
42-0-10 (ib id . , 263rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, p .461).
78 Ib id . , 4th Ctee., 118th Mtg., Nov.7, p .150.
This draft,  which became Resolution 33l(Vl), was 
adopted by the Assembly by a vote ol 39-2—8 (Ib id ., 
2 6 3 rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, p.46l).
which the members of the Special Committee.,.have in
measures adopted by Governments responsible for
Non-Self-Governing Territories concerning the economic
and social welfare of the inhabitants of such 
79Territories’. Because of this, and because other 
administering Powers had been mystified as to its 
purpose, Australia had decided to raise the matter
80later in the Fourth Committee. There, the Australian
delegate, Hood, argued that the administering Powers
needed technical assistance and that it would be
useful to the information committee to know what
assistance was being afforded. He spoke of rendering
the task of the information committee ’more constructive 
81and effective’. Australia was supported by a number
of anti-colonial Powers; Syria, Cuba, Guatemala, Lebanon
India and Egypt. The British delegation objected to
the implication that it was for anyone but the
administering Power to suggest a need for technical
assistance; it was not for the information committee
Ö2to interpose itself. Only Britain, France, Belgium
79 GAQR, 4th S., Annex, Ag.It.35» p p .120-1.
80 Ibid., Supplement N o .14, p.15«
81 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 127th Mtg., Nov.17, 1949, pp.197-8
82 Ibid., p.198.
and an unrecorded fourth Power failed to vote for 
the Australian draft, ^
This bracket of five resolutions, four of 
which received voting approval from Australia, had 
dual significance: it comprised attempted United 
Nations interference with the administering Powers, 
either indirectly in the form of recommendations to 
them or indirectly in the form of requests to third 
parties to interest themselves in those Powers' 
territories; at the same time, it comprised an 
attempt to widen the sources and scope of information 
supplied to the United Nations. On the particular 
issues in question, economic and social issues, 
Australia was prepared to be less intransigent 
than she had been, and was still, on issues with 
political implications. This latter aspect of 
Australian policy, an intransigence where political 
issues were involved, showed itself in the working 
out of the third major question noted above: when was 
the obligation to report in terms of Article 73© 
applicable ?
83 Ibid., p.199. This draft, which became Resolution 
336(iv), was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 
46-1-3 (ibid., 263rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, p.46l).
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Chapter XI of the charter, it was observed 
above, does not define a non-self-governing territory, 
on which the relevant administering Power is obliged 
under Article to transmit information. During
the first part of the Assembly's first (1946) session, 
it has also been seen, the Secretary-General was 
authorised to summarise and report on information 
submitted. In June, 19^6, he wrote to United Nations 
members asking them to give an opinion on factors to 
be considered in determining what comprised a non­
self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter 
XI and to list such territories under their jurisdiction. 
Australia seems not to have commented on factors involved 
in a definition, but to have given Papua as a non­
self-governing territory on which she would submit
84information. At the second part of the first session, 
when the question was referred to the Fourth Committee, 
Bailey suggested that it was not necessary to arrive at 
a definition; it would be better to proceed with a list 
of seventy-four territories on which eight members 
had said they would transmit information. If a member
III.
84 See GAOR, 1st S,, 2nd Pt. , 
274-6.
4th Ctee., Annex 19 * PP*
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felt that a relevant territory had been omitted,
85he could call attention to the fact. The Australian 
view, shared by Britain and the United States among 
others, was that adopted by the Fourth Committee 
and the Assembly.^ a  list of the seventy-four 
territories was incorporated in Resolution 66(l) 
referred to above in connection with the establishment 
of the ad hoc information committee.
The question next arose in its negative aspect? 
when is a territory n o t , or no longer, non-self- 
governing. It arose because information failed to 
be submitted on some territories listed in Resolution 
66(l). In 1948 * when there were eleven such territories, 
India submitted a proposal whereby the Assembly would 
note that not all administering Powers were reporting 
on territories listed and would ask administering 
Powers to inform the United Nations of constitutional 
developments such as to make reporting, in the view 
of those Powers, no longer applicable. / In effect, 
the administering Powers were not to be left free to 
decide for themselves when reporting was now inappro­
priate, even though they had been left largely free to
85 Ibid., 4th Ctee., Part III, 2nd Mtg., Nov.18, 1946, p.9*
86 Ibid., 64th PI.Mtg., Dec.14, p.1369.
87 GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt., 4th Ctee., 57th Mtg., Oct.14, 
19^8 , p.59.
say when it was appropriate in the first place. The 
aspects of the Indian proposal objectionable to the 
administering Powers were that a sort of political 
information was being requested and that it placed 
them in danger of having to defend what they regarded 
as domestic policy. That is, if a Power felt that 
a territory had achieved such a degree of self-government 
or independent status that the submission of information 
on it was no longer appropriate, it would have to 
explain its reasons and, presumably, justify itself.
The view of many anti-colonial Powers was expressed 
by Haiti; 'The Administering Powers were in the position 
of guardians of the Non-Self-Governing Territories;
8they could not dispose of them as their own property...’.
The administering Powers split on the issue. The United
89States found the Indian proposal 'logical and proper';
so, too, did the Netherlands. New Zealand found the
principle of having the United Nations informed
acceptable but feared that the wording of the Indian
draft might allow United Nations discussion of
90administering Powers' activities.
88 Ibid., 60th Mtg
89 Ibid., •C\00•ft
90 Ibid., p . 8 7 .
Oc t.1 8 , p .9 1 •
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Britain was less happy about the principle and scarcely
91doubted that unwarranted discussion would ensue.
Hood, for Australia, objected firmly; Australia, he
said, was 'quite unable to accept anything which
might be interpreted to mean that the Administering
Powers should provide details of constitutional changes,
and possibly be called upon to defend them before the
92General Assembly...1. In the event, the Indian
draft was accepted by the Fourth Committee (with
the United States and the Netherlands voting with
the majority, and Australia and the other administering
Powers abstaining) and was adopted subsequently by 
93the Assembly.
The question arose again in 19^9 when France 
was criticised for not having reported on a number of 
territories claimed to have the status, or virtual 
status, of overseas departments, Britain for having 
failed to document her decision that Malta had achieved 
a degree of self-government such as to make reporting- 
no longer appropriate, the United States for not having
91 Ibid., p.82.
92 Ibid., p.85.
93 Ibid., p .95. This draft, which became Resolution 
222(lll), was adopted by the Assembly without 
opposition (ibid. , 155th Pl.Mtg., Nov. 3» P*39^)*
submitted information on the Panama Canal Zone, and
95the Netherlands for having reported on Indonesia.
The Soviet Union tr ied to advance on the previous year* s 
Indian resolution by proposing in the information 
committee that an administering Power should not merely 
inform the United Nations of constitutional changes so 
important that a te rr i to ry  had moved outside the ambit 
of Chapter XI of the charter, but should be obliged to 
continue submitting reports un ti l  the information 
committee was satisfied that the te rr i to ry  was in fact 
self-governing and beyond the scope of the reporting 
obligation. This proposal would have had administering 
Powers discussing and clearing policy with a United
94
94 This was ironical in that in 1946, when the United 
States included the Canal Zone among te r r i to r ie s  on 
which she would submit information, Panama had objected 
that the United States was not competent to do this,
and the United States had agreed to reconsider the matter.
95 Anti-colonial Powers, and especially the Soviet Union, 
argued that Indonesia was a sovereign state and that the 
Netherlands, by submitting information on the area,
was supposing the contrary. In view of her stand on 
the Indonesian question in the Security Council (to be 
described below), i t  was curious to find Australia 
coming down with the Netherlands in the information 
committee; ' . . . t h e  Committee was not competent to consider 
what were the constitutional relations between a 
te rr i to ry  and the metropolitan government* (GAOR, 4th 
S., Supplement N o . 1 4 ,  p.3)* Following a policy dictated 
presumably by home colonial rather than general foreign 
policy c r i te r ia ,  the Australian delegate said no more 
than that the Netherlands might have refrained, but the 
decision was hers to take. In the Security Council, 
Australia was arguing that Indonesia was an independent 
s ta te .
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Nations body betöre putting it into effect, a practice 
which these Powers, and especially Australia, it will 
be seen below, refused to entertain even within the 
trusteeship system of Chapters XXI and XIII of the 
charter. Australia joined Britain, France and Belgium 
in declaring that the constitutional relationship 
between a metropolitan Power and its dependencies 
was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
that Power, which alone could judge whether a change 
in that relationship absolved it of the obligation 
to report under 73^. They were successful in their
stand and the information committee decided that the
 ^ 96Soviet proposal fell outside its competence.
In the Fourth Committee in 1949, Egypt returned 
to the basic definition issue. Her delegation submitted 
a draft resolution which declared the Assembly* s 
responsibility to express an opinion on principles 
to be taken into account in deciding territories to 
which Article 73e applied; further, it had the Assembly
97ask the information committee to examine such factors. 
Australia and her administering colleagues voted against
96 Ibid., p .2.
97 GAOR, 4th S., Annexes, Ag.lt,, 35, p.120.
121
the draft, which was adopted by the Fourth Committee
98and the Assembly.
IV.
A brief analysis of the voting, or views
expressed, on resolutions adopted by the Assembly in
1946-9 would, at first glance, seem to suggest evidence
for the opinions quoted in the Introduction to this
work: during her Labor Government's term of office,
which concluded after the Assembly's fourth session
in 19^9, Australia tended to place a 'broad construction'
on the charter, to be permissive in her response to
the activities of the anti-colonial Powers to the point
almost of appearing to be in their ranks. Of nineteen
resolutions noted on preceding pages, Australia
supported twelve (in one instance after voting against
part of the resolution and, in another, after
abstaining on part), voted against three and abstained
on two; of the remaining two, almost certainly she
99supported one and opposed the other.
98 This draft, which became Resolution 334(lV) , was 
adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 30-12-10 (ibid., 
263rd Pl.Mtg., Dec.2, p.46l).
99 Australia supported Resolutions 9(l) > 143(h ) >
144(H), 218(111), 219(111), 220(111), 221(111), 328 (IV) , 
330(iv), 331(IV), 332(iv) and 336fiv), and almost 
certainly l46(ll); she opposed 66(l), 67(1) and 334(lV), 
and almost certainly 327(lV); she abstained in voting
222(111) and 329(IV).on
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A closer examination of these resolutions, 
however, shows a simple numerical indicator to be 
misleading. Xn fact, the resolutions supported by 
Australia were minor or u t ter ly  negligible in their 
effect on the administering Powers* exclusive control 
of the ir  te rr i to r ies ;  those she did not support 
comprised the few adopted drafts which could be seen 
as endangering that control. Thus, she approved: 
the quite harmless request to the Secretary-General 
to summarise and report on information received 
under Article 73© - 9 ( l ) ; the favourable provision 
for comparative information on te r r i to r ie s  and 
independent states - 143 ( i l ) ; the only s lightly
•loaded* statement that the submission of p o l i t ic a l  
information was in conformity with the charter and 
should be encouraged - l 4 4 ( i x ) ;  the request for 
information on te r r i to r ie s  * physical and social back­
grounds and observance of human r ights,  but within 
the optional category of the standard form - 218(XII); 
the proposal in 1 9 ^ 8  to extend the information 
committee's l i f e  by one year, as opposed to three 
years or permanently - 2 1 9 ( l l l ) ;  the use of relevant 
information provided by the Economic and Social Council 
22 0 ( l l l ) ; the collation by the Secretary-General of
information from the specialised agencies - 221(ill); 
a call for the abolition of discrimination in territories* 
education systems amended so that relative expenditure 
in segregated systems also was requested of the 
administering Powers - 328(lV); a call to UNESCO to 
collaborate with administering Powers in combating 
illiteracy and to report on the use made of its services 
- 330(lV); a statement of the need for co-operation 
between specialised agencies and the administering 
Powers in meeting territories* problems -331(lV); the 
proposal in 19^9 to renew the information committee’s 
mandate for three years, rather than permanently - 
332(lV); the provision of information about the 
technical assistance afforded administering Powers 
by specialised agencies - 336(lV). It seems, too, 
that she approved the establishment of the information 
committee in 19^-7 - l46(ll).
Except for the establishment of the information 
committee in 19^7 » however, these resolutions were 
largely peripheral to the anti-colonial Powers’ central 
endeavour of trying to extend the role of the United 
Nations from that allowed by a literal reading of 
Chapter XI of the charter to one of supervision, and 
generally to have ignored the administering Powers’
vieitf that, in the last resort, they were masters of
their non-self-governing territories. Rather more 
important were those resolutions which Australia opposed 
or, in the voting on which, she abstained. She voted 
against Resolution 66(l) establishing the ad hoc 
information committee, 67(1) calling for dependent 
peoples’ conferences, 33^(lV) seeking a list of factors 
relevant to a definition of a non-self-governing 
territory and declaring the Assembly’s responsibilities 
in the matter. It is likely, too, that she opposed 
327(lV) whereby the Assembly expressed the hope 
that administering Powers would submit political 
information. She abstained on 222(lll), which asked 
for the submission of constitutional information 
relevant to an administering Power's decision not to 
transmit further information on a territory under 73e > 
and on 329(iV) which recommended to administering 
Powers that they promote the use of indigenous languages 
in their territories and report on the results.
Even more to the point, Australia opposed most 
of the major proposals which failed to enlist sufficient 
support to become resolutions. It has been seen that 
she opposed, for example, proposals that the Trustee­
ship Council deal with information transmitted under
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73©> that the information committee be established
on a permanent basis, that communications from
territories’ indigenes be considered, that United
Nations representatives visit territories, that
administering Powers should report until the Assembly
was satisfied that such reporting had become inappropriate.
Australia, then, was a little more flexible than 
some of her administering colleagues, including 
Britain. In 19^9» clearly, Australia was accepting 
the information committee and allowing it an area of 
activity in which she would positively co-operate 
with it. She was prepared, unlike most of her 
colleagues, to submit political information, but the 
choice had to remain hers to make. She fairly 
consistently opposed the anti-colonial Powers in 
their efforts to loosen the grip of the administering 
Powers on their territories. Compromises which she 
did make, especially in 19^9 » were in line with what, 
it has been suggested, was the substance of her policy 
originally at San Francisco. Xn 19^5» and still in 
1949, her policies at base were welfare rather than 
decolonialist policies; she did not envisage thereby 
any significant diminution of her authority in her
own dependencies.
C H A P T E R  4
N O N - S E L F - G O V E R N I N G
T E R R I T O R I E S
( p a r t  i i  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 3 )
By the end of the fourth (1949) Assembly
session, it was apparent that, 'on what might be
regarded as the very narrow basis of the obligation
under Article 73© for certain States to transmit
technical information to the Secretary-General, there
have emerged in a brief period of four years procedures,
objectives, studies and proposals for action which
have made Chapter XI one of the most vital sections
1of the Charter’. The momentum of decolonialist 
pressures within the context of Chapter XI gathered 
pace during the 1950s. Accountability, in the limited 
form applied in the League’s supervision of its mandates, 
became routine: the Assembly and its committees
discussed conditions in non-self-governing territories 
often in great detail, criticised them and sought 
changes in them.
Attempts to achieve and tighten United Nations 
supervision of the administering Powers occurred 
piecemeal on a number of fronts but, at least 
retrospectively, it is possible to discern a p a t t e m  
in them and in Australia's responses to them. The 
main elements in the pattern of attempts to develop 
United Nations supervision comprised:,(1) continuation
1 Anon., ’International Responsibility for Colonial 
Peoples’ in International Conciliation, No.458 
(Feb., 1950), p.55.
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of the existence of the information committee as a 
body whose functions could be expanded virtually 
to those of a trusteeship council; (2) efforts to widen 
the sources and nature of the information with which 
this committee and the Assembly could work; (3) efforts 
to have accepted the prerogative of the United Nations 
in determining the applicability in specific instances 
of Chapter XI and its obligations; (4) related to 
this prerogative, efforts to have accepted another 
allowing the Assembly to determine when Chapter XI 
no longer applied (in effect, the establishment of 
the United Nations’ right to certify the true 
independence or self-government of a territory);
(5) the building up of pressure for an increasingly 
rapid achievement of administrative aims, including 
that of independence.
More will be said of the general Australian 
reaction after a brief examination of these main 
elements and the particular Australian response in 
each case. It will be seen, however, that, for 
reasons which usually were legal in expression but 
as a rule almost certainly political in fact, Australia 
on the whole opposed decolonialist pressures of the 
sort just indicated. At the same time, she held largely
1 29
to her fundamental acceptance of a measure of
accountability and co-operation with the United Nations
when such co-operation did not seem to entail a
surrender by administering Powers of ultimate political
control of their territories or of their sovereign
status, as they saw it, as United Nations members. Xt
will be seen further that, for reasons to be discussed
below, this Australian response changed markedly
2at the end of the decade.
I.
The information committee had its mandate
renewed in 19^9 for three years. When this term
expired in 1 9 5 2, a group of twenty-one states proposed
permanence for it in terms which were to recur a
3decade later and with different results. These were
2 The characteristics and pattern of the Australian 
response over the whole range of the colonial question 
will be discussed in a later chapter.
3 It will be seen below that, in 1961, when a similar 
proposal was successful, and when the anti-colonial 
Powers virtually had ‘won* their major campaign in 
the United Nations, the Australian reaction was quite 
different. For an interesting, if slightly partisan, 
account of the history of the committee, see Usha Sud, 
'Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing 
Territories: Its Role in the Promotion of Self-Deter­
mination of Colonial Peoples' in International Studies, 
V ol. VII (1965), No. 2 (Oct.), p .3 11sq.
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that the committee should continue in being, not for
the further three-year term suggested by the committee
itself, but for as long as there existed territories
not yet fully self-governing. The Australian delegation
approved a further three-year term: ’...the machinery
so far established and its functioning over a three-
year period had been fairly satisfactory...’, said
Forsyth in the Fourth Committee. But he opposed
permanence on by now familiar grounds:
...the fundamental distinction between Non- 
Self -Governing Territories and Trust 
Territories was reflected in the fact that 
while the Charter had established the 
Trusteeship Council to supervise the 
administration of Trust Territories, it had 
omitted - and not by accident - the principle 
of supervision in the case of the Non-Self- 
Governing Territories. The Trust Territories 
were wards of the United Nations; the Non- 
Self-Goveming Territories constituted part 
of the sovereignty and territory of the 
administering Members. Their relationship 
to the United Nations was fundamentally 
different and it would be going far beyond the 
spirit and letter of^the Charter to establish 
permanent machinery.
In effect, Forsyth was saying that Australia accepted 
the committee and, despite dissatisfaction with some 
of its activities, supported its continued existence 
provided that its mandate was not so framed as to bolster 
already (to Australia) objectionable tendencies 
towards an exertion of supervision.
4 GAOR, 7th S., 4th Ctee., 266th Mtg., Nov.7, 1952, p.121
In the event, the committee’s mandate was
5renewed for three years and, when this term expired
in 1955» Australia voted with a majority for its
renewal for yet a further three years.0 The
Australian delegate, P.E. Joske, stated explicitly
that his vote was intended to signify Australia’s
7willingness to co-operate with the committee. In 
1958» Australia abstained in an Assembly vote on a 
proposal to have the committee continue again for 
three years, not because of any objections to the term
5 Despite the opposition of Australia and other 
administering Powers, the Fourth Committee adopted an 
amended version of the joint draft (by a vote of 40-12-2) 
whereby the committee would continue for three years and 
permanently thereafter unless the AssemDi^ should 
decide otherwise (Ibid. , 267th Mtg. , Nov.8 , p.127).
In the Assembly, Britain, Belgium and France announced 
that they would not co-operate with a permanent body, 
and enough Latin American and Asian states switched to 
abstentions to allow the draft adopted by the Fourth 
Committee to be amended so that only a further three- 
year term was provided for. The draft thus amended, 
which became Resolution 646(VIl), was adopted by 53-2-3 
(ibid., 402nd Pl.Mtg., Dec.10, p.355).
6 GAOR, 10th S., 541st Pl.Mtg., Nov.8 , 1955, p.293*
The draft of what became Resolution 933(x) was adopted 
by a vote of ^U-l-2,
7 Ibid., 4th Ctee. , 489th Mtg. , Oct.27, p.121.
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or even to the wording of the draft in question,c but 
as a gesture of protest against 1 a number of develop­
ments which have lately taken place'. These, said 
Walker, included:
...the express wish of certain delegations 
to telescope the consideration of matters 
relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories 
and Trust Territories, to extend without 
justification the functions of the Fourth 
Committee..., and to disregard the explicit 
provisions of the Charter... and not least 
of all, to disregard the rights and 
responsibilities of Member States.9
In 1961, when the Committee's mandate came 
up again for renewal, the anti-colonial atmosphere 
had been heavily charged by the 1960 Declaration on 
Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples and the subsequent creation in 1961 of the 
Committee of Seventeen charged with implementation
8 A difficulty facing a delegation at the United Nations 
is that it must vote simply for or against (or abstain 
on) what are often long, multi-purpose drafts. Many 
delegations have tended to ignore objectionable 
terminology or even operative paragraphs provided they 
have sympathised with the general intent of a draft.
On colonial questions, administering members as a 
rule have been on the defensive and wary of the implica­
tions, or directly objectionable by-products, of terms 
of drafts; one objectionable point in a draft very 
often has led them, including Australia, to oppose 
the whole lest precedents be set and their future 
activities thereby circumscribed. More is said of 
this below.
9 GAOR, 13th S., 789th PI.Mtg. , Dec. 12, 1958, p.586.
The three-year renewal was effected by Resolution
1332(XIIl) which was adopted by a vote of 72-1-4 
(ibid., p .584).
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of the Declaration. In this  setting of new and,
to some, disturbing developments, there seemed to
be a tendency for the familiar information committee
to evoke a kind of loyalty from Powers like Australia,
and even Britain which, in the past, notably had been
10coolly disposed towards i t .  Although an Afro-Asian- 
Latin American group submitted a draft which would 
have the committee exist for as long as non-self- 
governing te r r i to r ie s  remained, examine po li t ical  
and constitutional information submitted by administering 
Powers, intensively examine po l i t ica l  as well as 
other conditions in te r r i to r ie s  and establish links 
with the Committee of Seventeen, Australia 's  reaction 
was moderate. L.R. McIntyre said that the Australian 
delegation found the d ra f t ' s  implied instruction to 
administering Powers to submit po l i t ica l  information 
unacceptable, but he was content to abstain in
10 Britain changed her policy and announced that in 
future she would submit po l i t ica l  and constitutional 
information to the committee. She was, however, somewhat 
more hostile to the joint draft than Australia, stressing 
that she would not tolerate interference in her domestic 
affairs .  I t  is  likely that new warmth towards the 
information committee, at least under i t s  former terms 
of reference, was not unconnected with the administering 
Powers' numerical strength in i t ;  they were in a small 
minority in the newly-established Committee of Seventeen.
Fourth Committee and Assembly voting on it. Australia,1 1
he said, had come to regard the committee as ’an
1 2established organ of the United Nations...’. He
said, moreover, that the committee had been useful
as a source of information and as a stimulus to the
administering Powers, and Australia would continue
1 3to co-operate with it. To the extent, then, that 
the information committee would continue to perform 
functions which Australia from the beginning had 
thought proper and desirable, and despite its 
performing functions which Australia very often did 
not regard as proper, Australia supported its 
continuing existence and would co-operate with it 
while still opposing what she saw as unconstitutional 
pressures on administering Powers. Indeed, two years
11 What became Resolution 1700(XVl) was adopted by 
an Assembly vote of 77-0-16, the abstainers including 
Communist states which preferred the information 
committee's extinction in view of the Committee of 
Seventeen's establishment (GAOR, l6th S . , 1083rd PI.
Mtg., Dec.19j 1961, p .1105)•
1 2 Ibid. , 4th Ctee. , 1251st Mtg. , Dec. 15 > p .6 0 7 . 
Australia's own preference was renewal for one year 




la te r ,  Australia appeared to regret the demise of
the committee. 1 f
I I .
The question of the nature of information 
to be submitted by the administering Powers continued 
to arise mainly in the form of argument about whether 
po l i t ica l  information should be included. The 
Australian attitude continued to be hostile  though, 
a f te r  i9 6 0 , more moderately expressed.
In 195^ j Tor example, an Afro-Asian draft 
resolution submitted in the Fourth Committee noted 
’with sa t isfac t ion 1 that some administering Powers
14 The Assembly (by Resolution 1970(XYIIl) adopted 
by a vote of 84-0-26) dissolved the information committee 
in 1 9 6 3  (GAOR, 18th S., 1281st Pl.Mtg., Dec.16, 1 9 6 3 ,
p.12). This followed a statement in the Fourth Committee 
by a secretariat off ic ia l  on behalf of the Secretary- 
General to the effect that, because most administering 
Powers were now submitting po l i t ica l  and constitutional 
information, the information committee and the Fourth 
Committee were tending to concentrate on pol i t ica l  and 
constitutional questions, and these were also the main 
concern of the Committee of Twenty-Four (as the 
Seventeen had become in 1 9 6 2 ). Thus, there was 
duplication and the secretaria t fe l t  that money, time 
and effort could be saved by concentration on one 
body (Ib id .,  4th Ctee., 1501st Mtg., Dec.4, p.479)* 
Australia, one of the many states to abstain on the 
question, and a state with a possible interest in the 
survival of a committee of equal colonial and an t i ­
colonial representation, suggested that the information 
committee had developed a special expertise and that 
the Committee of Twenty-Four already had more work 
than i t  could handle (Ib id . , 1509th Mtg., Dec.10, p.5^3)*
had submitted political information, declared again
that the submission of political information was in
accord with the spirit of Article 73 and invited
administering members to co-operate, Australia argued
that ’a repetition of resolutions in no way increased
the prestige of the United Nations'; otherwise, her
opposition was based on legal grounds:
The considered position of the Australian 
delegation was that there was no obligation, 
either explicit or implicit, in Chapter XI 
of the Charter to submit political information 
and the Administering Members were not 
legally or morally bound to do so, Australia 
had freely transmitted such information, 
but on the clear understanding that its action 
was not to be regarded as prejudicing the 
interpretation of Chapter XI. The Australian 
delegation objected to the assumption in 
the draft resolution that the General Assembly 
was entitled to alter or amend the obligations 
set forth in the Charter.
With a solid group of administering Powers, Australia 
voted against the draft which was, nevertheless,
1
adopted by the Fourth Committee and the Assembly. 
Similarly, in 1959» Australia opposed a longer and
15 GAOR, 9th S., 4th Ctee. , 424th Mtg. , Nov.8, 1954, 
p . 1 S^T.
16 This draft, which became Resolution 848(IX), was 
adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 42-10-3 (ibid., 
498th PI.Mtg., Nov.22, p.291).
137
more strongly worded resolution along the same lines. 
Again, the Australian argument was legal, although 
with a political rider to the effect that the Assembly
should not risk alienating administering Powers whose
1 7co-operation was needed by the Assembly. In i9 6 0 , 
Australia abstained in voting in the Fourth Committee 
on a draft resolution on progress achieved in non- 
self-governing territories, in part, said the 
Australian delegate, because it contained a paragraph 
’urging once again' the submission of political
1 sinformation. It was seen above that Australia also 
abstained in 1961 on Resolution 1700(XVl) because 
her delegation felt that it contained an implied 
instruction to administering Powers to submit political 
informa tion.
Occasionally, the Assembly asked for information 
on specific political matters. In 1950, for example,
17 Interestingly, the Australian delegate, K.T. Kelly, 
explicitly linked the constitutionalism of Australia's 
internal politics with the attitudes of Australian 
delegations towards the charter: GAOR, 14th S . , 4th 
Ctee. , 984th Mtg., Dec.3 , 1959» p.6l7» Resolution
1468(XIV), which was adopted by an Assembly vote of 
50-13-9 (Australia voting 'against'), 'urged' rather 
than merely invited the voluntary submission of 
political information.
18 GAOR, 15th S . , 4th Ctee., 1025th Mtg., Oct.27,
i9 6 0 , p .149. This draft, which became Resolution 1535(XV), 
was adopted by an Assembly vote of 69-0-20 (ibid.,
948th PI.Mtg., Dec.15, p .1291).
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a resolution which had been submitted by four con­
sistently anti-colonial Powers (Haiti, Mexico, the 
Philippines and Syria) had the Assembly recommend that 
administering Powers report on the observance in their 
territories of the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adopted in 1948. Australian 
opposition was partly legal, in that such information 
was not provided for in the charter, and partly
political, in that the resolution would ask more of
20the administering Power than the ordinary member.
It will be remembered that the question of 
the origin of information to be considered by the 
information committee and the Assembly arose during 
the 1946-9 period. One example was advocacy of 
dependent peoples' conferences as an extra- 
administering Power source of information; another 
was a move to allow information committee members 
to visit non-self-governing territories. Like
19 This draft, which became Resolution 446(v) on 
adoption by the Assembly by a vote of 37-10-9 (GAOR,
5th S., 320th PI.Mtg., Dec.12, 1950, p.601), also asked
the information committee to use submitted information 
as a basis for recommendations on the application
of the Universal Declaration in territories.
20 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 187th Mtg., Nov.25, p.292.
139
that of the submission of political information,
the question of sources of information was part of
the larger question of United Nations supervision
of non-self-governing territories. The administering
Powers tended to deny the right of the United Nations
to supervise at all; the anti-colonial Powers went
ahead with attempts to establish supervision.
Inevitably, the efforts of the latter tended to be
towards the reproduction of aspects of the trusteeship
system - the proposal for visiting missions was a
case in point. Other parallel forms emerged in the
1950s: the examination of expert witnesses and
indigenous representation at the United Nations,
the latter being, as Toussaint says, ‘in effect...
equivalent to oral petitions from non-self-governing 
2 1territories 1 .
A suggestion that expert representatives of 
administering Powers should be interrogated by the 
information committee came from India in 1958» This
21 Charmian Edwards Toussaint, ’The Colonial Con­
troversy in the United Nations’ in Year Book of World 
Affairs, Vol. 10 (1956), p.193*
was at a time when anti-colonial pressure was 
building up towards the Declaration of 1960. At 
the 1958 Assembly session, India was arguing, for 
instance, that:
The administering Powers had accepted...a 
’sacred t r u s t ' . . . .
A ’t rust’ involved accountability of 
administration and hence the existence 
of an entity or an organization to which 
account was to be rendered... the General 
Assembly and, under its authority, the 
Committee on Information were the instruments 
for the fulfilment o ^ t h e  basic purposes 
of the sacred trust.
At the same time, the Mexican delegate was stating 
frankly that:
The Australian reply to the Indian suggestion for
interrogation of experts, which was not formally
24submitted as a draft resolution, was that, although
22 G A O R , 13th S . , 4th C t e e . , 823rd M t g . , Dec.1, 1958,
p .421.
23 I b i d . , 821st Mtg., N o v . 28, p.4l0.
24 In a similar way, Cuba had in 1950 again raised 
the question of visiting missions which, advanced 
by the Soviet Union, had been rejected in 1948.
But Cuba did not submit a draft for a vote.
The primary problem with regard to the Non- 
S e l f - G o v e m i n g  Territories was that the 
anti-colonialist countries considered the
provisions
to be inadequctutJ. . . .
of the Charter
the charter said nothing about examination by the
Assembly of information submitted to the Secretary-
General under 73e, the information committee had
been able to do useful work because of ’the spirit
of forbearance and comprehension shown by so many
delegations with respect to juridical issues...'.
•It would be a very great pity', said Kelly, 'if the
work of the Committee on Information were to be
imperilled by well-meaning attempts to assimilate
2 5the Committee to the Trusteeship Council'.
The question of indigenous participation 
assumed much greater importance. It arose first in 
1951 when Burma, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and India 
submitted a joint draft resolution to have the 
Assembly ask the information committee to report on 
the possibility of having the non-self-governing 
territories associated in its work. Perhaps because 
the draft referred to territories and not to people 
(let alone indigenes) and because the administering 
Powers were in a strong position in the committee, 
Australia supported the draft. Possible confidence
25 Ibid. , 819th Mtg., Now 27, P.396.
26 GAOR, 6th S . , 4th Ctee., 218th Mtg., Dec.3, 1951, 
pp.101-2. The draft, which became Resolution 566(Vl), 
was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 47-2-7 (ibid., 
361st PI.Mtg., Jan.18, 1952, p.355).
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in the administering Powers’ capacity to deal with 
too radical suggestions was rather borne out in that, 
during the committee's discussion of the question 
during 1952, a proposal to have the Assembly recommend 
non-voting representation for inhabitants of territories 
was defeated. In the Fourth Committee, however,
Asian states raised the question again in the same 
terms, and Latin American states submitted an amend­
ment to have the joint Asian draft refer to indigenous 
inhabitants. Australia opposed the form of the 
draft rather than the principle of indigenous 
participation. Forsyth argued that indigenous 
participation could be effected by separate territorial 
representation or by the inclusion of competent 
indigenous representatives in the delegations of 
administering Powers. The former, ’dual representation 
of Member States...would be entirely unacceptable 
and could only lead to chaotic conditions'. Of the 
latter, he said;
It must be understood...that the composition 
of their delegations was the exclusive 
prerogative of the Member States, and it 
was not for the United Nations to make any 
recommendations on the subject.
27 GAOR, 7th S., 4th Ctee. , 269th Mtg. , Nov. 1 1, 1952,
p. 14o.
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The administering' Power was the sole authority in the 
matter, anyway, and it was for the administering Power 
to decide how and xvhen such indigenous participation 
should be effected. Australia joined other 
administering and western Powers in a minority vote 
against the draft which, as amended, invited 
administering Powers to make possible the participation 
of qualified indigenous representatives in the work 
of the information committee and to transmit to 
territories’ executive and legislative bodies copies 
of information committee reports and relevant Assembly 
resolutions .
In the following year, 1953» the Assembly
adopted a resolution which more explicitly invited
administering Powers to attach to their delegations
indigenous representatives who could speak on matters
29relating to their territories. ~ In 1959, the newly
28 This draft, which became Resolution 647(VIl) , 
was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 43-11-4 
(ibid., 402nd Pl.Mtg., Dec.10, p.355).
29 Resolution 744(VIIl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 43-8-7 (GAOR, 8th S., 459th Pl.Mtg., Nov.27, 
1953, p.312). Australia did not enter the debates, 
roll-call votes were not requested and the delegation’s 
report on the session was not tabled in Parliament,
so that the Australian position is not recorded.
independent and energetic Guinea submitted a draft
resolution inviting administering Powers to nominate
territories for admission to specialised agencies,
emphasising the value of inclusion in the delegations
of administering Powers indigenous representatives who
could participate inthe work of the information
committee and the Fourth Committee, and asking the
administering Powers to report ontheir practical
implementation of the resolution to the Secretary-
General (who, in tuin, would report to the Assembly).
Australia, like Britain, professed to approve ’the
spirit’ of the draft. But, whereas Britain was
prepared to accept it, despite objections to its
implied instruction on the composition of delegations
and allowance for scrutiny of members’ response,
Australia would not compromise. For the reasons
which led Britain to abstain in voting merely on the
objectionable clauses, Australia (with Portugal, Spain,
Belgium, France and Peru) abstained in Fourth Committee
30voting on the whole draft.
30 GAOR, 14th S., 4th Ctee., 987th Mtg., Dec.1, 1959, 
pp.572-3. In the Assembly, where the draft of what 
became Resolution 1466(XIV) was adopted by a vote ol 
66-0-3 (ibid*. 855th PI.Mtg., Dec.12, p.726),
Australia was one of the three consistent abstainers 
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Summary 
Report of the Australian Delegation to the Fourteenth 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly held at 
New York from 15th September to 12th December, 1959, 
Canberra, i960, p.52 - in CPP, 196O-I, Vol•IV)•
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In 1960, it was found that none of the 
administering Powers had reported on their imple­
mentation of Resolution 1466(XIV) to the Secretary- 
General. The upshot was a resolution sponsored by 
twenty-one members and fairly moderate in that it 
did not refer to the information committee or the 
Fourth Committee or to administering Powers* 
delegations but merely declared the virtue of 
having direct indigenous participation in the work 
of 'appropriate organs of the United Nations' and 
asked the administering Powers to arrange such 
participation. Although the resolution also asked
the Secretary-General to report on implementation,
31Australia this time supported the proposal. In 
effect, Australia was prepared to accept the notion 
of direct participation (and has since practised it) 
and its being written into Assembly resolutions as long 
as its expression did not suggest any objectionable
31 GAOR, 15th S., 4th Ctee., 1022nd Mtg., Oct.25,
i960, p.130. This draft, which became Resolution 
1539(XV), was adopted by an Assembly vote of 79-0-10
(ibid., 948th PI.Mtg., Dec.15, p.1292).
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diminution of her freedom to exercise her sovereignty- 
over Papua and its inhabitants, or any interference 
with the mechanics of her diplomacy.^
The question of petitions as such within the 
context of Chapter XI of the charter arose again 
in 1961 when steps were taken to circumvent Portuguese 
claims that heroverseas territories were provinces 
of the home state and, therefore, were not subject 
to the provisions of Chapter XI. It will be seen below 
that at about this time Australia changed her policy 
on the issues involved in the Portuguese claim. In line 
with this change, she gave her support in 1961 to a 
resolution which, among other things, established a 
committee to examine available information on Portuguese
33territories and to receive petitions and hear petitioners.
32 This, at least, would be supposed from public policy 
statements. It is not unlikely, however, that Australia 
wished to be left free to avoid contributing to what a 
British delegate once described as the conversion of 
the information committee ’into tribunals in which 
States of the United Nations can be confronted with the 
indigenous inhabitants of these Territories’ (Toussaint^ 
The Colonial Controversy in the United Nations, as 
above, p.193)•
33 GAUR, 16th S., 1083rd PI.Mtg., Dec.19* 1961, p.1105* 
Voting on Resolution 1699(XVI) was 90-3-2, the voters 
against comprising Spain and ’hard core' intransigents, 
Portugal, and South Africa.
147
Australia also approved hearings by the Fourth Committee 
itself of two petitioners from Portuguese Guinea.
III.
It was observed above that in 1946, when the 
concrete application of Chapter XI of the charter 
began, the Assembly did not make good the charter's 
insufficiencies by saying just what comprised a 
non-self-governing territory. The Assembly simply 
took note of seventy-four territories listed by eight 
administering Powers. In 1949, it has been seen, 
the Assembly asked the information committee to examine 
and report on factors relevant to the application of 
Chapter XI, that is, non-self-governing status, to 
territories. But the context was one of dissatisfaction 
with the way in which territories were being removed 
from the 1946 list by the unilateral decisions of 
administering Powers. Consequently, the issue of 
'factors', as it came to be known, took on something 
of a negative aspect and the question became one of 
when was a territory no longer non-self-governing
34 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 1208thMtg., N o v .14, p.326.
Britain, which expressed fears of such a precedent being 
set, was one of five to oppose the hearings. Later still 
in the session, the Fourth Committee decided (without a 
vote or Australian comment) to hear the premier of 
British Guiana, Mr Cheddi Jagan. In 1962, and again 
without votes being taken, the Fourth Committee heard 
petitioners from British, Spanish and Portuguese 
territories in Africa.
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and beyond the scope of Chapter XI (this aspect is 
discussed in the following section of this chapter 
of this work).
The positive aspect of the question, that
is, the determination of when Chapter XI did apply
to a territory as opposed to when it did not or no
longer did, arose again in 1956. In that year, as in
1946, the Secretary-General asked sixteen states
admitted to the United Nations during the previous
year whether they administered non-self-governing
territories. Concern was expressed at the outcome
because all the replies were in the negative and
3 5these included Portugal's. Iraq's delegate argued
in the Fourth Committee, for example, that the
Assembly should examine objectively whether new
members had obligations to fulfil to the United Nations
36under Chapter XI. An Afro-Asian group submitted 
a draft resolution to have the Assembly establish 
an ad hoc committee to study the application of Chapter
37XI to new members who would be asked to state their views.
35 The new members included Spain which largely escaped 
censure during the Assembly's 1956-7 session because she 
had not yet replied to the Secretary-General. Portugal 
was the main target.
36 GAOR, 11th S., 4th Ctee., 6l5thMtg., Jan.29, 1957, 
pp.329-30.
37 This was not too far removed from Evatt's proposal at 
San Francisco in 1945 on how the reporting obligation 
might be applied.
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For Australia, this was a clear case of encroachment
on the domestic jurisdiction of members. The
Australian delegate, A.H. Loomes, said that:
The debate had shown the desire of certain 
Members to look beyond the replies received 
from new Members and investigate the reasons 
underlying them. The clear implication was 
that the General Assembly should seek to 
interpret the constitutions of certain 
Member States for the purpose of determining 
the applicability of Article 73e* It 
would be improper for any Member, and therefore 
improper for the General Assembly as a whole, 
to call into question the constitutional 
provisions of another Member... each Government 
was entitled to interpret and apply its own 
constitution in determining whether it had 
any obligations under the terms of Article 
73e.30
Loonies professed not to be sure what the committee was 
intended to do, although it was clear, he said, that 
members' constitutions might be examined, and this 
was unacceptable. He took the invitation to new members 
to make further statements to reflect on the veracity
39of their initial replies to the Secretary-General.
The objections of the administering Powers and their 
allies were overruled in the Fourth Committee, but the 
two-thirds voting rule was applied in the Assembly
4owhere the draft resolution was then defeated.
38 Ibid., 621st Mtg., Feb.4, pp.361-2.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 657th P I .Mtg., Feb.20, pp .1166,1179* The 
Assembly vote was 35-35-5, Australia voting against 
the draft.
During the next (1957) Assembly session,
Portugual1s claim that her African territories were
integral provinces of the one country and therefore
outside the scope of Chapter XI again came under
attack, again it was proposed to have an ad hoc committee
study the question, and again Australia joined the
administering Powers* counter-attack* As in the
previous session, the Australian case was that the
purpose of the proposal was to allow a committee to
state what parts of the metropolitan areas of members,
as described in their constitutions, were to be
characterised as non-self-governing territories*
This would allow the constitutions of all members to
1be questioned. As before, a draft resolution was 
adopted by the Fourth Committee but failed to survive
42the application of the two-thirds rule in the Assembly*
Yet again in 1958, a similar resolution was submitted,
4lmainly with reference to Portugal* Australia 
repeated her arguments of the previous year almost to
41 GAOR, 12th S., 4th Ctee., 693rd Mtg., Nov.5, 1957, 
p* 225•
42 Ibid., 722nd PI.Mtg., Nov.26, p*517. The Assembly 
vote was 41-30-10, Australia voting against.
43 Spain, while claiming that her African territories 
were Spanish provinces, had agreed to transmit 
information on them.
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the word. The draft resolution was adopted by the
Fourth Committee but, when the two-thirds rule was
again invoked, it was not put to the vote in the 
4 5Assembly. "
Developments took a new turn in 1959 when 
Canada and Ireland joined the anti-colonial Powers in 
submitting a draft resolution. This ignored 
particular members and their constitutional structures. 
It had the Assembly state the desirability of itself 
listing principles for the guidance of members in 
determining whether an obligation existed under 73e 
to transmit information, establish a committee of six 
(comprised equally of representatives of administering 
and non-administering Powers) to study such principles, 
ask the Secretary-General to prepare a list of opinions 
stated in the past on the question and invite members 
to communicate their views to him. For Australia still, 
the question was one of individual members to decide 
for themselves and she voted against that paragraph 
of the draft referring to the desirability of the
44 GAOR, 13th S., 4th Ctee., 832nd Mtg., Dec.5, 1958, 
p•484.
45 The Fourth Committee vote was 41-29-4, Australia 
voting against the draft (ibid., p.490).
Assembly listing principles (Britain was content to
\ 46abstain). Like Britain, however, Australia abstained
in voting on the whole draft which was adopted by
hithe Fourth Committee and the Assembly.
The committee established under Resolution 
1467(XIV) reported to the i960 Assembly session with 
twelve principles which the Australian delegation
48’endorsed in general’. However, Togo and Tunisia
moved to amend a principle dealing with the integration
of a territory with an independent state to the effect
that the United Nations would be empowered, if it
wished, to supervise the process by which a territory
expressed its wish for integration. Australia joined
Britain and most other westein states in voting
against this amendment and abstaining on the principles
as amended, as well as on an associated resolution
approving the principles and their application in
49cases of conflict.
46 GAQR, 14th S. , 4th Ctee., 981st Mtg. , Dec. 2, 1959 
P.596.
47 Assembly voting on what became Resolution 1467(XIV) 
was 54-5-15 (ibid., 855th PI.Mtg., Dec.12, p.726).
48 GAQR, 15th S., 4th Ctee., 1037th Mtg., Nov.4, i960,
P.223.
49 Resolution 1541(XV), which contained the list of 
principles in an annex, was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 69-2-21 (Ibid. , 9^8th Pl.Mtg., Dec.15, p. 1292).
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The logical consequence of this resolution
was another sponsored by twelve Afro-Asian states
naming nine Portuguese territories as coming within
the scope of Chapter XI of the charter. It declared
that Portugal was obliged to submit information on
them, and invited Portugal and Spain 0^ to participate
in the work of the information committee. Australia,
which *had reservations on the competence of the
General Assembly to make determinations and especially
to specify territories upon which information should
be supplied1, and which had in the past advanced
policy completely at odds with the provisions of the
draft, might have been expected to vote against
52it, but in fact was content to abstain.
At the following (1961) Assembly session,
Australia actually voted for a resolution which went
50 Spain still had not submitted information, but was 
continuing to say that she would.
51 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 
of the Australian Delegation, Fifteenth Regular Session 
(First Part) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
New York, 20th September - 20th December, I960, Canberra, 
1961» p . 64.
52 This draft, which became Resolution 1542(XV), was 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 68-6-17 (GAOR, 15th S.,
948th PI.Mtg., Dec,15, I960, p.1293)*
even further than the previous year* s. Not only did 
this 1961 resolution, as was noted earlier, establish 
a committee to examine available information and hear 
petitioners and receive petitions from Portuguese 
territories, but it also condemned Portugal for having 
failed to submit information and asked United Nations 
members to deny Portugal support of possible use 
against the peoples of her territories. The Australian 
delegate, McIntyre, said his delegation (unlike its 
predecessors, he might have added) did not propose 
to argue the legal competence of the Assembly to 
prescribe members’ obligations, Portugal, he said, 
should provide information, as other administering 
Powers had done; a member should interpret as 
liberally as possible obligations set out in the
53charter, as Australia, Britain and others had done. 
Indeed, during the next (1962) session, McIntyre 
'stressed that Australia regarded Portugal’s policies 
in Africa as utterly wrong’ and abstained in a vote 
on yet another draft, which again condemned Portugal, 
primarily because it contained a paragraph asking members
53 GAOR, 16th S., 4th Ctee., 1205th Mtg., Nov.10,
1961, p.306. Resolution 1699(XVI) was adopted by an 
Assembly vote of 90-3-2 (ibid., 1083rd PI.Mtg.,
Dec.19, p.1105).
155
^Lto prevent the sale of arms to Portugal.
Further developments in the placing of pressure
on Portugal will be discussed in other contexts below.
In view of previous insistence on defending the
national interest of administering Powers against
the encroachments of the international organisation,
one may note, however, part of a statement made by
one of Australia* s delegates, Mr Dudley McCarthy,
in 1 9 6 3 to the effect that:
. . .his Government disagreed profoundly 
with the Portuguese doctrine of self- 
determination. For his delegation, the 
principle of self-determination must be based 
on the unshakable belief that any people had 
the inalienable right to self-determination 
and meant quite simply the right of any 
people to choose for themselves the form of 
the government which they, as free people, 
decided might suit best
Australian policy, then, changed markedly on 
this question within a short time. In 1957 and 1958» 
Australia argued strongly for domestic jurisdiction: 
i t  was for the signatory to the charter alone to 
decide whether i t  had obligations to meet under the
54 GAOR, 17th S., 4th Ctee., l4l9thMtg., Dec.12, 1962, 
p.612. The draft of what became Resolution 1807(XVII) 
was adopted by an Assembly vote of 82-7-13 (ibid .,
1 194th PI.Mtg. , Dec . 14 , p’.1l48),
55 GAOR, 18th S., 4th Ctee., l494thMtg., Nov.29,
1963, p . 4 2 4 .
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provisions of the charter’s Chapter XI. In 1959 
and i960, it has been seen, she moderated her stand.
In 1961, she registered only mild objections when the 
Assembly not only denied the right of a member state, 
Portugal, to the freedom previously insisted on by 
Australia, but brushed that state's protests aside 
and proceeded to try to deal directly with people 
and territories over which that state held sovereignty. 
In 1962 and 1963, Australia joined in the condemnation 
of Portugal, explicitly set aside formerly stressed 
legal considerations and, like the anti-colonial 
Powers, argued on political grounds. More will be 
said below of this switch in Australian policy.
IV.
As directed by Resolution 33^(lV) described 
above, the information committee in 1950 discussed 
briefly the question of factors which should be taken 
into account in deciding whether a territory was 
non-self-governing and, therefore, within the scope 
of Chapter XI of the charter. The committee postponed 
a full consideration of, ana report on, factors until 
the following year, but events in 1950 itself fore­
shadowed a rapid change in the aspect of factors to be
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stressed. By this is meant that the notion of factors 
began as referring to criteria of non-self-government 
but quickly came to refer rather to self-government; 
emphasis on determining what territories fell within 
the scope of Chapter XI was replaced by emphasis on 
determining what territories did not, or any longer, 
fall within its scope. It has been seen already that 
the notion of factors arose directly from the decision 
of Britain and France to discontinue reporting on 
some territories listed as non-self-goveming in 19^6 . 
This arose again in 1950 when the Netherlands formally 
informed the Secretary-General that she would not 
in future submit information on the now sovereign 
Indonesia. She also gave notice that the Netherlands 
West Indies and Surinam would soon be self-governing 
and beyond the scope of Chapter XI. In the subsequent 
Fourth Committee debates, it became clear that many 
members were hostile to the idea of administering 
Powers unilaterally declaring a cessation in their 
transmission of information on territories. They 
wanted factors defined under Resolution 33M^V) 
and they wanted the United Nations to determine 
whether an administering Power was acting correctly
in ceasing to transmit information, that is, whether 
a territory had properly exercised its right to self- 
determination.
In 1951» the information committee listed 
a number of factors to be taken into account as criteria 
in decisions on the status of a territory as self- 
governing or not. Later that year, the Fourth Committee 
appointed a sub-committee of its own to study the 
question further and, despite her evident lack of
56interest, appointed Australia to it. This sub­
committee then proposed that an ad hoc committee be 
established to study the question even further and 
report at the next year's Assembly session. Again, 
despite her coolness towards the committee's purpose,
57Australia was appointed to it.
This ad hoc Committee on Factors, as it was 
called, arrived at a list of 'factors indicative of 
the attainment of independence or of other separate 
systems of self-government’ and submitted them at
56 Australia professed not to be able to see what 
advance the sub-committee could make on the information 
committee's work (GAOR, 6th S», 4th Ctee,, 218th
Mtg., Dec.3, 1951, p.99).
57 'The Australian delegation...had always doubted
the practical value of a list of factors', said Forsyth 
in the following year (gAOR, 7th S., 4th,Ctee.,
272nd Mtg., Nov.13» 1952, p.153)«
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the 1952 Assembly session. In the Fourth Committee, 
the Australian delegate, Forsyth, said that the Australian 
representative in the ad hoc committee had not approved 
that committee’s report, had seldom taken part in its 
discussions and had reserved Australia's position 
because the committee 'had deliberately evaded' defini­
tions of terminology. Australia felt that only the 
administering Power concerned was involved in a 
decision on whether or not to transmit information on a 
territory, that it was unreal to think in terms 
applicable to more than seventy very different terri­
tories. Further, said Forsyth:
The Australian delegation's chief criticism 
was that an attempt had been made to establish 
that the attainment of independence was one 
of the means by which a territory could 
achieve self-government. That view...was 
based on an unjustified interpretation of 
Chapter XI of the Charter.
He went on to argue that independence was merely
58one possible consequence of self-government. The
58 Ibid. It might be noted that, at about this time 
and throughout the 1950s, Australian views on the future 
of Papua-New Guinea, while various and vague, included 
the possibility of involvement in the Australian 
federation (see, e.g., Christian Science Monitor report 
of Sept.16, 1956, that New Guinea's future 'looks like
being statehood within the Australian federation') or 
in a Pacific Islands political unit, or even in self- government short of complete independence from Australia.
1 6o
Australian delegation subsequently voted against a 
draft resolution which, among other things, stated 
that the reporting obligation remained until the 
objectives of Chapter XX had been fulfilled, repeated 
the view that the United Nations should be informed 
of changes in the constitutional status of a territory, 
approved provisionally the ad hoc committee1s list of 
factors as a guide for the Assembly and members in 
deciding whether a territory had achieved self-govern­
ment and set up a new ad hoc committee to study the
59matter further*
Australia was appointed to the ad hoc committee 
established under Resolution 648(VIl). In that 
committee, which reported to the following (1953)
Assembly session, discussion covered ways of 
guaranteeing the principle of self-determination, 
discussion to which Australia objected because ’the 
question of self-determination had no direct relevance 
to Chapter XI of the Charter...’.^^  The committee
59 Assembly voting onwhat became Resolution 648(VIl) 
was 36-15-7 (GAOR, 7th S., 402nd Pl.Mtg., Dec.10,
1952, P.355). In separate votes in the Fourth Committee, 
Australia voted in a similar minority on each of the 
major provisions noted above.
60 GAOR, 8th S., Annexes, Ag.It.33, p.3*
approved a list of factors very similar to the previous
year* s. Conflict occurred in the Fourth Committee
when Middle Eastern, Asian and Latin American Powers
sought to amend a mildly-worded Brazilian draft
resolution, which did little more than accept the
list of factors, so as to have the Assembly assert
its competence to make recommendations based on
consideration of the factors. The Australian delegate,
Sir Douglas Copland, was not enthusiastic about even
the Brazilian draft: the factors equated independence
and self-government, the latter not being adequately
defined. The amendment, he said, was diametrically
opposed to the administering Powers' views and
61would be unenforceable. Australia voted against the
Brazilian draft under which, as amended, the Assembly
1would approve the list of factors, envisage Assembly 
use of them as occasion warranted, assert that in 
any given case the right to self-determination had 
to be considered,, and see self-government as being 
attained primarily through the achievement of 
independence•^
61 jbid. , 4th Ctee. , 327th Mtg. , Oct.6, 1953» pp.7'1-2.
62 Ibid., 330th Mtg., Oct.9, P.93. This draft, which
became Resolution 742(VTIl), was adopted by a plenary 
vote of 32-19-6 (ibid. , 459th PI .Mtg. , Nov.27, P-3‘12).
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The purpose of the anti-colonial Powers, and the 
intransigence of Australia, became even clearer in 
consideration of a number of cases where it was 
claimed by administering Powers that territories had 
achieved self-government, so that the transmission 
of information on them under Article 73^ would cease*
The first occurred in relation to the Netherlands* 
territories of Surinam and the Antilles. In 1932, the 
Netherlands informed the Secretary-General that these 
were no longer non-self-governing and no further
/f ninformation would be submitted on them.  ^ The Fourth 
Committee decided to postpone consideration for a year 
while the ad hoc Committee on Factors examined the
64Netherlands statement. In the committee, Australia
supported the Netherlands, but opinion was too divided
65to allow an agreed conclusion. In the Fourth Committee
63 The Netherlands view was that under the Interim Law, 
and pending formal revision of the structure of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, in which these territories 
would be units, they were fully self-governing.
64 Australia opposed this; the committee should deal 
only with generalities and not specific instances, 
said Forsyth.
65 GAOR, 8th S., Annexes, Ag.It.33, p.7*
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at the next (1953) Assembly session, Surinam and 
Antilles representatives gave evidence supporting the 
Netherlands. Sweden then submitted a draft resolution 
calling for a United Nations appraisal of the matter 
when Netherlands-Antilles-Surinam conferences had 
actually concluded and the information committee had 
reported on the outcome. Australia opposed this, 
said Copland, because it ‘assumed that the General 
Assembly, the Fourth Committee and the Committee on 
Information...all had the right to question the pre­
rogative of any administering Power to cease supplying 
information to the United Nations because the territory 
in question had attained a degree of control over its 
own affairs which entitled it to determine policy 
on the matters on which information should be supplied 
from Non-Self-Goveraing Territories' Australia
also opposed a Soviet amendment to have information 
supplied until a final outcome was known and the Assembly 
had decided that the transmission of information might 
cease, and an Indonesian amendment to have the Assembly 
ask the Netherlands advise Surinam and the Antilles of
66 GAOR, 8th S., 4th Ctee.,
p.202.
346th Mtg., Oct.29» 1953»
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the desirability of information on them continuing 
to be submitted. In Copland’s view, ’both amendments 
assumed that the Fourth Committee and the General
/ '  ryAssembly were the judges of sovereign rights’, '
In 195^» when Surinam and the Antilles agreed 
to enter a Kingdom of the Netherlands as self-governing 
units, some Fourth Committee members still expressed 
doubts about the nature of the territories’ decision­
making process. The outcome was a draft resolution 
having the Assembly suggest examination of statements 
on how the territories hadnade their decisions. 
Yugoslavia submitted an amendment to have the Assembly 
allowed to send visiting missions to observe expressions
of self-determination in territories. Australia voted
68against the amendment and the draft thus amended.
The Australian delegation leader, Sir Percy Spender, 
said in the Assembly:
67 Ibid., In the Fourth Committee, Australia voted in a 
minority against the Swedish draft as amended by the 
Soviet Union and Indonesia (ibid., 3^7th Mtg., Oct.29» 
p.211). The amended draft, which became Resolution 
747(VII.l), was adopted by an Assembly vote of 33-13-8 
(ibid., 459th PI.Mtg., Nov.27» P.319).
68 GAOR, 9th S., 4th Ctee., 433rd Mtg., Nov.15, 1952*» 
p.24l. The amended draft, which became Resolution 
850(lX), was adopted by an Assembly vote of 40-12-3 
(ibid., 499th PI.Mtg., Nov.22, p.307).
The terms of this draft resolution represent 
...yet another attempt to extend the provisions 
of the Charter by means of Assembly resolutions 
...A procedure for amendment is laid down 
in the Charter...it seems that some Members 
are irked by the limitations of Chapter XI. ^
The case was finally concluded in 1955« Some, 
like India’s Menon, were still not altogether happy 
about the matter. He equated cessation with self- 
government or independence which, in turn, he tended 
to equate with eligibility for United Nations member­
ship, and this was not the status of Surinam and the 
70Antilles. Fourth Committee debate, however, was
proceeding smoothly on a draft resolution submitted by
Brazil to have the Assembly recognise that the
submission of information on the territories should
cease. The Australian delegate, T.A. Pyman, was
content with this, although he urged members not to
write into the draft expressions of the alleged
competence of the Assembly to decide when submission 
71should cease. When Uraguay and India proposed amend-
69 Ibid., p.301.
7° GAOR, 10th S., 4th Ctee. , 524th Mtg., Nov.29, 
1955, pp.308-9.
71 Ibid., p.312.
merits which did just this, Australia voted against them
72and abstained on the draft thus amended. Even in the 
Assembly, where the Netherlands itself voted against 
paragraphs asserting the Assembly’s competence but voted 
for the draft resolution as a whole, Australia abstained. 
Australia thus found herself in the position of having 
to oppose a resolution, the main point of which was in 
accord with her own estimate of the facts of the case 
(that the territories were self-governing and no longer 
within the scope of Chapter Xl), and unable to vote 
in concert with an administering colleague, because of 
the inclusion in the resolution of (to her) an 
objectionable extension of Assembly powers.
It is not proposed here to follow other cases 
in equal detail, but their course and Australia’s 
policy were much the same. The insertion of a paragraph 
stating the Assembly’s competence in the matter was 
written into a draft resolution in 1953 accepting 
Puerto Rico as self-governing. Australia did not
72 Ibid. , 527th Mtg., Nov.30, pp.328-9.
73 Assembly voting on what became Resolution 9^5(x) 
was 21-10-33 (ibid., 557th PI.Mtg., Dec.15, p.462).
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support the draft, even though the administering Power,
the United States, was content to vote separately
against the competence paragraph and for the whole
74draft. As Copland put it, Australia ’would have 
voted for any resolution recognizing the right of the 
United States to do so, but he had been unable to support 
a resolution which implied that the General Assembly 
was competent to decide whether the cessation was 
justified’.^ '* Again, in 1954, Australia voted in the 
Fourth Committee against (and in the Assembly abstained 
on) a draft resolution accepting a communication 
from Denmark stating that Greenland was now outside 
the ambit of Chapter XI because an amendment was carried 
to the effect that the Assembly had competence in 
deciding the issue.^ The Australian delegate,
P.J. Clarey, explained;
74 In the Assembly, where what became Resolution 748(VIIl) 
was adopted by a vote of 26-16-18, Australia voted 
against the whole; some other administering Powers, 
including Britain, merely abstained (GAOR, 8th S.,
459th PI.Mtg. , Nov.27, 1953» PP.31 9-20)
75 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 356th Mtg., Nov.6, p.259»
76 This draft, which became Resolution 849(lX), was 
adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 45-1-11 (GAQRt 
9th S., 499th PI.Mtg., Nov.22, 1954, pp.306-7).
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The General Assembly was not empowered to 
consider political information regarding 
the Non-Self-Goveming Territories, and 
Administering Members were not bound to 
supply it. Therefore the Administering 
Members, and only they, could decide 
whether a Territory placed under their 
jurisdiction had really become independent. 
That principle applied both to Territories 
which had joined the former administering 
Power and to those which had become separate 
States...he would vote against the... 
amendment, and if it were adopted he would 
even have to vote against the joint draft 
resolution which he had at first intended 
to support.''
This pattern was repeated in 1959» when a draft 
resolution accepting the removal of Alaska and Hawaii 
from the scope of Chapter XI was amended to include a 
reference to the Assembly’s competence. Australia and 
the United States (the administering Power concerned) 
and other administering Powers and their allies voted 
in the Fourth Committee against the amendment and, 
while the United States voted for the draft as amended, 
Australia and other administering Powers were among 
those to abstain.^
It will have been apparent that these cases 
involved only territories integrating in some way with
77 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 430th Mtg,, Nov.11, p.219«
78 GAOR, 14th S ., 4th Ctee., 983rd Mtg., Dec.3, 1959, 
p.610. In the Assembly, the draft of what became 
Resolution 1469(XIV) was adopted by a vote of 58-0-17 
(ibid., 855th PI.Mtg., Dec.12, p.726).
the former administering Power. As a United Nations
publication has put it:
When territories have attained independence, 
the procedures for the cessation of trans­
mission of information have not been followed.
Given the anti-colonial Powers’ major interest in 
territories achieving independence, it is scarcely- 
surprising that, where cessation has followed indepen­
dence , the United Nations has done little more than
BOcongratulate the parties concerned. Still, where 
cessation was an issue, Australian policy was 
consistent: it was not the business of the Assembly
to give itself the role of supervisor or judge in a 
matter which was the exclusive province of 
administering Powers.
79 United Nations Office of Public Information, 
Everyman’s United Nations, New York, 1964, p.360.
80 In the case, for example, of France’s African 
territories, no action was taken when France 
announced a cessation of transmission with respect 
to a number of them in 1959»
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The adm inis te r ing  Powers opposed e f f o r t s  to 
have e s ta b l i sh e d  a system of a c c o u n ta b i l i ty  and 
superv is ion in  the context of Chapter XI analogous 
to the system formally e s ta b l i sh e d  under Chapters XII 
and XIII of the c h a r te r .  A r t ic le  73» i t  has a l so  
been seen, r e f e r s  to information being submitted by 
adm inis te r ing  Powers to the Secretary-General  ‘f o r  
in formation  purposes’ . The a n t i - c o lo n ia l  Powers 
then succeeded in  having t h i s  implemented in  such 
a way th a t  an information committee was e s ta b l i sh e d  
to  examine and repor t  on information submitted by 
the adm inis te r ing  Powers. To a perhaps minor degree,  
t h i s  in  i t s e l f  comprised the establ ishment of something 
l i k e  the t r u s te e s h ip  system and something qu i te  l i k e  
the mandates system. E f fo r t s  to have the s im i l a r i t y  
even more marked by the i n s t i t u t i o n  of v i s i t i n g  
missions and the hear ing  of p e t i t i o n s ,  as well as the 
in te r ro g a t io n  of expert w itnesses ,  l a r g e ly  were 
unsuccessfu l .  S t i l l ,  although p o l i t i c a l  information 
was not gene ra lly  submitted and examined u n t i l  the 
1 9 6 0 s, basic  elements of a c c o u n ta b i l i ty  ex is ted :  
adm inis te ring Powers reported, u l t im a te ly  to a body which 
examined th a t  in formation and reported p u b l ic ly  on i t .
V.
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The strong (equal) representation of the
administering Powers on the information committee tended
8 1to put a brake on i t s  activities. Nevertheless, 
year-by-year i t  examined conditions in non-self-governing 
terr i tories  and reported on them to the Assembly.
The question of supervision then arose when, on 
the basis of the information supplied by the administering 
Powers, the committee or anti-colonial Powers in the 
Fourth Committee sought to have the Assembly make 
recommendations to the administering Powers and 
to have the Assembly urge the implementation of i t s  
resolutions and reports on the information committee. 
Assembly recommendations dealt mainly with educational 
and social questions and most were fundamentally 
acceptable even to the administering Powers. These 
Powers, however, were sensitive to the principle 
involved.
In 1952, for example, Afro-Asian members were 
responsible for the information committee including 
in i t s  report a draft resolution recommending that
81 This, as Sady points out, was of value to the 
administering Powers in that the Assembly began each 
session’s deliberations on a basis of the information 
committee's reports rather than with a clean slate on 
which to write anti-colonial resolutions (see Sady, 
op.c i t ., p.75)»
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steps be taken against racial discrimination in 
territories. In the Assembly, Australia voted for 
the draft (no one voted against it, and only France 
abstained),  ^ In the information committee itself, 
however, Australia originally had abstained for 
several reasons but including this, that ’it was not 
proper for this Committee to recommend to Member 
States the examination of their legislation with a
O  oview to its alteration’. J Nor was Australia hostile 
merely to this particular sort of recommendation.
In 1956, when the Assembly adopted a resolution 
calling for intensified progress in education in the 
territories, the Australian view was that, as A,H.
Loomes put it, 'the United Nations could not request
* ' 84an Administering Member to adopt specific procedures,,.'.
82 This draft, which became Resolution 644(VIl), was 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 51-0-1 (GAOR, 7th S., 
402nd Pl.Mtg., Dec.10, 1952, p.35*0* Despite her abstention in the information committee, Australia was 
prepared to support the draft, said Forsyth, because
’of the importance of the principles with which the 
resolution dealt..,* (ibid., 4th Ctee., 261st Mtg.,
Nov.1, p.89).
83 GAOR, 7th S., Supplement No. 18, p.5«
84 This draft, which became Resolution 1049(Xl) by an 
Assembly vote of 55-5-9 (GAOR, 11th S., 6 5 7 th Pl.Mtg., 
Feb.20, 1957» p.1178)1 also was highly objectionable to 
Australia in that it called for the submission of target 
dates•
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Similarly, on the question of implementation,
Australia opposed the right of the Assembly to bring
pressure to bear to have its recommendations and
reports acted on. In 1952, Afro-Asian and Latin American
members of the information committee argued that
administering Powers should report on activities
undertaken as a result of the committee’s reports and
Assembly recommendations. The administering Powers,
including Australia, replied that administrative
responsibility was solely theirs, so that committee
reports and Assembly recommendations could serve as
no more than ’useful guides to possible solutions for
8 5particular problems'• Australia subsequently
abstained in Fourth Committee voting on a draft 
resolution requesting the administering Powers to 
report on implementation.
As on most questions, the Australian view 
on recommendations and their implementation tended 
to change in the 1960s. In i960, for example, another
85 GAOH, 7th S., Supplement N 0 .I8 , pp.1-2.
86 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 268th Mtg., Nov.10, 1952, p.130. 
This draft, which became Resolution 645(VIl), was 
adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 47-2-8 (ibid.,
402nd PI.Mtg., Dec.10, p.35^)«
draft resolution on racial discrimination in territories
was submitted. This draft had the Assembly recommend 
to the administering' Powers that they rescind all laws 
and regulations tending however indirectly to sanction 
discrimination and urge them immediately to extend 
basic political rights, including the right to vote, 
equally to all racial groups in territories. Explaining 
Australia’s lonely abstention with Britain in Fourth 
Committee voting on the draft, Loonies said that his 
vote 'had been entirely due to the demand... that 
full and immediate effect should be given to the 
recommendation...His delegation could not honestly 
have voted in favour of a draft resolution which his 
country would have been unable to carry out immediately’ 
He then went on to agree that racial discrimination 
in all forms should be abolished. He made no mention 
of possible illegality in the Assembly issuing 
recommendations directly to administering Powers, 
in referring to those Powers' internal laws and 
regulations, in addressing itself at all to political 
matters.
87 GAOR, 15th S., 4th Ctee., 1029th Mtg., 0ct.-31, 
i960, p.174. Australia also abstained in the Assembly 
where the draft of what became Resolution 1536(XV) was 
adopted by a vote of 88-0-2 (ibid., 948th PI.Mtg.,
Dec.15» pp.1291-2).
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The essential interest of the anti-colonial 
Powers at the United Nations in colonialism has been 
not merely to afiect its course but to hasten its end. 
This was apparent in the nature of a host of their 
proposals submitted from 19^ -6 and aimed in various ways 
at removing non-self-governing territories and their 
administration from the purely domestic arenas of 
administering Powers increasingly to the international 
arena of the General Assembly and its committees. A 
more intense concentration of the central purpose of 
decolonisation, however, can be seen to have emerged 
in the activities of the anti-colonial Powers in the 
mid-1950s and again, and even more strikingly, at 
the end of the decade - both points coinciding, it might 
be noted, with the appearance in the United Nations of
groups of new, mainly ex-dependent and anti-colonial
. . 88S U3.t 6 S •
The new phase in anti-colonialist activity was 
manifest in 1955» when a group of states proposed 
that the Assembly declare the desirability of having 
examined the overall progress achieved in attainment 
of the objectives of Chapter XI of the charter.
88 Sixteen states joined the United Nations in 1955» 
seven in 1958-8 and seventeen in i960.
VI,
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Australia took a leading part in attempts in the
Fourth Committee to have a draft resolution to this
effect defeated. The Australian, delegate, Joske,
spoke of ' the remarkable obscurity of the language
of the draft resolution' about which he had 'profound
misgivings'; what the draft proposed would be a
89'waste of time'* The draft was adopted, with Joske
90reserving Australia's position.
The following year, 1956, a draft resolution 
was submitted to give effect to the previous year's, 
that is, to have the Secretary-General prepare a 
report on progress achieved, using whatever information 
was available. The Australian delegate, Loomes, 
opposed the draft because, he said, he had doubts 
about the use to which the report would be put, and he 
opposed the use of information 'supplied to other
. 91organs for other purposes under other agreements.'
89 GAOR, 10th S., 4th Ctee., 485th Mtg., Oct.25, 1955, 
p.100. Joske's haste in trying to 'scotch' this draft 
almost can be.sensed from the summary records.
90 Ibid., 487th Mtg., Oct.26, p.107* This draft,
which became Resolution 932(x), was adopted by an 
Assembly vote of 45-0-12 (ibid., 541st PI.Mtg.,
Nov.8 , p.293)*
91 GAOR, 11th S., 4th Ctee., 627th Mtg., Feb.7,
1957, P.3Ö5.
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Still, the draft was adopted by the Fourth Committee
92and the Assembly. During the same session, it was
seen above, the Assembly adopted Resolution 1049(Xl)
dealing with progress in the field of education in
territories. As Loomes said: ’For the first time an
attempt was being made to apply the concept of targets
93and dates in Non-Self-Goveming Territories’.
The report on progress achieved in the non-self-governing 
territories was written by the secretariat and con­
sidered ultimately at the Assembly’s 1 960 session.
A resolution was adopted noting the contents of the 
report but also affirming that inadequate social and 
economic progress was not a bar to self-government 
and urging the administering Powers to provide 
political information. Loomes objected to the thesis 
that political progress could not be delayed because 
of inadequate economic and social progress and to
what Australia still saw as an unconstitutional
94request for political information."
92 This draft, which became Resolution 1053(Xl), 
was adopted by an Assembly vote of 65-3-3 (ibid.,
657th PI.Mtg., Feb.20, p.1179)*
93 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 610th Mtg., Jan.24, p.311*
94 GAOR, 15th S., 4th Ctee., 1025th Mtg., Oct.27, 
1960, p.149. Resolution 1535(XV) was adopted by an 
Assembly vote of 69-0-20, Australia abstaining (ibid.,
948th PI.Mtg., Dec.15, p.1291).
Meanwhile, in 1958» the anti-colonial Powers
reacted to their familiar experience of having success
in the Fourth Committee, where only a simple majority
was required to have a draft resolution adopted,
frustrated in the Assembly, where a two-thirds majority
95could be required of ’important’ questions. A group 
of these Powers submitted a draft resolution directly 
to the Assembly in plenary session to have the 
International Court of Justice asked for an advisory 
opinion on the voting procedure required for matters 
relating to Chapter XI of the charter. They argued 
that there had been inconsistencies, with the two-thirds 
rule sometimes invoked on unimportant measures and 
simple majorities allowed on major questions. Australia 
objected to the draft even more vigorously than her 
administering colleagues. The Australian delegate, 
Walker, tried on a point of order to have the draft 
disallowed because it had not been considered for the 
agenda by the General Committee. When this tactic 
failed, he attacked the draft on the additional grounds
95 Examples of the way in which the anti-colonial 
Powers could be frustrated in this way, especially 
in relation to the West Irian issue, will be seen below.
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that it challenged the ruling of a previous Assembly 
96president and that it had been rushed into the
97Assembly in the closing hours of the session.'
In the event, the draft was not put to a vote.
However, the following ( 1959) session was 
also disconcerting for the administering Powers in 
that Guinea, a new and very active member, submitted 
a draft resolution calling for the submission of 
timetables for the achievement of independence by all 
non-self-governing territories. It, too, was not 
put to a vote, but it served as something of a 
curtain-raiser for the i960 Declaration, to which 
reference already has been made.
It is not proposed here to discuss in detail 
the statements of seventy delegations made during 
seventeen days of plenary debate on a Soviet draft 
resolution calling for immediate independence for all 
dependent territories and a slightly more flexible
96 Prince Wan Waithayakon, of Thailand, who, said 
Walker, ’has earned the highest respect of the Assembly- 
of all parts of the Assembly for his impartiality*.
97 GAOR, 13th S., 789-90th Pl.Mtgs., Dec.12-13,
1938, pp.583, 593.
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version sponsored jointly by forty-three members. The
Australian contribution was noteworthy in that, unlike
the British response which was (as the Australian
\ 98delegation itself said) ’strong’,' its tone was 
moderate. The Australian delegate, (later Sir) James 
Plimsoll, admitted that colonialism had had its share 
of inhumanity and that, while it had been a necessary 
transitional phase, it was desirable that it should now 
come to an end. In the penultimate paragraph of his 
speech, he said;
None of us would say that there is no good 
or no bad in this institution of colonialism. 
But we are all agreed that we should bring 
it, as rapidly as possible, to an end in 
the form of self-government for all the peoples 
of the world.^9
In the sense of self-determination, this, he said, 
applied to Papua-New G u i n e a . A u s t r a l i a  did not 
explain the specific reasons for her rejection, with 
the majority, of the Soviet draft or for her abstention, 
with a small minority, on the successful joint draft
98 Australian Delegation Report, 1980, as above, p.23«
For the reaction of the British delegate, David Ormsby-Gore, 
see GAOR t 15th S., 925th Pl.Mtg. , Nov.28, i960, pp.982-6.
99 Ibid., 933rd Pl.Mtg., Dec.2, p.1093.
100 Ibid.
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101resolution. However, Plimsoll noted that Australia
could not agree with the opinion expressed in the joint
draft that colonialism necessarily impeded the progress
of a people. In New Guinea, he said, colonialism was
essential to advancement. And he spoke at length of
conditions in the territory to show that colonialism
1 0 2could not be abolished there overnight. The signi­
ficance of the Australian reaction to the draft of 
what became the Declaration lay not so much in the 
voting on i t  - Australia did not oppose i t  outright, 
but nor did anyone else and her fello\\r abstainers 
mainly comprised the generally less admired administering 
intransigents. I t  lay rather in the tone and expression 
of Plimsoll1s speech, which was conciliatory and
101 The Soviet draft was voted on in two sections and 
defeated by 32-35-30 and 25-43-29, Australia voting 
against in each case (ib id . , 947th Pl.Mtg., Dec.14, 
pp.1272-3). The joint draft, which became Resolution 
15l4txV), was adopted by 89-0-9 (ibid. , pp.1273-4).
102 Ib id . , 933rd Pl.Mtg., Dec.2, pp.1091-2. Among 
Australia's western allies , New Zealand generally 
approved the resolution despite dissatisfaction with 
some parts of i t  and voted for i t ;  Canada thought i t  
•a very good one and for which we are very pleased to 
vote ' . The United States objected to emphasis on speed 
and on independence as tne acceptable goal ana abstained 
in tne vote.
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sympathetic rather than the traditionally hostile 
and legalistic.1  ^’
The trend towards greater flexibility and
moderation in Australian activity noted above showed
itself in the context of the Declaration when, at the
following (1961) session, Australia voted for a
resolution setting up a special committee of seventeen
members to 'make suggestions and recommendations on
the progress and extent of the implementation of the
Declaration...1. This left France, Spain, South Africa
and Britain alone in an abstention consistent with
104their previous year* s stand. Without actually
explaining why Australia had not been prepared to vote 
for the Declaration in i960 but was in 1961 prepared
103 Of the Declaration's twelve introductory paragraphs, 
at least eight formerly would have been highly 
objectionable to Australia on legal and political grounds; 
of its seven operative paragraphs, at least five would 
have been objectionable enough to have warranted an 
Australian vote 'against'.
104 Portugal by now was refusing to register a vote 
of any sort on such resolutions. Like Australia, 
the United States also showed more permissiveness in 
1961 but this change was less notable (for a discussion 
of political pressures making for inconsistency in 
United States policy on colonial questions, see 
William Henderson, 'United States Policy and Colonialism* 
in Academy of Political Science Proceedings, Vol.XXVX 
(1954-59), No.3 , p.2^7).
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to vote for a move to pursue i t s  implementation,
Plimsoll stressed that i t  was not being accepted
that there should be immediate and universal independence
but merely that immediate steps should be taken in
that direction, and that i t  was assumed that the
105Committee of Seventeen would act responsibly.
In 1 9 6 2 , when the Assembly considered the
Committee of Seventeen"s f i r s t  report, Plimsoll,
speaking as a member of i t  as well as Australia’s
Assembly delegate, referred to i t  in kind terms and
allowed i t  a not inconsiderable mandate:
. . . the  committee should satisfy i ts e l f  
that the Administering Authorities are 
making an honest attempt, at a reasonable 
pace and in reasonable ways, to give effect 
to the provisions of the Charter on self- 
determination. The Committee should stimulate 
the Administering Authorities - stimulate 
them in many ways, stimulate them with ideas, 
stimulate them with questions.
A draft resolution was submitted to have the committee’s
105 GAOR, 1 6 th S., 1 0 6 5 th Pl.Mtg., Nov.27, 196l, 
pp.850-1. The writer has been told authoritatively 
that a strong consideration involved in Australia’s 
decision to support the creation of the committee was 
the inevitability of i t s  creation and the feeling 
that i t  was in Australia’s interest to co-operate with 
such a body rather than to obstruct i t  or i t s  establish­
ment. Resolution l654(XVl), establishing the committee, 
was approved by an Assembly vote of 97-0-4, Britain, 
France, South Africa and Spain being the abstainers 
(ib id. , 1 0 6 6 th Pl.Mtg., Nov.27, pp.8 7 1 - 2 ).
106 GAOR, 17th S., 1173rd Pl.Mtg., Nov.21, 1962,
p.8 0 7 . I t  is, perhaps, significant that, when the 
committee visited Africa in 1 9 6 2 , Australia was the only 
western member to send i t s  permanent representative,
an ambassador.
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107membership increased to twenty-four, 'and to have
the committee not only seek the speedy implementation
of the Declaration and to propose specific measures to
that end, but also to recommend independence target
dates. This last provision was voted on separately 
108and defeated. While voting against this provision,
Australia voted for the draft, whereas Britain again
109abstained with South Africa, Spain and France,
The effect of the Committee of Seventeen's 
work was to increase the degree to which particular 
terri tories received the attention of the Assembly,
These included Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Angola, 
Kenya, Zanzibar and the southern African territories 
of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Australia's 
reaction to attention being focussed on various 
terr i tories was permissive and, more than could have 
been imagined in the 1950s, her view of the Assembly’s
107 Pressure for the extra numbers on the committee 
came from Afro-Asian Powers which fe l t  under-represented, 
although some would have been content with a committee
of twenty-one,
108 Ibid. , 1 1 9 5 t h  PI.M t g . , Dec.17, pp. 1 1 5 5 - 6 .
109 This draft, which became Resolution 1810(XVII),
was adopted by an Assembly vote of 101-0-4 (ib id. , p.1156)
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activities  in each case was approving or only moderately 
host ile .
Southern Rhodesia emerged as a major issue
in late 1961 and early 1 9 6 2 . A number of states,
most of them Afro-Asian, disturbed by the pro-
European weighting of the revised 1961 Southern
Rhodesian constitution, proposed that the Assembly
ask the Committee of Seventeen to consider whether
Southern Rhodesia had attained a full measure of self-
government and was thus, as Britain argued, outside
the scope of Chapter XI of the charter and the i9 6 0
Declaration, A resolution to this effect was adopted
1 10by the Assembly, The Committee of Seventeen examined
the situation in Southern Rhodesia and, as a result,
urged the inclusion of the question on the agenda
111of the resumed Assembly session in mid-19 6 2 . This 
was done and, at the mid-year meetings of the Assembly, 
Afro-Asian states successfully submitted a draft 
resolution which, as amended by Bulgaria, asked Britain
110 Resolution 1745(XVl) was adopted by an Assembly
vote of 57-21-24, Australia voting against (OAQR, 16 th
S., 1 1 0 6 th PI.Mtg., Feb.23, 1962, pp,1376-7).
111 Inclusion of the question on the agenda was 
effected by a vote of 62-26-15» Australia voting 
against (ib id . , 1109th PI.Mtg., June 12, pp.1398-9).
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(described as the administering Power, British protests
to the contrary notwithstanding) to convene a
constitutional conference aimed at ensuring the rights
of the majority of Southern Rhodesia’s inhabitants
on a ’one man, one vote* principle. Australia abstained
in a separate vote on the ’one man, one vote’ reference
112and on the draft as a whole. The burden of Plimsoll*s
mildly-expressed opposition to this draft was that
’i t  asks the United Kingdom to do things which the
United Kingdom Government believes l ies  beyond i ts  
1 13
powers * ,
The few months remaining before the Assembly* s 
seventeenth ( 1 9 6 3 ) session were marked by outbreaks 
of violence in Southern Rhodesia and official action 
against the major African political party there. Two 
resolutions were adopted at the seventeenth Assembly
112 The draft, which became Resolution 17^7(XVl), was
adopted by a vote of 73—^-27 (16id ., 1121st Pl.Mtg«,
June, 28, p.15^9)•
113 I t  was characteristic of Plimsoll’s diplomatic 
style that he was able to convey sympathy with the 
causes of self-determination and Africans’ rights and, 
at the same time, argue some of Britain's cause.
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session. The first called on Britain to secure the 
release of political prisoners and a lifting of the ban 
on the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union in Southern
1 1 4Rhodesia. The second largely was a repetition of the
resolution of the previous session, but it also called for
a cancellation of elections due to be held under the
discriminatory 1961 constitution and asked the Secretary-
1 1 5General to lend his good offices in the matter.
Australia abstained in the voting on both drafts. Her 
abstention on the second, the major draft, was based on 
Australia’s view of the incompetence of the Assembly 
in the matter and the view that outside interference
4 4 Z
would not help the situation, said McIntyre. Again
in 1 9 6 3 » Australia abstained in voting on two resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly: one asked Britain not to cede
sovereignty to Southern Rhodesia or to allow military 
forces to be transferred back to Southern Rhodesia from the
117 -dissolved Central African Federation; the other affirmed 
Southern Rhodesians’ right to self-determination and 
independence
114 Resolution 1755(XVIl) was adopted by a vote of 
83-2-11 CgAOR, 17th S . , 1152nd PI.Mtg., Oct.12, 1 9 6 2 , 
p.484).
115 Resolution 176o(XVIl) was adopted by a vote of
81-2-19 (ibid., 116 3 rd PI.Mtg., Oct.3 1 , p p .655-6).
116 Ibid. , 4th Ctee., 1 3 6 8 th Mtg., Oct.3 1 , pp.255-6).
117 Resolution 1883(XVIII) was adopted by a vote of
90-2-13 (GAOR, 18 th S., 1241st PI.Mtg., Oct. 14, 1963, P*7).
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but asked Britain not to allow independence to the 
current minority government, asked Britain to convene 
a constitutional conference preparatory to early 
independence on a basis of universal adult suffrage, 
and asked the Secretary-General again to lend his 
good o f f ic e s .11'
The Southern Rhodesian question presented 
d if f icu l t ie s  for Australia, Ker delegation, i t  is  
clear from the Assembly’s debates, was concerned 
for the rights of Africans and held some doubts about 
the present and future observance of these rights 
in Southern Rhodesia. On the other hand, the 
delegation was, l ike other ’old Commonwealth’ delegations, 
aware of the constitutional complexity of Brita in’ s 
relationship xvith the self-governing te rr i to ry ,  fe l t  
that local racial harmony would not be promoted by 
expressions of international hos t i l i ty  towards the 
t e r r i to ry 's  minority government, and would prefer as a 
general rule to avoid too emphatic h o s t i l i ty  towards 
British policy on a sensitive area. In the event, 
Australia did not accompany Britain in the l a t t e r ’ s
118 Resolution 1889(XVIII) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 7 3 - 2 - 1 9(ib id : .,  1255th Pl.Mtg., Nov.6, 1 9 6 3 ,
p. 2) .
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refusal to vote, nor for the most part, did she 
join South Africa and Portugal in consistent and utter 
hostility to the Assembly’s resolutions; she was 
content to abstain. On the Portuguese question, 
Australia's path was easier in that her international 
friendship involved was weaker and the points at 
issue were, for a state no longer intransigent on 
colonial questions and their framing at the United 
Nations, less debatable.
It has been seen that in 1956-7-8» Australia 
voted against draft resolutions designed to bring 
pressure to bear on Portugal to have her recognise 
her overseas territories as non-self-governing and 
liable to the reporting obligation of Chapter XI 
of the charter. The Australian view, sternly put, 
was that only the individual member, and not the 
Assembly, could say whether the member administered 
territories within the scope of Chapter XI. It was 
seen, further, that Australian policy showed a marked 
change in 1960 when her delegation merely abstained 
in voting on Resolution 15^-2(XV) , which declared 
Portugal's obligation to report on nine specified 
territories. Then, in 1961, Australia actually voted 
for Resolution 1699(XVI), which condemned Portugal's
1 90
failure to co-operate with the Assembly and appointed
a committee to gather information on Portuguese
te r r i to r ie s  as best i t  could. In 1 9 6 2 , the Australian
delegation joined in verbal criticism of Portugal
and abstained in voting on Resolution 1807(XVII)
only because i t  included an appeal to members not to
1 1 9supply arms to Portugal. In 1 9 6 3 » f ina l ly ,  Australia
supported a draft resolution which called for immediate 
independence for a l l  Portuguese te r r i to r ie s  and asked
the Security Council to consider how th is  might be
, . ,  120 achieved•
Meanwhile, United Nations attention had become 
focussed par ticularly  on the Portuguese te rr i to ry  of 
Angola on Africa’s west coast. As a result of c iv il  
disturbances there early in 1961 ,  conditions in the 
te rr i to ry  were brought before the Security Council 
and General Assembly for consideration. The Council 
failed to adopt a draft resolution on the question, 
but the Assembly adopted Resolution 1603(XV), which
119 Resolution 1807(XVII) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 82-7-13 (GAOR, 17th S., 1194th Pl.Mtg., Dec.14, 
1 9 6 2 , p.1l48). The Australian view Was that the Assembly 
had no right to qall for  a ban on the movement of arms 
between alliance partners.
120 This draft,  which became Resolution 1913(XVTIl),
was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 91-2-11, the 
abstainers including Britain, the United States and 
Canada (GAOR, 18th S., 1270th Pl.Mtg., Dec.3, 19^3»
p.4) .
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called for reforms in the territory and implementation
of the i960 Declaration and appointed a committee to
121investigate the question. The committee’s report
was considered by the Assembly early in 1962 when 
there occurred another example of the change already 
noted in Australian policy.
On Resolution 1603(XV), Australia voted 
(abstained) on the Angola question with Powers like 
Britain, which held to the legal view that the 
Assembly was not competent to interfere in the legally 
domestic affairs of a member state. Later in 1961, 
as it has been seen, Australia switched to support 
for the condemnation of Portugal and the creation 
of an information committee to deal with Portuguese 
territories despite the domestic jurisdiction claims of 
Portugal. Now, early in 1962, the Australian 
representative, Plimsoll, followed this new attitude 
through with a speech which ’received widespread 
attention in the Assembly and was referred to 
appreciatively by many African and Asian countries
121 Resolution 1603(XV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 73-2-9» Australia abstaining (GAOR, 15th S., 
992nd PI.Mtg., April 20, 1961, p.435).
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1 22in their statements as being helpful and constructive*•
He was helpful and constructive in that he virtually
disowned ten or fifteen years of Australian emphasis
on legal considerations in defence of administering
Powers’ (and her own) interests. He said:
I do not think it would be profitable to 
go into the legal considerations. When we 
embark on legal discussions we often find 
ourselves in the position of having to lay 
down principles that govern a wide range of 
situations differing perhaps in so many 
respects from the one that is under con­
sideration that it is difficult to get 
agreement. But in a case like the present 
one, which we can all regard in the light of 
common sense and our general knowledge of 
the conditions of the territory and its 
people, it seems to the Government of 
Australia that, irrespective of what legal 
position the Government of Portugal may take 
concerning the constitutional status of its 
territories, it would be, to say the least, 
wise for them to regard Angola as a territory 
falling within Chapter XI of the Charter 
of the United Nations, with all that that implies. And that implies, in the first place, 
regular reporting to the United Nations in 
accordance with the Charter.It appears also to the Australian Government 
that the Government of Portugal should 
recognise, irrespective of any legal or 
constitutional principles which it regards as 
applying in this situation, that the people 
of Angola are entitled, at the proper time, 
to a genuine exercise of the right to self- 
determination.
122 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 
of the Australian Delegation, General Assembly of the 
United Nations, Resumed Sixteenth Session, 15th January 
to 23rd February, 19^2, Canberra, 1 9 6 2 , p.7«
1091st Pl.Mtg., Jan.18, 1962, p.1220.123 GAOR, 1 6th S.,
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Plimsoll then voted for a draft resolution under 
which the Assembly called on Portugal to cease 
repression in Angola, to in i t iate  a process for the 
transfer of power to the people of Angola and to 
report to the following Assembly session* I t  also 
reappointed the committee established under Resolution
1 p |i
1603(XV). In 1962, the Assembly adopted a draft
resolution along similar lines except that i t  called 
for sanctions and the imposition of an arms embargo.
124 Resolution 1742(XVl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 99-2-1 (ib id. , 1102nd Pl.Mtg., Jan.30» 1962,
P . 1 3 5 0 ) .  Australia’s affirmative vote presumably was 
made possible by the prior defeat of a paragraph in the 
draft calling for an arms embargo. I t  is interesting 
to note that Plimsoll reported to the Assembly that in 
the previous October the Australian Prime Minister,
Mr Menzies, had written to the Portuguese Prime Minister, 
Dr Salazar, to the effect that ’i t  was Australia’s 
view that the Government of Portugal. . .  should regard 
Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Chapter XI 
of the Charter, that i t  should report on Angola to the 
United Nations, and that i t  should recognise that the 
people of Angola are entitled to exercise freely and 
genuinely the right of self-determination’ (ib id . , 1 0 9 1 st
Pl.Mtg., Jan.18, p.1220). I t  appears, then, that the 
marked change in Australian attitudes may be dated to 
the period April-Oct ober, 19 6 1. In April, Australia
fe l t  constrained to abstain on Resolution 1603(XV) and, 
in October, Australia was privately informing Portugal 
of a change of policy to be manifest when Australia 
voted for Resolution 1699(XVI) in December. Two months 
later ,  Australia also voted for Resolution 1742(XVl).
This latter provision apparently was still objectionable 
to Australia, which subsequently voted against the 
draft.12'
It remains to note only that in 1962, when 
several British territories other than Southern Rhodesia 
received attention, Australia's course was somewhat 
closer than Britain's to that of the anti-colonialist 
Assembly majority. Thus, while Australia and Britain 
both abstained on resolutions affirming the right 
to independence of Nyasaland and of Bechuanaland, 
Bantuland and Swaziland, Australia voted for similar
125 Resolution 1S19(XVII) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 57-14-18 (GAOR, 17th S., 1196th PI.Mtg., Dec.
18, 1962, p.1166). Australia had voted unsuccessfully
for a separate vote on the paragraph calling for an 
arms embargo. It might be noted that four days earlier 
Australia was content to abstain on Resolution 1807(XVII) 
which did not refer to a specific territory but which 
also called for an arms embargo against Portugal, though not as well for Security Council-ordered sanctions.
I
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resolutions on Zanzibar and Kenya, whereas Britain 
persisted with abstentions.126
126 The resolutions involved here were respectively 
1818, 1817, 1811 and 1812(XVII). They were adopted 
without roll-call votes being requested, but for evidence 
of Australians, British and some other Powers* voting, 
see Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 
of the Australian Delegation, Seventeenth Regular Session 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 18th 
September, 1962 - 20th December, 1962, Canberra, 19&3» 
p . 2 4 . It may besupposed that Australia was prepared 
here to follow her own voting course where Britain* s 
essential interests were not much affected. Britain 
still had not accepted Assembly interference: '•..nothing
in the Charter authorizes the Assembly to adopt such 
recommendations; indeed the Charter specifically 
recognizes the responsibility of the Administering Members 
for the administration of territories..•the Assembly 
had no right or power to usurp a responsibility which 
clearly belongs to the Administering Power alone’, 
said a British delegate (GAQR, 17th S., 1195th Pl.Mtg.,
Dec. 17» 1962, p.1159)* Australia, on the other hand, was
now markedly less intransigent. But, while Britain 
persisted with abstentions on behalf of a principle, 
the content of the resolutions was only very mildly 
objectionable - the territories in question were anyway 
proceeding towards imminent independence. Where 
proposals significantly embarrassed Britain, as on the 
Southern Rhodesian and Aden questions (in 1963»
Australia voted vainly against Fourth Committee hearings 




A total of fifty resolutions has been referred
to in preceding pages of this chapter covering the
127period 1950-63. Australia apparently voted for 12,
1 28against 13» and abstained in voting on 24. £'< In 
the shorter period of 1950-9 » during which it has 
been seen that Australia was much less flexible than 
she was to show herself in the 1960s, she apparently
127 It should perhaps be noted that reference has not 
been made in preceding pages to four resolutions adopted 
by the Assembly in 1957-8-9 in response to some Powers1 
fears that European Economic Community developments 
might impede the achievement of economic objectives
in territories administered by members of the Community. 
Three of them - 1153(XIl), 1330(XIIl) and 1470(XIV) -
simply asked for information on the matter from 
administering Powers. Australia voted against all 
three. Whatever the motives of the resolutions1 sponsors 
and the bases of the contrary attitudes of the admini­
stering Powers, which (except for the Netherlands in 
one year) failed to co-operate, they seem to the writer 
not to have gone much beyond Article 73e and, thus, 
not to have had major decolonialist significance. A 
fourth resolution on the subject -1329(XIl) - had some 
such significance in that it comprised a recommendation 
to administering Powers to do something in respect of 
their territories ( to examine the advisability of 
adopting investment policies ensuring economic develop­
ment and rising per capita incomes in territories). 
Curiously, Australia was content to abstain in Fourth 
Committee voting on this draft which was adopted by an 
Assembly vote of 58-5-15 (OAOR, 13th S., 789th Pl.Mtg.,
Dec.12, 1958, p.584).
128 Of the 50 resolutions, Australia’s Assembly vote 
is documented on 34; her Fourth Committee vote is 
documented on 10; there are strong contextual indications 
of her vote on 5» on only 1 is her vote doubtful.
voted for only four resolutions, against 11 and 
abstained on eight. Xt was pointed out above, after 
discussion of events in the 1946-9 period, that a 
simple analysis of voting on resolutions can be mis­
leading if taken as more than very broadly indicative 
of attitudes, if note is not taken of which resolutions 
were supported or opposed.
If account is taken of the significance of 
resolutions supported or opposed by Australia, the 
conclusion reached onthe period 1946-9 largely applies 
again in the 1950-9 periods that is, Australian 
opposition to anti-colonialist pressures exerted in 
the United Nations was greater even than voting 
figures alone would indicate. The few resolutions 
supported by Australia in 1950-9 were of minimal 
anti-colonialist significance, while those she opposed 
outright or by abstention had considerable anti­
colonialist significance. Thus, Australia supported 
resolutions on: anti-discrimination, though
unenthusiastically - 644(VIl); a request for an 
examination of the question of territories* (not 
indigenes’) participation - 5 6 6 (vi); and extensions 
to the life of the information committee - 646(VIl)
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and 933(x)• On the other hand, Australia opposed 
resolutions to do with the major efforts of the 
anti-colonial Powers to take the fate of dependent 
territories from the exclusively domestic determination 
of administering members. These included resolutions 
to do with; reporting on the observance of the Human 
Rights Declaration - 446(v); indigenous participation - 
647(V1I); factors to be taken into account in deciding 
on a member* s obligation or not to continue reporting 
under Article 73 - 648(VII) and 7^2(VIIl); assumption 
by the Assembly of the right to legitimise a cessation 
of reporting - 747(vill), 748(VIIl), 849(ix) , 850(lX), 
945(x ) and 1469(XIV); education programme target dates - 
1049(Xl); and the submission of political information - 
848(lX) and 1468(XIV). Australia opposed less 
emphatically (by abstention) resolutions on; 
implementation - 645(VXl); achievement of progress 
in territories - 932(lX) and 1053(Xl); the information 
committee - 1332(XIIl); and principles relevant to 
establishment of non-self-governing status - 1467(XIV). 
Australia also opposed major anti-colonialist proposals 
which were unsuccessful and, if only for a time, did 
not become resolutions; in 1952, for example, she
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opposed permanence for the information committee; in
1 9 5 6- 7 - 8 , she opposed the establishment of an ad hoc
committee to study the application of Chapter XI
to the terr i tories  of new members; in 1 9 5 8 , she opposed
the interrogation of administering Powers* expert
witnesses and reference to the International Court
of Justice of the question of the application of the
two-thirds majority rule in Assembly voting.
The 1 9 6 0 s, i t  has been seen, saw a new
flexibil ity and pragmatism in Australian activity.
The observation that ’one does not contemplate with
much pleasure the sort of company in which Australia
sometimes found h erse lf , . . '  would apply much less to
129the 1 9 6 0 s than to the 1950s. Factors apparently 
associated with this policy reorientation will be 
discussed in a la te r  chapter of this work. I t  is 
necessary here merely to note that Australia now 
supported resolutions on; indigenous participation - 
1539(XV); establishment of the Committee of Seventeen
129 Geoffrey Sawer, ’The United Nations' in Gordon 
Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds. , Australia in \vorld 
Affairs 1956-1960, Melbourne, 1 9 6 3 » p.162.
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to prosecute the urgent independence objectives of
the i 9 6 0  Declaration - 1645(XVI); condemnation of
Portugal and establishment of an information committee
to deal with Portuguese terr itories - 1699(XVI); reform
and independence for Angola - 1742(XVl); extension of
the mandate and membership of the Committee of Seventeen -
1810(XVII); independence for Zanzibar and Kenya - 1811
and 1812(XVII); independence for all Portuguese
terri tories and reference of the question of enforcement
to the Security Council - 19'l3(XVIIl). While there was
1 30nothing like a complete somersault in policy,
approval for the sort of resolutions just cited reflected
a considerable change.
1 3 0  Thus Australia s t i l l  voted against a resolution 
on Southern Rhodesia -1745(XVl) - and on a resolution
which included a call for an arras embargo on Portugal - 
18 1 9 (XVIX). And she s t i l l  showed herself opposed, 
i f  in a moderate way, to the i 9 6 0  Declaration and to 
resolutions on: progress achieved - 1535(XV); anti- 
discrimination - 1536(XV); principle relevant to a
reporting obligation - 15^1(XV); Portugal1s obligation
to report on nine specified terr itories --1542(XV) -
and so on. Even here, however, the mere fact of 
abstentions rather than votes ‘against* was of 
significance.
I
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The fundamental conflict between administering 
Powers and anti-colonial Powers in the context of 
Chapter XI of the charter arose over the question of 
control of non-self-governing territories. The 
administering Powers sought to maintain their exclusive 
control which they felt the charter allowed; the 
anti-colonial Powers sought to establish to the maximum 
the right of the Assembly substantially to lessen 
that exclusiveness. It was a question of who, in 
the last resort, should decide the fate of non-self- 
governing territories; the administering Powers alone 
or the United Nations as a whole. A similar conflict 
developed in the context of the trusteeship system 
establisnea under Chapters XII and XIII of the charter. 
It was a question of who, in the last resort, controlled 
trust territories - Powers exercising trusteeship 
or the United Nations which awarded those Powers their 
trusteeship.
The trusteeship system operated in a smaller 
area than the informal system gradually devised 
for non-self-governing territories within the scope
2 0 3
of' Chapter XX. I t  at no time encompassed more than 
eleven te r r i to r ie s ,  ranging from 362,688sq. mile 
Tanganyika (population, over nine million) to 
5,263-acre Nauru (population, under five thousand)
But i t  operated in a more intense way, Article 75
of Chapter XII of the charter explicitly  provided
for a United Nations system of supervision; Article 76
l i s ted  independence as an objective of the system
(whereas Article 73® spoke only of self-government
for non-self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s ) , Article 8 5  named
the Assembly as the ultimate source of approval of
terms under which trust  te r r i to r ie s  would be administered,
1 Article 77c, of course, envisaged the possibi l i ty  of 
a l l  non-self-governing te r r i to r ie s  being subject to
the trusteeship system. In fact ,  the system has applied 
only to te r r i to r ie s  detached from World War I and I I  
enemies, and not even to a l l  of those. Terr itor ies , 
with independence date and the relevant administering 
Power, in the system have been: Ruanda-Urundi ( 1 9 6 2  
as two s tates, Burundi and Rwanda), Belgium; Cameroons 
( i 9 6 0 ) and Togoland ( i 9 6 0 ), France; Somaliland (19bO) , 
I ta ly;  Western Samoa ( 1 9 6 2 ), New Zealand; Cameroons ( 1 9 6 1 , 
part joining Nigeria, part joining Cameroon Republic), 
Togoland (1957, joining Ghana) and Tanganyika ( 1 9 6 1 ), 
Britain; Nauru and New Guinea, Australia; Pacific Is lands, 
United States.
2 While there have been 11 trust  te r r i to r ie s ,  the 
Assembly has in a l l  l i s ted  104 non-self-governing 
te r r i to r ie s  (some of these comprising parts of larger 
units - e .g. ,  four components in the Leeward Islands­
and some despite protests to the contrary by United 
Nations members alleged to be administering Powers).
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Article 87 allowed the Assembly, and an Assembly- 
dominated Trusteeship Council to accept petitions 
and send visitors to trust territories, and Article 88 
had the administering Powers report annually on the 
basis of a Trusteeship Council questionnaire covering 
all aspects - political as well as other - of the 
development of trust territories.
In a sense, the anti-colonial Powers initially 
had less ground to cover in the trusteeship than in 
the Chapter XI context. In the latter, they had to 
build a measure of accountability and supervision 
and press for territories’ independence, on what at 
best they could claim was implicit in the charter.
In the former, accountability and supervision were 
quite explicit in the charter and independence was a 
clearly stated goal: decolonisation under the aegis
of the United Nations was written into the trustee­
ship system at the beginning. However, difficult 
questions remained: what, for example, was meant by 
supervision; who would negotiate or set the terms 
under which each trust territory would be administered; 
what could be done if, as Evatt had postulated, 
territories were not submitted to the system; who 
could say when independence had become appropriate.
E'or the anti-colonial Powers, the value of the trustee­
ship system was that it took the administration and 
fate of trust territories out of administering Powers1 
hands and placed them in those of the Assembly, and 
the greater the degree cf supervision the better. For 
the administering Powers, including Australia, the 
trusteeship system was meant to ensure their own 
observance of the humane and progressive canons of 
Article 76 by having them held to account for their 
administrations before a body provided with adequate 
information. In the face of anti-colonialist efforts 
to maximise the supervisory role of the United Nations 
and to press for the attainment of the objective of 
independence, the administering Powers and their allies 
sought to retain freedom from (to them) objectionable 
interference. They sought, in the first place, to 
have the Assembly and Trusteeship Council allow them 
a sort of chronological primacy. That is, they 
insisted on a form of accountability by which they 
would be held to account only for policy implemented. 
They opposed the notion that they should first obtain 
United Nations approval for planned activity or be 
given concrete directions on planned activity. In the
second place, they sought to have the Assembly respect
the primacy of the Trusteeship Council, to leave
their relationship with the Council undisturbed in
the same way as, when they were mandatory Powers, the
League of Nations Council had left their relationship
3with the Permanent Mandates Commission undisturbed* 
Conflict between the two groups of Powers 
showed itself on a wide variety of questions which may 
loosely be categorised under three headings: (l) the
establishment of the trusteeship system; (2) the degree 
of supervision exercised under the system; and (3) the 
attainment of the political objectives of the system.
I.
Article 79 of the charter states that the terms 
of trusteeship for each territory placed under the 
system should be agreed upon 1 by the States directly 
concerned1. In the case of territories which had been
3 The administering Powers here were on very weak constitutional ground but this was an understandable 
defence tactic against the anti-colonial Powers. The 
latter 'in the Assembly... enjoy a preponderance of 
numbers.which the constitution of the Trusteeship Council denies them, and in the Fourth Committee in 
particular they have conducted what is virtually a 
continuous review of the Council’s policies’. (H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution 
London, 1959"* P *135) •
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League mandates, states directly  concerned would
include the mandatory Power. There was no indication
of what other Powers would be concerned, or of what
sta tes would be concerned in the case of te rr i to r ies
4
which had not been mandates. At the f i r s t  meetings
of the Fourth Committee in 1946, the Soviet Union sought
to have permanent members of the Security Council
declared to be 'States  directly  concerned' in each
case, but Britain and the United States apparently
5
would not tolerate  th is .  Other states had various 
views. Iraq, for example, argued that the states 
concerned were the administering Powers plus states 
'concerned, by virtue of geographical proximity, or 
cultural,  l ingu is t ic ,  economic, social and continued 
h is to r ica l  t ie s  with the te r r i to r ie s  to be placed 
under t r u s t e e s h i p ^  Bailey, for Australia,
4 Article 85 says that the Assembly shall approve 
trusteeship agreements, but s tates inclined to be 
c r i t i c a l  or suspicious of administering Powers clearly 
would have preferred to have a voice in the in i t i a l  
stages of drawing up the terms of agreements.
5 New York Times, Jan .10, 1946.




argued that a definition might be unnecessary} all 
member states could advance claims and the Assembly 
itself could, when approving agreements, consider 
whether ’States directly concerned* had been involved./ 
This view, which was largely in accord with that of the
Q
United States, prevailed/ A draft, which became
Resolution 9(l)» asked mandatory Powers to submit
trusteeship agreements reached in ’concert with other
States directly concerned’, but did not indicate which
9states these might be. Australia’s practical view 
of the concept emerged later in 19^6 when the Secretary- 
General inquired of members what prospects there were of 
agreements being submitted. Australia replied that a 
New Guinea agreement had been prepared and published 
and was being discussed with New Zealand, the United
7 Ibid., pp.21-2 .
8 It has been said that the United States originally was 
responsible for the phrase in question (Sady, op,cit., 
p.125)» but China and France also used the phrase, or 
close approximations to it, in their initial proposals
at San Francisco (UNCIQ Doc s. , Vol.10, p.646).
9 Resolution 9(t)> which also dealt with non-self-
governing territories, was adopted by the Assembly 
unanimously (GAQR, 1st S., 1st Pt., 27th Pl.Mtg., Feb.9» 
19^6, p.376). Failure to settle the question of the 
phrase’s meaning was partly responsible for the Soviet 
Union’s boycott of the Trusteeship Council from its 
inauguration in 19^ +7 until April, 19^8 (see Christian 
Science Monitor and New York Herald Tribune, March 26, 
19^7 and Herald Tribune, April 26", 19^ -8) •
States, Britain and France, all friendly, western
10and administering Powers.
The agreement which Australia submitted for
hew Guinea late in 19^ 6 gave Australia a firmer hand
in the territory even than she had had as a League
mandatory Power. As before, she intended to administer
New Guinea as * an integral part of Australia*. In
addition, there was explicit provision for union
1 1with Papua, and for fortification. The view expressed
in 19^6 by W.M. Hughes, who had waived Australia*s
annexation claim in 1919 only on condition of an
utterly permissive mandate, that 'th is  is  a matter of
l i fe  and death...our security can never be assured
unless there is  full control of these terr i tories,
1 2which are the outer bastions of our defence* seemed 
to colour every paragraph of the draft agreement. In 
the Fourth Committee, the Soviet Union condemned 
the agreement: states directly concerned had not been
defined and consulted; administration of a territory
2 0 9
10 There would have been a case for consultation with 
the Philippines and, more particularly, China.
11 This does not conflict with earlier Australian 
policy to the degree that Harper and Sissons (op.c i t . , 
p . 1 8 3 ) seem to suggest. The Trusteeship Council was not 
constituted according to the formula which had been 
desired by Australia. And Australia, i t  was seen above, 
had made no bones about her determination to control 
New Guinea's future.
12 London Time s , Jan. 19» 19^ +6.
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as ‘an integral part* of the administering Power
1 3reduced i t  to the status of a colonial possession,
Bailey defended the agreement strongly: the effects
of World War XX and the primitive state of the indigenes 
made such terms essential. He also made clear Australia’ s 
conception of authority and government, even under 
trusteeship:
A clear distinction should be drawn between 
the governmental functions of the administering 
authority and the advisory functions assigned 
by the Charter to the Trusteeship Council,
The administering authority was accountable 
to the United Nations for i t s  administration, 
but the administration i t se l f  was the function 
of the administering Power, The role of 
the Trusteeship Council was that of supervisor 
and not that of administrator.1^
In the Fourth Committee, a Soviet proposal to 
have the expression 'as an integral part* removed 
from the agreement was narrowly successful; so, too, 
was a Soviet proposal to have the agreement provide 
for revision, although the Soviet desire for revision 
after five years was denied in favour of a Chinese
13 GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt.,  4th Ctee., 18th Mtg., Nov. 11, 
1946, pp.9 1 - 2 .
14 Ibid. , p .95*
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1 5preference for ten years, Bailey, however, refused
to accept these changes which, he said, ’could not
promote the in te res ts  of the inhabitants of New 
1 6Guinea’ , and the Fourth Committee, despite i t s
ear l ier  voting to the contrary, accepted the agreement 
1 7as submitted. Bailey's only concession was to add
an eighth a r t ic le  containing what was virtually  an
indigenes' b i l l  of r ights.  This had been desired,
*  18
in particular ,  by China and India. I t  may be doubted
15 Ib id . , ( 2 3 rd Mtg., Dec.9 )» pp.141, 147. The proposal 
to delete ’as an integral p a r t ’ , applying to several 
other draft agreements as well as to that for New 
Guinea, was carried 16-15-3* The review proposal was 
carried by 20-14-1 and the proposal that such a review 
should occur a f te r  ten years by 20-7-8» The Soviet 
Union also objected to the provisions for administrative 
union and fo r t i f ica t io n ,  but could not enl is t  a majority 
on these points.
16 Ib id . , (2 6 th Mtg., Dec.11), p . 1 6 3 . Bailey objected
to revision on the ground that i t  would ’ stamp the 
in i t i a l  period, before revision, as a period of 
uncertainty and in s t a b i l i t y 1 (ib id . , 2 3 rd Mtg., Dec.9 » 
p . 145).
17 Ib id . , (26th Mtg., Dec.11), p.174. Despite Soviet
objections, the agreement was accepted by the Assembly 
by a ro l l -ca l l  vote of 41-6-5 (Ib id ., 62nd PI.Mtg., Dec. 
1 3 , p. 1287) •
18 Bailey’s accommodation was described at the time 
as a ’ surprise declaration’ (Herald Tribune, Dec.4,
1946).
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if Australia was in any sense prepared really to negotiate
an agreement. In August, 19^ +6, J.B. Chifley had
declared that his government was adamant in its demand
to have * complete and exclusive power in controlling
the administration of New Guinea’ and ‘full powers of
legislation, administration and jurisdiction’. That
had been the position under the mandate, and the
government was determined that it must continue.
Australia’s defence and the welfare of the natives
1 9demanded it, he said.
Besides the question on how or under what 
terms a territory might be placed under trusteeship, 
there also arose the question of which territories 
should be placed within the system. Article 77 merely 
lists the three Yalta categories (League mandates, 
territories detached from World War II enemy states 
and territories voluntarily submitted), adding that 
’it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to 
which territories in the foregoing categories will be 
brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms’.
19 C P D , V o l . 188, p.3853 (Aug.7, 19^6). Chifley added
that nothing but absolute control could be accepted 
by any Australian government.
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Nothing is said about how this agreement might be 
reached or by whom*
In fact, the third category did not eventuate.
It has been stated officially that Britain ‘had at
one time been prepared to place British Somaliland
under trusteeship, subject to certain conditions
and reservations...but since some Governments had not
agreed to those conditions and reservations, the
20proposal had been withdrawn’. And it seems that 
Australia may have considered the submission of Papua. 
During early meetings of the Assembly, some states 
seemed to assume that non-self-governing territories 
would be submitted. When this began to look unlikely, 
India in 1947 proposed a draft resolution by which the
2° GAOR, 4th Ctee., Part III, 7th Mtg., Nov.26,
1946, p .4o•
21 Evidence lbr this is not strong. J.K. Murray, at 
the time administrator of Papua-New Guinea and pre­
sumably with some ’inside’ knowledge, once argued that, 
judging by Australian activity at San Francisco and the 
subsequent Forde-Evatt Report (as above), 'Australia 
would have been willing to place Papua.•.under Irustee— 
ship if there had been any likelihood of the lead being 
followed by other powers' (see J.K. Murray, The Pro­
visional Administration of the Territory of Papua-New 
Guinea, Brisbane, 1949, p.18). An Australian cabinet
minister of the time has told the writer that cabinet 
at some time prior to San Francisco expressly approved 
trusteeship for Papua, but there is no evidence to 
support his memory of this.I
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Assembly would assert a superior value for the trustee­
ship system over the provisions of Chapter XI and 
express a hope that Powers administering non-self- 
governing Territories would submit trusteeship 
agreements for them. This draft was adopted by the 
Fourth Committee but failed in a tie vote in the
Assembly^ Australia voting against the draft on 
22each occasion.
The second category of territories eventually 
was brought into the system or otherwise dealt with
23to the satisfaction of most United Nations members.
22 GAOR, 2nd S., 4th Ctee. , 44th Mtg. , 0ct.l4, 1 €>47* 
p.92, and 106th PI.Mtg., Nov.1, p.667. The Fourth 
Committee vote was 25-23-3 and in the Assembly, where
a two-thirds majority would have been required, the vote 
was 24-24-1. According to private diplomatic papers 
seen by the writer, the Australian delegation saw some 
value in the Indian proposal having been put and 
defeated: administering Powers in future would not be
liable to accusations of ignoring United Nations wishes 
if they preferred to carry out their obligations under 
the terms of Chapter XI rather than the trusteeship 
system.
23 Under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, the 
disposition of Italian colonies was referred to the 
Assembly which recommended in 1949 that Libya be granted 
independence in 1952 after an interim United Nations 
administration, that Italian Somaliland be granted 
independence after ten years of administration by Italy 
under trusteeship, and that Eritrea be federated with 
Ethiopia.
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The first category, comprising the League mandates,
24was, after initial hesitation in some quarters,
brought into the system, but with one exception:
South-West Africa, which lad been administered by
South Africa under a League of Nations *C* mandate.
The South-West Africa issue, which was to
become a major colonial question engaging the attention
of the United Nations annually thereafter, arose late
in 1946 when the South African Prime Minister,
J.C. Smuts, told the Fourth Committee that the
inhabitants of South-West Africa had opted for union
25with South Africa; union was inevitable, he said. ' 
Sixteen of the fifty-one United Nations members 
immediately declared their hostility, arguing that 
the charter imposed on South Africa either a legal 
or moral obligation to submit the territory to 
trusteeship. Subscribers to the latter view included 
France and the United States. Only Britain gave
24 In particular, France and the United States.
25 QAOR, 1st S., 2nd Ft., 4th Ctee., l4th Mtg., Nov.4,
1946, p.65. This rather clashed with an earlier 
undertaking by South Africa to consult territorial 
opinion and submit a subsequent decision ‘to the 
General Assembly for judgement* (GAOR, 1 st S ., 1st Pt,,
4th Ctee., 3rd Mtg., Jan.22, 1946, p.10).
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South Africa outright support.' The Australian
position was difficult: a fellow Commonwealth member
was proposing a perhaps legally permissible course at
odds with general opinion of the time. In the event,
Commonwealth loyalty and support for the rights of
the administering Power dictated the Australian response.
Bailey, for Australia, largely ignored the substance
of South Africa’s absorption plan to attack the argument
that submission of a trusteeship agreement was in
any sense compulsory: ’Australia could not accept
the compulsory theory of trusteeship,..Article 77»
especially paragraph 2 was decisive as to the
27optional character of trusteeship...1. On the
substance of the South African propose!, Evatt said
later: ’We did not oppose it, but we could not support
it’ . ' By a large majority, the Assembly adopted a
resolution which declared the South African plan to be
unacceptable and called for the submission of a trustee-
29ship agreement. '
26 For debates, see GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., 
l4th-20th Mtgs., N o v .4-14, 19^6, pp.65-114.
27 Ibid., (9th Mtg., Sub-Ctee, 2 of 4th Ctee., Nov.28), 
PP •52-3•
28 CPD, Vol. 190, p .162 (Feb.26, 1947)«
29 Resolution 65(1) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 37-0-9, Australia abstaining (ibid. , 64tli PI.Mtg.,
Dec.14, p .1327)•
At the next (1947) Assembly session, South
Africa stated that, in deference to the Assembly's
wishes, she would not proceed with incorporation but
would maintain the status quo, continuing to observe
the spirit of the League mandate and transmitting
30information on the territory annually. In the 
ensuing debate, it was again argued that there was 
a legal obligation on South Africa to submit a trustee­
ship agreement or that, whatever the legal position, 
there was a moral obligation. The Australian 
response was energetically to defend South Africa.
Evatt himself entered the debate to argue that South 
Africa had contributed well to the Allied cause and to 
the United Nations Organisation, that she had not 
apparently exploited South-West Africa, that her 
critics should look to their own territories, that 
there was no legal obligation to submit an agreement 
and it had not been intended at San Francisco that there 
should be. He stated that 'the system under which 
South-West Africa was administered mattered less than




tlie way in which the Union Government governed the 
31territory*• When the iourth Committee nevertheless
adopted an Indian draft resolution calling for the
submission of a trusteeship agreement within the next
year and a Polish amendment declaring it to be the
‘clear intention of the Charter' for mandates to be
submitted to trusteeship, Evatt again rose to champion
South Africa. In the Assembly, he denounced the draft
resolution as 'intended to injure and censure South
Africa*; it was wrong to hammer away at Smuts, who
was a leader of liberal thought; the South African
government had decided what it must do; censuring
South Africa would not, anyway, help the natives of
South-Vest Africa. He concluded:
There is an old saying...'For forms of 
government, let fools contest; what'er is 
best administered is best* . I think South 32Africa can take its stand on that principle. 
Evatt supported the application of the two-thirds rule
31 Ibid., (39th Mtg., Oct.8), p.59* Evatt's fervour
was noted by one reporter who wrote of the American 
and Australian reactions: 'As Mr Dulles obviously
regretted to point out, and Dr Evatt delighted to do, 
South Africa cannot legally be compelled...',
Manchester Guardian, Oct.10, 19^-7)*
32 GAOH, 2nd S. , 104th PI.Mtg., Nov.1, 19^7, p.586. 
Evatt's was one of the longest speeches made. Evatt, 
of course, was willing enough to have Spain censured; 
here, he professed outrage at members censuring another 
member.
(it had not been invoked the previous year) and voted
against both a Danish amendment deleting the time
provision and the Polish contribution and, vainly,
the draft resolution thus emasculated.
This resolution asked the Trusteeship Council
to examine a report on South-West Africa already
submitted by South Africa. In the Council, the
Australian representative, Forsyth, sought constantly
to shield South Africa. He objected to the Council
inviting South Africa to send an expert witness for
the standard Council interrogation because South
Africa might be put ’in the difficult position of
34having to decline’. During Council consideration 
of its own report back to the 1948 Assembly, Forsyth 
took extreme pains to have the report contain a minimum 
of conclusions and no recommendations in case, as he
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33 Resolution l4t(ll) was adopted by an Assembly vote
of 40-10-4 (ibid., 105th PI.Mtg., Nov.1, pp.650-1).
Reasons suggested by his former associates for Evatt's 
extreme stand range from high personal regard for Smuts 
to ’old Commonwealth’ solidarity.
34 'TCOR, 2nd S . , 1st P t ., 6th Mtg., Dec.1, 1947, p . 122.
Forsyth had his way in that the Secretariat, not the 
Council, sent a tactful invitation which was anyway not 
accepted - although written questions prepared by a 
Council sub-committee, which included Australia, were 
answered•
argued, an unfriendly tone prejudiced the ultimate
submission of an agreement of even further reporting. 
When the Assembly met in 1948, South Africa 
announced that she had turned back to a policy of ‘close 
association and integration', South-West Africa would 
be given six seats in South Africa's lower house and 
two in its senate; matters such as defence would be 
handled by South Africa. But this was not incor­
poration: there would be local self-government,^
Australia did not participate in the heated discussions 
which followed, but she was consistent in voting against 
an attempt to have the Assembly endorse rather than 
merely note the Trusteeship Council’s report, for an 
Assembly expression of regret that an agreement had
35
35 TCOR, 3rd S., 41st Mtg., Aug.4, 1948, p.532.
The Council's report was still censorious. The absence 
of any political representation of indigenes was 
'noted*; the expenditure of 10 per cent of the 
territory's budget on 90 per cent, of its inhabitants 
was ’observed’; that the 90 per cent held only 42 per 
cent of the land was ’observed'; a total absence of 
government educational facilities in indigenous 
areas was ’noted'•
36 GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt., 4th Ctee., 76th Mtg., Nov.
9, 1948, pp.287-94. It is relevant to note that, 
earlier in the year, elections in South Africa had 
seen the defeat of Smuts’ United Party and the 
accession to power of the less moderate Nationalist 
Party.
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not yet been submitted as distinct from a reference
to Assembly recommendations not having been implemented,
against an attempt to have the Assembly ask South
Africa not to alter South-West Africans’ rights pending
the submission of an agreement, and against an
attempt to have the Assembly ask South Africa not to
proceed with what amounted to integration and to agree
to a visit to the territory by a Trusteeship Council-
37appointed commission.
Then, in 1949» when South Africa announced 
that she would not submit further information on the 
territory, events took a dramatic turn in that Cuba 
proposed that documents submitted by the Rev. Michael 
Scott, who was asking actually to appear before the 
Fourth Committee on behalf of South-West Africans, 
be circulated among members. Australia voted vainly 
against this, and against a decision to allow oral
38evidence to be heard from representatives of indigenes. 
After Scott’s speech to the Committee comprehensively 
criticising South Africa, Fourth Committee discussion
37 Ibid., (83rd Mtg., 84th Mtg., Nov.18-19), pp.371-6.
38 Australia abstained in a vote on acceptance of 
Scott’s credentials and in another on the placing of 
documents mentioned in his speech in the Assembly 
records. See GAOR, 4th S., Annexes, pp.103-5«
centred mainly on two issues: the submission of
reports by South Africa, and the reference of the South-
West Africa issue to the International Court of Justice.
Proceedings on the former were based on an Indian draft.
Australia voted with a majority against a Soviet
amendment to have South Africa accused of having
violated the charter and, unsuccessfully, voted
against a Philippines amendment to have South Africa
accused of repudiating past assurances. In a series
of votes on paragraphs asking South Africa to resume
reporting, Australia voted ’against’ in each case,^°
In the final vote on a proposal to refer the question
1to the International Court for an opinion, Australia
k2abstained.
39 Reference to the Court had been suggested in 19^7 by 
the Netherlands, supported by Greece, but little note 
seemed taken of the suggestion at that point.
40 In the Assembly, where the draft of what became 
Resolution 337(lV) was adopted by a vote of 33-9-10, anci 
where amendments greatly softened its tone, Australia
was content to abstain (ibid. , 269th Pl.wtg., Dec.6 , p.53^)
41 The Court was asked for opinions on the status of 
South-West Africa and the obligations of South Africa 
towards it, on the force of the mandate, on the applica­
bility of the trusteeship system, and on competence to 
modify the territory’s status.
42 Resolution 33b(^V) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 40-7-4 (ibid., p.537).
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Evatt once described bis emphatic defence of 
South Africa thus;
...an appeal for...a spirit of tolerance was 
made by Australia. Delegates were reminded 
that international morality begins at home... 
X denied that there was any legal obligation 
to place any territory under trusteeship; . 
this was clearly stated at San Francisco...
An appeal for tolerance may have been appropriate; even
the view that there was no legal obligation was
acceptable to many members. But, unlike some of these
members, which included western and administering
states, Australia did not go on to urge South Africa
to meet general United Nations opinion. Instead, she
defended South Africa, saying virtually that competence
of South African government outweighed the principle
of trusteeship. This view was directly antagonistic
to the anti-colonial attitude that metropolitan Powers
were no longer free unilaterally to decide the fate of
dependencies, that, as Evatt himself had said back in
1942, the United Nations must be the agency to effect
any changes in the government or administration of
peoples.4^ It has already been suggested that the
43 Evatt Report, 19^7»
44 CPD, Vol. 172, p .83 (Sept.3, 1942).
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involvement of Smuts and a tendency towards Common­
wealth solidarity contribute towards an explanation 
of the Australian policy. Perhaps of more importance 
was the simple domestic jurisdiction issue. South 
Africa was being told by an international body what 
it might or might not do with a contiguous dependency, 
and Australia also administered a virtually contiguous 
dependency, an administration the security of which 
she equated, as will be seen later in this worl^ , 
with the preservation of her metropolitan territorial 
security. South Africa, it might also be remembered, 
was under attack at the same time for internal policy 
towards coloured inhabitants, especially Indians, 
and Australia might well have felt potentially 
vulnerable to similar attack on the situation of her 
aborigine s.
Australian concern for the rights of the 
administering Power also showed itself on the question 
of petitions. As the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, 
said when he opened the Trusteeship Council’s first 
session in 1947, petitions, visiting missions and 
annual reports together comprised ’ the backbone of the
r "
2 2 5  
4 5system of international supervision*. Of petitions,
Article 8 7  of the charter said merely that the 
Trusteeship Council might * accept petitions and examine 
them in consultation with the administering authority*. 
Australia’s N.J.O. Makin, who was f i r s t  to address the 
Council on the question, took up a fairly conservative 
position. He urged the allowance of oral petitions 
but only in support of written petitions, that the 
administering Power’s comments on a petition should 
be received by the Council at the same time as}or
46before, the petition. For the same reason, he was
not happy that visiting United Nations missions should
be treated as human le t te r  boxes: the administering Power
47must be informed and able to comment. On the question
45 TOOR, 1st S . , 1st Mtg•, March 26, 1947» p.4.
46 Ibid. , (5th Mtg., March 31), pp.78-9. Makin*s
position at base was that of New Zealand' s Sir Carl 
Berendseni * My thought is: le t  us not do anything to
hamper the authority of the Administering Power unless 
and until we are convinced that i t  should properly
be harnpered* • (Ibid• , 6th Mtg. , Apri 1 1, p. 1 1 8) .
47 Ibid. (5th Mtg., March 3 1 ), p.89. Makin*s regard 
for the rights of administering members was also 
evident when he objected to a provisional procedural 
rule referring to the Council’ s need to formulate a 
detailed and comprehensive questionnaire. This, he 
said, 'might be taken to imply that the Administering 
Authority would be inclined to conceal data i f  the 
Trusteeship Council did not find i t  out* (ib id . , 14th 
Mtg., April 11, p.343).
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of circulating petitions among Council members before 
a Council session, the same consideration should apply; 
otherwise, there would be a time lag prejudicial to
48the administering Powers. On the acceptance of 
anonymous petitions, Makin at first was favourably 
disposed: they would allow the emergence of information
which might otherwise not be available. However, 
after a strong and hostile speech from the British 
representative, Makin announced that he had been 
’impressed with the arguments advanced regarding the
question of anonymous communications not being regarded
_ ,... , 4 9  Australia and herm  the sense of a petition...’,
fellow administering Powers largely were successful 
in having their views written into the Council* s 
procedural rules. Oral petitions would be allowed 
only ’in support or elaboration of a previously 
submitted written petition' (Rule 80). They might 
otherwise be permitted only in exceptional circum­
stances and only after the Council and the relevant 
administering Power had been informed of the subject
matter•
48 Ibid., (5th Mtg., March 31), p.9^ and (6th MtS* » 
April 1T, p.112.
49 Ibid., (7th Mtg., April 2), pp.135,15^»
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Just as Australia sought at the establishment 
of the trusteeship system to safeguard the rights 
of administering Powers so, in the operation of the 
system, she showed herself unwilling to tolerate 
interference by the United Nations in these Powers’ 
decision-making in the administration of their trust 
territories. This was evident on the question of 
administrative unions.
The New Guinea agreement submitted by Australia 
and finally approved by the Assembly expressly 
provided for Australia’s ’liberty to bring the 
Territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative 
union or federation with other dependent territories 
under its jurisdiction or control...’. In 19^6, 
when the Assembly discussed the New Guinea agreement, 
the Soviet Union tried unsuccessfully to have this 
article deleted.^0 Late in 1947, Forsyth informed 
the Trusteeship Council that Australia intended to 
establish an administrative union between New Guinea 
and the contiguous non-self-governing territory of




Papua, giving economy of administration as Australia’s
5 1principal motive.'" Challenged by China on this score,
he added another motive: it would be easier to recruit
5 2administration personnel for a larger service. Finally, 
he observed that ‘the main reason is not one of these.
The main reason is that the Territories are almost 
identical in character... there is a good prima facie
53case for not maintaining two separate administrations.’ ' ' 
Reaction to the announcement was unfriendly.
China, for example, denied that there was a prima facie 
case at all; the territory of New Guinea could support 
itself separately. More to the point, she feared that 
separate reporting might become impossible and the 
attainment of the trusteeship system’s objectives
51 TCOR, 2nd S., 1st Pt., l6thMtg., Dec.15, 19^7, 
p.519. Australia had toyed with the idea of union in 
the mandates period but seemed deterred by legal 
difficulties. When still a Justice of the High Court 
of Australia, Evatt, for example, could not indicate 
where sovereignty lay in respect of New Guinea (see 
H.V. Evatt, ’The British Cominions as Mandatories' in 
Australian and New Zealand Society of International 
Law, Proceedings, J~. Melbourne , p p . 27-5^) •
52 TCOR, 2nd S., 1st Pt., 16th Mtg., Dec.15, 19^7, P*525
53 Ibid.
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5/ijeopardised. Mexico thought it unlikely that
officials serving in a single administration could
work simultaneously under a trusteeship and a
55colonial policy. Even the United States represent­
ative wondered if union could allow maintenance of the 
trust territory1s separate identity and he suggested
that Australia might let the Council examine the plans
56for union before their implementation.' Other
57administering Powers supported Australia. Belgium 
and France objected, in particular, to the United States 
suggestion: the basic idea of trusteeship, they argued,
was that the administering Power did what it thought 
best and reported on what it had done so that the
COCouncil might review the outcome. The British 
representative, Sir Alan Burns, declared that ‘the 
Council could not prejudge an issue before the
59Administering Authority had taken action* .
54 Ibid., pp.525-6.
55 Ibid., (17th Mtg., Dec.15), p.541.
56 Ibid., (16th Mtg., Dec.15), p p .529-30«
57 Britain, Belgium (to a less degree) and France 
(to still a less degree) themselves created unions of 
various sorts in Africa.
58 Ibid., pp.530-1.
59 TCOR, 2nd S., 2nd Pt., 33rd Mtg., March 8 ,
19^8 , p p .168-9•
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When, in 19^ -8» "the Council continued its drawn- 
out examination of Australia* s first report on New 
Guinea, the Soviet Union, which had now taken its 
seat on the Council, and the Philippines joined in 
the attack. The most effective critic, however, 
probably was the representative of the United States, 
a fellow administering Power. He was ’somewhat puzzled* 
by the union plan. He wished to know what features 
'were possessed by political union which this admini­
strative union did not possess. Xt provided for a 
common administrator for both Territories, a common 
legislature, a common judicial system, a customs union, 
common taxation, and allowed the administrator to 
change b o u n d a r i e s ' A u s t r a l i a ' s  expert witness,
J.R. Halligan, scarcely attempted a rebuttal; he was
content in the main to repeat that all these 'common
61services...were of a purely administrative nature'.
The Trusteeship Council was not impressed, and reported 
to the Assembly that it was 'not... entirely convinced 
that the proposed union between New Guinea and Papua
60 TCOR, 3rd S . , 25th Mtg., July 15, 19^8, P«304.
61 Ibid.
may not go so far as to compromise the preservation 
of the separate identity of the Trust Territory’, and 
it suggested that Australia reconsider.62
In 1948, wnen effects of the East-West conflict 
were very apparent in United Nations proceedings, J 
the Assembly adopted a resolution, based on a draft 
sponsored jointly by Cuba, India, the Philippines,
Iraq and Venezuela in the Fourth Committee, and 
calling on the Trusteeship Council to investigate
64and report on all aspects of administrative unions. 
Except for the application of the two-thirds rule, 
this resolution would have contained a great deal 
which had passed the Fourth Committee despite the 
objections of Australia and other administering Powers.
62 GAOR, 3rd S., Supplement No. 4, p . 17. In a minority 
reijort, the Soviet Union refused to accept Australian 
assurances that absorption would not occur (ibid., p.48).
63 The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, for
example, complained that ’the Trusteeship Council was in 
danger of degenerating into a platform for political 
propaganda.,.’ (GAOR, S., 1st P t ,, 144th Pl.Mtg.,
Sept.27, 1948, p.150).
64 Resolution 224(ill) was adopted unanimously by 
the Assembly (ibid., 160th Pl.Mtg. , Nov. 18, p.492).
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The draft adopted by the Fourth Committee noted that
political unions were precluded; that territories*
identities should carefully be kept intact until
indigenes could express their views; that, if union
interfered with the submission of adequate separate
information on trust territories, the Trusteeship Council
should intervene and supervise the gathering of
information. The Australian delegate Hood, who voted
with unsuccessful minorities against these provisions
in the Fourth Committee and with (given the two-thirds
rule application) adequate minorities in the Assembly,
argued that unions could not be considered in the
abstract, that the Papua-New Guinea union would not
interfere with the separate identity of New Guinea,
and that the charter did not oblige administering
Powers to discuss policy with the Council before its
6 5implementation. On this last issue, that of prior 
consultation, it is worth noting Hood’s statement in 
the Council in defence of Britain’s right to implement 
her African Inter-Territorial Organisation plan without 
prior reference to the Council:
65 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 69th Mtg., Nov.2, p.207
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The representative of Australia considered 
that the proper role of the Trusteeship 
Council was that of review and criticism 
of measures taken...and not that of sharing 
in the administration of Trust Territories, 
and that the Council did not have the right 
to consider in advance or give directions 
in regard to measures contemplated...the 
Administering Authorities•..were.•.not 
’agents* of the Trusteeship Council.
Pursuant to Resolution 224(lll), a committee 
of the Trusteeship Council examined the various 
administrative union schemes of administering Powers
but did not make any specific recommendations. 'The
question was too complex', as a Mexican representative,
7a member of the committee, said in the Council.
Mexico and the United States proposed a mild resolution 
to have the Council keep the question in mind during 
examinations of administering Powers' annual reports,
and Australia succeeded in having this made even
68more innocuous in its wording. However, a Fourth 
Committee sub-committee appointed to consider the 
Council's report, submitted a draft resolution whereby
66 GAOR, 3^d S. , Supplement No.4, p.27«
67 TCOR, 5th S., 21st Mtg., July 15, 1949, p.268.
68 Ibid., pp.269-70, and (22nd Mtg., July 18), p.275.
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the Assembly would ask the Council to continue its
investigation, looking particularly into the desirability
(l) of administering Powers consulting it before
6 aimplementing unions, (2) of consultation with indigenous 
elements before implementation, and (3) °f preserving 
separate legislative and judicial bodies. Hood put
the by now familiar Australian view that
The Administering Authorities were not 
acting on behalf of the United Nations but 
on behalf of the peoples of the Trust 
Territories; under the terns of the Charter 
and the Trusteeship Agreements, the General 
Assembly merely exercised supervisory 
functions. The Australian delegation would 
therefore oppose any suggestion that the 
Administering Authorities should be obliged 
to submit any plans in connexion with 
administrative unions to the Assembly.
It scarcely needs pointing out that throughout 
most of this period (1946-9), and later, issues were 
not necessarily treated on objective considerations. 
With perhaps some justification, Hood once complained 
of *a tone of complaint and criticism directed 
against the Administering Powers’ and of the existence
69 Australia, at this point, already had proceeded 
with implementation of the Papua-New Guinea union.
70 GAOR, 4th S., 4th Ctee., 107th Mtg., Oct.25, 1949, 
p.90. Resolution 326(lV) was adopted in the Assembly 
by a vote of 44-9-1 (Ibid., 240th Pl.Mtg., Nov*15, 
p.192). A roll-call vote was not requested in the 
Assembly, but in the Fourth Committee Australia voted 




of a 'division between the Administering Powers and
some of the non-Administering Powers,,.not the fault 
71of the former'• However, objections to administrative 
unions need not be seen entirely in terms of Cold Var 
propaganda or undiscriminating anti-colonialism* The 
administering Powers wer e resisting attempts to have 
the United Nations allowed any sort of supervisory 
role in non-self-governing territories and they were, 
except for a very small number of territories involved 
in World War I and II peace settlements, refusing 
to submit territories to the trusteeship system under 
which there was provision for supervision. Yet, even 
here in the small trusteeship system area, the anti­
colonial Powers found the administering Powers merging 
some of the few trust territories with the more 
impregnable colonial territories. In the case of 
Papua-New Guinea, the trusteeship territory's seat of 
administration was outside the territory altog^her.
It was scarcely surprising that many Powers should 
have been suspicious of Australian intetions,
71 GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt., 4th Ctee., 72nd Mtg.,
Nov.5, 1948, p.252.
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Australia’s reaction to positive supervision 
taken to the point virtually of instruction, as well 
as to anti-colonial Powers’ attempts to do in the 
Assembly what was difficult to achieve in the Trustee­
ship Council, may be gauged on two other issues: 
corporal punishment and the flying of the United 
Nations flag in trust territories. In 1949, after the 
Trusteeship Council apparently unavailingly had 
recommended the abolition of corporal punishment 
in trust territories (and especially in Africa and 
New Guinea), China and Cuba submitted a draft resolution 
in the Fourth Committee. This urged the abolition of 
judicial discrimination, the humane application of 
penal laws and the abolition of corporal punishment 
in trust territories. Australia did not approve of 
the Committee taking up a question which, Hood argued,
was properly within the province of the Council and
72should be left there. He tried, too, to have a 
reference to New Guinea speak of a ’formal abolition*




on the grounds that although the law In the territory
still allowed corporal punishment it had not in fact
been ordered since World War II.^ In the Fourth
Committee, Australia voted against the operative
section of the draft in the company only of Britain
Ikand South Africa. In the Assembly, however, 
Australia succeeded with her amendment and voted for 
the amended draft, although Britain still voted
75against it.
73 Ibid., p.4o,
74 Ibid», (98th Mtg., Oct.12), p.46.
75 Resolution 323(iV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 52-1-4 (Ibid., 240th PI.Mtg., Nov.15, p.189).
This turned out to be one of a number of resolutions 
ignored or only partly implemented by Australia, 
despite Evatt*s dictum that 1 each member should faith­
fully observe the recommendations and decision of United 
Nations bodies* (Herbert V# Evatt, The Task of Nations, 
New York, 1949» p«39)» To anticipate a little, in
1950 the Assembly adopted Resolution 44o(v), which 
again called for abolition, Australia abstaining in 
the Fourth Committee but voting 'for* in the Assembly 
vote of 55-0-2 (GAOR, 5th S., 4th Ctee., 172nd Mtg.,
Nov. 9, 1950, p.187, and 316th PI.Mtg., Dec.2, p.549).
At the 1951 session, a more forceful draft, which 
became Resolution 562(Vl), was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 48-0-4 - Australia abstained in the Fourth 
Committee; there was no roll-call vote in the Assembly 
(GAOR, 6th S., 4th Ctee., 244th Mtg., Jan.11, 1952, 
p•289 f and 361st PI.Mtg., Jan#l8, p.350). The Australian 
delegate, B.C. Ballard, announced that some provisions 
for corporal punishment in New Guinea would be eliminated 
and others modified, but implied that there would not 
be total formal abolition.
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The United Nations flag issue loomed large 
7 6for a time. It arose in 1949, when China, Costa Rica,
Egypt, Liberia, Mexico and the Philippines submitted
to the Fourth Committee a draft resolution whereby the
Assembly would ask the Trusteeship Council to recommend
to administering Powers that they fly the United
Nations flag in trust territories. For the administering
Powers, there were several objectionable elements in
this proposal: the notion of flying a second emblem;
the notion of the Assembly asking the Council to issue
a directive; the notion of the Council issuing what
amounted to an instruction. Britain, for example,
began by arguing that the language of the draft was
derogatory to the dignity of the Council but, when
the British delegation failed to have it reworded
so that the Council would be merely requested to * study
the possibility of inviting* the Powers to fly the
United Nations flag, the ground was shifted somewhat
and Britain argued that a second flag would suggest
77a second authority in each territory. Hood, for
76 Given the set-backs suffered by the anti-colonial 
Powers, it was, as Johnson suggests, *a symbolic gesture... 
born of a sense of frustration* (D.H.N. Johnson, ‘Trustee­
ship: Theory and Practice’ in Year Book of World Affairs, 
Vol. 5 (1951), p.236).
77 GAOR, 4th S., 4th Ctee., 96th and 97th Mtgs.,
Oct. 10-11, 1949, PP.34,37.
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Australia, stated that he must vote against a proposal
to have the Assembly suggest to the Council activity
of the sort envisagedj he would not have opposed, he
said, a request to the Council to study the matter
and make what recommendations i t  wished, Australia
joined Britain, France and the Netherlands in a minority
vote against the draft in the Fourth Committee but was
79content to abstain in the Assembly.
78 Ibid. , (97th Mtg., Oct.11), p .3 6 . Hood was slow
to enter the discussion, perhaps because Evatt seems 
to have supported the flying of the United Nations 
flag in trust terr i tories at a World Federation of 
United Nations Associations conference in Rome earlier 
in the year.
79 Resolution 325(lV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 4 8 - 5 - ^  (ibid., 2 4 0 t h  PI.Mtg., N o v . 1 5 »  p . 1 9 0 ) .  
Again to anticipate, the flag issue petered out in 
1 9 3 0 ,  when the Trusteeship Council ultimately adopted 
a mildly worded proposal to give effect to Resolution 
325(lV). Australian representatives stressed that, 
whatever the decision of the Council, Australia 1 could 
recognize no obligation to use the United Nations flag* 
(TCOR, 6 th S., 7 6 th Mtg., March 3 0 ,  1 9 5 0 ,  p . 6 0 9 )  and 
that the flag would be flown in New Guinea only when 
circumstances on a given occasion were thought by
the administration to be ’suitable1 (TCOR, 7th S.,
30th Mtg., July 21, 1950, p .2 6 7 ) •
2kO
Article 76 of the charter lists as one of 
the objectives of the trusteeship system the promotion 
of the * political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, 
and their progressive development toward self-govern­
ment or independence as may be appropriate..•1 • It 
has been suggested already that Australia was more 
inclined to stress extra-political advancement than 
political progess, to see the trusteeship system 
primarily as a guarantor of good government rather 
than as essentially providing the course for the 
territories’ imminent transition to self-government 
or independence. So, when, at the first Assembly 
meetings early in 1946, even the United States 
delegate, John Foster Dulles, allied himself with 
the critics of colonialism to the extent of urging 
administering Powers to ’vitalize’ in their 
dependencies the ’orderly processes for the attain­
ment of their legitimate aspirations,..’ Australia
80 GAOR, 1st S.,
1946, p ,15 •
III.
1st Pt., 4th Ctee., 5th Mtg., Jan 24,
24 1
expressed sympathy with the Belgian delegate who had
replied that there were other obligations than that
81of promoting self-government. Bailey argued that
emphasis on the political aspects of trusteeship
should not be ‘exclusive of the social, economic
and educational objectives1. Presumably with New
Guinea in mind, he declared further that a distinction
should anyway be drawn between relatively advanced
societies and ‘primitive peoples’ whose greatest
8 2need was good and humane administration.
Again, in 1947, when China, Iraq and Mexico 
urged the Trusteeship Council to accept a draft
resolution calling for full self-government for
o oWestern Samoa J as soon as possible, and increasing 
degrees of self-government in the meantime, Australia 
supported New Zealand which was prepared to accept 
only a much weaker draft. Forsyth, for Australia,
81 Ibid., (9th Mtg., Jan.29), p.30.
82 Ibid., p.32.
83 The Trusteeship Council's first special mission 
to a territory had gone to Western Samoa after 
receiving from Samoan chiefs in 1947 a petition asking 
for implementation of self-government.
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opposed reference to ’ self-government as soon as 
possible’; he preferred emphasis on a process of gradual 
development towards ultimate self-government 
Then, in 1948, when Poland submitted a draft resolution, 
amended by India, in the Fourth Committee calling 
for an effort to accelerate progress towards self- 
government in trust territories, Hood castigated it 
as unnecessary and composed of truisms, and joined 
other administering Powers in vain votes against it^8^
In 1949, when the Fourth Committee appointed 
a sub-committee to rationalise a number of draft 
resolutions on trusteeship, one resolution draft, 
based largely on Cuban and Czech proposals, again 
dealt with accelerated progress towards self-government 
or independence* Besides calling on the administering 
Powers to speed this progress, the draft also asked 
the Powers to report on how they proposed to achieve 
acceleration and the Trusteeship Council to report on 
the Powers’ reports* In a tilt at administrative unions,
84 TCOR, 2nd S., 1st Pt., 9th Mtg., Dec.4, 1947,
pp.236-7.
85 The Fourth Committee vote was 26-10-10 (GAOR, 3rd S., 
1st Pt. , 4th Ctee. , 74th Mtg., Nov.8, 1948, p.286).
This draft, which became Resolution 226(lll), was adopted 
by the Assembly unanimously (Ibid., 160th PI.Mtg.,
Nov.18, p.493)•
243
there was also a paragraph proposing that seats of
administration should be within trust territories'
borders. The Australian delegate, R.A. Peachey,
stated that, if the reference to seats of administration
were retained, he would have to vote against the
8 6whole draft. Despite the votes of Australia and
other administering Powers and their supporters,
this reference was retained, and Australia voted
8 7against the whole draft. But Australia also voted 
against the provision for reporting on implementation 
plans, and it is highly likely that the survival of
this, too, made for an Australian vote against the
. 88whole.
There emerged at the beginning of the trustee­
ship system's history, then, pressure on the administering 
Powers to achieve quickly the main political objectives
86 GAOR, 4th S., 4th Ctee., 100th Mtg,, Oct.14, 1949, p.54.
87 Ibid. The Fourth Committee vote on the whole 
draft was 24-10-11. In the Assembly, the references
to seats of administration and reporting on implementation 
plans failed to achieve two-thirds majorities, and 
the surviving drafts of what became Resolution 320(IV) 
was adopted by a vote of 31-0-2 (ibid., 240th PI.Mtg.,
Nov.13, p.188).
88 It has been seen, and it will be seen more 
particularly below, that Australia constantly opposed 
the anti-colonial Powers on implementation questions.
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of trusteeship. No doubt with New Guinea in mind,
Australia opposed this pressure. Forsyth, for
example, stressed in the Trusteeship Council that
l i t t l e  substantial political development should be
89
expected in the territory in the near future.
Halligan asked the Council to keep in mind that ’the
indigenous people were very primitive, and that the
f i r s t  step would be to improve their health and give
them access to education and to participation in
public l i f e ’ .^° In 1949, Hood made i t  clear that
Australia and other administering Powers were the best
judges of affairs in their trust terr i tories ,  under
the supervision of the Trusteeship Council:
I t  was consistent with the Trusteeship 
System that the Administering Authority 
of a Trust Territory should be not only 
permitted but should indeed be obliged to 
make i t s  own decisions and to use i t s  own 
judgment in regard to the government of that 
Territory.••the United Nations. . . ^ould assess 
the actions of a trustee S tate . . .
89 TCOR, 2nd S . , 
19^7.  p p . 527,546.
90 TCOR, 3rd S . ,
91 GAOR, 4th S . ,
1st Pt . ,  l6th-17th Mtgs., Dec.15,
24th Mtg., July 14, 1948, p.300. 
240th PI.Mtg., Nov.15, 19^9,  P * 185.
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It was unwise, he said, for the Assembly to push the
Council or address recommendations directly to the
92administering Powers.
Of the resolutions mentioned in preceding 
pages, Australia voted for five (three of them being 
adopted unanimously), against one and abstained on four.^ 
Such figures, it may be stated yet again, present 
an incomplete picture: of the five resolutions
supported by Australia, one simply asked for the 
submission of trusteeship agreements, two sought the 
abolition of corporal punishment, one asked for an 
examination by the Trusteeship Council of administrative 
unions, and one (greatly emasculated) sought accelerated 
progress in trust territories - all relatively harmless 
in their impact. Australia voted against the call 
in 1947 for a trusteeship agreement for Scuth-West Africa, 
and abstained on three other resolutions dealing with 
that territory and on one to do with the flying of 
the United Nations flag. It is much more to the point
92 Ibid., p.184.
93 On two others, the Australian vote is unrecorded 
although, in the case of one, it is recorded that 
Australia abstained in Committee.
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to note that Australia was uniformly hostile to all 
the more significant anti-colonial proposals which 
failed to be adopted. Thus, she voted against the 
Soviet attempt in 1946 to have parts of the New Guinea 
agreement re-written, the attempt by India in 19^7 
to have all dependencies submitted to the system, 
instructions to South Africa to maintain the status quo 
in South-West Africa, the sending of a United Nations 
mission to South-West Africa, the several proposals 
made in 1948 on administrative unions, and the reporting 
by administering Powers on their planned efforts to 
hasten progress in their territories. More of this 
pattern in the Australian response to anti-colonial 
activity in the context of the trusteeship system 
will emerge in the next chapter of this work. It 
is enough to stress here that in the early years of 
attempts to tighten the reins of United Nations 
supervision of trust territories, years of Labor Govern­
ment rule in Australia, Australia argued a largely 
conseiwative case with consistency and vigour.
C H A P T E R  6
T H E
T R U S T E E S H I P
S Y S T E M
( P A R T  I I  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6  3)
In the trusteeship system context, as in that 
of Chapter XI of the United Nations charter, the 
pre-1950 period saw the groundwork laid for what was 
to be a marked intensification in emphasis on decoloni­
sation, leading to a comprehensive campaign for 
independence for dependent territories. The ’self- 
government or independence’ issue came to overshadow 
all others. Other major issues, those involved in 
the rights of administering Powers and in the Assembly- 
Trusteeship Council relationship, continued to provide 
foci for conflict but increasingly in forms related 
almost exclusively to the question of independence.
Before discussing the Australian response to the 
accelerated campaign for independence for trust 
territories, it is proposed first to glance briefly 
at several questions intimately linked to that campaign, 
and there will be a continued discussion of the 
South-West Africa issue which, in its long defiance of 
solution, serves as a useful additional illustration 
of the previously noted change in Australiern policy 
at the end of the 1950s from intransigence to flexibility.
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Three issues may be seen as related to attempts 
of anti-colonial Powers to strengthen the hand of 
the United Nations in the supervision of trust 
territories: indigenous participation, implementation 
of resolutions, and the dissemination of information 
about the United Nations and the trusteeship system 
in trust territories.
The question of how, if at all, the indigenes 
of trust territories might be brought into direct 
contact with United Nations bodies sharing in the 
operation of the trusteeship system arose in the early 
1950s, just as a corresponding version of it did in 
relation to non-self-governing territories in the 
context of Chapter XI of the charter. Australia had 
little enough time for the notion in the latter context; 
in the former, her opposition was even more adamant 
and sternly expressed.
In 1951» Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and India 
submitted a draft resolution to have the Assembly 
ask the Trusteeship Council to consider how the 
indigenous inhabitants of trust territories might be
I.
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1associated with it in its work. Australia opposed
this on political and legal grounds. In political
terms, there was the danger that association might
mean representation, and indigenous representation
would mean dual representation, and this, in turn,
could mean public differences between indigenous
representatives and administration representatives,
The possibility of competing representation had to
be considered because nothing should be done which,
said Ballard, might 'even hypothetically, deprive
the Powers to which the General Assembly itself
had entrusted the administration of the Territories
of some of their authority or lessen the confidence
2placed in them by the indigenous inhabitants'.
1 It will be remembered that, also in 1951» a similar proposal was submitted in the Chapter XI context. However, 
this referred to the association of territories with
the work of the Information Committee, not indigenous 
inhabitants, and Australia supported the proposal 
which was adopted by the Assembly in the form of 
Resolution 566(Vl). When, in 1952, it was proposed 
that indigenes themselves be associated with the work 
of the committee, that is, when there was postulated a 
distinction between the government of territories and 
the governed and a desire was expressed for direct United Nations contact with the latter, Australia voted 
against Resolution 647(VIl) by which the Assembly 
adopted the proposal.
2 GAOR, 6th S., 4th Ctee., 237th Mtg. , Jan. 4, 1952, 
p.240.
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In legal terms, the charter already provided machinery
by which the views of indigenes might reach the Council;
the draft resolution amounted to charter revision
3and must be opposed.
Still, the draft was adopted by the Fourth
4Committee and the Assembly and, tfen the Council
considered the question as requested by the Assembly,
the Soviet Union immediately proposed non-voting
representation for indigenes at Council sessions
concerned with their territories, Forsyth* s response
was essentially legalistic; neither the charter nor
the trusteeship agreements provided for such
representation and 'the Council could not validly
require or recommend something for which the Charter
5and the Agreements did not provide'. The upshot 
was that the Council adopted a mild proposal to the 
effect that it was hoped the administering Powers 
would find it appropriate to associate qualified
3 Ibid.
4 Resolution 554(Vl) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 41-5-5 (ibid., 361st Pl.Mtg., Jan.18, 1952, p.348). 
There was no roll-call inthe Assembly; in the Fourth 
Committee, Australia abstained in a 33-4-4 vote (ibid., 
4th Ctee., 237th Mtg., Jan.4, p.242).
5 TCOR, 10th S., 389th Mtg., March 31, 1952, p.22.
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indigenes with the Council’s work by including them in
their delegations or by any other means they might find
acceptable. Australia approved or this and voted for
it.b In the Fourth Committee, however, a large group of
anti-colonial Powers found this pallid and submitted a
draft resolution whereby the Council would invite
indigenes to speak, though not to vote, during examination
and discussion of annual reports on their territories.
Forsyth’s reaction to this was strong: the draft was
’absurd, presumptuous and unconstitutional...the draft
resolution should be studied and then destroyed’. Of
the sponsors (Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Syria, Lebanon and
Yugoslavia), he said that:
None of them was an experienced member of the 
Trusteeship Council. More than one of them 
represented a country which had never had a 
general election, a country governed by a 
dictatorship, or a country in which the 
communist faith enjoyed a wide measure of 
support...Did such countries really think 
they could instruct France, the United Kingdom, 
BeJgLum and the United States in regard to 
human rights, parliamentary practice, liberalism 
or methods of teaching self-government?7
6 TCOR, 11th S . , 454th Mtg., July 23, 1952, p.12.
7 GAUR, 7th S., 4th Ctee., 296th Mt g . , Dec.8, 1952,
P*333» It might be noted that this statement is quoted 
with approval in Sir Alan Burns, In Defence ol Colonies, 
London, 1957, p.104. Burns, it has already been 
mentioned, was a British representative on the Trustee­
ship C ouncil.
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The draft was subsequently toned down by United States 
amendments, which virtually revived the Trusteeship 
Council*s proposal, and Australia abstained in the voting.
Discussion continued during 1953 in 'the 
Council and in the Assembly. ’ We think it is quite 
unnecessary...we wonder what there is to study...*, 
said an Australian representative J.D. Petherbridge, 
commenting on the appointment of a Council committee
Qto study the question. In 1954, Syria proposed 
in the Council that visiting missions be asked to 
take the initiative in seeking out indigenes and 
obtaining their views. Forsyth’s reaction was to 
lecture the Syrian representative who had, he said, 
’confused the separate roles of the Administering 
Authorities and the Trusteeship Council’• The task 
of the former was to achieve the objectives of Article 
76 of the charter; the latter’s was to supervise
8 The Fourth Committee adopted the draft by a vote
of 25-1-24 (GAOR, 7th S., 4th Ctee., 299th Mtg., Dec. 9, 
1952, P.353)• The draft, which became Resolution 
653(VIl), was then adopted by the Assembly by a vote 
of 36—1 — 19 (ibid., 410th PI.Mtg., Dec.21, p.472).
9 TCOR, 12th S., 4o8th Mtg., July 14, 1953» P»319«
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their performance. There was no instrument whereby
the Council could ’impose its co-operation upon the
Administering Authorities in their performance of
their task'.1^  The Syrian proposal was rejected in
an even vote in the Council but was raised again in
the Fourth Committee. There, the Australian delegate,
Clarey, repeated that the Council’s function was to
supervise, not to administer or interfere in
administration; further, 'it was...a matter of surprise
and regret to the Australian delegation that the
Assembly should be regarded as a kind of appellate 
1 1organ...’. However, a draft resolution incor­
porating the Syrian proposal was adopted by the
1 2Committee and the Assembly. This issue usefully 
illustrated the importance to the administering Powers 
of their numerical strength on the Council and to 
the anti-colonial Powers of strength in the Assembly.
10 TCOR, 13th S., 522nd Mtg., March 23, 1954, p.322.
11 GAOR, 9th S., 4th Ctee., 444th Mtg., Nov.26, 1954,
P • 303*
12 The draft of what became Resolution 853(lX) was 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 48-4-4 (ibid., 512th 
PI.Mtg., Dec.14, p .499).
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First, Syria was able to make good a Council defeat 
in the Assembly. But, second, the administering Powers 
were able to have the last word back in the Council. 
When, in 1955» anti-colonial representatives on the 
Council tried to have Resolution 853(lX) applied 
so that visiting missions to be sent to West Africa 
would be instructed to seek out indigenes* views, the 
administering Powers* representation was such as to
allow them to force deadlocked votes and thus obstruct
1 3the application of the resolution.
The question of the implementation of United 
Nations* instructions or recommendations as such 
arose in 1950. Anti-colonial Powers previously had 
shown concern about implementation so that, for example, 
Resolution 320(IV) had not only called for attempts 
to accelerate progress in trust territories towards 
self-government, but also called on administering Powers 
to report on how they proposed to fulfil the purpose 
of the resolution and called on the Trusteeship Council 
to report on the administering Powers* submissions.
13 TCOR, 16th S., 633rd Mtg., July 8, 1955, P .170, 
and 63^th Mtg., July 8, p.176. An anti-colonialist 
move in 1953 on a related front, to have the United 
Nations station representatives in trust territories, 
failed by only one plenary vote to obtain a two-thirds 
majority; Australia voted *againstf (GAOR, 8th S.,
471st PI.Mtg., Dec.9, 1953, P.455).
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But, in 1950, a draft resolution was submitted (the
work of a number of members, but based mainly on a
Cuba-Mexico draft) whereby the Assembly would ask
the Secretary-General to list Assembly resolutions
related to trusteeship, to report on measures taken
by administering Powers to implement them, and, where
applicable, to supply administering Powers' reasons
for not having implemented them. The Australian
response was to argue that it was beyond the Secretary-
14General's competence to ask for such information.
Australia voted with a minority against the draft
i 5which was adopted by the Assembly.
In 1951, the Assembly had before it the 
Secretary-General's report showing that not all 
resolutions had been implemented. As a result, Cuba 
submitted a draft to have the Assembly make a request 
directly to the administering Powers to implement 
speedily all relevant Assembly resolutions and ask 
the Trusteeship Council to report on implementation in 
the case of each trust territory. The Australian
14 GAOR, 5th S. , 4th C tee. , 156th Mtg. , (Jet. 23, 1950,
p .81 .
15 The draft of what became Resolution 436(V) was 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 33-11-12 (Ibid.,, 316th 
PI.Mtg., Dec.2, P.549).
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delegate, Ballard, allowed that the Assembly should
be informed of what the administering Powers did or
did not do in trust territories, but he argued that
it was a misconception to suppose that an administering
Power failed to discharge its obligations by not
immediately conforming with Assembly resolutions;
.••it was the Administering Aihority which 
had the responsibility and the discretion 
in the final analysis, of deciding how far 
and when a recommendation of the General 
Assembly could best be implemented.^
The draft was greatly modified by United States
amendments to the point where it did little more
than note the fact that not all resolutions had
been implemented and asked the Council to report on
1 7implementation, and Australia voted for it.
The question of the dissemination of information
about the United Nations and the trusteeship system
among the indigenous inhabitants of trust territories
ran something of a routine course in that it was
raised by anti-colonial Powers, who persisted until
finally they achieved their aims. The question was
raised by China in the Trusteeship Council in 1948,
16 GAOR, 6th S., 4th Ctee., 245th Mtg., Jan.12, 1952, 
p.297.
17 The draft of what became Resolution 56o(Vl) was 
adopted by the Assembly without objection (ibid.,
361st PI.Mtg., Jan.18, p.350).
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when China could still be described as an anti-colonial 
Power, and when it was agreed that the administering
Powers should provide a list of officials to whom 
information might be sent concerning the United 
Nations and the Trusteeship System. Australia did not 
object, although Forsyth stressed that this did not 
mean that Australia abrogated anything of her
exclusive responsibility for education in her trust 
1Rterritory. In 1952, Syria sponsored a draft resolution
in the Fourth Committee whereby the administering
Powers would be asked to disseminate information as
widely as possible in their territories, and again
1 9Australia did not object. In 1953» Australia opposed, 
though in mild terms, a Dominican Republic proposal 
that the Secretary-General institute a flow of 
information directly from his office to peoples of 
trust territories without necessarily referring first 
to administering Powerz. Sir Douglas Copland told the
18 TCOR, 3rd S., 19th Mtg., July 7» 19^8, p.229.
19 The draft of what became Resolution 556(Vl) was
adopted by the Assembly without discussion or a vote 
(GAOR, 6th S., 3$1st PI.Mtg., Jan.18, 1952, p.3^9)
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Fourth Committee that the notion would be ’difficult
to apply* and thought it preferable for the administering
20Powers to disseminate the information.
In 1958» the Assembly adopted a resolution
urging the desirability of having United Nations
information centres placed in or near trust territories
and having the Secretary-General report on ways and
21means of doing so. Australia abstained on the grounds, 
which must have seemed somewhat obtuse, that her 
delegation *was not convinced that the Fourth Committee 
was the proper place to determine that in the Trust 
Territoriesthere was greater need for the dissemination 
of.,.information than in the metropolitan territories
20 GAOR, 8th S., 4th Ctee., 389th Mtg., Dec.3, 1953, 
P.501. The draft of what became Resolution 754(VHl) 
finally referred to a direct flow of information
on the basis of trust Powers’ suggestions or on the 
Secretary-General’s ’own knowledge of appropriate 
information channels'. The draft was adopted by 
a vote of 52-1-5, Australia's vote not being recorded 
(ibid., 471st PI.Mtg., Dec.9, p.455).
21 The draft of what became Resolution 1276(XIIl) 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 67-1-10 (GAOR, 13th 
S., 783rd PI.Mtg., Dec.5, 1958, p.455).
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22of Member States generally*, In 1959» when i t  was
found that none of the administering Powers had shown
interest, a widely sponsored draft resolution was
submitted specifically naming Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi
and New Guinea as places where information centres
should be located, preferably staffed with indigenes,
Australia again abstained, not, said the Australian
delegate in the Fourth Committee, K.T. Kelly, because
of the substance of the draft, but rather as a gesture
of protest against comments on the administration of
23New Guinea made during the committee* s discussions.
In i 9 6 0 , when the Assembly adopted a somewhat harshly
worded resolution to the effect that the Secretary-
General proceed with the establishment of the centres,
Australia declared that she was well able to disseminate
the necessary information without assistance, and
24again abstained in the vote. In 1 9 6 1 , Britain and
22 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 799th Mtg., Nov.13» p.302. There 
was no rol l-cal l  in plenary session - Australia* s 
abstention was registered in a Fourth Committee vote of
6 1 - 3 - 9  (ib id . , p.299)•
23  GAOR, 14th S., 4th Ctee., 953rd Mtg., Nov.16, 1959, 
p,405. The draft of what became Resolution 1410(XIV) 
was adopted by an Assembly vote of 67-0-13 (ibid.,
8 4 6 t h  PI.M t g . , Dec.5, p . 6 3 2 ) .
24 The draft of what became Resolution 1607(XV) was 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 78-0-9 (GAOR, 1 5 th S., 
994th PI.Mtg., April 21, 1 9 6 1 , pp.457-8).
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Belgium at last agreed to the establishment of centres 
in their two territories, but Australia did not 
announce agreement until the end of the year when the 
Assembly adopted a resolution which called for the 
establishment of a centre in New Guinea ’without 
further delay*.^
The questions of implementation, indigenous 
participation and dissemination of information were 
significant in their illustration of the determination 
of anti-colonial Powers to see that trust territories, 
as much as and perhaps even more than non-self- 
governing territories, ’ceased to be the private 
preserve of their imperial owners’• The implementation 
question arose from their efforts to build up pressure 
against the administering Powers and, as it were, 
to put teeth into resolutions which they were able to 
have the Assembly adopt; the indigenous participation 
and information dissemination issues reflected their 
determination to break down the old exclusive 
administering Power-dependency relationship and to have
25 Resolution 1644(XVI) was adopted by the Assembly
withot objection (GAOR, 16th S., 1047th Pl.Mtg., Nov. 6,
1961 , p.562) .
26 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Cambridge 
(Mass.), i960, p.5«
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the world community deal with, and be known by, 
the inhabitants of trust territories. But these 
questions essentially were only peripheral to that 
of trust territories’ attainment of self-government 
or independence.
The steadily expanding campaign of the 1950s
for greater progress in the achievement of self-
government or independence was not long in showing
itself. Thus, in 1950, for example, the Trusteeship
Council itself recommended that Australia ’quicken
the pace' in New Guinea by giving indigenes a distinct
national status, a greater share in suffrage, more
village councils and an education system stressing
preparation for ’representative government and
27eventual independence’. In 1951» to take another
example, Indonesia’s delegation expressed regret 
at the slowness of political progress in the trust 
territories, noting somewhat ominously that ’the 
Administering Authorities...appeared to think that 
the system was destined to remain in force for a
27 GAQR, 5th S., Supplement No. 4, pp.123-5
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considerable time.*.1. The shape of things to come 
also became apparent in 1951 when a group of anti­
colonial Powers (in this case, Haiti, India, Lebanon, 
the Philippines and Yemen) submitted a draft 
resolution in the Fourth Committee to have the Assembly 
not only ask (as it had before) that administering 
Powers report to the Council on measures designed 
to promote self-government and on the way in which 
indigenes’ wishes were taken into account, but also 
to ask the Powers to state when they expected their
trust territories to become self-governing or independent -
29that is, to provide target dates* The Australian 
delegate, B,C. Ballard, immediately supported a 
British attempt to have this target date provision 
deleted from the draft. Even the most conscientious
30estimates, he argued, could be no more than speculation.
28 GAOR, 6th S., 4th Ctee., 227th Htg., Dec.14, 1951,
p. 168.
29 Expectations and target dates are not necessarily 
the same thing but, in this context, their meaning was 
taken to be virtually identical.
30 Ibid., 240th Mtg., Jan.9, p.262.
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The British move Tailed and Australia voted with the 
administering Powers (except for the United States, 
which abstained) against the target date provision 
and against the draft as a whole which was, never­
theless, adopted by the committee and finally by the 
31Assembly. A similar resolution was adopted again 
two years later, in 1953» but with the addition of 
a request to the Trusteeship Council to report on the
3trust Powers* activities in promoting political progress. 
Copland entered a reservation for Australia which, 
while meaning no disrespect for the Council or the
33Assembly, would not be able to provide target dates.
When the Assembly found at its next (195^) 
session that the Trusteeship Council had not reached
31 This draft of what became Resolution 558(VI) was
adopted by an Assembly vote of 38-8-11 (Ibid., 361st
Pl.Mtg., Jan.18, 1952, pp.3^9-50).
32 The draft of what became Resolution 752(VIIl) 
was adopted by an Assembly vote of 46-9-5 IGAOR, 8th 
S., 471st Pl.Mtg., Dec.9, 1953, P•455)• Australia*s 
vote was not recorded.
33 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 389th Mtg., Dec.3, p.501.
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any conclusions or made any recommendations on the
34matter,' a draft resolution was submitted whereby
the Assembly would repeat its request tothe Council,
and ask in addition that the Council instruct members
of visiting missions to report particularly on
political progress. Because of this latter provision,
and because of the repeated reference to target dates,
Australia voted vainly against the draft in the
35committee and in the Assembly, During 1955» the 
Council was still unable to reach agreed conclusions
r\ /or make recommendations^ and, at that year* s Assembly 
session, the request that it do so was repeated yet
34 Australia* s Forsyth virtually told the Trusteeship 
Council to put the notion of target dates from its 
mind - they would not be forthcoming (TCOR, 13th S., 
517th Mtg., March 16, 1954, p.283)*
35 The draft of what became Resolution 858(lX) was
adopted by an Assembly vote of 41-8-5 (GAQR, 9th S., 
512th PI .Mtg. , Dec , 14, 195*1, p.499). For some evidence
of the Australian vote, see Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Summary Report of the 
Australiern. Delegation to the Ninth Session of the 
United Nations General. Assembly in New York, 21st 
September to 17th December, 1954, Canberra, 1955» P • 5*1 
(in CPP, 195*1-5, Vol.II, p. 1785sq.).
36 Largely at the insistence of the administering 
members, including Australia, the Council decided it 
could not apply its finally found procedure (that
of adding its conclusions and recommendations to the 
notes on each territory in its reports to the Assembly) 
in time for the 1955 session.
266
37again, and with Australia in the minority yet again,
For the 1956 Assembly session, the Council 
at last had conclusions and recommendations ready 
for submission: in each territory’s case, including 
that of New Guinea, calling for self-government or 
independence target dates. In Canberra, Casey,
Minister for External Affairs, expressed dismay.
M0re cause for dismay was to come, however, because 
in the Fourth Committee the Soviet Union submitted 
a draft resolution calculated to shock the admini­
stering Powers. Its content was for them objectionable 
enough: it called for independence or self-government
37 The draft of what became Resolution 9^6(x) was 
adopted by an Assembly vote of 43-11-9 (GAOR, 10th S.,
557th PI.Mtg., Dec.15, 1955, p.464).
38 Casey said that it was impracticable to set in advance
a schedule for the time limits for steps of political 
advancement. In such advancement, especially of primitive 
people, human and psychological elements were all important 
(London Times, Aug.11, 1956). It is interesting to note
that in an editorial on the same day, the Hindu expressed 
Indian disapproval of the Australian Council representa­
tive’ s description of target dates for New Guinea as 
nonsense. It said that ’it is one thing that "White” 
Australia should seek security; but this cannot be a 
reason for depriving the people of New Guinea of the 
inherent right to self-government', going on to mourn
that Britain, which had shown a more enlightened 
attitude in Africa, should support Australia.
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for a number of specified African trust territories
within five years and for announcements of target
dates for the rest. Its form was shocking in that
it did not merely have the Assembly express its wishes
through the Council, a practice anyway disagreeable
to the Administering Powers, but went a step further
and would have had the Assembly issuing recommendations
to the administering Powers in its own right. More
will be said of this aspect below. Australia objected
strongly to it, but also to the substance of the draft.
Hood described a target in respect of Nauru as
39‘illegal, impractical and unwise*. Even when the 
Soviet Union responded to Syrian and Indian appeals 
to replace the time reference with the more open 
•at an early flate1, Australia and the other 
administering Powers, and most of their western
4oallies, voted in vain minorities against it.
Before the Assembly vote was taken, the Australian 
delegate, Walker, made a strong statement on 
Australia’s position:
39 GAOR, 11th S., 4th Ctee., 637th Mtg., Feb.13» 1957» 
P.431.
40 Resolution 1 0 6 4 ( X l )  was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 4 5 - 1 4 - 1 6  (Ibid., 6 6 1st PI.Mtg., Feb.2 6 ,  p . 1 2 2 7 ) .
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•••if the Trusteeship Agreements designate 
us as the sole authority v/hich shall exercise 
administration of the Territories concerned, 
they thereby place on our shoulders a heavy 
responsibility to determine in the last 
resort what can and what cannot be done in 
those Territories, and a responsibility to 
decide what course of action will benefit 
and what course will harm the interests of 
the people who, with the approval of the 
Assembly, are at present under our care,
*•.we do not interpret these obligations 
as being satisfied by the mere transfer of 
authority from ourselves to a few selected 
individuals in the Territories concerned, 
with the abandonment of the mass of the 
people to conditions which may be totally 
incompatible with the modern and essential 
democratic standards which are the proudest 
inheritance of our own country,• .Nor can we 
regard the provisions of Article 76 of the 
Charter as requiring us merely to construct 
in careless haste, whether by force or 
pretence, a superficial framework of self- 
government or independence which would at 
best be a fiction,^1
Casey also declared that it would be irresponsible
to give the people of Nauru and New Guinea ‘half-baked
promises and guesses' as to when they would be ready
42to handle their own affairs.
The administering Powers ignored Resolution 
1064(Xl) and, in 1957» the resolution was reaffirmed
41 Ibid., p.1125.
42 London Times, March 1, 1957
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by another which again also called on the Council to
43report on administering Powers* responses. In 
1958» the anti-colonial Powers renewed their attack 
with an eight-power joint resolution draft inviting 
the administering Powers to set ‘early successive 
intermediate targets and dates in the fields of 
political, economic, social and educational develop­
ment so as to create, as soon as possible, the pre­
conditions for the attainment of self-government or 
independence*. The Australian delegate, Kelly, was 
now prepared to concede that Australia might well 
adopt tentative target dates but he emphasised that 
setting a target date did not guarantee its attain­
ment; many factors lay beyond the control of the 
administration. But his attitude to the draft
43 Resolution 1207(XIl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 51-15-7 (GAOR, 12th S., 729th Pl.Mtg., Dec.
13, 1957» p.595). For evidence of the Australian vote, 
see Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Summary 
Report of the Australian Delegation to the Twelfth 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 
New York, 17th September to l4th December, 1937» Canberra, 
1959. p .49 (in CPP, 1939-60, Vol.IV).
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resolution as such was strictly orthodox}
...the Trusteeship Agreement for the 
Territory of New Guinea clearly designated 
the Government of Australia as the sole 
authority which should exercise the admini­
stration of the territory. The draft 
resolution was intended to curtail the 
solemnly con^rred rights of the Administering 
Authority.•.
Australia voted against the draft which was, however, 
adopted by the Assembly.^ When, at the next (1959) 
session, a number of Powers co-sponsored a draft 
resolution very similar to the previous year’s, 
except that it singled out Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi 
for * near future* target dates, Kelly claimed that 
only the sensitive situation in Ruanda-Urundi made
46him vote against it. If he was genuine in this,
Australia presumably no longer objected very strongly
44 GAOR, 13th S., 4th Ctee., 797th Mtg., Nov.12,
1958, p.287.
45 Australia’s vote was recorded in the Fourth Committee 
(ibid., pp.288-9). Resolution 1274(XIIl) was adopted
by an Assembly vote of 57-18-2 (ibid., 782nd PI.Mtg.,
Dec.5 > P *454).
46 GAOR, 14th S., 4th Ctee., 95^th Mtg., Nov.16,
1959, p.4l4. Kelly went out of his way to say that 
Australia ’deeply respected the attitudes of the 
sponsors of the draft resolution...’. The draft
in question became Resolution 1413(XIV) by an Assembly 
vote of 52-15-8 (Ibid., 846th PI.Mtg., Dec.5, p.632).
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to the Assembly issuing recommendations directly to
administering Powers over the head of the Trusteeship
Council or to requests for target dates as such.
I t  was as i f  the Burmese delegate, U Tin Maung,
was right in his 'firm conviction that the Administering
Authorities could see the wisdom of abandoning their
47obstinate refusal to read the writing on the wall'.
The following year, 19 6 0 , was, of course, 
dominated by the Declaration of Granting Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to which reference 
already has been made and which applied to trust 
terr itories as much as to non-self-governing terr itories.  
I t  has been remarked, too, that this was a year which 
saw a noticeable softening in Australia's attitude; 
policy did not change dramatically, but i t s  expression 
did. Thus, before that year's Assembly session, the 
Australian Minister for Territories, Mr Paul Hasluck, 
said that Australia was now prepared to give immediate 
and realist ic  target dates for educational, social and
47 Ib id . , 4th Ctee., 954th Mtg., Nov.16 , p .407
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economic advancement, adding though that ’in political 
advancement we would rather take each step too soon 
than too late, but we see no kindness in making human
llQbeings walk over cliffs in the dark* . Early in the
49session, the Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies,
certainly declared that:
Nobody who knows anything about these 
Territories and their indigenous people 
can doubt for a moment that for us in 
Australia to abandon our responsibilities r 
forthwith would be an almost criminal act.
But he also affirmed that ’we regard ourselves as
having a duty to produce as soon as is practicable
an opportunity for complete self-determination for the
51people of Papua and New Guinea’• The tone of 
52Plimsoll’s speech on the Declaration it self was
48 London Times, June 28, 1960,
49 At the time, Menzies was still aiso Minister for 
External Affairs, a portfolio he had held since the 
retirement of Casey earlier in the year. Sir Garfield 
Barwick, the next holder, was in the delegation,but as Attorney-General.
50 GAOR, 15th S., 888th PI.Mtg., Oct.5, I960, p.435.
51 Ibid.
52 Then Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
Mr (since Sir) James Plimsoll later was appointed
High Commissioner to India and is now Secretary of 
the Department of External Affairs.
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one reflecting patience, conciliation, almost 
53gentleness. He professed to find some of its
wording objectionable and abstained in the vote,
54as has already been described.'
The Declaration tended to consolidate the 
decline in importance of the trusteeship system. In 
a sense, this decline was inevitable in that British 
Togoland already had left the system, in the year 
of the Declaration Somaliland proceeded to independence 
according to plan, and the French Cameroons and Togoland 
that year achieved self-government. In 1961, it was 
clear that trusteeship in regard to Tanganyika, 
Ruanda-Urundi, Western Samoa and the British Cameroons 
had only months to run. This left only Australia’s 
Nauru and New Guinea and the United States’ Pacific
53 Ibid., 933rd PI.Mtg., Dec.2, pp.1090-3).
54 It was observed at the time that the group with 
which Australia saw fit to abstain ’includes many
of the most controversial countries in the Assembly. 
Except for Britain and Australia, they have all been 
under very severe attack on charges of deprivation 
of human freedom - and even the two Commonwealth 
countries have not been wholly immune from such charges’ 
(London Daily Telegraph, Dec.23» i960). The same
might have been said of the Declaration’s supporters, 
but the latter included many western friends of 
Australia and many with admirable social and political 
re c o rd s •
21k
Islands, Indeed, the Soviet Union*s view was that 
the trusteeship system, *a variant of the colonial 
regime, should be buried along with the rest of the 
obsolete colonial system*. On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union has continued to find the Trusteeship 
Council a convenient forum in which to lead criticism 
of Australia's administration.^
In 1961, when the Special Committee of Seven­
teen was established (with Australian support and 
membership) to prosecute the Declaration, the Assembly 
virtually reduced the status of the Trusteeship 
Council to parity with that of the Information Committee, 
placing both at the disposal of the Special Committee 
of Seventeen. In the event, the Information Committee 
became manifestly redundant, and it was wound up in 
1963« The same might have happened, one suspects, 
with the Trusteeship Council except for the formidable
55 Perhaps to fill the gap left by Afro-Asian 
concentration on Africa, communist representatives 
have been particularly critical of Australia* s per­
formance as a trust Power, Generally, the communist 
claim has been of inadequate indigenous representation, 
preservation of tribalism, and economic exploitation.
See, e,g., Soviet News, March 20, 1931»
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fact that i t s  existence i s  written into the charter,
Xt also had the right to send visiting missions to 
territories - a practice, certainly, of the Committee 
of Twenty—Four, but only by the courtesy of Assembly 
members. The Declaration* s inclusion of trust 
territories within i t s  scope bore logical fruit in 
1964 when both the Trusteeship Council and the Committee 
of Twenty-Four considered Australian policy in New 
Guinea, Since 1960-1, i t  has scarcely been possible 
to speak of Australian attitudes on political progress 
in trust terr itories as such, but only in her own 
and the one other. In this very limited sphere, her 
attitudes have been generally unchanged, but she has 
shown a much greater tendency than formerly to bend 
before the anti-colonial wind, to argue her case 
in a conciliatory and diplomatic way, to make con-
56cessions to United Nations opinion.
Throughout the 1950s, however, Australia 
generally defended the position she had taken up in 
the 1940s: i t  was the right of the administering Powers
to administer their trust terri tories as they saw f i t ,
56 More will be said of Australia* s attitudes as a 
trust Power in Chapter 10 of this work.
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subject only to their undertakings, given in signing 
the United Nations charter and the trusteeship agree­
ments, to achieve certain objectives, and to the fact 
that an international organ existed to supervise 
their performance. The crux of the conflict between 
the administering Powers and their anti-colonial 
critics lay essentially in what properly was involved 
in the function of supervision. For Australia, as 
for most of her administering colleagues for most of 
the period, supervision meant no more than a literal 
accountability: performance had publicly to be 
justified if questioned. This, of course, was what 
the mandates system had encompassed. The trusteeship 
system erected by the charter added little to this 
except that sources of information available to 
the supervising organ were widened.
What if the supervising organ found fault?
In the mandates system, the supervising organ, 
the Permanent Mandates Commission, said what it thought 
should not have happened in territories and what it 
wished to see happen. In that the League Council, to 
which the Commission reported, did little more than 
formally receive the Commission’s reports, the only
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pressure on the administering Powers to conform \vith
the Commission’s wishes comprised the possibility
57of adverse publicity. Xn the case of the trusteeship 
system more was involved because there now existed 
in the international community a large number of 
states with an interest of one sort or another in 
seeing that a heavier form of pressure was exerted 
on administering Powers. In the Permanent Mandates 
Commission, the League Council and even the League 
Assembly, there were few, if any, members who felt 
it their business to seek to hasten the loosening, 
at least in the case of ’B ’ and ’C* mandates, of ties 
between mandates and mandatories. They sought rather 
to obtain improved and more humane standards of 
administration within the indefinite continuation of 
those ties. Xn the Trusteeship Council and the General 
Assembly, on the other hand, there were many who did 
try to hasten the loosening of ties between trust
57 The deterrent value of adverse publicity could be 
based on more than ordinary reputation considerations. 
Australia, for example, constantly feared that bad 
publicity for her administration of New Guinea could 
help the cause of German groups agitating for the 
return of what had been their colony. See Hudson, 
op.cit. , pp .43-4.
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territories and t m s t  Powers. Many also felt a
responsibility to seek improved and more humane
standards of administration (at times, perhaps,
58with doubtful credentials) but, unlike their League 
forbears, at whatever cost to the authority of trust 
Poivers - that authority anyway being in their view 
temporary and United Nations-given.
The difference between the assumptions of 
League members and many United Nations members was 
reflected in two ways. In the first place, the 
Trusteeship Council (or at least very often the 
non-administering half of it), much more than the 
Mandates Commission, expected the administering Powers 
to rectify alleged faults and, more, to make the 
Council a co-operator in planning and implementing 
policy. This was a function which Australia would 
not allow the Council. As Forsyth told the Council 
in 1952:
58 Too much, of course, can be made of this. Statements 
like that of Hancock - ‘Some of the orators represent 
sovereign States whose standards of welfare compare 
ill with those of adjacent colonies...’ (op.cit., p.1?)- 
seem to reflect pique at criticism.
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It was not the function of the Trusteeship 
Council to govern the Trust Territory; 
while it could make suggestions, recommendations 
or criticisms, the sole authority responsible 
for deciding whether any action should or 
should not be taken in the Trust Territory 
was the Administering Authority, to whom 
that responsibility was delegated not by 
the Trusteeship Council but by an inter­
national treaty between the Administering 
Authority and the United Nations,^
In the second place, pressure on administering 
authorities was no longer restricted to the pressure 
of publicity exerted by the supervisory organ to 
which the administering Powers had to account. The 
anti-colonial Powers used the Assembly and its Fourth 
Committee as a source of further pressure in the form 
of publicity and as a source of another sort, the 
Assembly resolution which carried with it at least 
the appearance of majority world opinion. These 
pressures were exerted directly on the administering 
Powers and indirectly through the Trusteeship Council. 
Australia objected to both forms. As Hood said in 
1956 of a Soviet Union attempt to have the Assembly
59 TCOR, 10th S., 400th Mtg., March 18, 1952, p.118. 
Perhaps to stretch a point, it was a little ironical 
that in this context Australia should place a relation 
ship withthe United Nations as a whole over her 
relationship with the Council. In other contexts, 
she was inclined strongly to underline a priority 
relationship with the Council over the Assembly where 
the United Nations as a whole was represented.
specify self-government or independence target dates
for trust terr itories,  its
...would constitute a clear directive to 
the Administering Authority which had no 
justification in either the Charter or the 
Trusteeship Agreements.
The effect,,,would be to go over the heads 
of the Administering Authorities.. . thus 
violating the legal rights conferred on them 
by the Trusteeship Agreements and the 
Charter... 0
Australia did not allow the Assembly, any more than, 
the Council, the right to te l l  the administering 
Power what to do.
Similarly, Australia objected to the Assembly 
exerting pressure through the Council by treating i t  
virtually as a subject organ. As always, there 
was political motivation. As Casey complained in 1952, 
the Fourth Committee could be E in  unpleasant place 
for administering Powers.^ But Australia was not on
60 GAOR, 1 1 th S., 4th Ctee., 6 3 7 th Mtg., Feb.15» 1957»
P . 4 3 1 .
6 1 Australian restrictions on the freedom 01 the 
Assembly could take an extreme form. In 1953» Copland 
voted in the Fourth Committee against the draft of 
what became Resolution 746(VIII) because i t  recommended 
that the Secretary-General consider increasing 
secretariat recruitment from non-self-governing 
terr i tories,  a recommendation which would read as an 
instruction and abridge the Secretary-General's 
freedom (GAOR, Sth S. , 4th Ctee., 3^ +2nd Mtg., Oct.23»
1953, p p . 1 7 0 - 1 ) .
62 GAOR, 7th S., 38^th PI.Mtg., Oct.20, 1952, p.107.
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strong legal grounds in seeking to have the Council 
removed from Assembly interference. Article 87 
of the charter describes the Council as being under 
the Assembly's authority, and it was to the Assembly 
that, in theory, the administering Powers reported. 
Most trusteeship agreements, moreover, spoke of the 
administering Power co-operating with the Assembly 
and the Council.  ^ The Australian case tended to be 
obscurantist. Hood, for example, told the Council 
in 1950 that it was not advisable to 'probe too 
deeply into the question of the constitutional 
relationship between the General Assembly and itself. 
It was proper for the former to take an interest in 
trust territories, just as it was proper for the 
Council to take that legitimate interest into account. 
But it was for the Council to take its own decisions.* 
Cr, as Forsyth said in the Fourth Committee two years
63 The New Guinea agreement, however, referred only 
to the Council.
6h TCOR, 6th S., 8th Mtg., Jan.27, 1950, p.62.
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later, 'it might be better...to deal only with
6 5questions of principle in the Committee*. Many 
other members, and often enough a majority of them, 
have felt as the Philippines delegate did in 1950 
when, after stressing the role of the Assembly in 
the operation of the trusteeship system, he declared 
that his delegation 'welcomed the opportunity given 
to the general Assembly and the Fourth Committee♦•.of 
making recommendations to the Council and the 
Administering Authorities'.^ To sum up, it may safely 
be said that throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the 'hey-day* 
of the trusteeship system, Australia consistently 
reacted with hostility to the intention and forms 
of anti-colonial Powers' attempts to spur on the 
process of decolonisation in trust territories.
65 GAOR, 7th S., 4th Ctee., 285th Mtg., Nov.28, 1952, 
p.257. In 1950, it might be noted, Australia voted 
with a sufficient minority (under the two-thirds rule) 
to have deleted from the draft of what became 
Resolution 433(v) a paragraph stating that the 
Trusteeship Council was bound to so order its procedures 
as to assist the Assembly in carrying out its functions 
(GAOR, 5th S., 316th PI.Mtg., Dec.2, 1950, p.548).
147th Mtg., Oct.9, 1950,66 GAOR, 5th S., 4th Ctee., 
p. 19.
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The South-West Africa question, which continued 
to engage the United Nations each year, illustrates 
very clearly the pattern already noted in Australian 
policy and activity on colonial questions generally: 
a strong conservatism throughout the 1950s giving 
way to flexibility in the 1960s. In this case, Australia 
during the 1950s continued, as she had done in the 1940s, 
to seek to save South Africa from heavy pressure to 
co-operate with the United Nations, but from 1961 
switched her policy utterly and supported extremely 
harsh condemnations of the republic.
Under the terms of Resolution 338(lV), the 
International Court of Justice was asked in 1949 
for an advisory opinion on questions relating to the 
status of South-West Africa. The Court*s opinion, 
handed down in mid-1950» was that the territory was 
still under mandate, that the United Nations was 
qualified to exercise the function of supervision of 
the mandate previously exercised by the League, that 
South Africa could not unilaterally modify the mandate 
status of the territory, that nevertheless South 
Africa was not obliged to submit a trusteeship agreement,
III.
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and that the 'normal* means by which the territory's 
status might be modified would be by submission of
/  rya trusteeship agreement. The Court's views were 
of some comfort to the anti-colonial Powers which, 
late in 1950, submitted draft resolutions to give them 
effect. Australia gave them a slightly more hostile 
reception even than Britain. Thus, Australia voted 
in the Fourth Committee against a draft by which
tthe Assembly would ask South Africa to submit out­
standing reports and transmit petitions according 
to League usage, and establish a commission of ten
experts to be nominated by governments and to fulfil
68the function of the League's Mandates Commission.
She voted against an unsuccessful Soviet Union proposal
to have South African activity regarding the territory
69noted as 'a violation of the Charter'. And she 
voted against a draft repeating previous requests that 
the territory be placed under the trusteeship system
67 See I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.128sq.
68 GAOR, 5th S., 4th Ctee., 196th Mtg., Dec.4, 1950, p.367.
69 Ibid., 198th Mtg., Dec.5 , p.378
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because, said D*0. Hay, i t  was unfair that the draft 's
preamble should mention the Court* s view that the
normal way of modifying the terr i to ry 's  status was
by submission of an agreement but without mentioning
the Court's view that submission was not legally 
70obligatory, The f i r s t  of these drafts was abandoned
in the Assembly which adopted instead a milder resolution
under which a five-man committee would be established
to negotiate with South Africa and in the meantime to
receive reports and petitions on the territory. Britain
71supported this, but Australia abstained. The third
draft was adopted as recommended by the Fourth Committee,
72Australia again voting against i t .
In 1951» South Africa told the Assembly's 
committee that she was prepared to negotiate only 
with Britain, France and the United States, the surviving 
Principal and Allied Powers which had awarded her 
the mandate in 1 9 1 9 » The committee countered this with
70 Ibid. , p p . 3 7 5 ,3 7 9 .
71 Resolution 449A(v) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 45-6-5 (ibid . , 322nd Pl.Mtg., Dec.13, p . 6 2 9 ).
72 Resolution 449B(v) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 3 0 - 1 0 - 1 6  (ib id. , pp.6 3 1 - 2 ).
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a proposal that South Africa deal with a 15-man Assembly
committee with the same powers as the Mandates Commission,
but South Africa refused to entertain this. Late in
1951» the Assembly adopted a resolution whereby
South Africa was solemnly asked to reconsider her
position and resume negotiations with a reconstituted
73Assembly committee. Australia abstained on this in
part at least because, said A.H. Tange, its expression
appeared to imply that South Africa would evade its
obligations and thus prejudiced the chances of
74negotiations. Australia also abstained on a draft
which again called for the submission of a trusteeship
agreement on the grounds that it also would prejudice
7 5the success of negotiations. In 1951» Australia
voted vainly against a proposal in the Fourth Committee 
to allow an oral hearing so that the Rev. Michael Scott 
might again appear on behalf of inhabitants of South-
73 Resolution 570A(Vl) was adopted by an Assembly vote
of 45-5-8 (GAOR, 6th S., 362nd Pl.Mtg., Jan.19» 1952,
p.375).
74 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 224th Mtg., Dec.11, 1951» p.150.
75 Resolution 570B(Vl) was adopted by an Assembly \ote 
of 36-0-22 (ibid., 362nd PI.Mtg., Jan.19, 1952, p.375)*
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Vest Africa. Tange argued that, according to the 
Court's opinion, Mandates Commission procedure should 
be followed, and this had not provided for oral 
hearings•^
In 1952, Australia voted for a draft resolution 
whereby the Assembly gave its committee a further year 
in which to negotiate with South Africa.^ In 1953» 
when the committee yet again reported failure to 
conclude an agreement, the Assembly adopted a 
resolution in which it virtually censured South Africa 
and established a seven-member Committee on South-Vest 
Africa. This committee was authorised to negotiate 
with South Africa if possible, but also to examine 
whatever information was available on the territory, 
to examine reports and petitions which might reach it 
and to prepare a procedure for the future. Loomes 
stated that Australia's abstention in voting on the 
resolution was due to its provision for examination 
by the committee of available information. Given
76 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 204th Mtg., Nov.16, 1951, P«18.
77 Resolution 65l(VIl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 45-2-8 (GAOR, 7th S., 409th PI.Mtg., Dec.20, 
1952, p.458). Australia's abstention was recorded
in the Fourth Committee (Ibid., 4th Ctee., 308th Mtg., 
Dec.16, p.423)•
288
South Africa's current refusal to co-operate, this
information could only be unofficial, and unofficial
information had not been allowed for under Mandates
Coqamission procedures which were those relevant to
78the case of South-West Africa. Australia also
abstained on a resolution which once again called
for submission of a trusteeship agreement. Not only
was South Africa not bound legally to submit - Australia’s
customary argument - but it was damaging, said Loomes,
to the United Nations' prestige repeatedly to adopt
79the same resolution.
In 1954, when the Committee on South-West 
Africa reported adversely on conditions in the territory, 
and in 1955» the anti-colonial Powers turned again 
to the Court in an effort further to reinforce their 
case against South Africa. South Africa objected 
to having the United Nations as successor to the League
78 GAOR, 8th S., 4th Ctee., 364th Mtg., Nov.12, 1953» 
P.314. Resolution 749A(VIII) was adopted by an 
Assembly vote of 46-1-12 (ibid., 460th PI.Mtg., Nov.
28, P.325).
79 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 364th Mtg., Nov.12, p.314.
Resolution 749B(VIII) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 47-1-11 (Ibid., 460th Pl.Mtg., Nov.28, p.325).
289
in supervising the mandate on the grounds that a
two-thirds majority was sufficient to carry an
important proposal in the United Nations’ Assembly
whereas League procedure had required unanimity. In
195^, therefore, the Assembly adopted a resolution
whereby the International Court of Justice was asked
for an opinion on the matter. Australia abstained
in the vote; the United States and New Zealand were
80among the resolution’s supporters. In 1955» the 
anti-colonial Powers succeeded in having the Assembly 
adopt a resolution whereby it asked the Court for 
an opinion on whether it could legally empower the gCommittee on South-West Africa to hear oral petitioners. 
In the Fourth Committee, the Australian delegate,
J.M. McMillan, made a speech which came oddly from 
a delegation which so often had taken legal stands 
against the anti-colonial Powers:
80 Resolution 904(IX) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 25-11-21 (GAQR, 9th S., 501st Pl.Mtg., Nov.23,
1954, p.326).
81 Resolution 9^2(,X) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 32-5-19 (GAQR, 10th S., 550th Pl.Mtg.,
Dec.3, 1955, p.399).
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The basic objective of both parties in the 
dispute should be the promotion of the interests 
of the inhabitants of South West Africa,
However, in the effort to consolidate its 
legal position, the United Nations appeared 
to some extent to have lost sight of that 
objective. The Australian delegation was 
not convinced that the United Nations could 
make any useful progress towards that 
objective without the full co-operation of 
the South African Government, It did not 
consider co-operation had been or would be 
encouraged by the multiplication of advisory 
opinions, the insistence upon a trusteeship 
agreement, or the reiteration of criticisg^ 
the validity of which was often in doubt.
Q oAustralia again abstained. J (in both instances, the 
Court handed down an advisory opinion favourable 
to the anti-colonial Powers. In the Court* s view, 
application of the two-thirds rule in the Assembly 
on questions related to petitions and reports regarding 
South-West Africa was not inconsistent with its 1950
opinion on the status of the territory, and nor would
be the granting of oral hearings to petitioners by
v 84the Assembly1 s Committee on South-West Africa.)
82 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 499th Mtg., Nov.7, p.178.
83 See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Summary Report of the Australian Delegation, United Nations General Assembly, Tenth Session, 22nd September 
to 20th December. 1955» New York, Canberra, 1956, p.49 - 
in CPP, 1956-7, Vol.III.
84 See I.C.J. Reports 1955, p.66sq. and I.C.J. Reports 
1956, p.23sq.
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Australia continued to support South Africa 
against the anti-colonial members. In 1956, for
example, she was again arguing that it was undignified
to persist with resolutions requesting the submission
of a trusteeship agreement which South Africa was
8 5not legally required to submit. In 1957» Australia
supported an Assembly decision to appoint a good offices
8 6commission to confer with South Africa. However, 
she objected to a draft resolution which criticised 
conditions in South-West Africa and asked the Committee 
on South-West Africa to consider the possibility 
of referring to the International Court of Justice the 
question of whether some administrative acts in the 
territory were compatible with the League Covenant,
85 GAOR, 11th S., 4th Ctee., 583rd Mtg., Dec.21,
1956, p.170.
86 This commission was established under Resolution 1l43(XIl) which was adopted by an Assembly vote of 
50-10-20 (GAOR, 12th S., 709th PI.Mtg., Oct.25,
1957, P.37ÖTT"
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the Mandate and the United Nations charter, 1
The good offices commission was unsuccessful,
South Africa still refusing to accept the United
Nations as a second party to an agreement on the
territory. At the 1958 Assembly session, there was
again dissension over a hearing extended to the Rev.
Michael Scott, There was a difference of opinion
even within the western group on whether, if Scott
were heard, he should be heard with reference to the
report of the good offices commission or to the
Committee on South-West Africa. The United States
and Canada, for example, approved hearing him on the
latter. Australia voted vainly against hearing him
88on either, and expressed a degree of sympathy for 
the South African delegation which refused to remain
87 Resolution 1l42(XIl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 55-3-17 (ibid., p.369). For evidence of a
vote •against’ in the Fourth Committee and an abstention 
in plenary session, see Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Summary Report of the Australian 
Delegation, United Nations General Assembly, Twelfth 
Session, New York, 17th September to 14th December, 1.95.7.» 
Canberra, 1958, p*55 - in CPP, 1959-80, Vol.IV. The
Australian argument was the familiar one that to pass 
the draft resolution would be to prejudice the chances 
of the good offices commission (GAOR, 12th S., 709
Pl.Mtg., Oct.25, 1957, P.372).
88 GAOR, 13th S., 4th Ctee., 7^7th Mtg., Sept.30,
1958, pp.24-5.
293
in the Fourth Committee for and after Scott* s appearance.
Cyril Chambers said his delegation * regretted...the
attitude of those delegations who precluded the
possibility of a diplomatic and political solution
89of the problem...*. 7 Similarly, in 1959» Australia
abstained in voting on yet another resolution calling
90for the submission of a trusteeship agreement and, 
in the company only of Britain, Portugal and South 
Africa, against a resolution whereby the Assembly drew 
the attention of members to the possibility of 
individually referring to the International Court of 
Justice any dispute they might have with South Africa
9 1over interpretation and application of the mandate.
Signs of a change in policy appeared in 1960 
when Australia was content to abstain in voting on a
89 Ibid., 761st Mtg., Oct.13, p.83.
90 Resolution 1339(XIV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 56- 1-13 (GAOR, 14th S., 838th PI.Mtg., Nov.17,
1959, p.557).
91 Resolution 136l(XIV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 33-4-16 (ibid.). For evidence of the Australian 
vote on these two resolutions, see Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Australian 
Delegation, United Nations General Assembly, Fourteenth 
Regular Session, New York, 13th September to 12 th 
December. 1939« Canberra, i960, p.54 - in CPP, 1960-1,
Vol. IV
294
resolution which deplored South African policy in the 
territory, especially the application of apartheid, 
and asked the Committee on South-West Africa to
proceed to the territory for an on-the-spot
92examination of the situation there. Australia also 
abstained on a resolution which noted terrorisation 
of the territory* s indigenes and armed action against 
them by the South African Government, and called the
attention of the Security Council to a situation which
93could endanger international peace; on another 
which appealed to members to bring influence to bear
94to have South Africa implement Assembly resolutions;
on another which commended Ethiopia and Liberia for
their initiative in referring a private dispute with
95South Africa over the mandate to the court; and on
92 Resolution 1568(XV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 78-0-15 (GAOR, 15th S., 954th Pl.Mtg., Dec. 18, 
1960, p.1388)•
93 Resolution 1596(XV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 83-0-9 (ibid., 979th Pl.Mtg., April 7, 1961, 
p.239).
94 Resolution 1593(XV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 74-0-9 (ibid., 963rd Pl.Mtg., March 16, 1961,
p. 1 6) .
95 Resolution 1565(XV) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 86-0-6 (ibid.t 954th Pl.Mtg., Dec.18, i960,
p.1387)•
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another which urged South Africa to cease the 
imprisonment and deportation of Africans in the
96territory. And Australia voted for a resolution 
which considered conditions in the territory unsatis­
factory and called on United Nations agencies to
97assist and on South Africa to co-operate with them.
In 1961, it was manifest that Australia had
98indeed switched her policy. Although Britain, Belgium, 
France and Spain abstained, Australia voted in the 
Fourth Committee for a draft resolution which referred 
to South Africa*s 'ruthless intensification of the 
policy of apartheid* and 'oppressing the indigenous 
people', declared that South Africa had 'persistently
96 Resolution 1564(XV) was adopted by an Assembly
vote of 84-0-7 (ibid.) Australia's abstention was recorded 
in the Fourth Committee (ibid., 4th Ctee., 1063rd Mtg.,
Nov.24, 1960, p.373).
97 Resolution 1566(XV) was adopted by the Assembly
without objection (ibid., 95^th PI.Mtg., Dec.18, i960,
P•13Ö7). Australia voted 'for* in a Fourth Committee 
roll-call (ibid., 4th Ctee., 1076th Mtg., Dec.6, 1960,
P.458).
98 A similar switch in Australia's position on human 
rights questions involving South Africa has been noted 
(see Gordon Greenwood, 'Australian Foreign Policy in 
Action' in Greenwood and Harper, op.cit., p.51)*
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failed in its international obligations in administering
the Territory*, established a seven-member United
Nations Special Committee for South-West Africe
which would visit the territory and set in motion
processes whereby the territory could achieve
independence, and called the attention of the Security
99Council to the situation. The Australian delegate,
L.R. McIntyre, admittedly, was not happy with all
the provisions of the draft resolution and in fact
abstained in the voting on it in plenary session10^
but, besides voting for it in the Committee, he
expressly approved its condemnation of apartheid and
its emphasis on self-determination and applauded
101the sincerity of its sponsors. Australia voted for
99 GAOR, 16th S., 4th Ctee., 1247th Mtg., Dec.13»
1961, p .5 8 8 •
100 Resolution 1702(XVI) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 90-1-4 (Ibid., 1083rd PI.Mtg., Dec.19, p.1106). 
McIntyre explained to the Assembly that Australia
had abstained in plenary session because her ’for* 
vote in the Fourth Committee had assumed that the 
Committee would also adopt an associated Swedish draft. 
This would have had appointed a committee, agreeable 
to the Assembly and South Africa, to examine conditions 
in South-West Africa and report to the Assembly and 
South Africa. It was rejected by a large margin.
101 Ibid., 4th Ctee., 1246th Mtg., Dec.12, p.576.
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another resolution in which South Africa was accused of 
deliberately depriving the te r r i to ry ’s indigenes 
of access to complete secondary and higher education, 
and which authorised the establishment of a training 
scheme for them.
I f  1961 saw Australia supporting conditionally 
a draft resolution almost every sentence of which 
formerly would have been u t te r ly  objectionable to 
her, 1 9 6 2  saw the consummation of the policy trans­
formation. McIntyre told the Fourth Committee that:
The Government and the people of Australia 
deplored the practice of racial discrimination, 
in South Vest Africa as elsewhere, and 
further considered that South Africa should 
have followed the example of other Mandatory 
Powers and have placed South Vest Africa 
under the Trusteeship System. . .There was 
also a clear moral obligation on the part 
of South Africa to promote the Territory’ s 
advancement towards self-determination and to 
put an end to a l l  discriminatory po l ic ie s . . .  
South Africa should grant exit permits to 
students. . .The continued failure of South 
Africa to acknowledge i t s  obligations or 
to heed world opinion could not but have 
explosive consequences.
•  •  ♦
. . . th e  United Nations should seek to 
avail i t s e l f  of a l l  possible channels to 
bring the pressure of world opinion to bear 
upon the South African Government. ■’
102 Resolution 1705(XVl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 94-0-1 (ib id . , 1083rd PI.Mtg., Dec.1 9 , p . 1 1 0 6 ).
103 GAOR, 17th S . , 4th Ctee., 1 3 8 7 th Mtg., Nov.l6 , 
1 9 6 2 , p . 3 8 8  (author’s underlining).
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Australia then voted for a resolution which condemned
(McIntyre would have preferred that it ’deplored’)
South Africa’s refusal to co-operate with the United
Nations, instructed the Secretary-General to establish
a United Nations presence in the territory, and urged
members to take account of some of their fellow
members’ feelings about the supply of arms to South 
i o l±Africa. In 1963» it was significant that Australia
was content to abstain (Britain and the United States
were among those to vote ’against’) in voting on a
resolution which included a call for an arms embargo
10 5on South Africa. Australia voted for another
resolution (Britain abstained) which further condemned
South Africa and asked the Security Council to consider
*10^the critical situation in South-West Africa.
104 Ibid., 1194th Pl.Mtg., Dec.14, p.1l46. Resolution 
1803(XVII) was adopted by a vote of 98-0-1.
103 Resolution 1899(XVIII) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 84-6-17 (GAORt 18th S. , 1237th Pl.Mtg., Nov.
13, 1963, p.4).
106 Resolution 1979(XVIIl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 89-2-3 (ibid., 1284th Pl.Mtg., Dec.17, P»2).
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It is impossible at this stage to state precisely 
Why Australia switched from a fairly constant tendency 
to shield South Africa to a willingness to join her 
critics in the Assembly. A vital difference between 
Australian-South African relations before and after 
1961, when Australia first actively supported Assembly 
resolutions inimical to South Africa, was that South
107Africa left the Commonwealth of Nations early in 19^1»
A simple view would be that Australia then felt at 
liberty to vote and speak as only feelings of Common­
wealth solidarity previously had prevented her. This 
lacks conviction in that it was apparent already in 
i960 that Australia was not untouched by the growing 
anti-colonial consensus in the Assembly. Thus, 
she abstained in i960 in voting on Resolution 1565(XV),
a draft essentially consequential to Resolution 1361 (Xiv)
108against which she had voted the year before. Voting
107 More accurately, South Africa did not apply for 
continued membership. It had become customary for a 
state assuming republican status, as South Africa 
had just done, to seek other members* approval to its 
remaining in the Commonwealth. Because of the degree 
of criticism of her racial policies received at the 
1961 Prime Ministers’ Conference, South Africa did not 
persist with her initial application.
108 Resolution 136l(XIV) drew the attention of members 
to the possibility of taking legal action against South 
Africa. Resolution 1565(XV) commended Ethiopia and 
Liberia for having done so.
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figures given in footnotes on preceding pages show 
how Assembly minorities were shrinking on this and 
other colonial questions in 1959 and 1960, And, on 
many questions besides that of South-West Africa, 
Australia in 1961 and 1962 le f t  the company of the 
colonial intransigents who were reduced to Portugal 
and South Africa and, less often, Britain and Spain.
An explanation based on South Africa’s departure 
from the Commonwealth also lacks conviction in that, 
before and after 1 9 6 1 , Australia’s voting at times 
was at odds with that of Britain, even when British 
interests were involved, and very often different from 
that of other ’old* Commonwealth members.
A probably effective factor was the considerable 
obloquy which had fallen on South Africa as a result 
of the Sharpeville and Langa incidents of i 9 6 0 .
This showed i ts e l f  on the question of racial conflict 
in South Africa in Special Political Committee activity. 
Explaining in the Australian parliament what ’ some 
regard as a switch in policy by Australia' whereby 
Australia had abstained in the Committee in voting in 
1959 on what became Resolution 1375(XIV) but voted 
in 1961 for what became Resolution 1598(XV), each 
comprising a condemnation of South Africa and a call
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to change her racial policies, Menzies referred to
109* the events that happened and were happening...1.
Soeaking of Sharpeville, he said he had been’horrified by 
the dreadful events’. He then declared his hostility 
to apartheid, because it would ’end in the most 
frightful disaster’, and to South Africa’s refusal, 
when still in the Commonwealth, to establish regular 
diplomatic contact with Afro-Asian Commonwealth states.
He made clear in his speech that Smuts' support for
segregated social development had been one thing,
but that policy which led to a Sharpeville was another.
Voting on the South-West Africa issue did 
not arouse the same interest in the Australian 
parliament as that on apartheid. But it would seem 
likely that similar considerations would have prevailed. 
That is, it would seem likely that South African 
internal policy had reached a point where Australia 
could no longer easily support her, remembering that 
apartheid was being applied in South-West Africa.
South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth may 
then have made Australia's change easier to make,
109 CPD, H. of R. Vol. 30, p•651sq• (April 11, 1961)
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especially as Britain had given a lead on the apartheid
1 1 0question in the Special Political Committee. But
Sharpeville or not, and Commonwealth solidarity or not,
it remains that at about the same time Australia
1 1 1switched policy on other colonial questions. All that 
might reasonably be supposed is that, without a 
Sharpeville and without a Commonwealth break, Australia 
may have been a little slower to leave South Africa* s 
side •
110 The evidence for Britain giving a lead in the 
Committee was brought to the author’s attention by
Dr T.B. Millar. Menzies (ibid.) implicitly denied that 
the Australian delegate had said one thing and, after 
hearing the British delegate, had done another.
According to Menzies, the Australian delegate left the decision to Canberra where *1 consulted my senior 
colleagues’.
111 Menzies (Ibid.) somewhat dubiously claimed that Australia felt free to criticise South African policy
in the Assembly but not at a Prime Minister’s Conference.
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In preceding chapters, attention has been
restricted to the attempts of anti-colonial Powers
to apply decolonialist pressure on administering Powers
by the use of machinery provided for in, or erected
under, either Chapter XI or Chapters XII and XIII
of the United Nations charter.1 However, there have
been a number of notable instances of anti-colonial
activity which have been made to involve the United
Nations but not primarily, if at all, within the
context of these chapters of the charter. They have
comprised instances of a member or members of the
United Nations drawing the attention of the Security
Council or the Assembly to events in a territory
under the political control of another member. In
the early years of the United Nations and sporadically
since, this reference tended to be to the Security
Council - as in the case of Indonesia; in the early
and mid-1950s, reference tended to be to the Assembly
and its First Committee - as in the case of the North
2African territories under French control; in the
1 Since i960, there has been use of machinery erected 
under the Declaration of Colonilaism, but the Declaration 
itself was framed in terms jointly of Chapters XI, XII 
and XIII, and this activity has already been discussed.
2 This reached such proportions that one observer wrote 
that 'the main colonial issues of the United Nations are 
channelled to the First Committee.••' (Benson, op.cit., 
P.238).
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late 1950s, reference to the Assembly tended to 
involve rather the Special Political Committee - as 
in the case of Oman, Characteristically in these 
instances, there has been a claim on one side that 
events in the area constituted a threat of some 
degree to peace consequent to a member's attempts 
to thwart the just aspirations to a full exercise 
of self-determination of the area's inhabitants, On 
the other side, there has, as a rule, been a denial 
of these claims and an assertion that the United Nations 
in any case lacked competence in a matter which was 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a member. This 
was the setting for the reference of the Indonesian,
West Irian, Moroccan, Tunisian, Algerian and Oman 
questions to the Council or Assembly by Powers 
interested in the removal of western authority from 
the respective areas. There has been besides the 
question of Goa, a case of an anti-colonialist and 
forcefully decolonialist Power being cited for 
violating the peace.
Australian activity on these seven questions 
will be examined in succeeding pages. There have been 
other colonial questions raised in the United Nations, 
but not within the scope of this work. In the case of
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Cyprus, for example, three of the five principal
actors have been European, so that colonialism in
this case has been of the intra-group sort mentioned
3earlier. The Tibetan question, too, even if it were 
judged to involve a form of colonialism, was set 
in an intra-group context and not in the context of 
the alienation of European authority. The Palestine 
question, undeniably colonialist in many of its aspects, 
came to the United Nations not as representing a 
customary conflict between indigenous nationalism 
and a European intruder, but as a conflict between 
two local groups, quasi-indigenous Jews and indigenous 
Arabs. The Indo-Chinese question, which involved 
anti-colonialist fundamentals (an indigenous Asian 
attempt to throw off European authority) and constituted 
at least as significant a threat to peace as the
3 There is, too, the point that ’although strictly 
speaking Cyprus is a colony, this problem does not pose 
the classical question that arises in colonies as to 
whether the people of the territory have reached the 
point of being able to make decisions for themselves... 
this is a question of the exercise of self-determination 
by an ethnic minority group...' (Benjamin Rivlin, 
’Self-Determination and Dependent Areas’ in International 
Conciliation, No. 501 (Jan., 1955)» p.261).
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Indonesian or Algerian conflicts, did nor come before
4the United Nations at all*
In examination of the seven questions to be 
dealt with in this and the following chapter, it 
will be seen that the Australian response to the courses 
taken by anti-colonial Powers broadly was of a pattern 
with her response to anti-colonialist activity in the 
contexts of Chapters XI, and XII and XIII , of the 
charter: at least until i960, support for western 
administering Powers and opposition to the anti­
colonial Powers. There was one major exception: the
Indonesian question. Here, Australia openly, ener­
getically and effectively took the part of indigenous 
Asian rebels against a European administering Power. 
Until the 1960s, in which she has joined the anti-
4 The factors advanced by Goodrich ana Simons (Leland 
jn. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and 
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 
Washington, 1955» pp.39-60), the French veto in the
Security Council, the alliance issue, and the manifest 
communist involvement in the conflict, go some way 
towards explaining why the conflict was not referred 
to the United Nations. In the earlier years of the 
conflict, when it was still the practice to refer 
such questions to the Security Conncil , France, 
certainly, could have blocked action. In the later 
years, when it became the practice to refer them to the 
Assembly, the effective government of China, clearly 
an interested party, was not represented. And communist 
involvement may well have been an inhibitor. Still, 
it remains a curiosity that conflict on such a scale 
between a European colonial Power and Asians in Asia 
did not lead someone at least to try to raise the question.
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colonial Powers ln public hostility towards South 
Africa and Portugal, the Indonesian independence 
question alone evoked an Australian response 
substantially injurious to the cause of a metropolitan 
Power and contributory to the decolonisation process,
THE INDONESIAN QUESTION
I.
Conflict between nationalist Republican forces 
and Allied (mainly British and Indian) forces sent 
to Java to organise the surrender and evacuation of 
Japanese troops and to maintain order pending the 
return of Netherlands East Indies authorities was 
brought to the attention of the Security Council 
in January, 19^6, by the Ukrainian delegation.
The Ukraine complained that British and British- 
employed Japanese troops were assaulting Indonesian 
nationalists in a situation which constituted a 
threat to international peace and security, and asked 
that a commission be established to determine the facts. 
A member of the Council, Australia denied that peace
5 SCOR, 1st Yr., 1st Ser., 12th Mtg., Feb.7, 19^6, 
pp•174-8.
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was threatened or that an inquiry was necessary
although, should there be an inquiry, Australian
geographical proximity demanded her participation.
The Ukrainian and an associated Egyptian proposal
tailed to enlist sufficient support in the Council,
7and the question was dropped.
During succeeding months in 1946, Indonesian 
Republican and Netherlands representatives pursued 
negotiations leading to the signing of the Linggadjati 
Agreement in March, 1947* Subsequent discussions on 
outstanding points (return of Dutch property, lifting 
of a Dutch naval blockade, Dutch sponsoring of 
separatist movements etc.) reached an impasse. The 
Netherlands withdrew from the talks and, in July,
1947, launched what became known as the first policegaction. Ten days later, India and Australia reported 
the matter to the Security Council. The Australian 
letter asked the Council to 1 take immediate action 
to restore international peace and security* and to
6 Ibid., 16th Mtg., Feb.11, p.234.
7 Ibid., 18th Mtg., Feb.13, pp.258,263.
8 The Netherlands itself used the term 'police action*•
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•call upon the Governments of the Netherlands and
the Republic of Indonesia to cease host il i ties
9
forthwith and to commence a rb i tra t io n . . .1. The
Council took up the Australian communication, which
10had the support of India. Australia submitted a 
draft resolution in the terms of her le t te r .  The 
Netherlands claimed domestic jurisdiction, and was 
supported in varying degrees by Britain, France and 
Belgium; other Council members supported Australia. 
The Soviet Union expressed doubts about arbitration 
and the United States about references to particular 
charter articles in the Australian draft but, as 
amended by Poland to have the two sides keep the
1 1Council informed, i t  was adopted by the Council.
9 SCOR, 2nd Yr., Supplement N o . 1 6 ,  Annex 40  , p . 1 49•
10 India* s reference to the Council had been in terms 
of Chapter VI of the charter (Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes) and Australia*s in terms of the much more 
forceful Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression). India was not a member of the Council 
and, given the success of the Australian move, her 
communication was not considered.
11 SCOR, 2nd Yr., 173rd Mtg., Aug.1, 19^ 7» pp.1702-3
With a ceasefire call effected, Australia then
turned to the organisation of a source of information
on the local political situation and of arbitration
machinery. The Australian representative, W.R. Hodgson,
in discussion on a source of information, at f i r s t
suggested a report by a Secietariat official or a
1 2Council-appointed commission. Finally, he submitted
a draft resolution calling for the establishment of
a commission to act for the Council, but without
reference to i t s  composition (whether Council members
or not) except to note United States and Australian
1 3offers of good offices. However, because the 
Netherlands was opposed to a Council commission, 
Australia then co-sponsored with China a proposal 
stated by the Netherlands to be acceptable whereby 
the diplomatic representatives in Batavia (the
12 Ibid. , 1 7 8 th Mtg., Aug.7, p . 1 8 5 3 .
13 The United States offer, accepted by the Netherlands, 
was made in the Security Council on August 1• The 
Australian offer was made by the Prime Minister,
J.B. Chifley, in Canberra on August 7s ’ . . . the  
Australian Government. . .would be prepared to act 
jointly with the United States Government in a capacity 
of mediator and arbi trator’ (see Current Notes, Vol.18, 
p.469- August, 19^7)»
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Netherlands administration’s capital, later renamed 
Jakarta) of governments on the Security Council would
14report on the situation. The Soviet Union and Poland, 
not having representatives in Batavia, formally proposed 
a commission of Council members to supervise imple­
mentation of the cease fire and Australia, apparently 
still preferring this (her own initial suggestion),
voted with them - though vainly in that France used 
1 5her veto. The Australian-Chinese proposal for a
1 6consuls’ report was then adopted.
With a source of information established,
Australia tried to have the Council approve a form of
arbitration whereby the Netherlands and the Republic
of Indonesia would each nominate a Power, with the
Council nominating a third to make up a three-man
commission. The Soviet Union and Poland felt that this
would tend to by-pass the Council; the United States
preferred to keep the direct Council role to a minimum.
14 SC OR, 2nd Yr. , 193rd Mtg. , Aug.22, 19^7, pp.2173-2**
15 Ibid., 194th Mtg., Aug.25, p.2200.
16 Ibid.
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The Australian proposal was defeated, and the Council 
adopted instead a United States proposal for a commission 
of three to be comprised of a nominee of each of the
1 7disputing parties and a third appointed by the nominees.
The Netherlands nominated Belgium to this Good Offices
Committee, the Indonesian Republicans nominated
Australia, and Belgium and Australia invited the
18United States to join them.
When the consular commission submitted an 
interim report in the following month, Evatt success­
fully urged that the Good Offices Committee begin work.
He was less successful in trying to have the Council 
issue instructions to the conflicting parties.
Australia had disapproved of attempts by Netherlands 
forces in preceding weeks to advance their front 
line level with spearheads established at the time 
of the ceasefire. Australia proposed in the Council 
that Netherlands and Republican forces withdraw to 
positions at least five kilometres behind their 
positions of August The Soviet Union proposed
17 ibid., p.2209 18 Ibid., 206th Mtg., Oct.1, p.248l.
19 Ibid., 210th Mtg., Oct. 11, p.2555.
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more rigorously that the forces of each side withdraw
to positions held at the beginning of the police
action in July.20 Australia supported the Soviet
suggestion and, when this was defeated, accepted a
Soviet amendment to her own draft so that it called
for a withdrawal of twenty-five instead of five
kilometres. This, too, was defeated and the Council
adopted a United States draft which merely asked for
a Netherlands-Republic conference on the effective
implementation of the ceasefire and for the Good
21Offices Committee to assist. The result was the 
Renville Agreement signed in January, 19^8»
After 19^7» Australia was no longer a member 
of the Council, but she continued to play an active 
role as an interested party in Council discussions 
and as a member of the Good Offices Committee in 
working out the Indonesian independence problem. It 
is not proposed here to repeat a narrative of events
20 Ibid., 211th Mtg., Oct.14, p.2579*
21 Ibid., 217th Mtg., Oct.31, pp.2698, 2700 and 
219th Mtg., Nov. 1, p.2750.
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22available elsewhere« Australia*s principal contribu­
tions were her national’s share in the Critchley-DuBois 
23proposals; her outspoken denunciation of the
Netherlands following the launching of the second
24’police action’ in December, 1948; her request
in company with India in the following March for Assembly
25consideration of the Indonesian question; and 
joining with interested regional Powers in a conference
22 See. e .g.,  J. Foster Collins ’The United Nations
and Indonesia' in International Conciliation, No.459 
(March, 1950); Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence 
and the United Nations, London, 196O; and Current Notes, 
Vol.19» pp.460-76 ( August, 1948) and Vol. 20, pp. 173-86
(February, 1949)»
23 After the signing of the Renville Agreement,
T. Critchley replaced R.C. Kirby as Australian member 
of the Good Offices Committee. DuBois was the United 
States member. Their proposals for a political settle­
ment involving a high degree of self-determination 
and a transfer of sovereignty were unacceptable to 
the Netherlands.
24 See SCOR, 3rd Yr. , 390th Mtg. , Dec.2 3 , 1948, pp.5-1^.
23 The question was then referred to the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee which adopted an Australia-India joint draft 
whereby hope was expressed for current Netherlands- 
Republic negotiations and further consideration was 
postponed for a year. This draft, which became Resolution 
247(111), was adopted by an Assembly vote of 43-6-3 
(GAOR, 3rd S . , 208th PI.Mtg., May11, 1949, p.348.
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at New Delhi in 1949* Finally, with India, she 
sponsored Indonesia’s admission to the United Nations 
in September, 1950.
The relevance of the brief summary of events 
given in preceding pages l ies  in i t s  i l lustra tion  of 
Australia’s persistent activity against the proclaimed 
interests of a western, administering Power. As the 
Netherlands representative told the Council late  in 
1 9 4 8 :
I fully understand the interest which countries 
like Australia, India, the Philippines and 
other adjacent terri tories take in the 
solutxon of the Indonesian question. But 
this does not entitle  the Security Council 
to intervene in what was and s t i l l  is  an 
internal conflict within the limits of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.^?
The Netherlands from the beginning claimed that the
Indonesian question fell  exclusively within her domestic
26 GAOR, 5th S., 289th PI.Mtg., Sept.2 8 , 1950, p.176.
27 SCOR, 3rd Yr. , 388th Mtg., Dec.22, 1948, p.27.
The Netherlands representative went on to make some 
capital from the publication of a book (Workshop of 
Security, Melbourne, 1948) by Mr Paul Hasluck, formerly
a member of Australian delegations at the United Nations, 
at the time a university lecturer, la te r  Minister for 
Territories and for a short time Minister for Defence 
and now ( 1 9 6 6 ) Minister for External Affairs. He 
quoted the book to the effect that Hasluck did not feel 
that international concern over a matter took i t  outside 
the domestic jurisdiction of a state or that the 
Security Council should have dealt with the Indonesian 
question without f i r s t  establishing i t s  own competence.
317
jurisdiction; Australia argued the opposite and in
a number of ways, it has been seen, sought to have
the Council override the Netherlands claim. For
Australia, the Council had competence and the Republic
had separate international status and was not submerged
2 8in the identity of the Netherlands.~ However, the 
part played by Australia was not limited to acts of 
reference and the submission of resolutions. Her 
delegates, it would not be exaggerating to say, at 
times verbally flayed the Netherlands and her supporters, 
not merely on broad issues of jurisdiction but on a 
variety of practical details reflecting on their 
good faith.
II.
Signs that Australia might be more than a 
disinterested peace-maker were not slow to emerge.
Within a week of the Security Council’s call for 
a ceasefire during the first police action of 19^7» 
Australia complained that the ceasefire call had been 
held up by Netherlands officials in Batavia for a day
28 See, e.g., SC OR., 3rd Yr. ,
p. 6.
390th Mtg., Dec.23, 19^8,
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29and a half before being sent on to the Republic.
Again, after the submission of the consular commission’s
interim report in September, 1947, Hodgson made it
clear that Australia doubted the good faith of some
30of the consuls involved. The interim report, he said,
was unintelligible and unsatisfactory and delays had
occurred in its submission, adding that Australia’s
representative in Batavia had used a stronger word 
3 1than * delays’•
When the Netherlands forces launched their 
second police action late in 1948, the Australian 
and Belgian members of the Good Offices Committee 
were in Kaliurang, near Jogjakarta. The Australian 
deputy representative, T.W. Cutts, with the American 
member, H. Merle Cochran, reported to the Security 
Council from Batavia that Netherlands forces were 
keeping Committee members and staff incommunicado in 
Kaliurang and accused the Netherlands of having 
(a) broken the terms of the Renville Agreement in
29 SCOR, 2nd Yr., 174th Mtg., Aug.4, 1947, p.1718*
30 Ibid., 209th Mtg., Oct.9, P.2544.
31 Ibid.
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their repudiation of i t ;  (b) acted precipitately without
the Republicans having given cause for apprehension
or alarm; (c) prepared for a military offensive
some time earlier; (d) failed adequately to explore
possibilities for negotiation under Committee auspices;
(e) failed to negotiate with the Republicans in
that Netherlands-Republic talks for months had taken
the form of Netherlands demands for the complete
surrender of the Republic to the Netherlands position
on all  important issues; and (f) violated the Renville
32Agreement in resuming military operations.'
Referring to the second police action in
the Security Council, Hodgson declared that, in that
the Netherlands had violated a solemn undertaking,
'we thus have the f i r s t  clear-cut deliberate violation
of the Charter by a Member'• He continued;
We are told this is  'police action '• Do 
police issue military operation orders, 
military supply orders, military communi­
cations orders? do they impose a military 
censorship, employ tanks, employ heavy- 
art i l le ry ,  employ paratroops and have 
combined chiefs-of-staff to carry out 
detailed military, air  and naval operations? 
. . . th i s  operation must have been initiated 
weeks ago.-7^
32 SC OR, 3rd Yr. , Supplement for December, 19^ -8, pp. 287-8.
33 SCOR, 3rd Yr., 3 9 0 th Mtg., Dec.23, 19^8 , p.11*
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Hodgson argued that it was anomalous to call on both
sides to observe a ceasefire: it would be sufficient
34to call on the Netherlands to observe it.'
Australian support for the Republic was as
marked as her antipathy towards the Netherlands.
After conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement, Australia
recognised the de facto authority of the Republic and
sought trading contacts, and offered the planned
interim federal government of Indonesia advice and
assistance in the fields of trade, finance, communications
35and economic rehabilitation and development. After 
the first police action, Australia vigorously supported 
the admission of Republican spokesmen to Security
o  /TCouncil discussions. At the same time, Australia 
opposed a Belgian move to have the question of the 
Council’s competence in the matter referred to the 
International Court of Justice. The Australian view
34 Ibid., p.13.
35 Current Notes, Vol. 18, p.4l1 (June-July, 1947)«
36 Australia clashed verbally with Belgium on this
question (SC OR, 2nd yr., 181st Mtg., Aug. 12, 1947,
P.1930). Australia clashed too with Britain on the 
admission of the Philippines, Australia favouring 
and Britain opposing (ibid., 178th Mtg., Aug.7»
pp.1838-9).
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was that, whatever the legal niceties, an appeal to 
the Court would be slow in yielding an opinion and
37the need here was to meet an urgent political situation*
In voting on this, Australia parted company with
ooBritain, Belgium, France and the United States.
In a bitter statement in the Council after the launching
of the second police action in 19^8, Hodgson likened
Belgium to Pontius Pilate in having wanted to refer
39the matter to the Court*
The bias of Australia and other Powers seemed 
to appear in the working of the consular commission.
The report submitted by the commission in October 
19^7, was manifestly pro-Netherlands. There was 
reference to an influential class of Indonesians 
who were almost all nationalists seeking some form 
of independence, but these, according to the report, 
comprised only five per cent of the population.; 
there was little hatred of the Dutch, it said, and 
their assistance in running the country was acknowledged
37 Ibid., 195th Mtg., Aug.26, pp.2216-7.
38 Ibid., p.2224.
39 SCOR, 3rd Y r . , 390th Mtg., Dec.23, 19^8, p.6.
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as essential. Appendices to the report, however,
contained a number of separate reports by various
consuls on field trips, and in these may be seen
conflicts grossed over in the final report.
Thus, Eaton (Australia) and Raux (France)
went to Jogjakarta, where they found civilian morale
’quite high’ and the feeling of Indonesian officials
41towards the Dutch one of ’hatred’. The British 
and American officials, on the other hand, found 
Republican enthusiasm in Jogjakarta engineered,
42restricted and amounting to no more than ’war fever’.
In East Java, Eaton and Raux found universal hatred 
of the Dutch in Republican territory and, in 
Netherlands-held territory, Eaton and Lambert (Britain) 
found that Indonesian officials wanted the Dutch to
4lleave, and looked to Jogjakarta. Belgian and Chinese
40 SCOR, 2nd Y r . , Special Supplement No.4, p.23.
41 Ibid., p .26.
42 Ibid., p .31.
43 Ibid., pp.29*38» The general conclusion of Eaton 
and Raux on East Java was that ’Indonesian officials 
so far encountered are intensely bitter against the 
Dutch police action, and their present attitude is 
fanatically anti-Dutch’ (ibid., p . 3 1 ) •
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consuls, on the other hand, found in Dutch-held East
Java that Indonesiern officials disapproved of the
Republic's 'detrimental attitude towards the country...'.
Eaton, Raux and Lambert went to Sumatra, where they
found the Chinese population better off under the
Republic than under the Dutch and, in a kindly written
report, noted that the ’spirit of independence is
45strong...'. The American consul went to West Java, 
where 'not a sign of hatred was senn...*. Admittedly, 
'all were nationalists at heart, but the intelligent 
ones favour the United States of Indonesia instead
46of the Republic of Java and Sumatra'. In etfect,
when an Australian official was involved, a report
was likely to be favourable to the Republic rather
than to the Netherlands; where an Australian was not
involved, a report was likely to be pro-Netherlands.
Australia, too, constantly expressed fears
that tardiness in reaching a settlement would injure
the Republican cause. Just as she opposed reference
to the Court on grounds of time, Australia opposed
a British suggestion in August, 1947, that the consular




commission should establish a line of demarcation
between the opposing forces because this would take
too long to organise. In mid-1948, a year of lengthy
and largely fruitless Netherlands-Republic discussions,
Hood declared in the Council that:
...it is easy to see how some of us have 
formed the conclusion already that the net 
result of these trends and the conduct of 
negotiations in the hands of the Netherlands 
authorities has been to drive the Republic 
more and more into a position of relatively 
inferior strength and status vis-a-vis ^
the Netherlands representation in that area.
Late in 19^8, Hodgson urged the Council to act with
speed:
- We are...inclined to the view that each day
which passes without effective action being 
taken by the Security Council leads to a 
further prejudicing of the position of the 
if not a practical elimination
Opposing a move at one stage for an adjournment to 






SCOR, 3rd Yr., 326th Mtg., June 23, 
Ibid., 393rd Mtg., Dec.27, p.17.
19^8, p.31•
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...we shall be presented not only by a 
fait accompli but by a complete liquidation 
of the Republic. ^
It was scarcely surprising that, in September, 1950,
when Australia and India co-sponsored the admission
of Indonesia to the United Nations in the General
Assembly ('our very dear neighbour’, was how the
Australian delegate, Officer, described the new state),J
the Indonesian delegate, Lambertus Palar, said:
We are deeply grateful to the governments 
and peoples of India and Australia, supported 
by the Philippines, Pakistan and Burma, 
who have taken up our case in the United 
Nations by bringing it first before the 
Security Council and, later, before the 
General Assembly, and have carried it 
through thick and thin until the ultimate 
goal was achieved.-'*
III.
Evatt declared as late as February, 19^9i 
that Australian policy did not seek the removal of 
the Dutch from South-East Asia. The Opposition’s claim
49 Ibid., 396th Mtg., Dec.29, p.42. Australia’s 
international support for the Republic involved forums 
other than the Council and the General Assembly.
In 1948, for example, Australia co-sponsored a move 
to have the Republic admitted as an associate member of 
ECAFE, a move which was opposed by the Netherlands 
and the United States and coolly received by Britain 
and France (see L.P. Singh, ECAFE and India, Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra,
1964 , p. 5*0 •
5° GAOR, 5th S., 289th PI.Mtg., Sept.28, 1950, p.177.
51 Ibid. , p.184
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to the contrary was a ridiculous canard, he said,
noting Australian approval of a Netherlands-Indonesian
52Union. Further, he said: ’X entirely repudiate
the idea that this Government has any thought whatever 
that Australia should interfere with the interests
53of European countries... in the Pacific’.' However, 
it remains that on the Indonesian question Australia did,
52 The Opposition’s hostility to the Government's 
course was partly emotional and partly power-based.
On the emotional side, there was aversion to the 
radicalism of some Republican leaders and to their alleged 
history of collaboration with Japan. Sukarno was 'the 
man who visited Japan to pay his tribute to the Japanese 
people during the war' . Tan Malakka was, in Menzies' 
words, 'that other rabble-rouser'. Of the Republic's 
leaders, he said that their 'only claim to history is 
that they collaborated with the Japanese...'. (CPD, 
Vol.186, p.8 - March 6, 19^ -6). Again, Sukarno was
'the man who led the feeling against the British and 
Americans...’ (Ibid.) and it is unlikely that the 
loyalist-minded Opposition found edifying the spectacle 
of the Communist (Ukrainian) attacks on Britain in 
the Security Council. On the power side, Menzies even 
then was concerned with the need for powerful friends.
He feared that the application of self-determination 
in the East Indies might justify the eviction of 
Australia from New Guinea and Britain from India,
Burma and Malaya. 'When we have, in this absurd 
frenzy, cleared our powerful friends out of places 
that are vital to us, we in Australia will know all 
about isolation’ (ibid., p.9) •
53 CPD, Vol.102, p.475 (Feb.17, 19^9)-
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in fact, interfere with the interests of a European 
Power by insisting on United Nations intervention 
in a metropolitan-colony conflict against the wishes 
of the metropolitan Power and by showing a constant 
solicitude for the cause of the colonial rebels,
Given the inaccessibility of official 
documentary material, it is not possible to say 
definitively why Australia took up this position, 
which generally was inconsistent with positions 
taken up on other colonial questions at the United 
Nations. A number of factors, however, may be noted.
There was, for example, the feeling among Labor 
Government members and their supporters that, 
of all colonialists, the Dutch were the least defensible, 
Chifley expressed this feeling in 1946 when defending 
waterside workers refusing to load Netherlands ships 
destined for Indonesian ports. He said that a body 
of Australian opinion had not been happy with the 
nature of the pre-war Dutch administration in the 
Indies, an administration which had 'required a good 
deal of reformation'. This feeling, he said, 'ran 
very deeply through the whole trade union movement...
54not...merely... among a few Communists'. On a more
54 CPD, Vol. 186, p .16 (March 6, 1946)
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general level, there was the influence of Labor 
attitudes towards colonialism as such. Harper and 
Sissons state quite simply that: ’Labour’s general
views about imperialism...furnish the key to Labour 
policy in this case’. Certainly, Chifley once said 
that ’the policy of this country is that every other 
country should be free to choose its own form of
36government'. And Labor back-benchers, like K.E.
57Beazley, welcomed what they saw as a peasant revolt. '
However, given the Labor Government’s tepid, and
sometimes hostile, attitude towards self-determination
in some other dependencies, it would seem unwise
to go beyond the view of Partridge that Labor policy
in this case was ’consistent with’ the ideology of
the Labor movement or Wolfsohn’s view that support
for self-determination was ’in accordance with’
58socialist belief. Inherited ideological attitudes,
55 Harper and Sissons, op.cit., p.297*
56 CPD, Vol• 193, p.24l (Sept.25, 1947).
57 CPD, Vol. 189, p .168 (Nov.13, 1946).
58 P.H. Partridge, ’Depression and War’ in Gordon 
Greenwood, ed,, Australia A Political and Social History, 
Sydney, 1935, p.402, and H. Wolfsohn, 'Foreign Policy’
in A.F. Davies and Geoffrey Serie, eds., Policies for 
Progress, Melbourne, 1954, p.167*
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then, may have contributed to Government policy in 
this case, but they do not comprise a sufficient 
explanation: if they were effective in this case, why 
were they not in the case, for example, of South- 
West Africa?
It has been suggested that the Labor Government
saw that nationalist success was inevitable and,
especially in view of its immigration policy then being
enforced with some notoriety, felt it only politic to
59espouse the nationalist cause. Related to this,
59 Partridge, op.cit., p.402, and Taylor, op.cit. ,
PP* 375-6. If this was a Labor Government assumption, at 
least one observer thought it mistaken. Referring 
particularly to Calwell’s rigorous interpretation of 
'White Australia* as Minister for Immigration, Friedmann 
wrote: ’Every act of expulsion hits the headlines, in
the United States and all over the Far East. The 
Australian Foreign Minister has been a foremost champion 
of the movement for Asian independence. He has offended 
the Dutch by his emphatic support of the Indonesians; 
he has sent official delegates to Mr Nehru’s Pan-Asian 
conferences. But the effect of these gestures is more 
than nullified by the psychological effect of 
Australian's handling of her own colour problems.
Nations struggling for independence and recognition 
are always particularly sensitive to matters touching 
national prestige. And even if it is a common experience 
for nations to be eloquent in the defence of oppressed 
peoples under another nation's rule,..the contrast 
between Australia's championship of the underdog 
elsewhere add her own handling of the relatively few 
coloured people under her jurisdiction has been the 
subject of particularly bitter comment... (W. Friedmann, 
'A Foreign Policy for Australia' in World Affairs, Vol.
4, No. 1 - Jan., 1950 - p.8o).
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FitzGerald has suggested that the Australian Government 
wished to earn the kudos which otherwise would 
certainly have gone to India alone. Acceptance 
of the inevitable and a preference for being on the 
winning side may have been relevant factors, but they 
do not seem to have had marked relevance to government 
policy on other colonial questions. Why should they 
have been relevant in the Indonesian case? Evatt 
himself once gave the prevention of bloodshed as * the 
purpose of our intervention...There has been no other 
purpose from first to last...The whole area might have 
been convulsed with senseless and useless slaughter1.^  
But on other occasions, it will be seen below, he 
offered other explanations of a perhaps less idealistic 
and more persuasive sort.
If the factors just mentioned at best only 
reinforced the Labor Government's policy decisions, 
what were likely to have been the major factors basically 
responsible for those deciaons? Four might be suggested.
60 C.P. FitzGerald, ’Australia and Asia* in Greenwood 
and Harper (1950-55)» op.cit♦, p.202.
61 CRD, Vol. 201, p .82 (Feb. 9, 19^9)•
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First, there was Evatt’s immense faith in, and attachment 
to, the United Nations as an instrument for bolstering 
international morality and security. In terms of 
morality, he was himself active in seeking a degree of 
interference in the affairs of Spain, not a United 
Nations member but clearly a sovereign state, and of 
Hungary after the Mindszenty trial. In terms of security, 
some of his cabinet colleagues seem to have had rather 
less faith in the United Nations than Evatt, but the 
climate of opinion in the party strongly favoured 
any moves to remove conflict from a ’dirty war’ 
context to the cleaner context of collective, distant, 
international resolution. That this was a colonial 
war and a war involving the Dutch may have made 
Australian initiatives in seeking such a removal even 
more likely, but they were likely anyway in a matter 
so geographically proximate to the Australian sphere 
of interest.
This leads to the second point: the orthodox
regional goal of friendly relations with neighbouring 
states. During World War II, Evatt assumed that this 
goal would be realised by means of regional arrangements 
with returning colonial Powers covering security and
332
co-operation in colonial administration. Thus, 
he assumed the return of the Netherlands to the 
East Indies and co-operation with them along these 
lines,^ Even when an apparently viable Republican 
administration had emerged, he still thought in 1946 
that Australia had ’a vital interest in the preservation 
of the war-time friendship with the Dutch in relation 
to the Netherlands East Indies’. But the new entity 
could not be ignored and he added that’ at the same 
time, it is important to do everything possible to 
establish good relations with the Indonesian and
64other dependent peoples...'. This attitude, pro- 
Dutch and Pro-Indonesian continued until the first
62 In an article published in the Sydney Daily 
Telegraph in August, 1943» Evatt spoke of ’a great 
bouth-west Pacific zone of security’• His assumptions 
about the continuing dependent status of much of the 
area were apparent when he added that ’in its establish­
ment, Australia must act with such colonial Powers as 
Holland, France and Portugal, as well as with the 
United States and Great Britain, which will have 
important interests in contiguous parts of the zone* 
^Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, op.cit♦ , p.132).
63 C P D , Vol• 179, p.235 (July 19, 1944).
64 CPD, Vol. 186, p.201 (March 13, 1946)
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/  p'police action in mid-19^7«  ^ However, even in the 
months before the first police action, events in 
other parts of Asia, especially perhaps the British 
withdrawal and the evident strength of anti-French 
feeling in Indo-China, modified the general lines of 
Australian policy. Early in 1947, Evatt spoke of 
Australia’s interest in the results of colonial 
emancipation in Asia and her need, as the European 
Powers withdrew, to enter the councils of the new Asia,^ 
On another occasion, he urged Australians to regard
/TryAsian nationalism ’realistically and with understanding’./
Chill*ey, too, argued for the acceptability of Asian
nationalism which, especially in India and Indonesia,
he said, was a genuine phenomenon and not merely a
68manifestation of Communism. In a statement issued
65 As A1binski has said, the first police action jarred 
Australian Government hopes for a peaceful solution
and thereafter the Labor Government was clearly pro- 
Indonesian (Henry S. Albinski, 'Australia and the Dutch 
New Guinea Dispute’ in International Journal, Vol.XVI 
(1961), No. 4 (Autumn), p.'36'o). Chifley and Evatt 
persistently denied bias, but Australian actions spoke 
rather louder than their words.
66 CPD, Vol. 190, p.164 (Feb.26, 1946).
67 CPD, Vol.197, P.1170 (March 26, 1947).
68 CPD, Vol. 193, p.242 (Sept. 23, 1947).
to mark the opening in January, 19^9» of the New Delhi 
conference on the Indonesian question, Evatt stated 
that:
Geographically, Australia is closely linked 
with South-East Asia. Those who are devoted 
to Australia* s welfare will desire to live 
in the closest harmony with these new neighbour 
nations three of which, India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon, are new and very important members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations. In other 
parts of South-East Asia, such as Indonesia, 
newer nations are coming into existence and
the transition should be smooth and orderly. 69
It was significant that in the same statement he
said with reference to Asian nationalism movements
70that ’these progressive trends cannot be arrested’. 
After the conference, he expressed satisfaction in 
it having 'undoubtedly strengthened the practical
co-operation between...Australia , India, New Zealand,
71Pakistan and Ceylon'. The Australian Government, 
then, wanted to involve Australia in Asian and Pacific 
affairs as a Pacific and something of an Asian Power. 
When Asia was dependent, this meant involvement with 
the colonial Powers; when Asia was no longer dependent, 
this meant involvement with new independent Powers.




Third, there was a desire to have polit ically 
stable an area with which Australia assumed developing 
trade links, especially perhaps in the matter of oil.
I t  has been noted that Australia showed interest in 
promoting trade with the Indies area even while post— 
Linggadjati negotiations were s t i l l  in progress, and 
in promoting conditions favourable to trade with a 
United States of Indonesia. As Chifley said laconically 
early in 1946, *70,000,000 Indonesians might be very 
good customers. . . this country would be as likely
72to get trade from the Indonesians as from the Dutch’ • 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, there 
was the defence consideration. Australia had been 
shocked by the ease with which the umbrella of depen­
dencies to the north had succumbed to Japanese 
invasion; indigenous opposition had been limited and 
the administering authorities had been defeated or 
considerably distracted in Europe. With this experience,
72 CPD, Vol• 186, p.19 (March 6, 1946). Australia’s 
imports from the Netherlands East Indies in 1939-40 
had amounted to £9,829,274 and exports to the colony 
had amounted to £2,o4o,491 - respectively 8.2 and 1.5 
per cent (approximately) of Australia’ s total imports 
and exports for the year. Oil products comprised 
three-quarters of the imports. See Commonwealth Bureau 
of Census and Statist ics ,  Oversea Trade and Customs and 
Excise Revenue 1939-40, Bulletin No. 37, Canberra,
pp.708-10, 606.
336
it was not illogical for the Australian Government 
to suppose that a unified, nationalist state straddling 
the approaches to Australia from the Asian mainland 
might be more useful to Australia in security terms
73than a divided, oppressed and wasted state. It
should be remembered, too, that fear of communism
(often exaggerated by the Opposition and played down
by the Government) was widespread and there was, it
seems, some concern that, if Australia did not intervene
to help obtain a satisfactory settlement to the
Indonesian conflict, other forces might intervene
and obtain a settlement unsatisfactory to Australia.
As Chifley, by then Opposition leader, said in 1950
in justification of his Labor Government's policy;
We realized that a revolutionary tendency, 
which might finally lead to the development 
of communism in that country^, would constitute 
a grave danger to Australia.
He also said on the same occasion that;
The Labour Government realized that 
00,000,000 Indonesians could not consent to 
be governed by 10,000,000 Europeans whose sole 
interest in Indonesia was to extract from that 
country as much wealth as they could get and to 
give in return as little as possible.
73 This argument was expressed almost in so many words by
Beazley in 1946 (CPD, Vol.189, p .169 - Nov.13, 1946). Its
relevance has been noted by Harper and Sissons (Op.cit., 
pp.159-6o ), Taylor (op.cit. , p.375), Wolfsohn (op.cit. , 
p.167) and FitzGerald (opTcit., p.202).
74 CPD, V o1.206, p .1176 (March 23, 1950).
75 Ibid., p.1175.
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The Labor Government, it^may be supposed, adopted 
policies on the Indonesian question thought likely to 
serve the national security interests of Australia.
The Dutch were in an impossible situation, militarily 
and morally; it was in Australia’s economic and strategic 
interest to support the decolonialist forces. As 
Hodgson said in the Security Council in 19^8 , the 
Indonesian situation ’causes strife and strikes and 
turmoil; it causes a loss of vital war materials...; 
it causes the loss of trade and commerce; it gives cause 
for the growth of extremist forces to take charge in 
areas vital to our well-being’. This, as it happened, 
was the one significant occasion when an Australian 
government’s view of the national interest dictated 
such support. In questions within the contexts of 
Chapter XI and Chapters XII and XIII of the United 
Nations charter and in the West Irian and other major 
decolonialist questions, the Australian view as a 
rule was, and largely continued to be, during the 
1950s,that Australia's security interests demanded 
conservative opposition to the decolonisation process.
76 SCOR, 3rd Yr., 390th Mtg. , Dec.23, 19^8, p.l4
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WEST IRIAN
The question of West Irian (or Netherlands 
New Guinea or West New Guinea) was throughout the 
series of negotiations between Dutch and Republican 
representatives in the late 19 -^Os a subsidiary and 
largely quiescent aspect of the general Indonesian 
independence question. The Netherlands insisted 
that the New Guinea territory, though for a long time 
administered from Batavia, had not been an integral 
part of the Netherlands East Indies, government of 
which was to pass to indigenous elements; the Republicans 
claimed, on the contrary, that the New Guinea territory 
was an integral part of the Netherlands East Indies 
as described in the Linggadjati and Renville agreements 
and that, in any case, western New Guinea had ancient 
connections with the archipelago. Only as the i'inal 
1949 round table conference at the Hague (between 
Netherlands and Indonesian representatives briefed 
to negotiate a transfer of authority to a United States 
of Indonesia) approached did the West Irian question 
emerge as a likely obstacle to a successful outcome.
339
Because the West Irian question was slow to
emerge as a vital issue, it is not easy to state
confidently the Australian Labor Government’s attitude
on it. During the Hague Round Table conference,
Critchley, the Australian member of the United Nations
Commission on Indonesia (the Good Offices Committee
renamed), which was a party to the conference,
suggested that either the territory be placed under 
United Nations trusteeship or that the whole question
77be held over for subsequent negotiation. The 
latter course finally was taken. While the conference 
was in progress, Evatt was asKed in the federal 
parliament in Canberra to comment on the question.
He said merely that this was a matter to be settled 
primarily by the Indonesians and the Dutch. Australia’s 
interest was only in a peaceful settlement. Whatever 
the outcome, whether the Dutch remained in New Guinea 
or were succeeded by Indonesians, he anticipated, he 
said, a continuing close co-operation between authorities 
in western and eastern (Australian) New Guinea.^
77 Taylor, op.cit., pp.238-y.
78 CPD, Vol• 204, p.1120 (Oct. 7, 19^9).
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From this, it would be gathered that the Labor Government
did not actively support Dutch retention of the territory
79or object to its cession to Indonesia. On the other
hand, there is Taylor’s recollection that Australia
at no time showed a desire for a change in sovereignty
80over the territory, and there was contemporary 
journalistic comment ascribing significance to the fact 
that Critchley apparently had not sought to pursuade 
the Netherlands to surrender to Indonesian demands
79 This view is supported by the memory or a senior 
member of the Australian Labor cabinet who, in 
conversation with the author, has said that the cabinet 
as a whole was genuinely neutral.
80 Taylor, op.cit., p.442.
even when the New Guinea question threatened the
81success of the Hague conference.
There was, moreover, a hiatus in Australian 
politics at an important point in the history of the 
West Irian dispute. In October, 19^9» before the 
Hague conference's conclusion, federal parliament in 
Canberra was dissolved for a December election which
81 AAP report in Sydney Morning Herald, Jan.31> 1950. 
One scholar in the field has argued that there is 
evidence to support the view that the 'Labor Government 
considered it to be in Australia's interest for Dutch 
authority to b e ...retained in West New Guinea'
(Margaret Haupt , Australian Policy and the Emergence 
of the West Irian Dispute 19^6 to 1950, Seminar 
Paper, Department of International Relations,
Australian National University, Canberra, Oct.25* 19^5»
p.13). But the only public evidence offered to support 
this view is Australia's acceptance in 19^6 of West 
New Guinea as a participant in the South Pacific 
Commission, and a claim by Evatt in 1950 that this 
acceptance had involved an Australian decision that 
West New Guinea was a Pacific and not a South-East 
Asian entity. In that Miss Haupt admits that it was 
the Netherlands which raised the issue in 19^ +6 and 
insisted on West New Guinea being the only part of 
the Indies to be involved in the Commission, with 
Australia called on merely to accept the Netherlands' 
condition of membership, and given that (as will be 
seen below) Evatt's view in Opposition in 1950 utterly 
contradicted those he had espoused in office on this 
question, this evidence is scarcely compelling.
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resulted in defeat for the Labor Government and the
accession to office of a Liberal-Country Party coalition
led by Menzies. Parliament did not re-asseinble
until March, 1950. In the meantime, the Hague
conference had seen sovereignty passed to the United
States of Indonesia, and, in January, 1950, two
startling statements had emanated from Indonesia.
The first, made by President Sukarno, declared
positively that Netherlands New Guinea would be within
the United States of Indonesia by the end of the year,
and seemed to suggest that Indonesian success was
being guaranteed regardless of diplomatic arrangements
8 2made at the Hague. The second, made by Yamin, a 
leading member of the Indonesian negotiating team at 
the Hague, declared that the new Indonesian state 
would be incomplete not merely until Netherlands New 
Guinea had joined, but until Australian New Guinea,
.83Portuguese Timor and British North Borneo had joined. 
The Indonesian Information Ministry was quick to 
announce that Yamin had spoken personally and not
82 Sydney Morning Herald, Jan.3» 1950
83 Ibid., Jan.31, 1950.
officially, and that Indonesia had no designs on 
Australian New Guinea, but the effect of his statement 
was considerable.^
The new Government, predictably, emphatically 
denied Indonesia*s right to West New Guinea; surprisingly, 
it was supported by the Labor Opposition, When 
parliament met in March, Evatt reversed his position 
of the previous October, Now he declared that 
Netherlands New Guinea belonged to the Pacific, not 
to Asian Indonesia (he was no longer publicly neutral 
about the dispute as such), and that no change should 
be allowed in the status of Netherlands New Guinea 
without Australia's consent (it was no longer a matter
O  K
domestic to the Netherlands and Indonesia) /  He was
8 6supported by many of his colleagues. Only Chifley,
84 Ibid., Feb•1, 1950.
85 CPD, Vol. 206 , p .918 (March 16 , 1950).
86 Especially by A.A. Calwell, E.J. Ward (formerly 
Minister for Territories) and W. Bourke. Bourke 
revived a suggestion made earlier in the Labor cabinet 
by Calwell that Australia should buy West New Guinea.
As late as 1958, a Sydney periodical, the Observer, was 
suggesting the same thing. In response, the Manchester 
Guardian (April 28, 1958) commented in a leader: 'How
any educated person can think that in these days it
is possible cheerfully to buy and sell territories 
and their inhabitants passes understanding'• (Direct 
evidence of Calwell having made his suggestion 
in cabinet came to the author verbally from two 
members of the cabinet).
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now Opposition leader, was prepared s t i l l  to say 
that the West New Guinea question was for the Dutch 
and Indonesians to settle ,  possibly with United 
Nations assistance/  Given the extraordinarily hostile
Q
tone of some leading Labor members, especially Calwell,
in reference to Indonesia, i t  is difficult to say
whether the new attitude followed directly from the
careless Indonesian reference to Australian New Guinea
or whether Labor members felt  free in Opposition to
express personal views very candidly*
In 1950, then, there was in Australia almost
universal political antipathy towards the Indonesian 
89claim and, at the same time, general support for
87  CPD, Vol• 2 0 6 , p . 1 1 7 6  (March 23, 1950).
88 Calwell1s vituperation surpassed that of Menzies
in 1946. For Calwell, Sukarno was now a ‘traitorous 
and dangerous character* ruling ’the ramshackle 
Indonesian Republic’ ; he wanted Australia to announce 
that she would not countenance cession of the territory 
to Indonesia; he declared that Australia should seek 
al lies  among ethnic colleagues (CPD, Vol. 2 0 8 , pp.3893-4 
June 7, 1950).
89 I t  has been commented that this ’unexpected 
support from the Australians, hitherto the most 
vehement Western cr i t ics  of Netherlands policy in 
Indonesia, was regarded by many Dutch as evidence 
that world public opinion was belatedly turning in 
their favour, and their resolve has tended to harden 
accordingly’ (Charles A. Fisher, ’West New Guinea in 
i t s  Regional Setting’ in Year Book of World Affairs,
Vol. 6 (1952), p.203)•
3^5
the view that a vital constitutional change in a
neighbouring territory was Australia*s business, Thus,
P.C. (since Sir Percy) Spender, the new Minister Tor
External Affairs, declared that:
...should discussions between the Netherlands 
and Indonesia tend towards any arrangement 
which would alter the status of western N^w 
Guinea, the matter is no longer one merely 
for those two parties.
.,,the territory is naturally integrated 
with the rest of New Guinea and other adjacent 
island territories which experience has shown 
to be strategically vital to our defence...
It would...be...unreasonable that any change 
of status for the territory should occur 
which disregards the interests of the 
indigenous population and those of Australia.
Evatt fully supported the Government*s view that the
Indonesian claim was spurious, and he agreed that:
It is clear that the unanimous wish of the 
Australian people and of the Parliament 
is that any change inthe status of Dutch 
New Guinea should be a change of which 
Australia approves.
The West New Guinea dispute remained domestic 
to the Netherlands-Indonesian Union until 195^» when 
Indonesia sought to have the United Nations General 
Assembly consider the West Irian question on the
90 CPD, Vol. 208, p.3973 (June 8, 1950).
91 Ibid., p.3975.
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grounds that it posed a latent threat to peace and
regional security. When the Assembly referred the
issue to its First Committee, R.G. Casey, who had
succeeded Spender as Minister for External Affairs,
condemned Indonesia on every conceivable ground;
it was unwise to allow an issue to become emotionally
charged by shouting about it from roof-tops; accession
of Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia would not be to the
benefit of the territory's Papuan inhabitants; apart
from 'echoes from Djakarta', there was not an anti-
Dutch movement among the Papuans; this was not a
threat to peace, although the distance between wishing
to see a threat to peace and actually stimulating
disorder and tension was short. Australia, he promised,
92would contest the issue vigorously. The Indonesian 
delegation leader, Sunario, professed to be surprised 
at the tone of Casey's speech; it was much less 
moderate than that of the Netherlands representative, 
and Indonesia was in conflict with the Netherlands, 
not with Australia. 'We cannot understand why the 
Australian delegation is so concerned, even violent.
92 GAOR, 9th S., 479th Pl.Mtg., Sept.27, 1954, p.76
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over this matter1 , he said. Disputing a claim
by Casey that Dutch New Guineans were ethnically
distinct from Indonesians, he pointed out that
Indonesia as it already existed comprised a number
of ethnically distinct groups, but this had not
stopped Australia from being ’one of our earliest
and warmest supporters in our stniggle for
93independence...'. Menon, of India, suggested
that Casey's speech showed an unawareness that 'there
9kis a new Asia' . Syria protested that it was
'misleading and...unfair' to dismiss the Indonesian
claim as 'a territorial grab'; for Indonesia, this
95was an issue of colonialism.
In the First Committee, Spender made it clear 
that Australia's experience of threatened invasion 
via New Guinea strongly influenced Australian policy
93 Ibid., 484th PI.Mtg., Sept.30, p.124.
94 Ibid., 492nd PI.Mtg., Oct. 6, p.227.
95 Ibid., 507th PI.Mtg., Dec.10, p.45«
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96on the West Irian question. He denied Indonesia’s
legal and political arguments and, more to the point,
he denied the competence of the Assembly to discuss
tht; question and the wisdom of the Assembly in urging
renewed negotiations (a draft resolution had been
submitted to this effect) between a party determined
to maintain sovereignty and another determined to
97accept only a transfer of sovereignty. Australia
voted against the draft, which was adopted by the
Committee but defeated by an application of the two-
98thirds rule in the Assembly.
In the following year, 1955» fourteen other 
Powers joined Indonesia in having the West Irian 
question placed on the agenda of the Assembly.
96 Liberia’s comment on this was that ’it might mean 
that Australia viewed every Asian neighbour as a 
threat and every occupation of territory by Europeans 
as a safeguard’ (ibid. , 1st Ctee., 729th Mtg. , Nov. 26,
p.413)•
97 Ibid., 727th-733rd Mtgs., Nov.24, 29, PP.399-^02, 
440-2.
98 Ibid., 509th PI.Mtg., Dec.10, p.46l. The draft 
as a whole was not put to the vote, each of three 
paragraphs having been rejected in turn by votes oi 
34-21-5, 34-23-3 and 33-23-4 - simple but not two- 
thirds majorities* Australia voted against in each 
case, even though one referred merely to the goodwill 
of the parties and another hoped for persistence in 
negotiation.
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Spender vainly opposed this, claiming that as long
as Indonesia demanded Dutch New Guinea the dispute
could not be settled by negotiation, and that the
United Nations should not be used Tor the prosecution
99of territorial claims," The First Committee was told
of pending Netherlands-Indonesia discussions and thus
considered only an innocuous draft expressing hopes
for a successful outcome. This was adopted by the
Committee and the Assembly,10 '^ Again in 1956,
Australia tried unsuccessfully to prevent the Afro-
Asian group having the question placed on the Assembly’s
agenda. The Australian view, put by Casey, was that
there was no threat to peace; the aims of the disputing
parties were irreconcilable; this was not a remnant
101of the colonial problem. In the First Committee,
Spender repeated the now familiar Australian arguments 
against a draft resolution calling for a United Nations 
good offices committee to assist in negotiating a 
settlement: given Indonesia’s policy, a settlement
could only mean surrender by the Netherlands; if
99 GAOR, 10th S., 532nd PI.Mtg., Oct.3, 1955, pp.228-9..
100 Resolution 915(x) was adopted by the Assembly 
without objection (ibid., 559th PI.Mtg., Dec.16, p.488),
57öth PI.Mtg,, Nov.15, 1956, p. 43.101 GAOR, 11th S . ,
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I n d o n e s i a ’s was a political case, the Assembly was not
the place for satisfying territorial ambitions; if
I n d o n e s i a ’s case was legal, she should take up a
Netherlands offer to submit the case to the International
Court of Justice; this was a case of would-be Asian
colonialism. However, even more than formerly, he
stressed the security factor:
...Indonesia was seeking...that the United 
Nations should assist it in the furtherance 
of its a i m s .••
...Australia had a cardinal interest in the 
whole area of Ne w  Guinea and its future...
Ne w  Guinea represented the very key to 
A u s t r a l i a ’s defence and so Australia could 
never stand idly by when a question affecting 
the future ol the island of New Guinea was 
before the United Nations.
This tended to throw doubt on the good faith with
which Australia was advancing arguments against the
Indonesian case. As the Indonesian delegate could
immediately reply, Australia evidently put her own
defence interest before principles of self-determination
10 3and social advancement. I n d i a ’s Menon condemned
104A u s t r a l i a ’s defence consideration as ’imperialistic*•
The degree to which Australia had involved herself
102 I b i d . , 1st Ctee. , 858th Mtg. , Feb . 25, 1957, p.285.
103 Ibid., p . 303-
10** I b i d . , 862nd Mtg., Feb. 27, p.311
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as a protagonist in the dispute was reflected in an
Ecuador delegate’s (scarcely valid) comment that
'confronted by two States as affluent as the Netherlands
and Australia, Indonesia might well fear that it
might not obtain full respect for its rights’f in
105the International Court, The draft resolution
was adopted by the Committee, but failed to achieve a
10£two-thirds majority in the Assembly.
Afro-Asian members yet again had the question
placed on the Assembly's agenda in 1957 when they
submitted a draft resolution whereby the Secretary-
General would be asked to offer his assistance in
negotiations. The Indonesian delegate added little
to preceding years' arguments, except to make the
curious admission that the application of self-
determination would 'be tantamount to accepting the
107disintegration of the Indonesian national State'.
There were, too, ominous notes in an Indonesian warning
105 Ibid., 861st Mtg., Feb.27, p.305.
106 The Assembly vote was 40-25-13, Australia voting 
against (ibid., 664th PI.Mtg., Feb.28, p.1263).
107 GAOR, 12th S., 1st Ctee. , 905th Mtg. , Nov.20,
1957, P.199.
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that a continuing political dispute was dangerous
in a sensitive area like South-East Asia and that
’the patience of the Indonesian people was not 
10 8inexhaustible’. Ceylon appealed directly to
Australia to put aside security considerations and
109not to deny Indonesia her due. The Soviet delegate
declared that ’Australia clearly preferred to have
a 'bolonial buffer” between independent Indonesia. .. and
the colony of Papua and the Trust Territory of New 
1 10Guinea...’. Even Ireland appreciated how
’wounding the presence of the Netherlands in New
1 1 1Guinea must be to Indonesian national sentiment...’.
The Australian response was energetic. The Australian 
delegate, Walker, hit back at the Soviet Union, ’that 
well-known defender of the self-determination of 
peoples'. Indonesia’s refusal to submit to litigation, 
he said, showed that her argument was purely political; 
it was apparent, he added, that many delegations did 
not accept the Indonesian reasoning but voted for
108 Ibid., p .200.
109 Ibid., 906th Mtg., Nov.20, p . 206
1 10 Ibid., p . 20 7 »
111 Ibid., 911th Mtg., Nov.2 6 , p .241
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draft resolutions implying support for emotional 
1 1 2
reasons. Australia voted against the draft,
which was adopted by the Committee but again failed
to obtain a sufficient majority in the Assembly.
The question was not raised again until 1961 ,
when the Netherlands took the ini t iat ive .  Recalling
the previous year* s Declaration on Colonialism, the
Netherlands submitted a draft resolution whereby the
Assembly would establish a commission to investigate
the early implementation of the Declaration by means
of a plebiscite in Netherlands New Guinea to be
supervised by the United Nations. Indonesia, of
course, opposed the draft as a tactical blow to her
1 1 4claims to the territory. Australia’s response
was notable in that , perhaps because there was no 
reason to think the terr i to ry 's  indigenes would opt
112 Ibid. , 9 0 7 t h  M t g . , Nov.2 1 ,  pp.2 0 9 - 1 1 *
113 Ibid. , 724th PI.Mtg., Nov.2 9 , p *547*
114 GAOR, 16th S . , 1 0 1 6th PI.Mtg., Sept.26, 1 9 6 1 , 
p . 1 0 8 .  There had been a considerable recent develop­
ment in indigenous political self-consciousness almost 
certainly unfavourable to the Indonesian cause:
see Justus M. van der Kroef, ’The West New Guinea 
Problem’ in World Today, Vol, 17 ( 196 1) , No. 10 (Oct,), 
p.489sq., and Paul W. van der Veur, ’Political Awakening 
in West New Guinea’ in Pacific Affairs, Vol.XXXVI 
(1963) j No. 1 (Spring), p.54sq.
for Integration with Indonesia, she approved an
exercise of self-determination even if the result
were to be integration» Plimsoll said;
If the people of West New Guinea, by a 
genuine act of self-determination, choose 
to join Indonesia, Australia will not oppose 
this. Again, if the people of West New 
Guinea choose some other form of Government, 
Australia would want the Territory to be in 
full friendship and co-operation with Indonesia...
But the essence of our approach is 
that the solution should be one which 
the people of the territory themselves 
want.115
Two other draft resolutions were submitted: a nine-
Power draft calling for continued bilateral negotiations 
(its sponsors argued that other parties, even the 
United Nations, could not be involved without tending 
to negate what they believed to be Indonesian sovereignty 
over West New Guinea); and a thirteen-Power (all 
African members of the French community) draft calling 
for continued bilateral negotiations, but also, if 
negotiations remained fruitless, for a United Nations 
commission to investigate conditions in the territory 
and the possibility of a temporary international 
administration. In separate votes, Australia voted 
for a paragraph in the thirteen-Power draft affirming
115 GAOR, 16th S •, 1065th PI.Mtg., Nov.27, 19^1, p .852
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that a solution must be based on the principle of
self-determination and, when this was defeated, for
the draft as amended. This, too, was defeated. ;
Australia voted against the nine-Power draft, which
1 1 7was also defeated. The Netherlands withdrew her 
draft, claiming that the vote on the thirteen-Power 
draft was sufficient indication that she was moving 
in the right direction. Again, then, nothing concrete 
emerged from the Assembly1s consideration of the 
question; on theother hand, the Netherlands had 
foreshadowed a willingness to leave the territory and 
the possibility of an interim international administration 
had been mooted.
These two developments had effect in 19^2, 
when the Netherlands and Indonesia finally concluded 
an agreement whereby West New Guinea would be transferred 
initially to United Nations and, by May, 19^3, to 
Indonesian administration. The territory's inhabitants 
would be given an opportunity to express their wishes 
as to their political future by the end of 19&9 »
When the Assembly met, its only task was to approve a
116 The Assembly vote was 53-^1-9 (Ibid. , 1066th PI.
Mtg., Nov.27, p»875)»
117 The Assembly vote was 41-40-21 (ibid.., p.876).
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joint Netherlands-Indonesian draft resolution along these 
lines. Australia’s delegation leader, Berwick, then 
Minister for External Affairs, welcomed the arrange- 
ment and voted for the draft. Since then, an
Indonesian administration has followed an interim United 
Nations administration, but it seems unlikely that
119the envisaged exercise of self-determination will occur.
On the West Irian question, as with many 
other components of the overall colonial question,
Australia in the 1950s was a conservative upholder 
of the apparent legal rights of a European administering 
Power, of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Where 
formerly she had denied the competence of the United 
Nations even to discuss the question, however, Australia 
in the 1960s was prepared now to allow the United 
Nations actively to intervene; where formerly she had 
attacked vehemently Indonesia’s claims, she now denied
118 Resolution 1752(XVIl) xvas adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 89-0-14 (GAOR, 17th S., 1127th Pl.Mtg., Sept.
21, 1962, PP.52-3)•
119 President Sukarno was reported in 1965 as saying
that Indonesian national consciousness in West Irian 
made a plebiscite ’superfluous’ (Straits Times, May 26, 
1965) and Papuan separatist leaders were arrested 
(Indonesian Herald, May 25» 1965)» The Australian
Government, however, still professed to believe that 
Indonesia would carry out what Hasluck called an ’act of 
ascertainment’ (A g e , Aug.27» 1965)»
357
1 20ever having disputed them; where formerly she had 
maintained that her security was involved in the denial 
of West New Guinea to Indonesia, she now appeared to 
accept the possibil ity  of a transfer of sovereignty.
An easing in the r ig id ity  of b^r position, of course, was
121made possible, i f  not inevitable, by a change in the
policy of the administering Power concerned. The
in terest  shown by the United States in the achievement
of a solution may have influenced Australia. I t  i s
possible, too, that the Australian Government regarded
an exercise of self-determination as sufficient guarantee
1 22that the te rr i to ry  would not pass to Indonesia. I t
120 'The Australian Government has never entered into
discussion of the merits or demerits of the respective 
claims in the dispute which developed between Indonesia 
and the Netherlands as to the sovereignty or administration 
of the T e r r i to ry ' , said Barwick (GAOR, 17th S . , 1127th
Pl.Mtg., Sept.21, 1962, p .54)•
121 One observer thought that 'a situation might well 
be imagined when Australia would present a more whole­
hearted opposition to a transfer of authority in New 
Guinea than would Holland i t s e l f '  (R.F. Wall, 'Asia 
and the Far East' in G. Barraclough, ed . , Survey of 
International Affairs, London, 19^4, p.272).
122 Fourteen s ta tes , members of the African French 
Community, abstained in voting on Resolution 1752(XVIl) 
precisely because they fe l t  that the principle of self- 
determination was not suffic iently  explicit in i t
and because the exercise of self-determination provided 
for was to be organised by Indonesia, a state interested 
in the outcome.
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is also possible that she concluded that the issue
could not be allowed to drag on in the lace of Indonesian
121persistence and threats of direct action. It remains 
that throughout most of the history of the West Irian 
dispute, Australia opposed decolonisation in respect cf 
the New Guinea territory in the sense that she opposed 
attempts to have European authority removed under duress. 
There were several reasons for this. In the 1950s, 
Australian governments generally were unwilling to 
accommodate apparent encroachments on the domestic 
jurisdictions of United Nations members by other members 
or the organisation itself. In the case of West New 
Guinea, there were two additional local factors: 
views on the political future of the whole island of 
New Guinea, and Australian defence considerations.
There was a strand in Australian thinking 
about New Guinea to the effect that a way should be 
left open for possible political union of the island. 
Australia had merged the administration of her colony 
of Papua with that of her contiguous trust territory
123 Marine and air landings were reported to the 
Security Council during 1962.
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and, from 1953» discussed with the Dutch at ministerial 
and official levels the possibility of recognising 
in their administrations the ’ethnological and
1 24geographical affinity* of the island’s people.
Discussing an Australian-Netherlands statement issued
late in 1957 as a declaration of jointly held general
administrative principles, Casey said:
The declaration does not represent a decision 
that New Guinea will necessarily become a 
political unit at some time in the future. 
That is a question for the future and will 
be primarily for the inhabitants of New 
Guinea themselves. But, in the view of the 
Dutch and Australian Governments, we should 
not conduct our respective administrations 
in a manner which will rule out the 
possibility of such a choice later on. The 
choices that we hope will be open to the 
inhabitants of New Guinea will be many. A 
single political unit for the whole island 
is one of them. J
There has already been reference to continuing 
Australian concern about the effect of events in New 
Guinea on Australian security. This concern was not 
limited to the Government; indeed, it is possible that 
the Government felt public opinion, moulded during 
World War II and even earlier, to be such as to make
124 Current Notes, Vol. 28, p.882 (Nov. , 1957)»
125 C P D , Vol. H. of R. 17, p.2921 (Dec. 5, 1957).
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opposition to the Indonesian case electorally advisable. 
When the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, 
visited Australia in 1959» the Labor Opposition attacked 
the Government very strongly for having made too 
great a concession to Indonesia. A joint Subandrio-Casey 
statement said no more than that Australia, while 
recognising Netherlands sovereignty and the principle 
of self-determination, would not oppose any Indonesian- 
Netherlands agreement on West New Guinea provided it
were reached by ‘peaceful processes and in accordance
* *1 2  (Swith internationally accepted principles...’.
Despite denials by Casey and Menzies, both of whom
felt obliged to defend the Government at length in
parliament, Evatt, then leader of the Opposition,
saw in the joint statement a form of pressure on the
Netherlands to hand West New Guinea to Indonesia. He
opposed this on the grounds that the inhabitants
of West New Guinea should have preserved for them their
right to a free exercise of self-determination, but also
on traditional defence grounds:
126 Current Notes, Vol.30, p.82 (Feb., 1959)»
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We, on this side, will do our best to be on 
friendly terms with Indonesia...but we have 
a duty also to see, primarily, that the 
interests of the native peoples are protected... 
We have also to watch Australia’s defence.
I do not care a fig for those people who say 
that the question of Australian defence is not 
inseparably bound up with New Guinea, whatever 
particular changes in weapons take place.
That fact ^„.obvious... We must watch our 
defence... ^ ‘
Even more perhaps than the Government, the Labor
Opposition seemed unwilling to see Australia share a 
land frontier with Indonesia. United States interest 
in a settlement, sympathy in the United Nations for 
Indonesia, Indonesian persistence and threats of direct 
action, and Netherlands unwillingness to prolong the 
conflict further left Australia with little choice 
but to accept the transfer of the administration of 
West New Guinea to Indonesia. But it is unlikely that 
the Australian acceptance was as happy as the 
Government’s public statements in 1962 suggested.
127 C PD, Vol. H. of R. 22, p.200 (Feb.24, 1959).
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MOROCCO
The Moroccan question was first brought to the 
attention of the United Nations in 1951» when Egypt, 
supported by other Arab states, sought to have it 
considered by the Assembly. Their argument was that 
the 1912 Treaty of Fez between France and Morocco 
had subjected Morocco to protectorate status in a 
way contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations charter, and that conflict in Morocco 
threatened international peace. Australia joined France 
and her supporters, opposing inclusion of the Moroccan
question on the Assembly's agenda and voting with a
1majority to that end.
In 1952, the Arab states, supported now by 
Asian members, succeeded in having the Moroccan 
question placed on the Assembly's agenda. In subse­
quent First Committee discussions, the French view 
was that the Treaty of Fez had been concluded between 
two sovereign states, providing for French handling of 
Morocco's foreign relations and French co-operation
1 The Assembly approved rejection of inclusion of 
the question by its General Committee by a vote of
28-23-7 (GAOR, 6th S., 35^+th Pl.Mtg. , Dec.13, 1951, p.269).
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and initiatives in internal reforms. The Arab case 
essentially was that Morocco had been forced into 
dependent status as a result of French political and 
military offensives and by permission of other 
European Powers dividing Africa into tributary or 
colonial areas. Australia supported the French claim
2that the United Nations had no competence in the matter.
The First Committee adopted a joint Latin American draft
resolution whereby the Assembly called for a negotiated
settlement and referred to self-government. In the
Assembly, Australia voted for an amendment so that the
reference to self-government was deleted and mention
was made merely of ’developing free political
institutions’, but then abstained in voting on the
3draft as amended.
In 1953» the Security Council refused an Arab 
request to consider the question as a matter of urgency, 
and the question was again considered by the Assembly.
2 GAOR, 7th S., 1st Ctee., 549th Mtg., Dec.15, 1952, p.294.
3 Resolution 612(VII) was adopted by an Assembly vote of 
45-3-11 (ibid., 407th PI.Mtg., Dec.19, p, 426 ). In 
effect, Australia voted to soften the impact of an 
anyway unacceptable resolution.
Australia claimed that the issue fell within the
domestic jurisdiction of France and voted in the First
Committee against a Bolivian draft resolution amended
by India, Burma and Indonesia so as to affirm the
4right of Moroccans to sell-determination. This draft
was adopted by the Committee but failed to achieve a
5two-thirds majority in the Assembly. The question 
was discussed again in 195^, although only briefly in 
view of an announcement that talks were to be held 
between France and Morocco. Australia abstained in 
voting on a resolution which did little more than 
postpone consideration of the item.1' This was not, 
said Forsyth in the Assembly, because of any lack of 
confidence in France but as an indication of Australia’s
4 GAOR, 8th S. , 1st Ctee., 64oth Mtg., Oct.19»
1953, p.78.
3 A preambular paragraph recognising Moroccans’ right 
to self-determination was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 37- 13-9, Australia voting ’against'. However, the 
draft’s only operative paragraph, a call for a reduction 
in tension and free political institutions, was defeated 
32-22-5 (Australia 'against') and the draft as such was 
considered defeated (ibid. , 455th PI.Mtg., Nov.3» p.266).
6 Resolution 812(IX) was adopted by an Assembly vote
Of 55-0-4 (GAOR, 9th S., 51^th PI.Mtg., Dec.17, 195^,
P • 537) •
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view that the United Nations did not have competence
7even to discuss the matter. In 1955, Australia
abstained even on a resolution co-sponsored by thirty-
one members welcoming; a French-Mo roc can statement that
talks hid been arranged to negotiate the full independence
of Morocco.0 Spender ’applauded the motives of the
sponsors...Nevertheless, because the General Assembly
was not competent to deal with the matter, he had been
uunable to give the draft resolution his support'. In 
1956, Morocco achieved independence and was admitted 
to the United Nations.
TUNISIA
The Tunisian question was comprised of elements 
basically similar to those involved in the Moroccan 
issue, and it ran a similar course at the United Nations. 
The Australian contribution, too, basically was the same: 
a legalistic defence of the French interest.
Pakistan, then a member of the Security Council, 
took the initiative in 1952 in bringing before the Council
7 Ibid., pp.537-8.
8 Current Notes, Vol. 26, p.829 (December, 1955)« 
Resolution 911(x) was adopted by an Assembly vote of 
51-0-5 (GA OR, 10th S., 550th Pl.Mtg., Dec.3, 1955, P-389).
797th Mtg. , Nov.28, p.211.9 Ibid. , 1st Ctee. ,
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a complaint from the Tunisian Prime Minister to the
effect that the French-Tunisian Treaty of Bardo of
1881, which had left domestic sovereignty with the Bey,
had been subverted by a process of French colonisation
10and direct administration of the territory, Conflict
between Tunisians seeking autonomy and French officials
seeking continuing French participation in Tunisian
political affairs could, it was argued, prejudice
friendly relations between nations based on respect
for equal rights and self-determination as described
in Article 1(2) of the United Nations charter. With
Britain siding with France and the United States
abstaining, the Council decided against discussing 
1 1the question. A number of Arab and Asian states then
tried to have a special Assembly session convened,
1 2but they received inadequate support. The question
finally was placed on the agenda of the ordinary 1952 
Assembly session and referred to the First Committee, 
where France refused to participate in discussions.
10 France, it might be noted, reported on Tunisia 
as a non-self-governing territory under Article 73© 
of the charter.
11 SC OR, 7th Yr. , 576th Mtg. , April 14, 1952, p.27.
12 Twenty-three states approved a special session, 
but twenty-seven (including Australia) opposed it.
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Proposals by Pakistan that France reconsider her non­
participation and that the Bey of Tunis be invited to
appoint a representative to take part in debates
1 3were defeated, Australia voting against both.
Discussion centred on two draft resolutions:
(1) a thirteen-Power Arab-Asian draft which referred 
to self-determination and the rights of small Powers, 
described the Tunisian situation as a threat to peace, 
noted that force should not be employed, urged France 
to grant civil liberties in Tunisia, and had the Assembly 
establish a good offices committee to assist in French- 
Tunisian negotiations; and (2) an eleven-Power Latin 
American draft along similar lines but in much more 
conciliatory language and without provision for United 
Nations activity. Australia voted against the first, 
which was defeated, and against two unsuccessful Indian 
amendments to the second (the first would have withdrawn 
an expression of confidence in France, the other would 
have asked the Assembly president to assist the parties
13 In a slightly complex procedure, the first proposal 
was defeated in a vote of 2-21-34 and the second in a 
vote of 24-26-7 (GAOR, 7th S . , 1st Ctee., 542nd Mtg.,
Dec.10, 1952, pp.236-7).
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at his discretion), abstaining on the second as a whole.
The Australian position put by Spender was that:
...his delegation’s regard for the principle 
of self-government and the tradition of 
liberty should not divert its attention from 
the preliminary problem of the competence 
of the Assembly to deal with the Tunisian 
question...The argument which based a claim 
on competence on a theoretical threat to 
international peace was...irrelevant, because 
no one really believed that there was any 
threat to peace, and even if there were one 
the General Assembly could not intervene, 
because paragraph 7 of Article 2 gave 
competence...to the Security Council.
• • •
...it should be pointed out that the domestic 
jurisdiction of a State was not restricted to 
matters in the metropolitan area...the „ 
sovereignty of Tunisia was not complete.
He concluded by stating that France’s only obligation
in United Nations terms was that of submitting reports
1 6under Chapter XI of the charter.
14 The vote on the thirteen-Power draft was 24-27-7»
the votes on the Indian amendments were 21-31-6 and 20-31-7; the vote on the eleven-power draft was 43-3-10 (ibid,.,
546th Mtg., Dec.12, pp.270-1). This last, which became 
Resolution 6ll(VIl), was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 44-3-8 (ibid., 4o4th PI.Mtg., Dec.17, p.382).
Australia again abstained (see Parliament of the Common­
wealth of Australia, Summary Report of the Australian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly,
Seventh Session, New York, Qctober-December, 1932,
Canberra, 1953, p .18 - in CPP~ 1951-2-3 , Vol.Il) .
15 GAOR, 7th S., 1st Ctee., 5^5th Mtg., Dec.1 1 , 1952, 
p.259.
16 With what might have seemed in the circumstances to 
be mock piety, he observed that Australia had tried at 
San Francisco to have provision made for United Nations 
supervision of non-self-governing territories, of which 
Tunisia was one, but had failed.
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A similar discussion occurred again in the
following year, 1953» when the First Committee adopted
another, more forceful draft resolution which included
a reference to full sovereignty and independence for
Tunisians, Despite the adoption of amendments softening
its tone, it failed to achieve a two-thirds majority
in the Assembly, Australia voting against i t . ^  In
1954, when France announced plans to confer with Tunisian
as well as with Moroccan representatives, a resolution
1 8postponing consideration was adopted by the Assembly.
As in voting on the similar Resolution 812(IX) in
respect of Morocco, Australia abstained ’because a
vote in favour might have conceded the competence
of the United Nations to discuss these questions
which Australia regards as being of French domestic 
19concern’. In 1936» Tunisia became independent 
and a member of the United Nations.
17 The Assembly vote was 31-18-10 (GA O R , 8th S.,
457th PI.Mtg., Nov.11, 1953, p.293).
18 Resolution 8l3(lX) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 56-0-3 (GAOR, 9th S., 514th PI.Mtg., Dec.17, 1954,
p.538).
19 Current Notes, Vol.25, p .826 (December, 1954).
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ALGERIA
The Algerian question, arising from conflict 
in an area proximate to Morocco and Tunisia and 
involving the same European Power, differed from the 
Moroccan and Tunisian questions in that much more 
blood flowed in its working out and in that it had 
much greater repercussions in French politics.
Moreover, whereas France recognised the separate 
identity of Morocco and Tunisia as non-self-governing 
territories, she claimed that Algeria was, by conquest, 
an integral part of the metropolitan state. Even more 
than on the Moroccan and Tunisian questions, then,
United Nations intervention in the Algerian question, 
whether by discussion or demand, would, in the French 
view, encroach on her domestic jurisdiction. Australia 
publicly shared her view.
The Algerian question was first raised in 1955» 
when Arab and Asian members sought its inclusion on 
the agenda for that year’s Assembly session. The 
General Committee ruled against its inclusion, but 
the Assembly reversed that ruling (Australia voting 
vainly for the General Committee’s decision to be upheld)
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20and referred the question to the First Committee.
There, however, India noted France's refusal to participate 
in discussions and successfully urged that consideration 
of the question be set aside for that session.
In 1956, when Arab and Asian members again 
had the question placed on the Assembly's agenda,
France agreed to participate in First Committee 
proceedings. Australian delegates did not address 
the Committee but voted mainly in the French interest 
on three draft resolutions. The first, sponsored by 
Arab and Asian members, referred to a disturbance to 
international harmony, asked France to cater for the 
Algerian desire for self-determination, invited 
French and Algerians to negotiate a ceasefire and a 
peaceful settlement and asked the Secretary-General 
to assist in such negotiations. Australia voted 
vainly with a minority against a preambular paragraph 
referring to the right of Algerians to sell—determination, 
but with a small majority against the operative
21paragraph asking for French respect for that right.
20 GAOR, 10th S., 530th Pl.Mtg., Sept.30, 1955. p. 196.
21 The vote on the preambular paragraph was 36-27-14 
and on the operative paragraph 33-3^-9 (GAOR, 11th S.,
1st Ctee., 846th Mtg., Feb.13, 1937, p.208)7
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The call for negotiations was also defeated and the
draft was dropped. The second draft, sponsored by
’western* Asian states, hoped that Algerians would
negotiate rather than fight and that the French and
Algerians would find a solution. This was adopted by
22the Committee, although Australia voted against it.
The third, sponsored by Italy and Latin American states,
merely hoped that a peaceful and democratic solution
would be found. This time Australia voted with a
23majority for the draft. In the Assembly, the sponsors
of the two drafts adopted by the Committee presented
a joint draft resolution close to the wording of the
Italian-Latin American draft, that is, it said nothing
about principles involved and addressed none of the
parties involved. This was adopted by the Assembly,
24Australia supporting it.
In 1957» when the question again reached the 
First Committee, France’s opponents were markedly more 
hostile. It was suggested in the Committee that French
22 The vote was 37-27-13 (Ibid., p.212).
23 The vote was 41-33-3 (Ibid., pp.210-11).
24 Ibid., 654th PI.Mtg., Feb.15, p.1105. Britain was 
the only state, apart from France which did not vote 
at all, not to vote for the draft of what became 
Resolution 1012(Xl) but she later ’rectified’ her vote 
to give unanimity.
Intransigence and denial of the competence of the
United Nations, together with an insistence on a rebel
ceasefire as a prerequisite for negotiations, justified
25a military solution. During this discussion, the 
Australian delegate, Walker, stated his government’s 
policy on the issue. He declared first that the whole 
matter fell within French domestic jurisdiction.
S ec ond:
Certain delegations used the United Nations 
as a propaganda forum, not merely for the 
purpose of gaining general sympathy for the 
rebels - which certainly constituted inter­
vention in French domestic affairs - but 
also in order to encourage resort to violence
Third, Assembly discussion had ’crystallised1 the
position of the Algerian rebels who would find it
difficult during negotiations subsequently to abandon
a position which had received the support of a large
part of the Arab world. Finally, the question was very
complex and there was no point in the Assembly’s
issuing instructions: the relevant authority was France.
Australia’s proclaimed motives in supporting France,
then, were legal and political. In First Committee
25 See, e.g, the Syrian view: GAOR, 12th S., 1st Ctee., 
915th Mtg., Nov.30, 1957, p.265.
26 Ibid., 924th Mtg., Dec.5, p.328.
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voting on a seventeen-Power draft resolution,
Australia voted successfully for western amendments
deleting a reference in the draft to self-determination
and softening the tone of its call for negotiations,
and then for the draft which, thus emasculated, was
defeated in a deadlocked vote." The Committee’s
failure to provide an acceptable draft was made good
in plenary session by a fifteen-Power draft expressing
concern, welcoming recent Tunisian and Moroccan offers
of good offices and hoping for a negotiated solution.
28This was adopted unanimously.
In 1958» when France again refused to 
participate in discussion of tne question, tne First 
Committee adopted a draft resolution sponsored by 
seventeen Afro-Asian states and stronger than previous 
drafts in that it recognised Algeria’s right to 
independence and urged negotiations with a so-called 
provisional Algerian government, which was not recognised 
by France and other western Powers. Australia voted
27 The vote was 37-37-6 (ibid., 926th Mtg., Dec.6 , p.342).
28 This draft became Resolution 1184(XII) (ibid.,
726th PI.Mtg., Dec.10, p.568).
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with a minority against it in the Committee and in
the Assembly where, however, the minority was sufficient
29under the two-thirds rule to defeat it. France was
also absent in 1959 when the First Committee adopted
an Afro-Asian draft calling for negotiations and a cease- 
30fire. This draft was not put to the Assembly, 
preference being given to a more mildly worded Pakistan- 
sponsored draft which, nevertheless, failed to achieve 
a majority. Australia voted against both drafts as 
being superfluous.^
In 1960, when France refused to discuss the 
question even in plenary session, the First Committee 
adopted a draft which recognised the right of Algeria
29 In the Committee, the vote was 32-18-30 (GAOR.,
13th S., 1st Ctee., 102 3rd Mtg. , Dec.13, 1958, p.3 8 3)and in the Assembly 35-18-28 (ibid., 792nd PI.Mtg.,
Dec.13» P•827)•
30 The vote was 38-26-17, Australia voting ‘against’ 
(GAOR, 14th S., 1st Ctee., 1078th Mtg., Dec.7, 1959»
p.2 7 7).
31 The vote was 39-22-20 (ibid.. 8 5 6th PI.Mtg., Dec.12, 
P.747). Plimsoll said that ’in view of the fact that
we do not think there should be any resolution, we feel 
that the best course would be for the Australian 
delegation to abstain on votes on any parts of 
resolutions...’ (ibid., p.7^3). After abstaining in 
voting on parts of the draft, however, Australia voted 
against the whole.
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to self-determination and independence, recognised
a United Nations responsibility to contribute towards
a just implementation of this right, and called for
a referendum in Algeria supervised by the United Nations.
In a characteristically conciliatory speech, Plimsoll
opposed the draft, not on legal grounds of United
Nations incompetence to intervene, but entirely on
utilitarian political grounds. France would not
tolerate a referendum conducted by the United Nations,
so it was better not to try to effect it; de Gaulle,
anyway, should be given a further opportunity to find
32a solution^he said. Australia voted against the
draft in the Committee.^ In the Assembly, where the
reference to a referendum was deleted, Australia was
content to abstain even though the draft still affirmed
a United Nations responsibility in respect of the imple-
34mentation of the Algerian right to self-determination.
In 1961, the First Committee adopted a draft which
32 GAOR, 15th S., 1st Ctee., 1133rd Mtg., Dec.15, 
i960, pp.267-8»
33 The vote was 47-20-28 (ibid., p.276).
34 Resolution 1573(a V) was adopted by an Assembly vote 
of 63-8-27 (ibid., 956th PI.Mtg., Dec.19, i960,
pp,1429-30).
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called for renewed negotiations on the implementation 
of Algerian self-determination, and referred as well to 
independence and to the provisional Algerian government. 
Again, Australia*s objections were political: more 
than two parties were involved, the reference to the 
provisional government was objectionable to France,
33the draft resolution could achieve nothing. Still, 
the draft was adopted by the Committee and by the 
Assembly despite heavy voting abstentions, including 
Australia’s . ^  The following year, 1 9 6 2 , Algeria 
attained independence and United Nations membership.
OMAN
The question of Oman came before the Security 
Council in 1957 very largely as a political issue 
involving alleged aggression by a state (Britain) 
against what was alleged to be another state (Oman); 
by 1 9 6 3 » it was being discussed in the General Assembly’s 
Fourth Committee as a colonial problem. Whether the 
placing of the question in a colonial context can in
35 GAOR, 16th S., 1st Ctee. , 1227th Mtg., Dec.19,
1961 , p. 3 4 4 .
3 6 Resolution 1724(XVl) was adopted by an Assembly 
vote of 62—0—38 • (Ibid., 1085th PI.Mtg., bee•20, p.1l4l).
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fact be justified is difficult to decide. ^  It remains 
that such a placing was effected in the United Nations 
and this is considered sufficient, given also the 
involvement of a European Power in a non—European 
society, to make it relevant to this work.
The claim of eleven Arab states in asking 
the Security Council in 1957 to consider British 
aggression against Oman was that Oman comprised an 
independent sovereign state and was not, as Britain 
argued, part of the dominions of the Sultan of Muscat 
and Oman. In their view, Britain’s motivation for seeking
37 Formal relations between Britain and the Sultanate, 
dating from 1798» are governed largely by treaties of 
1891 and 1951» The 1891 agreement, like its 1951 
successor, is certainly on the surface ’a foreign treaty 
with a sovereign state’ (Report by a Chatham House Study 
Group, British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East, London, 1 9 5 8 , p . 3 1 ) • Butthey arescarcely equal 
treaties: by the 1891 agreement, e.g., the Sultan of 
Muscat and Oman agreed not to dispose of territory except 
to Britain, and the 1951 treaty allowed extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to Britain in the Sultanate. In the 1950s, 
there were British officials in the Sultanate's admini­
stration and British officers under contract in the Sultan* s 
armed forces (Sir Reader Bullard, ed., The Middle East, 
London, 1958, p.144), and although 'Muscat is not a 
British protectorate...British mediation or intervention 
in the affairs of the Sultanate has been accepted for 
more than a century...' (j.B. Kelly, 'The Legal and 
Historical Basis of the British in the Persian Gulf 
in St Antony's Papers, No. 4 (1958), p»139)*
3Ö0
to subdue a rebellion in Oman against the Sultan1s 
encroachments was greed lor oil lately discovered there. 
Britain argued that, on the contrary, she was helping 
a friendly state put down rebellion in a part of the 
state which sought secession only to avoid sharing oil 
revenues with the state at large. Australia, at the 
time a member of the Council, opposed placing the 
question on its agenda and voted with a majority (the 
United States abstaining) to that effect. The Australian 
position was that there had been no threat to inter­
national peace as claimed by the Arab states, that 
Oman was not an independent state, and that the
o OSultanate was independent of Britain.
In i960, Arab states asked the Assembly to 
consider British aggression, which, they said, 
threatened peace and security in the Middle East.
The question was placed on the agenda and referred to 
the Special Political Committee. In the Committee, 
fourteen states submitted a draft resolution which 
referred to the Declaration on Colonialism, recognised 
the right of Oman to self-determination and independence,
38 G-AOR , 13th S., Supplement No. 2, p . 60 .
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called lor a withdrawal of foreign forces and invited
the parties involved to seek a settlement. The draft
was not put to a vote, but i t  was re-submitted during
the next ( 1 9 6 1 ) Assembly session. Australia voted
against i t  in the Special Political Committee, which
adopted i t ,  and in the Assembly, where i t  was rejected
39under the two-thirds rule." In the Committee, 
Australia also voted vainly against a proposal that
4oOmani representatives be granted a hearing. Hood 
said that:
To grant the hearing would be to create a 
precedent whereby dissident elements in a 
certain part of a country which was under 
the recognized authority of that country1 s 
Government could claim the right to have 
individuals participate in United Nations 
debates on their behalf. 1
Again in 1 9 6 2 , the Oman question was placed
on the Assembly*s agenda and was again referred to the
Special Political Committee where a draft resolution
similar to that adopted by the Committee in 1961
was submitted. Again, Australia voted with a minority
39 The plenary vote was 33-21-37 (GAOR, 16 th S., 1 0 7 8 th 
Pl.Mtg., Dec.14, 1961, p . 1 0 2 9 ).
40 The vote was 40-26-23 (ib id . , Sp .Pol .Ctee. , 299th. 
Mtg., Nov.27, p.199).
41 Ibid. , p.197
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against it. Australia also voted in a small minority 
against granting a hearing to Prince Talib of Oman.
In the Assembly, where Britain announced that the Sultan 
of Muscat and Oman had agreed to invite a representative 
of the Secretary-Gnneral to visit his country, the 
three operative paragraphs of the draft were rejected,
44Australia voting against each of them.
It was apparent during Committee discussions in 
1982 that increasing emphasis was being placed on the 
colonial aspect of the Oman question. Britain was 
said to be colonialist either because she was responsible 
for armed aggression against a small, independent state 
or because, even if Oman was not independent, inter­
vention at the request of a submissive ruler was 
implicitly condemned by the I960 Declaration on 
Colonialism. This trend continued in 1963 when the Oman 
question was again placed on the Assembly’s agenda 
but was referred to the Fourth rather than to the First 
or Special Political Committees. In the Fourth Committee,
42 The vote was 41-18-36 (GAOR, 17th S., Sp.Fol.Ctee. , 
357th Mtg. , Nov.28, 1962, pp.164-5).
43 The vote was 51-9-26 (ibid., 351st Mtg., Nov.19» 
P.130).
44 The votes were 36-25-38, 40-26-31 and 44-23-30
(Ibid., 1191st PI.Mtg., Dec.11, pp.1100-1).
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emphasis almost exclusively was placed on the colonial
aspect. As the Syrian delegate said:
The colonial nature of the question had not 
been stressed at first because the over­
riding concern of tnose who had brought the 
question before the United Nations had been 
to put an early end to the British armed 
aggression wnich was endangering Oman* s 
independence and territorial integrity and 
threatening international peace and security. 
The United Kingdom aggression had since 
assumed the aspect of an armed presence 
and had become a constant factor in the life 
of Oman; the question should therefore be 
considered in the wider context of British 
colonialism. J
The United Arab Republic *s argument was slightly 
difierent: the British presence had always been
colonialist. Of the Arabian Peninsula, he said:
’Some parts were under direct United Kingdom admini­
stration. ••Other parts were controlled under the name 
of protectorates or through pseudo-legal agreements 
imposed by the United Kingdom during the nineteenth
46century*• The British response was again to 
claim that relations between Britain and the Sultanate 
were .those of two sovereign Powers. It was also stated 
that the Arab states had failed to convince the Assembly
43 GAOR, 18th S., 4th Ctee., 1499th Mtg., Dec.3, 1963, 
P.459.
46 Ibid., 1498th Mtg., Dec.3 , p.454.
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and were now seeking success by labelling the question 
47’colonial1. The notable feature of the Australian
response was that it was not unequivocally pro-British.
Where Britain found the situation clear, McCarthy, for
Australia, found it ’difficult to form a judgement...’.
He agreed that a colonial issue did not exist ’despite
some dubious aspects of the situation... over the
48last two centuries’ . But in voting in the Fourth
Committee on a Brazilian draft, which expressed concern
with the Oman situation and established a five-man
ad hoc committee to examine the problem,Australia
abstained, even though Britain still denied the right
of the United Nations to take any action with regard
49to a matter domestic to a sovereign state. In the
Assembly, Australia went further and voted for the
draft despite British persistence with a vote ’against*
and the decision of France, the United States, Portugal
50and Afghanistan to persist with abstentions.
47 Ibid., 1499th Mtg., Dec.3, p.463.
48 Ibid., 1502nd Mtg., Dec.5, p.489.
49 The vote was 95-1-7 (ibid., 1307th Mtg., Dec.9» 
P.531)•
50 Resolution 1948(XVIU) was adopted by an Assembly 




The Goan question had a peculiar aspect in
that it involved military conquest by an anti-colonial
state of the dependent Asian territories of a European 
51Power. It did not take the form basically of conflict
between dissident internal elements, supported by
external sympathisers, against the administering Power.
Integration was the aim, as in the West Irian and
52Mauritanian issues,' and not autonomy for the depen­
dencies. It was, certainly, a decolonisation issue 
in the sense in which the term is used in this work, 
though it is of peripheral importance to this work 
because, while it was taken to the United Nations, it was 
taken to the Security Council at a time when Australia 
was not a member and did not seek the status of an 
interested party and because it was dealt with by the
51 Portugal, of course, claimed that they were provinces 
of the metropolitan state; the United Nations on the 
other hand regarded them as non-self-governing territories 
within the scope of Chapter XI of the charter.
52 The Mauritanian question arose late in i960 when 
Morocco claimed that Mauritania, not a contiguous 
territory and about to achieve independence, ought to 
have been integrated with her and not given separate 
status. Indonesia, drawing a parallel with the West Irian 
case, and other Moslem states supported Morocco,
but many others, including African members of the French 
community, were hostile to what some saw as Arab 
expansionism and the Assembly took no action.
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United Nations rather after the event.
Briefly, Portugal reported to the Security 
Council in early and mid-December 1961, that Indian 
troops were massing on India’s frontiers with the 
contiguous Portuguese territories of Goa, Damao and Diu. 
India replied with a similar charge, but claiming 
that Portuguese armed forces were actually inside 
Indian territory. India invaded the territories on 
December 18. On that day, the Security Council met 
Portugal’s request for a meeting and considered two 
draft resolutions: the first, sponsored by Ceylon,
Liberia and the United Arab Republic, rejected 
Portugal’s complaint of aggression, described the 
Portuguese control of the territories as a threat 
to peace and called on Portugal to co-operate in the 
liquidation of its administration; the second, sponsored 
by France, Turkey, Britain and the United States, 
deplored India’s use of force and called for a ceasefire 
and the withdrawal of Indian forces. The first failed 
to achieve majority support; the second was subject to 
the Soviet Union's veto. The following day, Portuguese
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forces in the territories surrendered to Indian forces 53
The official Australian comment was critical,
but restrained, Menzies, Minister for External Affairs
as well as Prime Minister, said that:
••.he recognised that Indian public opinion 
felt strongly about the dispute, which was 
of long standing. However, it was the 
responsibility of rations to seek their 
objectives through legal processes or by 
peaceful negotiations in accordance with 
the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter 
all members had expressly undertaken to 
refrain from the threat or use of force in 
their international relations except in 
self-defence.•.J
In effect, Menzies denied the Indian claims that this
was a colonial question, that in view of the i960 Declara 
tion on Colonialism Portugal had no right to exercise 
authority on the sub-continent, and that she had 
reacted justifiably to provocation. On the other hand, 
India’s feelings in the matter were recognised and 
Portugal was not explicitly defended. Australia seems 
to have been the only western state subsequently to
55recognise Indian sovereignty over Goa.'
33 See GAOR, 17th S., Supplement No.1, pp.71-2.
54 Current Notes, Yol. 32, pp.15-16 (December, .
33 In April, 1964, Plimsoll, then High Commissioner to 
India, visited Goa which he described publicly as 
’this part of India’.
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The Australian response to the involvement 
of the United Nations in these questions was consistent 
with the pattern of her response to other aspects of 
the decolonisation process indicated in earlier 
chapters: in the 1950s, constant support on legal
and sometimes political grounds for the administering 
Power under attack; after i960, a readier accommodation 
of Assembly unconcern about legal technicalities and 
apparent acceptance of the dominance of political 
considerations. This, however, is not necessarily 
to say that the pattern here applied for the same 
reasons that it applied in the contexts of Chapter XI 
of the charter and the trusteeship system. In the 
latter categories, certainly, there was a marked change 
in Australian policy at the end of the 1950s due, 
doubtless, to estimates of the national interest 
(that is, no matter how convinced Australia might have 
been about the legal rectitude of her position, there 
could come a point when it was manifestly unwise to 
try to be one of only two or three Powers ’in step’). 
In the ’threats to peace’ category, there was a 
distinctive feature. For, while the Moroccan and
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Tunisian questions arose and were settled in what
might be called the heyday of Australian and western
conservatism on colonial issues, the West Irian,
Algerian and Oman questions ran through to the post-
1980 years when not only did Australian policy generally
tend to soften but the policies of the more immediately
involved administering Powers also softened. Had the
Netherlands and France remained intransigent, i t  is
possible that Australia would, at least for a longer
period, have continued to support them. The Netherlands
and France, after a l l ,  had not become quite as isolated
as Britain, Portugal and South Africa had become in
the Chapter XI context. Australia s t i l l  had (though
she tended to stop saying so with her former emphasis)
a close interest in West Irian, and France was a
colleague in military and socio-political regional 
57organisations.
56 I t  has been seen that Australia continued fully to 
support the British position on Oman until 1 9 6 3 .
57 Specifically, SEATO and the South Pacific Commission. 
One cannot be certain of the effects of such t ies ,  as 
United States conflict with NATO allies and British
and Australian conflict with Commonwealth partners have 
shown.
C H A P T E R  9
J U R I D I C A L
O B J E C T I O N S
The United Nations charter negotiated at 
San Francisco in 19^5 was a document of compromise.
In its colonial aspects, it represented a compromise 
between Powers seeking to conserve their jurisdiction 
over dependent tertitories and Powers seeking to open 
dependent territories to international activity designed 
ultimately to lessen or terminate their dependence.
In general, the compromise favoured the administering 
Powers. The posited ends of Chapters XI, XII and XIII 
of the charter were radical but their achievement largely 
was left to the administering Powers. Anti-colonial 
Powers defeated at San Francisco or joining the United 
Nations subsequently could then pursue their objectives 
within the restricting provisions of the charter, 
or they could seek to amend it. Charter amendment under 
Articles 108 and 109 was in practical terms impossible 
(amendment needed the approval of two-thirds of the 
United Nations and all permanent members of the Security 
Council, the latter including three administrators of 
dependencies). The result was a situation of conflict.
Given a situation in which her national interests 
and policies constantly were under attack by what came
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to be a majority of states, Australia had only perhaps 
three courses open to her: (1) to join the attackers
(as Denmark, for example, and, to a less extent, the 
United States did on occasion); (2) to engage in 
political battle with the attackers; or (3) to deny the 
legal right of the attackers to be pursuing an offensive 
at all.
For by far the most part of the period under 
review, Australia followed the second and third courses. 
The second course scarcely needs further illustration. 
Repeatedly, Australian delegations pleaded the special 
nature of problems faced in Papua and New Guinea 
and sought to dispute the case of anti-colonial Powers 
on grounds of fact. She asserted her own good 
intentions and doubted the motives and qualifications 
of her opponents. And, for the most part, she defended 
the colonial interests of her fellow administering 
Powers as well as her own. In 1951» for example, Casey 
defended colonialism, argued for the good intentions 
of the administering Powers and, typically, attacked
the Soviet Union:
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For generations past the advanced countries 
have been bringing their knowledge and 
technical skill to these poor areas...it is 
not sufficiently recognized that this process 
has been an integral aspect of what it has 
become customary to decry as ’colonialism'.
• • •
The western world...had been prepared, while 
relinquishing the political control of the 
nineteenth century, to provide in ever- 
increasing measure ... skill and material 
re sources...
• * •
What part...has been played by the Soviet Union?
So far from helping the peoples of the less- 
developed countries to find their feet, so 
far from assisting the new countries to 
establish themselves, Soviet policy has been 
one of disruption and the sowing of distrust.
In his opening plenary speech at the following year’s
Assembly session, Casey again defended the Australian
position and that of other administering Powers;
There has been an underlying innuendo that 
countries responsible for dependent peoples 
and Trust Territories are bent upon maintaining 
the status quo for some selfish ends of their oxm.
1 GAOR, 6th S., 338th PI.Mtg., Nov.9 , 1951, pp.45-6.
2 Casey here touched on an issue with very wide implica­
tions. The Indonesian distinction between old established 
forces interested in conservation of the status quo and 
new emerging forces with an interest in c h a n g e (see 
George Modelski, eel. , The New Emerging Forces, Canberra, 
1963» pp.ii-viii) was implicit in the views of older and 
other anti-colonial Powers and was reflected in their 
attitudes towards conventions dear (and useful) to the 
administering Powers. As Larson (Arthur Larson, When 
Nations Disagree, Louisiana, 1961, pp.22,166) has noted; 
'International law in the traditional sense is associated 
with a system which was largely the handiwork of the 
nations of Western Christendom...It is not surprising, 
then, that many nations do not think of international law 
as their law. Indeed many of them are apt to treat it as 
one more leftover of the days of imperialism’. For the 
new states, a slogan could be; 'The law stands for the 
status quo; we want change’.
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The fact is that the responsible Powers have 
been loyally carrying out their duties 
under the C h a r t e r . I n d e e d , better conditions 
exist in certain colonies or dependent 
territories than exist in the countries of 
some of the critics.J
He went on to warn of dangers consequent to a premature 
granting of self-government, and gave details of the 
financial cost to Australia of the administration of 
Papua and New Guinea. But he singled out for particular 
criticism the Assembly’s Fourth Committee which, he said, 
had 'sought to impose its will in contravention of 
the Charter’. There had not only been discussions, 
but also positive recommendations, on matters not 
contemplated by the charter.
This last complaint, a legal complaint, had 
been, and was to continue to be, constantly made by 
Australian delegates. Nor was it restricted to the 
1950s, a decade of solid hostility towards the 
administering Powers; it was made in the years of the 
Australian Labor Government in the 1940s, and it con­
tinued to be made occasionally in the 19^0s. Given 
her political and legal history, it is scarcely 
remarkable that Australia should have been prone to
3 GAOR, 7th S., 384th PI.Mtg., Oct.20, 1952, p.107
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placing a high value on constitutional considerations.
It is worth quoting at some length an admission of
this and an explanation for it made by Kelly in the
Fourth Committee in 1959s
...the six Australian states, after a struggle 
to attain autonomy, had surrendered part of 
that autonomy in order to form the Australian 
national federation, the Australian Commonwealth, 
which had a rigid written Constitution brought 
into being by popular plebiscite and which could 
be amended only by the same means: it could
not be altered by an act or resolution of the 
Australian Parliament. It followed that respect 
for a written constitution was ingrained in 
the Australian character and that, from the 
earliest days of the United Nations, the 
Australian delegation had had the greatest respect 
for all the provisions of the Charter. As in 
the case of his own country’s Constitution, a 
special procedure had been provided for amending 
the Charter and his delegation was unable to 
subscribe to the view that the Charter could 
be amended, by implication or otherwise, by a 
mere resolution of the General Assembly. T^ ie 
wording of draft resolutions required to be 
carefully weighed; if his Government raised any 
juridical objections to a given proposal, his 
delegation would be failing in its duty to the 
representatives of other Member States if it 
did not convey these views to them.
• • •
If certain phrases in a draft resolution 
carried legal connotations unacceptable to 
his Government, then t^ ie draft resolution would 
be unacceptable to it.
However, it may be doubted if Australia has been as 
idealistic or as consistent as Kelly suggested. One
4 GAOR, 14th S., 4th Ctee., 984th Mtg., Dec.3, 1959,p. 617.
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need not go so far, perhaps, as Gross:
...West European and Latin American countries... 
are prone to resort to legal arguments and 
to supplement them with good or had political 
arguments as they are available.^
But it would seem that Australia has tended to employ
legal argument when it served her purpose, has on
occasion opposed legal with political argument, and
has not hesitated to use political argument alone.
Something of the flexibility, not to say 
inconsistency, of Australian legalism may be seen in 
several issues which arose in the early years of the 
United Nations within the context of Chapter XI of the 
charter. In 1946, Bailey, the Australian delegate in
3 Franz B. Gross, ’Evolving Parliamentary Procedures 
in the UN' in Orbis, Vol.VI (1962), N o.1 (April), p.l45.
6 This behavior lias not been unique to Australia. As 
Eagleton (Clyde Eagleton, ’The United Nations: A Legal 
Order' in George Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics in the 
World Community, Berkeley, 1953, pp.134-6) has observed: 
’The desire to move ahead in spite of Charter restrictions 
has led to strong division of opinion...'. Again, ’This 
political element, rather than respect for the Charter, 
has governed the votes of delegates and the decisions oi 
organs. Such a pressure, if consistent, could lead 
properly enough into new constitutional interpretations 
and allow for desirable growth. The practice of the 
United Nations, however, has not been consistent... 
Delegates have, for one situation, upheld the restrictions 
of the Charter, and, for another situation, have denied 
or disregarded such restrictions'.
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the Fourth Committee, assured other administering Powers,
which for the most part preferred to keep to the letter
of Article 73^ whereby technical information on their
territories would be submitted to the Secretary-General
and processed by him for the information of members,
that there was 1 nothing insidious or unconstitutional*
about the Secretariat* s proposal for the creation of an
ad hoc committee of experts to examine information sub-
7mitted and to report on advisable future procedures.
This was in harmony with Australian attitudes prior 
to the signing of the charter, but there was no explicit 
provision for such a committee in Chapter XI. (When 
the Assembly subsequently adopted a Cuban proposal 
making the committee non—expert and representative 
of states, Australia closed ranks with the administering 
Powers, not on their legal grounds which were scarcely 
now available to her, but on the purely political grounds 
that the committee as constituted could be exploited 
as a medium for criticism of colonial administrations.)
At the same Assembly sessio» n , there arose the 
question of conferences of dependent peoples.
7 GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt., 4th Ctee., Part III, p.33*
8 This view is based on a ccrf'idential official 
document of the time seen by the author.
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Australia professed not to object to these conferences 
as such, but to their being held under United Nations 
auspices, to the Assembly recommending that they be 
held and to the involvement of United Nations bodies.
As in the case of the establishment of an information 
committee, the Australian delegation was faced here 
with proposals which had no basis in Chapter XI as it 
stood but were not actually proscribed by it. The 
Australian view here was that:
...care should be taken not to push too far 
with the argument that anything not prohibited 
by the Charter was permissible.^
On a third issue, that of the submission of political
information, Australia* s views were at odds with those
of anti-colonial Powers, which asserted that, read
as a whole, Article 73 clearly made it necessary for
political information to be submitted. Although
Article 73 did not say that political information
might not be submitted, and despite her stand at San
Francisco and despite the fact that she herself always
was voluntarily to submit such information in her
reports on Papua, Australia here took the view that,
9 GAOR, 1st S., 2nd P t ., 4th Ctee., Part III, p. 6 7 .
399
as Bailey put it in 1946: ’The obligation to transmit
the information mentioned in Article 73(e) was the sole
10specific obligation undertaken,..and was clearly limited,'
As Hood declared on the same issue in 19^ +8 s
,,,although nothing less than what is written 
in the Charter in regard to dependent peoples 
should be achieved, on the other hand nothing 
more should be required of those with whom the 
responsibility rests.,,* 11
This last attitude remained largely characteristic of 
the Australian response to anti-colonial pressure, 
as it was of the response of most of the administering 
P owers:
The anti-colonial States having taken the 
initiative within the United Nations, the 
colonial countries found themselves on the 
defensive, using for their defence primarily 
the text of Chapter XI itself and the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
in matters of domestic jurisdiction.
This attitude emerged early in the period because anti­
colonial pressure emerged early and with intensity.
As it was observed as early as 1949 in respect of non­
self-governing territories:
10 Ibid., p.13.
11 GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt.y 4th Ctee., 57th Mtg., 0ct.l4, 
1948, p.53.
12 J.A. de Yturriaga, ‘Non-Self-Goveming Territories:
The Law and Practice of the United Nations' in Year Book 
of World Affairs, Vol. 18 (1964), p.184.
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...on what might be regarded as the very narrow 
basis of the obligation under Article 73© for 
certain States to transmit technical information 
to the Secretary-General, there have emerged 
in a brief period of four years procedures, 
objectives, studies and proposals for action 
which have made Chapter XI one of the most 
vital sections of the Charter.^
And, just as a British delegate complained in that year
of ’the tendency to extend the scope of Chapter XI...
to read into the Charter obligations and functions
1 4which were not in it’, so Evatt in 1949 talked of
unconstitutional pressure to widen the scope of the
charter and to re-write the charter by Assembly
resolution, referring, too, to ’the tendency, running
through the dealings of the Fourth Committee since its
inception at the first meeting of the General Assembly,
to attempt to constrain colonial powers to take action
1 5expressly stated in the Charter to be voluntary’.
It was typical, then, that Australia saw moves 
in 1948 to have administering Powers consult the 
Trusteeship Council before implementing administrative 
unions in the first place as ’contrary to the terms of
13 Anon., ’International Responsibility for Colonial 
Peoples, the United Nations and Chapter XI of the Charter’ 
in International Conciliation, No.458 (February, 1950),
p.55.
14 GAOR, 4th S. , 262nd Pl.Mtg. , Dec. 1, 1949, p.455.
15 Evatt Report, 194?, as above, p.95*
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the trusteeship agreements’ . A draft resolution 
in 1951 whereby the Assembly would ask the Trusteeship 
Council to investigate the possibi li ty  of associating 
indigenes in i t s  work ’in effect sought to amend the
Charter, and the Australian delegation would therefore
1 7have to oppose i t ' , And during Trusteeship Council 
discussions, i t  was seen above, the Australian view 
was clear:
Since the Charter made no provision for direct 
collaboration between the indigenous population 
and the Council, i t  followed that neither the 
Charter nor the Trusteeship Agreements imposed 
any obligation on the Administering Authorities 
to secure the participation of the populations 
they administered in the Council’s work...the 
Council could not validly require or recommend 
something for which the Charter and the 
Agreements did not provide. l;
A 1954 resolution whereby the Assembly declared for
i t s e l f  an interest in exercises of self-determination
used by administering Powers as evidence to justify
cessation of the transmission of information under
Article 73© represented, in the Australian view, ’yet
another attempt to extend the provisions of the
1 6  Evatt Report, 19^8i as above, p.75»
17 GAOR, 6 th S., 4th Ctee. , 237th Mtg. , Jan .4, 1952,
p . 2 4 0 .
18 TCOR, 10th S., 390th Mtg., March 3, 1952, p.22.
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1 9of the Charter...’. A further attempt in the same
year to elicit political information was condemned
because ’the Australian delegation objected to the
assumption...that the General Assembly was entitled
20to alter or amend the obligations’ in Chapter XI."
Concern for guarantees for observance of the principle
of self-determination was out of order because * the
question of self-determination had no direct relevance
21to Chapter XI of the Charter. . . ’ . The view that the
attainment of independence was a means by which a
territory could achieve self-government was ’based
on an unjustified interpretation of Chapter XI of the 
22Charter’. The charter, argued successive Australian 
delegations, gave no competence to the Assembly in the 
matter of the cessation of the submission of information 
in the cases of Antilles and Surinam, Greenland, Puerto 
Rico, Alaska or Hawaii. Australia carried consistency 
to remarkable lengths in 194-9 when, in the information 
committee, the question of Netherlands submissions of 
information on the Netherlands East Indies was raised.
19 GAOR, 9th S. , 499th PI.Mtg. , Nov.22, 195**, p.301.
20 Ibid. , 4th Ctee. , 424th Mtg., Nov.8, p.l84.
21 GAOR, 8th S., 1953, Annexes, Ag.It.33, P-3.
22 GAOR, 7th S., 4th Ctee., 272nd Mtg., Nov. 13, 1952, 
P.153.
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Australia, despite her effective hostility towards 
Netherlands interests in the Security Council and her 
view there that the Indonesian Republic enjoyed separate 
international status, supported the Netherlands in this 
case by arguing that ’the Committee was not competent 
to consider what were the constitutional relations
2 3between a territory and the metropolitan Government1.
Nor, said Australia, did the charter allow the Assembly 
competence in the several North African questions. A 
Soviet proposal in 1956 to have the Assembly call on 
administering Powers to meet or set self-government target 
dates for trust territories was, said the Australian 
delegate, of ’questionable legality’. The proposal, 
said Hood, would ’constitute a clear directive to the 
Administering Authorities which had no justification
2 4in either the Charter or the Trusteeship Agreements’. 
Decisions by the Assembly on which of those territories, 
said by states concerned to be part of their metropolitan 
areas, were in fact non-self-governing territories 
within the scope of Chapter XI were ’in contradiction
23 GAOR, 4th S., 19^9» Supplement No. 14, p.3*
24 GAOR, 11th S., 4th Ctee., 637th Mtg., Feb.15, 1957, 
p.431.
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to Article 2, paragraph 7» and Article 73» sub-
25paragraph e of the Charter...1. As late as 1958,
the information committee, in the Australian view,
was surviving as a useful instrument ‘because of the
spirit of forbearance and comprehension shown by so
many delegations with respect to certain juridical 
, 26issues’ .
More than some other delegations, Australian 
representatives were strongly inclined towards consistency 
of a kind in that, if they objected to a paragraph of 
a draft resolution, even a non-operative paragraph, 
they would oppose not merely the objectionable paragraph 
but the whole draft. At times a negative vote on the 
objectionable paragraph would be followed by an 
abstention on the whole draft; only rarely would an 
Australian delegate oppose the one and accept the other.
In 195k, for example, when a draft resolution accepting 
the removal of Greenland from the ambit of Chapter XI 
was amended to include a reference to the Assembly's 
competence in such matters, Spender explained the 
Australian vote in this way:
25 GAOR, 12th S., 4th Ctee., 693rd Mtg., Nov.5, 1957,
p.225.
26 GAOR, 13th S., 4th Ctee.,
P .396.
819th Mtg., Nov.27, 1958,
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My negative vote on the sixth paragraph of the 
preamble and my abstention on the draft 
resolution as a whole should be taken to mean 
that my delegation cannot, under any circum­
stances, accept the thesis that competence in 
this matter rests with the General Assembly...
The Danish delegation, which opposed the particular
paragraph but accepted the draft as a whole, expressed
quite a different view:
The delegation of Denmark has...maintained that 
disagreement with a special point in the text 
of a resolution should not necessarily block 
acceptance of the resolution as a whole if the 
main object of the resolution is acceptable or, 
even more so, if it is desirable.
As it was noted above, Australia has not always 
relied solely on legal argument. On the South-West 
Africa issue usually there was a mixture of legal and 
political argument. In 1951» for example, Tange, the 
Australian delegate, opposed oral hearings for 
petitioners from the territory on the legal grounds 
that hearings would contravene the territory’s mandatory 
status affirmed by the International Court and on the 
political grounds that it would be unwise to irritate
27 GAOR, 9th S . , 499th Pl.Mtg., Nov.22, 1954, p.301.
It is not difficult, of course, to appreciate Australian 
fears for the creation of precedents likely gradually 
to erode her position. Indeed, from a conservative 
viewpoint, she may not have been careful enough (see 
Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and Portugal, London,
1964, pp.27-9).
28 GAOR, 9th S., 499th Pl.Mtg., Nov.22, 1954, P.307
South Africa while negotiations with the Union were still 
29proceeding, On the question of administrative unions,
it has been seen that Australia defended herself on
grounds both of legal justification and political
expediency. Australia opposed the move by India in
1948 to have administering Powers report on constitutional
developments making Article 73 no longer applicable
because there was no legal obligation derived from the
charter to provide this sort of information and because
there was the political danger that administering Powers
30might have to defend policies before the Assembly.
Hay, for Australia, objected to a draft resolution 
in 1950 calling for reporting on the observance of the 
Declaration of Human Rights in non-self-governing 
territories for the political reason that more would 
be thus asked for administering Powers than of non­
administering Powers, and for the legal reason that 
* obligations for the transmission of information on the 
observance of human rights...were not laid down in the
3 1Charter or in any other United Nations instrument,..1•
29 GAOR, 6th S., 4th Ctee., 204th Mtg., Nov.16, 1951, p•18
30 GAOR, 3rd S., 1st Pt., 4th Ctee., 60th Mtg., Oct.18, 
1948, p.85.
31 GAOR, 5th S., 4th Ctee.,
Nov. 24-25, 1950, pp.284, 292
186th Mtg., and 187th Mtg.,
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Un the question of West Irian, too, it has been seen
that Australian opposition to the anti-colonial Powers
ranged in content from United Nations competence to
the substance of Indonesian arguments and to politico-
strategic considerations. On yet other issues, where
legal argument would have been difficult or where it
would have involved something of an Australian volte-face,
Australia argued purely on political grounds: it was
better, said Australia in 19^-9» not to attempt to
achieve three-year or permanent terms for the information
committee because such terms might well be unacceptable
32to the Assembly. It was better, said Australia in
1953, not to adopt proposals on ’factors’ which, given
tne antipathy of the administering Powers, would be 
33inapplicable.
Because the anti-colonial Powers constantly 
wanted done what administering Powers complained was 
unconstitutional in terms of the charter or trusteeship 
agreements, the anti-colonial Powers were forced to 
engage in a degree of legalism. Thus, when anti—colonial 
Powers seeking the submission of political information
32 G A O R , 3rd S . , 4th Ctee. , 59th Mtg., Oct.16, 1948, p.77*
33 GAOR, 8th S., 4th Ctee., 327th Mtg., Oct.6, 1953»
p p .71-2.
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on affairs in non-self-governing: territories were opposed 
by administering Powers wishing either not to provide 
it or not to be told or asked to provide it, it became 
necessary for the anti-colonial Powers to argue that 
there was nothing in Chapter XI actually prohibiting 
such provisions, that it was desirable that there should 
be such submissions, that the international community 
had legally justifiable obligations which could not 
be fulfilled without such submissions, that a reading 
of the whole of Article 73 rather than merely sub- 
paragraph (e) in isolation made it clear that political 
information should be submitted - all this accompanied 
by political and emotional argument.
Australia was not always consistent in her 
response to legalism in the opposing camp. She disapproved, 
it has been seen, of anti-colonial Powers’ attempts to 
bolster their case against South Africa with International 
Court of Justice opinions. In a switch to political 
argument, Australia claimed that ’the multiplication of 
advisory opinions’ would not help the inhabitants of
34South-West Africa. She disapproved of the Assembly’s
encouragement of members to take unilateral legal action
34 GAOR, 10th S., 4th Ctee., 499th Mtg., Nov.7, 1955,
P.178.
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against South Africa. Again, Indonesia’s refusal to
take the West Irian dispute to the International
Court was, in Walker’s words, evidence that Indonesia’s
3 5claim ’was not legal, but political’. Yet Australia
had, in the strongest vituperative terms, scorned
reference to the Court of the Security Council’s
competence to intervene in the Indonesian independence
conflict: there was no time for legal action in an
urgent political situation." Most ironical of all,
Forsyth once in the Fourth Committee ’appealed to the
members...to turn their backs on legal hairsplitting
and academic problems’. The subject being discussed
was administrative unions and it is worth quoting at
some length the view put by Forsyth of a fairly innocuous
draft resolution on the matter, not in any sense as
light relief but as illustrative of the customary
Australian approach, especially during the 1950s;
...the Australian delegation...had voted in 
favour of paragraph 2 of the operative part 
of the draft resolution which merely drew 
attention to the observations and conclusions 
of the special report, on the understanding 
that the reasons the Australian delegation had 
advanced in the Trusteeship Council had not 
been withdrawn. He had voted in favour of 
paragraph 4 of the operative part without the 
phrase ’or extending the scope of’ because it
35 GAOR, 12th S . , 1st Ctee., 907th Mtg., Nov.21, 1957,
p .210 .
36 SC OR, 3rd Yr., 390th Mtg. , Dec.23, 19^8, PP •6 » 1/*0 *
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did not prejudice establishing administrative 
unions. He had abstained, however, from voting 
on the phrase ’or extending the scope of’ on 
the grounds explained by the representatives of 
Belgium and the United Kingdom, and also because 
it might in some cases be impracticable to 
ascertain the wishes of an entire population 
of Trust Territories. He had abstained on 
paragraph 4 as a whole and had not voted against 
it because the principle of consulting the 
freely expressed wishes cf the inhabitants was 
embodied in the Charter, He had voted in favour 
of the first part of paragraph 5 of the operative 
part because it did not prejudice the principle 
that prior consultation was not required under 
the Trusteeship Agreements. He had abstained on 
the second part because it implied consultation 
in advance and the Australian Government could 
not commit itself to that principle, although 
in practice it had informed the Trusteeship 
Council of its plans for Administrative Union 
of Papua and New Guinea. He had abstained in 
voting on paragraph 5 as a whole on the same 
grounds. Nevertheless, he was in general 
agreement with the draft resolution as a whole...
In 1959-63, it has been seen, Australian attitudes 
softened and, to a degree, the new attitudes were 
inconsistent with the old. It was inconsistent now 
to be agreeing that South Africa should have submitted 
a trusteeship agreement for South-West Africa, or 
that Portugal should report on her overseas territories, 
or that the information committee, even in peraanencee, 
was a praiseworthy institution, or that the Committee 
of Seventeen was actively to be supported. But this
37 GAOR, 7th S., 4th Ctee.,
P.329.
295th Mtg., Dec.6, 1952,
is not necessarily to say that there was explicit legal 
inconsistency. In a changing situation, Australia 
changed her policies and, perhaps more important, the 
terms in which she expressed them so that there tended 
to be a change of emphasis: legalism gave way to 
political considerations. In 1961, for example, Australia 
approved a draft resolution condemning Portugal even 
though virtually all its five preambular and eight 
operative paragraphs bristled with statements and 
assumptions to which Australian delegations of the 1950s 
would have registered strong legal and extra-legal 
objections. Old Assembly demands of Portugal were 
repeated (this no longer for Australia detracted from 
the dignity of the Assembly); Portugal’s failure to 
co-operate with the Assembly was regretted (there was 
no obligation to co-operate, Australia would formerly 
have said); the situation in Portuguese territories 
was described (this was no longer an infraction of 
domestic jurisdiction); Portugal was condemned 
(Australia did still raise a mild query about this); 
Assembly responsibility and competence were declared 
(Australia would once have questioned their existence); 
the Assembly proceeded to deal directly with the 
territories rather than through the Administering Power
(again, there was no protest against encroachment on
domestic jurisdiction); oral petitions were allowed for
(Australia here merely warned against setting a general
precedent - in this case, they were permissible);
members were called on to apply pressure on Portugal
(Australia was content to express a hope that sanctions
were not envisaged because sanctions would not help
the territories* inhabitants). Indeed, the Australian
delegate, McIntyre,stated quite explicitly that:
He did not propose to enter into any legal 
argument on the competence of the General 
Assembly, under the terms of the Charter, to 
go as far as the draft resolution suggested 
that i t  could go in prescribing obligations 
to Administering Members.-'
For the rest, he criticised Portugal for not placing 
a liberal construction on obligations imposed on 
administering members by the charter, a criticism quite 
contrary to the earlier Australian view that a member 
should not be asked to do more than the strict  
wording of Chapter XI demanded and a criticism implying 
a complete disregard for earlier views on the Assembly* s 
incompetence to deny a member’s interpretation of i t s  
own constitutional structure.
38 GAOR, 1 6 th S., 4th Ctee.,
1961,  p . 3 0 6 .
1205th Mtg., Nov.10,
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Australia in the 1960s, then, tended to drop
legal argument rather than considerably to change it.
The question which immediately arises is whether Australia
should ever have stressed legal argument. There is an
argument, of the sort expressed by Morgenthau, against
undue constitutionalism:
It is the tendency to look at the legal 
provisions of the Charter and the institutions 
derived from them as though they were self- 
supporting entities which receive their 
political meaning and their ability to perform 
political functions from their own literal 
content without reference to the political 
environment...
There are other objections. Was there any point in 
appealing to international law when ‘under the surface 
of the universality of international law lies a great 
deal of indifference, heterodoxy, and pent up resentment 
or sense of revolt on the part of newer and smaller
4oStates’. Another writer has suggested that:
...the effort to fall back on Article 2(7)» 
or on the limitations contained in Chapters 
XI, XII and XIII does not constitute a solution.
39 Hans J. Morgenthau, ’Political Limitations of the 
United Nations’ in Lipsky, op.cit. , p .143•
40 Bin Cheng, ’International Law in the United Nations’ 
in Year Book of World Affairs, Vol.8 (195^) j p.1?0.
Cheng went on to observe that ’all Members follow faith­
fully at all times the code of power politics in disguise, 
using international law the more often only as a tactical 
weapon, either in attack or in defence’ (ibid., p.195)»
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By relying on these legal niceties and 
preventing the United Nations from playing 
a more useful role in the settlement of 
tension-laden colonial disputes, they invited 
the people who are seeking freedom to resort 
to force...
• • t
Instead of being viewed as a ’distortion1, 
the pre-occupation with self-determination 
in the United Nations should be viewed as a 
warning of a maladjustment that requires 
attention... 1
There is, too, the view that:
The negative attitudes and defensive tactics 
of colonial-power interests provide oppor­
tunities to bring into alliance forces of 
nationalism and internationalism which are 
hostile to Western influence in all its 
aspects.4f'
However naive their language may sound, these writers 
have a valid point. Australia might well have been 
advised, as one of the writers went on to say, to have 
joined in ’positive action indicating an understanding 
of the feelings of the colonial peoples and the 
creation ol an atmosphere in which these peoples will 
share in the general progress of the world and feel
41 Benjamin Rivlin, ’Self-Determination and. Dependent 
Areas’ in International Conciliation, No.501 (January,
1955), p.270.
42 Benson, op.cit. , p.23d. One might also cite the
view of the Bconomist leader writer: ’There is ample
justification for opposing a blank negative to the 
claims of the United Nations. But is it wise? World 
opinion is strong and remarkably unanimous on the 
question of colonial status’ (quoted in Johnson, op . cit. , 
p p .222-3)•
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free of foreign oppression’ . ' On the other hand, while 
this  sort of view may have some appeal, i t  may not 
be relevant, Australia may have shown a strong 
tendency towards undue constitutionalism and she nmy, 
for reasons which the United States, for one, found
44cogent, ’ have tended in any case to support positions 
taken up by Britain and other administering Powers 
with xvhich she had links of sentiment or in terest .
But Australia herself administered te r r i to r ie s  in 
which were invested not only common emotional and 
financial factors but a defence factor. Australian 
governments may possibly have exaggerated this
43
43 Rivlin, loc . c i t .
44 For discussion of the dilemma posed for United
States policy makers seeking to offend neither alliance 
partners nor the anti-colonial group, see David W. 
Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire; The United Nations and 
the End of Colonialism, New York, 19b4, pp. 1 , 8^  1 37-41;
Philip ¥. Bell, ’Colonialism as a Problem in American 
Foreign Policy’ in World P o l i t i c s , Vol.V (1952-3) 1
No.1 (October, 195271 William Henderson, ’United States 
Policy and Colonialism’ in United States Academy of 
Po l i t ica l  Science Proceedings, Vol.XXVI (1954 - 9 ) >
No.3; William Fisher Armstrong, ’UN on T r ia l ’ in 
Foreign Affairs , Vol.39 ( 1 9 6 1 ), No.3 (April), p.397sq.
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45factor but, given their  view of i t ,  their  reaction 
to attempts to interfere with i t  almost can be
46
assumed. The ramifications of this aspect of 
Australian policy considerations are explored in 
the following chapter.
45 For a somewhat sceptical and, therefore, unorthodox 
view, see F.J. ¥ e s t , ’The New Guinea Question' in 
Foreign A ffairs , Vol.39 ( 1 9 6 1 ), No.3 (April), p.506.
46 This is  not, of course, to suggest that 
Australian governments did not as well feel themselves 
to have a moral responsibility to safeguard what
they saw as the best in terests  of the indigenes of 
Papua-New Guinea.
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+ ’She [ _ Australia/ tends to look at the problem of 
dependent territories in terms of her colony oi Papua 
and her Mandated Territory of New Guinea1 (K.H. Bailey, 
’Dependent Areas of the Pacific: An Australian View’ 
in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24 (19^6), No • 3 (April), p.495)•
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In 1936» Senator Sir George Pearce, then Minister 
for External Affairs, expressed what he said was the 
‘general attitude* of the Australian Government on 
’the whole matter’ of colonial territories. His arguments 
may have been intended to have had general validity, 
but his motives for stating them and the exception 
he allowed for Australia’s own interest in ’the whole 
matter’ were highly particular. Quite explicitly, 
he was concerned to prove unacceptable the particular 
contemporary claims of Germany, Italy and Japan to 
removal from the ranks of what he called the colonial 
have-nots. Rather than argue on ethical or historical 
grounds, he chose to meet the claimants on what he 
declared were their own grounds by trying to show that 
colonies did not provide a settlement outlet for surplus 
populations and that colonies were financial burdens 
rather than sources of prosperity. He had to concede 
that in some quarters the possession of colonies 
might have value as a token of status but, clearly, 
he did not regard this as sufficient justification for 
colonial ambition. Having shown that colonies were 
in general scarcely worth having, he was quick to 
impress on the Senate that New Guinea (he was reierring
419
to the mandated territory, not Papua) comprised a
significant exception: its proximity to Australia, its
harbours and aviation facilities, its strategic
value, its natural resources, its settlement and
trading potential were such that, while the status quo
might not be permanently tenable, ’it is unthinkable
that Australia should even consider the handing over
of any territory’. His conclusion was that;
Every country is entitled to examine any 
international issue in the light of its own 
security and national interests, and the 
inviolability and integrity of our Australian 
territories is as much one of the cardinal airns^ 
of our people as is the White Australia policy.
2Pearce, then, was less than logical, but his speech 
serves as a useful illustration of attitudes which 
were prevalent in Australia for fifty years before 
he spoke and only recently have begun to change. His 
assumption that Australia’s relations with New Guinea 
were peculiar enough to allow an exception to general 
rules about colonies reflected the view, strongly 
held over a long period, that Australia was dependent
1 CPD, Vol.149, p.123 (March 13, 1936).
2 For a kinder estimate, see Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision, 
Melbourne, 1965, p.128. In this biography of Pearce, 
Heydon, however, goes on to quote a Sydney Morning Herald 
reference to the claim that colonies were not useful
for the settlement of surplus populations: ’Most foreign
peoples will receive with derision such a commentary 
from an Australian’.
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on her dependencies. This dependency was not merely
a matter of economics or prestige or peripheral security
considerations; Australia equated continuing' effective
control of Papua and New Guinea with the maintenance
of her own metropolitan territorial security. Given
the fact of this equation, whatever its validity,
it is not surprising that for as long as it held, or
for as long as it was diplomatically feasible to act
on it, Australia was loath to approve United Nations
measures at all dangerous to the preservation of her
control of the territories:
It is taken for granted that, at least for 
defensive purposes, every State has uppermost^ 
in its mind its own existence and survival...
That Australia’s interest in Papua and New Guinea has
been primarily a defence interest, and that this defence
interest has been proclaimed as being of a vital kind,
is scarcely open to doubt. Some writers, Scott and
Garran, for example, have given too little weight to
4Australia’s secondary economic motives; both claimed
3 G. Schwarzenberger, ’International Law and Society’
in Year Book of World Affairs , Vol. 1 (.1947)» PP • 1 60 - 1 •
4 Ernest Scott, Australia During the War, Vol.XI of
The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1919, 
Sydney, 1937, p.773; Sir Robert Garran, Prosper the 
Commonwealth, Sydney, 195&, p.264.
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that Australia’s sole motive for seeking control in 
1919 of territories to the north was a security one, 
yet it is clear that Australian governments of the time
were closely interested in the economic consequences
5ol possession.' However, as McAuley has said, whatever 
the importance to Australia of her ’considerable 
shipping, aviation, trading, mining, plantation, and 
missionary interests in the region....defence interests 
are paramount’,^
5 In 1916, for example, the Government asked the 
Inter-State Commission for a report on trade potential 
in the South Pacific; the report, which assumed Anglo- 
Australian possession of what had been German New 
Guinea, was optimistic (Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Inter-State Commission of Australia,
British and Australian Trade in the South Pacific, Report, 
Melbourne, 191B , pp.116-8 - in CPP, 1917-18-19, Vol. V) .
In 1918, too, Pearce wrote to the then Prime Minister,
W.M. Hughes, arguing for the commercial and industrial, 
as well as strategic, value of islands to the north 
(Heydon, op.cit., p,23l). In 1919, Cook saw the islands 
as a ’source of great wealth to Australia’ and this 
as ’the best of reasons' for holding the power to ’exploit 
them (CPD, Vol.89, p.12409 - Sept.17, 1919). Hughes 
said of Labor Opposition advocacy for international 
control; ’It would be for us the end. Not only national, 
but economic safety forbids it...Under international 
control, how could we secure the trade of these islands 
which legitimately belong to us...’ (Ibid., p. 12608 - Sept 
19). And he saw control of phosphate-rich Nauru as 
offering a chance for Australia to recoup the cost of 
World War II (Ibid., p.12679 - Sept.24).
6 James McAuley, ’Defence and Development in Australian 
New Guinea’ in Pacific Affairs, Vol.XXIII (1950), No.4 
(Dec•) , p .371 *
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Colonial commitments present two military faces:
on the one hand, they may boost the capacity of the
metropolitan Power to defend its interests; on the other,
they can strain and spread thin that capacity, both
for defence of dependent territories and the home
7state. A minority in Australia has argued that, 
far from guaranteeing or aiding Australia* s defence 
capacity, island possessions to the north merely have 
presented Australia with more and difficult defence
g
responsibilities. But the majority view, or at least 
the official view, has been that island territories 
to the north must be kept in friendly, and preferably 
Australian hands. This was the view of the pre­
federation Australian agitators for British activity
7 For a discussion of the military aspects of colonialism, 
see Royal Institute of International Affairs Study Group, 
The Colonial Problem, Oxford, i937> p p .17-20, 28-39.
8 A leading inter-war spokesman for this school in 
Australia was Senator Lynch, a former minister, who urged 
that the mandate be handed over to the United States 
(see CPU, Vol.98, p. 13872 - Dec.7, 1921; Vol.100,
p .2215 - Sept. l4, 1922; Vol.130, p .3106 - June 26, 1931).
See also A Naval Expert, 'Mandated Territories - Some 
Defence Considerations' in F.W. Eggleston, ed.. , The 
Australian Mandate for New Guinea, Melbourne, 1928, p.90; 
and John Andrews, 'New Guinea and Australia's Defence 
and Foreign Policy’ in John ¥ilkes, ed., New Guinea and 
Australia, Sydney, -1958, p.177*
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ain what became Papua. This was the view of a Prime
Minister, W.M. Hug'hes, in 1919 when he said that ’any
strong power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia'
and that, if Australia did not control the territory,
10she could ’not...feel safe' . This was the view of
the then Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley, in 1946 when
he declared that Australiern defence (and the welfare
of the natives) demanded that Australia must have
’complete and exclusive power in controlling the
administration of New Guinea’ and. 'full powers of
1 13. egi slation, administration and jurisdiction'.
This was the view of the then Australian Ambassador
to the United States, Sir Percy Spender, in 1957 when
he said that 'Australia had a cardinal interest in the
whole area of New Guinea and in its future...New Guinea
1 2represented the very key to Australia's defence...'.
9 See, e.g., J.D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy, 
Sydney, 195^> P •30•
10 Quoted in David Lloyd George, The Truth About the 
Peace Treaties, Vol.1, London, 1938» pp.519-20.
11 CPD, Vol.188, p.3853 (Aug.7, 19^6). He added that 
nothing but absolute control could be accepted by any 
Australian government.
12 GAOR, 11th S., 1st Ctee. , 858th Mtg., Feb.25,
1957, p.285.
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And one may suppose this was the view behind Menzies'
statement in the same year that 1 the integrity of
1 3Dutch New Guinea is vital to Australia...*.
Her view of her relations with her dependencies, 
then, has placed Australia in almost a unique position 
among administering Powers, not so much in her pro­
clamation of a military interest in their retention 
as in the degree or nature of that interest. This, 
in turn, is related directly to another unique aspect 
of Australia's experience of colonialism: the geographical
1 4factor of virtual colonial contiguity. No other state 
(unless South Africa is regarded as an administering 
Power) has in the United Nations period administered
13 Sydney Morning Herald, April 25» 1957» Just as the 
defence value of Papua-New Guinea to Australia may be 
debatable, the whole notion of value or motivational 
categories may be questioned. One might, as Strachey 
says (John Strachey, The End of Empire, London, 1959» 
p.211), see all interests as ultimately economic, as all 
related to the alternatives of exploiting or being 
exploited. Equally, one might see all interests as 
ultimately political, to so with power and its extension 
or preservation. Here, conventional categorisation 
serves the purpose of clarifying the Australian position.
14 Some writers would see the expression 'cplonial 
contiguity' as a contradiction in terms (see, e.g., 
Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations,
New York, 1955, p.181). Most allow for such a concept 
(see e.g., G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, London,
1951, p.69).
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contiguous dependent territories of the sort relevant 
to this work. Properly speaking, Papua and New Guinea 
are non-contiguous with Australia, but they are 
separated by a barrier of water so narrow that it 
has been possible for a responsible Australian minister 
to say;
The Territory is no more remote from the 
national capital and the heart of Australian 
population than the outlying States of the 
Commonwealth. Hence, the administration of the 
Territory can be in the clearest and most direct 
sense an Australian administration, as 
distinguished from a colonial government. J
Consequently, Australia has tended to behave as
though the territories were contiguous with the
metropolitan state. As Andrews has suggested,
Australian policy makers might have been happier
had New Guinea not existed.  ^ But New Guinea does exist,
and, just as Australian Governments have seen the
1 7territories as dependent on Australia, so contiguity
15 Paul Hasluck, Australia1s Task in Papua and New 
Guinea , Melbourne, 1956» p . ’i .
16 Andrews, loc.cit.
17 Until 1945-6, this was rather played d o w  Subse­
quently, it has been accepted by Australian governments 
with good grace: see a statement 01 Hasluck, for example,
in Murray Groves, New Guinea: Australia’s Colonial
Frantasy, Melbourne, 1962, p.13»
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almost inevitably has led them to see Australia as
1 8dependent on the territories.
Except in the context of' the West Irian dispute
(and then repeatedly), Australia has not stressed
the defence consideration as a factor in her relations
1 Qwith her dependencies in the international forum.
It would have been diplomatically foolish to have done 
so as, perhaps, it was in the West Irian case. Thus 
one does not find Australian delegation members 
objecting to United Nations activities explicitly 
on the grounds that such activities would or might inter­
fere with the security of Australia's hold on her 
territories and that this was intolerable because 
Australia had invested defence value in the maintenance 
of her hold. On the one hand, Australia has, mainly
18 The view that 'no other trust territory is so 
intimately related from a security point of view to its 
administering government' (Harper and Sissons, op.cit. , 
p.215) applies as much to Papua and non-self-governing 
territories as to New Guinea proper and trust territories.
19 This consideration has, of course, been advanced 
from time to time. In 1946, for example, when the 
Soviet Union was objecting to the degree of control 
written into trusteeship agreements submitted by 
mandatory Powers, Bailey declared that 'strategically,
New Guinea was of vital importance to Australia'
(GAOR, 1st S . , 2nd P t . , 4th Ctee. , 18th Mtg., Nov.11 ,
1946, p.94).
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outside the international forum, consistently until
recent years stressed such an investment and, on the
other, inside the international forum, done almost
everything possible to preserve the security of her
control of her territories.
Australia inherited Papua from Britain and,
until 1945> was free to administer it as she chose
without fear of significant outside interest. She
inherited New Guinea and Nauru from Germany under
international auspices and subject to a limited degree
of international accountability. Having achieved
sufficient control of them to lull defence fears,
Australia paid a minimum of further attention to them
20in the inter-war period. Her administration was
relatively humane, but limited in scope; simple possession
21was the principal end.' Because she was internationally 
accountable, Australia did have to go some way towards
20 Hudson, loc.cit.
21 A former administrator of Papua-New Guinea, J.K. Murray, 
mourned that public concern for the territories was
’allayed too easily by the bare legal occupancy of the 
two Territories’. He continued: ’It is significant
that New Guinea has been in the forefront of public 
attention on only three occasions, all of them crises 
from the strategic point of view’ (j.K. Murray, The 
Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua- 
New Guinea, Brisbane, 1 9^9 • p • 1 2.) .
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justifying her somnolence, and this she did by 
stressing constantly the primitive condition of the 
indigenous inhabitants, the geographical and. linquistic 
difficulties faced by the administration and her own 
inability as an economically developing state to achieve 
immediate and massive progress in the territories/'"'
The Mandates Commission, the focus of international 
accountability in the League’s two decades, courteously 
and persistently sought to have Australia change 
administrative policy, but to little effect. League 
forms and Commission membership allowed Australia 
to ward off encroachments on jurisdiction and go her 
own way.
At San Francisco in 1945» Australia clearly wanted 
international accountability made universal for 
dependent territories, except for a few approaching
22 The Permanent Mandates Commission occasionally, and 
later the Trusteeship Council more frequently, showed 
impatience with Australia’s claims of special difficulties. 
As Healey has suggested (Allan Kealey, ’Under White Rule’ 
in New Guinea, 1962, p.10), this tactic has not sounded 
altogether convincing. The question is whether 
administrative difficulties adequately explain govern­
ment inactivity over many years or whether the explanation 
was indicated by McAuley when he wrote that ’the idea 
of perpetual subjection of the native people has existed 
in the past as an unexamined premise in the minds of 
many people who have dealt with New Guinea affairs*
(James McAuley, ’Australia’s Future in New Guinea’ 
in Pacific Affairs, Vol.XXVI (1953), No.1 (March), p.61).
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autonomy. But the form of accountability was couched 
essentially in League terms: accountability in the
form of reporting to a commission of experts. While 
Australian statemente before and during the conference 
frequently referred to political development, Australia, 
as Bailey wrote in 1946, was used to dealing with 
territories of a sort that 1 to state the objectives 
of trusteeship in terms of independence, or even of
self-government, would be to use language without any
23present reality...'. in seeking universal accounta­
bility, Australia pursued a radical course, but her
ends were moderate. Her hold on Papua and New Guinea
24was not intentionally placed in jeopardy.
When the United Nations charter was signed, 
Australia's control of her dependencies seemed safe. 
Papua fell within the ambit of Chapter XI but this 
involved only an Australian undertaking to be a 
progressive and humane administrator, to let the outside 
world know something of economic, educational and 
social progress in the territory and to point the 
territory in the direction of self-government. The
23 Bailey, op.cit., pp.495-6.
24 Sections of the Australian press, and especially 
the Sydney Morning Herald, professed to fear this
at the time
territory of New Guinea, if Australia chose, came 
within the scope of the trusteeship system of Chapters 
XII and XIII. This comprised a system of supervision 
somewhat more rigorous than the League's out not to 
the point, it seemed then, of posing a substantial 
threat to Australia’s interests. Very soon, however, 
it became apparent that Australian interests were 
threatened.
This threat was posed not, as it had been 
in the League's years, by imperial jealousy, but by 
the novel phenomenon of outright anti-colonialism. 
Members of the United Nations quickly showed a 
desire to exert pressure on administering Powers to 
terminate their administrations in favour of indigenous 
elements and, in the meantime, to allow the United 
Nations a decisive voice in administration. This 
pressure was effective because of two factors; 
numbers and organisational forms.
It is sometimes argued that the number of anti­
colonial Powers in the United Nations reflects the 
formerly colonial background of a large proportion 
of members, but this is scarcely to the point; the same
431
2 5could have been said of many League members. The 
essential fact is that, from the beginning, the United 
Nations' membership has included recently dependent 
states which were not League members (or only for 
short periods), and states which were members of 
the League but were then represented by governments 
with a different outlook. Because of ideological 
and political developments during World War II, there 
emerged in the United Nations identifiably anti­
colonial Powers and a large number of them. United 
Nations forms then became important because (a) the 
structure of the Trusteeship Council inevitably allowed 
strong anti-colonial membership unheard of in the 
Mandates Commission's day, and (b) the Assembly 
could depart from the ’rubber-stamping' role played 
formerly by the League Council and address itself 
directly to administering Powers and direct the 
activities of the Trusteeship Council. Add to this
25 Thus, Sayre's citation of a London Times analysis 
of the colonial backgrounds of the charter signatories 
is not in itself very relevant or informative (Francis 
B. Sayre, 'The Advancement of Dependent Peoples' in 
International Conciliation, No.435 (194?)» p.^99)* What 
is important is that states like India and Iraq, members 
of the League, behaved differently in the United Nations.
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the effect of the Cold ¥ ar, which cost the anti-colonial 
cause full United States support but guaranteed 
it Soviet bloc backing, and the administering Powers 
found themselves facing unexpected and difficult problems.
To a degree, the Australian response to anti­
colonial pressure was predictable in the circumstances, 
especially when her own territories were involved.
This response could take an ad hominem form as in 
1955 when, after some sarcasm from an Indian represent­
ative on Australia's performance in New Guinea, Forsyth 
told the Council that:
The Indian representative...had never visited 
the Territory, was comparatively new to the 
Trusteeship Council, was apparently imperfectly 
acquainted with the voluminous material 
supplied to the Council...by the Australian 
Government and seemed to have listened to and 
questioned the special representative only 
in order to obtain evide^ge in support of 
preconceived criticisms.
There was what might be called an ad nationem response.
This comprised mainly attacks on the Soviet Union
and communism (which offered only the 'kiss of death’
2 7to nationalism, as Casey once put it) and on smaller 
critics ('we are sometimes criticized by certain 
countries for not providing social services in our...
26 TCOR, 16th S . , 624th Mtg., June 27, 1955, p.100.
27 GAOR, 7th S., 384th PI.Mtg., Oct.20, 1952, p.107.
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Territories on a scale far beyond that which exists
in the countries of some of our critics’).^ As
Spender once said in justification: ’No one can be
expected to lie down and be sniped at forever without
some human impulse to retaliate in kind’ .^' There
could also be a kind of aggressive give-and-take
in this context. So that, if the Trusteeship Council,
for example, condemned the use of pidgin in New Guinea
as representing outworn concepts of indigenous-outsider 
30relationships,' the responsible Australian minister,
Hasluck, could answer back that to suggest the abolition
of pidgin ’was as ridiculous as to suggest that all
Europeans should begin speaking nothing but Russian 
31next week’.
More to the point, however, it was evident 
that the Australian reaction to anti-colonial pressure, 
even when Papua, New Guinea or Nauru were not involved 
to any greater degree than any other dependent territory, 
was associated with anxiety for her position in her 
own territories. Xn 1952, for instance, Casey complained
28 Ibid., p. 108.
29 New York Herald Tribune, Nov,15» 1952.
30 GAOR, 8th S . , Supplement No.4, 1953» p.109*
31 London Times, July 22, 1953
in parliament that there was a 1 tendency... to attempt 
to use the United Nations Organization as a means of 
bringing pressure on other nations in respect of
32matters that are in fact of domestic concern., . * .
Later in the year, he said that the whole question of 
colonial issues needed serious consideration, adding 
that:
We will not tolerate attempts to take our 
responsibility for New Guinea out of our hands... 
It should be the function of the United Nations 
to foster friendly discussion - not to use 
pressure tactics upon administering governments 
which, merely tend to cause unrest in the 
Territories concerned.^3
In 1950, Hood refused to approve a proposal
that the United Nations flag be flown beside administering
Powers* flags in trust territories, not because he
could not envisage appropriate occasions for such
dual flag-flying, but because there should not be
any confusion about the ultimate authority in trust
territories and the administering authorities should
34be free to avoid actions likely to cause such confusion.
In 1952, on the question of indigenous participation 
at the United Nations, the Australian delegate declared
32 CPD, Vol.217, p .1369 (June 4, 1952).
33 Current Notes, Vol.23, p.74l (December, 1952).
34 TCOR, 6th S . , 76th Mtg., March 30, 1950, p.609*
k'j5
the necessity of having»
...nothing done which might, even hypothetically, 
deprive the Powers to which the General Assembly 
has entrusted the administration of the 
Territories of some of their authority or lessen 
the confidence placed in them by the indigenous 
inhabitant s.55
In 1955» Forsyth stressed that ’the deliberative
body which could instruct the Territorial Government
and determine policy in the Territory of New Guinea was...
Q  /
the Parliament of Australia...’. ' Objecting in 1956
to a Soviet proposal for the setting of self-government 
target dates, Walker repeated the view that 'the 
Trusteeship Agreements designate us as the sole authority 
which shall exercise the administration of the 
Territories...'.^ In 1958» Kelly used almost the 
same wording;
...the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory 
of New Guinea clearly designated the Government 
of Australia as the sole authority which 
should exercise the administrationof the 
Territory.
In the 1940s and 1950s, Australia did not deny 
that Papua was proceeding towards self-government or
35 GAOR, 6th S. , 4th Ctee., 237th Mtg., Jan.4, 1952, 
p . 2 40 .
36 TOOK, 16th S., 642nd Mtg., July 19, 1955, p.231.
37 GAOR, 11th S . , 661st PI.Mtg., Feb.26, 1957, p.1225.
38 GAOR, 13th S., 4th Ctee., 797th Mtg., Nov.12, 1958, 
p.287.
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that New Guinea and Nauru were proceeding towards 
self-government or independence. But, in that period, 
Australian delegates made it clear that self-government 
or independence was very distant. Thus, when each 
year the Trusteeship Council earnestly sought greater
indigenous participation in administration and
39representation in a legislature, the stock Australian 
response was that New Guineans were primitive, lacked 
territorial or political consciousness, and needed first
4oto be given health and education facilities; that
it was pointless to talk of a greater share in 
administration for indigenes when most of them would
41not know the meaning of the concepts involved;
39 A Belgian member of a visiting mission to New 
Guinea said in 1953 that ’in political matters, we 
cannot but get the impression that the Administration 
is somewhat timid in its recognition of indigenous 
institutions' (TCOR, 12th S., 473rd Mtg., July 2,
1953» p.211). But it is doubtful if the Belgian 
would have agreed with a comment made much earlier;
'The reason for the Commonwealth Government's reluctance 
to grant even the most limited form of self-government
to the territory is somewhat obscure' (Marjorie G. Jacobs, 
'The Australian Native Dependencies in the Pacific' in 
A.I.I.A., Australia and the Pacific, Australian Supple­
mentary Papers, Series E. Nos. 1 to 3, prepared for 
the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938» 
Melbourne, 1938, p.12).
40 TCQR, 3rd S . , 24th Mtg.,yJuly 14, 1948, p .300.
41 TCQR, 5th S., 15th Mtg., July 7, 1949, p.191-
437
that the indigenes had the mental age of children; 
that ’our enquiries revealed...not one indigenous
43inhabitant with...general knowledge of the Territory’.
For anti-colonial Powers, the point of this sort of
view was that, as Forsyth once said, ’full self-
government is a very long w^r off in such primitive
44territories as these...', ‘ and, as Hood said in 1949,
’some aspects of development had to be thought of
4 5in terms of... generations...’ . That is to say,
Australian control had to be thought of in terms of 
generations.
42 TCOR, 7th S., 9th Mtg., June 13, 1950, p.68.
43 TCOR, 12th S., 472nd Mtg., July 1, 1953, p.184.
44 TCOR, 2nd S., 1st Pt., l6thMtg., Dec.15, 1947, p.527.
4 5 TCOR, 5th S. , 15th Mtg., July 7, 1949, p.191. If* 
nothing else, emphasis on New Guineans’ backwardness 
was bad debating strategy. A Soviet member of the 
Council could comment in 1951 that ’Stone Age conditions 
prevailed in certain areas was a highly significant 
admission from an Administering Authority which had 
administered New Guinea for thirty years’ (TCOR, 8th 
S., 340th Mtg., March 12, 1951, p.211), and in 1955 
an Indian member could find it ’strange that after more 
than thirty-five years of modern influence not a single 
member of the indigenous community had reached the 
stage where it could advise the Administration in a 
responsible and democratic manner’ (TC OR, 16th S.,
624th Mtg., June 27, 1955, P»99)»
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During the late 1950s, there was still emphasis
in official Australian statements on the backwardness
of the indigenes of Papua dnd New Guinea and on their
'recently barbaric way of life’ . 1 ^  but there was also
apparent an awareness of growing international pressure
on the surviving administering Powers, including
Australia, As Casey said in 1957s ‘As the area of
colonies contracts..,¥e may expect, X think, that the
remaining non-self-governing territories...will attract
47much attention’ .
In 1900, there occurred a significant event
in the political history of Papua-New Guinea: the
expansion of indigenous representation in the territory's
Legislative Council from three appointed members to
five appointed and at least six elected members.
48 49At about the same time, both Hasluck and Menzies 
firmly stated Australia’s intention to implement self- 
government in the territory. Hasluck stressed that
46 Statement by Casey (CPD, H. of R. Vol.18, p.874 
(April 15, 1958).
47 Current Notes, Vol.28, p.405 (May, 1957)» Hasluck, in 
i9 6 0 , felt that ’as a result of recent developments in 
Asia and Africa and of changes that are taking place in
the United Nations there is increased international interest 
in the Australian administration of Papua and New Guinea'
(CPD, Vol. H. of R. 28, p.257 - Aug.23, i9 6 0 ).
48 Ibid., p . 1 2 9 1 (Sept.22, i9 6 0 ).
49 GAOR, 15th S., 8 8 8 th Pl.Mtg., Oct.5, 19^0, p.^35-
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50’we are not going out of the Territory in a hurry’ ,
that events in 1 9 0 0  reflected ’no recent change of
, 51policy’ , that Australia s t i l l  had an interest in the
52region. But there was not the old emphasis on the 
primitive nature of the indigenes; rather there was 
emphasis on progress achieved, and Hasluck claimed 
that only parliamentary circumstance had prevented
53reform of the Legislative Council several years ea r l ie r .
Australia’s in terest  in the area was expressed in
terms of friendly relations when Papua-New Guinea
had achieved self-government and ’a f te r  self-government’
rather than in terms of Australian control.
I t  is  not possible to declare as a fact that
international pressure forced, and a changing strategic
54situation perhaps allowed,' Australia to relax her
5 0 CPD, Vol. H. of R. 28, p . 2 6 3 (Aug. 23, 1960).
51 I b id . , p.255.
5 2 I b id . , p.260.
53 Current Notes, Vol.3 1 » p.343 (July, I960).
54 Writing in 19^5» one defence specialis t,  af ter
noting that control of eastern New Guinea by a hostile 
Power would make easier that Power’ s attack on 
Australia’s east coast and seriously endanger Australian 
shipping and a ir  routes to the north, described Papua- 
New Guinea as ’ ’’essential" to the defence of Australia, 
but not ’’v i t a l ’’ ’ (T.B. Millar, ’Defence of New Guinea’ , 
in New Guinea , Vol.1 ( 1 9^5) » No. 1 (April) , p . 6 9 .
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position in Papua-New Guinea and that resignation on 
the question of foreseeable, imminent self-government 
for Papua-New Guinea allowed her to relax her position 
on other colonial questions - whether on South-West 
Africa, the Portuguese te r r i to r ie s ,  or implementation 
of the Declaration on Colonialism. However, i t  will 
be apparent from the narrative in preceding chapters 
that international pressure did mount markedly in the 
la te  1950s, and that the process of decolonisation 
was leaving Australia in an increasingly isolated 
position. There then followed, coincidentally i f  
nothing more, at once a manifestly new Australian attitude 
on Papua-New Guinea and a manifestly new attitude on
55other colonial issues.
55 L i t t l e  has been said here of Nauru. I n i t i a l ly ,  
Australia’s in terest  in the island was solely financial; 
la te ly ,  the fate of the islanders af te r  the exhaustion 
of Nauru’s phosphate reserves (and tillable land) 
had caused po l i t ica l  embarrassment for Australia, 
but not so far of a major kind.
C H A P T E R  1 1
D I P L O M A T I C
C O N S E Q U E N C E S
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The preceding chapters of this work have 
represented an attempt to describe Australian positions 
on a large number of questions of significance in 
decolonialist terms and to indicate something of the 
basis of Australia's interest in colonial issues.
Little has been said to this point, however, about the 
immediate diplomatic effect of Australian policy.
It is proposed in this chapter, on analyses of proposals 
put to the General Assembly or its committees and of 
voting on them, to indicate with greater precision 
than previously those states which have been most 
involved in attempts in the United Nations to hasten 
the process of decolonisation and the extent to which 
they have included states of close interest to Australia; 
to indicate in highly summarised form the Australian 
response to their activities; to note with which states 
and to what degree Australia has tended to make common 
cause. The point of these questions is apparent 
if yet more are asked; to what extent have policies 
on colonial issues alienated Australia from Asian 
neighbours with whom Australian governments have declared 
the desirability of maintaining friendly relations; 
if continuing control of Papua—New Guinea has principally
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determined the Australian position, what price has 
Australia apparently paid for seeking to safeguard 
that control; to what extent has Australia’s position 
happened to coincide with that of friends greater 
and more powerful than her immediate neighbours; 
to what extent has Australia, like the United States, 
been torn between a desire to alienate neither anti­
colonial noi colonial Powers; to what extent has the 
Australian record varied according to changes of govern­
ment at home and circumstances abroad?
The analyses which follow are based on 192 
proposals put in the Assembly during the period 1946-63 -
154 of them being proposals which were adopted and 
thus became Assembly resolutions and 38 being 
proposals which were rejected.1 They were chosen either 
for having seemed to mark a notable step in mounting 
pressure in the United Nations on dependency-administering 
states, or for having seemed essentially characteristic 
of the kind of ’pressure by resolution’ practised in 
the Assembly. They relate to Chapter XI and trusteeship 
system issues and to the specific questions discussed 
above under the ’Colonial Threats to Peace' heading, 
with this exception; the Indonesian question, which
1 For a list of the resolutions and unsuccessful 
proposals, see Appendix A»
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engaged the United Nations almost entirely in the
Security Council, has been omitted because of the
difficulties involved in trying to translate Security
Council membership and forms into Assembly terms.
The omission of any proposals arising from the one
question on which Australia took a strongly anti-colonial
position distorts to a degree some of the patterns
indicated below and allowance should be made for it.
The 192 proposals are not chronologically balanced:
there were years of particularly intense activity -
1949 and i960, for example. Nor do they comprise more
than a fraction of all those submitted, although the
2fraction is not small.
In considering voting figures, it should be 
noted that states’ attitudes are not always simply 
reflected in their voting. One state may vote against 
a proposal because it is too radical and another because 
it is too moderate (in this sort of context, Australia
2 Of the 192 proposals, 139 went to plenary or committee 
roll-call votes and thus allow detailed analysis of 
voting. In his comprdi ensive analysis oi voting on 
colonial questions, Rowe bases his calculations on 319 
«issues' on which roll-call votes were requested, but it 
will be seen that the trends which he indicates on a 
basis of examination of the 3^9 are evident in an 
examination of the 139s see Edward i. Rowe, ’Ihe 
Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations 
in Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 3 (Sept.), Vol. 
VIII (1964), pp.210-11.
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and communist s tates occasionally have been found voting
in the same way). Sometimes, the vote of a state is
admitted by i t s  delegate to have l i t t l e  to do with the
substance of the proposal in question but is  designed to
3
manifest an attitude about something else . '  I t  might 
be questioned how far  the ac t iv i t ie s  of some delegations 
reflec t the policies of the ir  governments. A vote 
may reflec t views of the form or expression of a 
proposal rather than i t s  substance. Finally, as i t  
was noted above, the option of voting in one of only 
three categories on often long and complex drafts 
reduces policy to expression in very crude terms. For 
these reasons, undue precision should not be attributed 
to figures given below.
3 I t  was seen above that in 1958 the Australian 
delegate abstained in plenary voting on a further 
three-year term for the information committee as a 
general protest against anti-colonial pressures rather 
than because Australia opposed re-appointment.
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Of the 192 proposals, Australia voted for 50,
against 70 and abstained in the voting on 72 in
4the following way:
Table 1
AUSTRALIAN VOTING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND COMMITTEES 
ON 192 PROPOSALS ON COLONIAL QUESTIONS 1946-63
I.
Australian Vote
Proposal Category Number For Against Abstained
NSGT4 5 91 26 34 31
TrS6 71 1 6 2 1 34
Pol7 30 8 15 7
192 30 70 72
Looking now at the Australian voting on those proposals
accepted by an adequate majority (a simple majority 
in committee and usually a two-thirds majority in plenary
4 In 45 instances, cited in Appendix A, the vote counted 
is that registered by Australia in a committee of the 
Assembly, whether because the Australian vote in plenary 
session is unavailable, the proposal in question was 
rejected at the committee stage, or because the proposal 
adopted in committee was not submitted in plenary session. 
'For' votes include adoptions recorded as having been 
unanimous or ’without objection'.
5 This encompasses Chapter XI and Declaration on 
Colonialism issues.
6 Trusteeship system proposals.
7 Proposals related to the West Irian, Moroccan,
Tunisian, Algerian and Oman questions.
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session) and. tftose r e je c te d ,  i t  can be seen in  the 
following ta b le s  th a t  m a jo r i t i e s  aga inst  proposals 
very ra re ly  failed, to include A u s t ra l ia  but t h a t ,  
on most occasions,  A u s t r a l i a  did not vote with the 
m ajor i ty  when a proposal was adopted:
Table 2
AUSTRALIAN VOTING Ojn 38 REJECTED PROPOSALS 1 9 4 6 - 6 3
A ustra l ian  Vote
proposal Category JNl umb e r For Against Abstained
in oGT 14 — 1 4
TrS 6 1 5
r o l 18 3 15
38 4 34  T
Table 3
AUSTRALIAN VOTING ON 154 ADOPTED PROPOSALS 1946-63





A ustra l ian  Vote 
For Against Abstained
26 20 31






These ta b le s  show f a i r l y  c le a r ly  the general h o s t i l i t y  
f e l t  by A u s t ra l ia  towards these proposa ls .  However, 
as the next t ab le  shows, t h i s  h o s t i l i t y  was not manifested 
uniformly. I t  was apparent during tlie e a r ly  (A ustra l ian  
Labor Government) yea rs ,  grew much more in tense  during 
the 1 9 5 0 s, re lax ing  markedly in  the 1 9 6 0 s:
Table 4
AUSTRALIAN VOTING ON 192 PROPOSALS IN THREE PERIODS OF 
______________________________ 1046-63_____________________________________________
V o t i n g  C a t e g o r y 1946-9 1950-9 1960- '
F o r 18 16 16
A g ainst 17 48 5
A b s t e n t i o n _J3 39 28
4o 103 49
I I .
Turning now to the major ques t ion  of the
diplomatic consequences of A u s t ra l ian  p o l ic y ,  to the
question of which s t a t e s  A u s t r a l ia  has tended to oppose
or support,  answers may be sought in  two ways: ( l)  by
determining those Powers which, as f a r  as may be
gathered from a v a i la b le  records ,  have taken i n i t i a t i v e s
in  the submission of p roposa ls  on co lo n ia l  i s su es  and
in d ic a t in g  the A u s t ra l ian  response in  the case of each
Power; and ( 2 ) by analysing the A u s t r a l ia n  voting record
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on these proposals in comparison with the voting 
records of' other administering Powers (which include 
Australia1s greatest international friends), of 
Asian Powers (which include most of Australia* s 
neighbours), of several western Powers heirs to a 
tradition and outlook similar to Australia’s but not 
themselves directly involved in colonial questions, 
of a communist Power, of two representative Middle 
Eastern Powers, of two African Powers and of two Latin 
American Powers.
Dealing first, then, with the identity of those 
Powers which have most lent themselves to the submission 
and support of proposals on colonial questions, the 
following table indicates the roles of fifteen Powers 
in an order governed by the number of proposalsgwhich they initiated or co-sponsored:
8 In the case of eleven of the 192 proposals, it 
is not possible to indicate sponsorship with assurance. 
They were submitted initially in the information committee 
or a committee on South-West Africa, the records of 
which tend to be highly summarised.
450
Table 5
INCIDENCE OF SPONSORSHIP OF 181 PROPOSALS ON COLONIAL
ISSUES 1946-63
C oun t ry NumberSponsored C oun t ry
Number
Sponsor«
1 India 87 9 Philippine s 42
2 Egypt - UAR^ 70 10 C eylon 38
3 Indone sia 54 11 Guinea 38
4 Iraq 55 12 Morocco 38
5 Burma 53 13 A f ghanis t a n 36
6 Syria 52 14 Cuba 35
7 Ghana 49 15 P akis t an 35
8 Liberia 45
Because all proposals categorised under the ’Threat 
to Peace’ heading related to Arab or Moslem grievances, 
it might be thought that some Arab or Moslem states 
could have had a particular interest in these issues 
sufficient to distort their proper place in a generally 
anti-colonial group. In fact, if consideration is 
restricted to Chapter XI and tiusteeship system proposals, 
Guinea, Afghanistan and Pakistan are replaced near the 
bottom of the list by Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and M^li . 
Otherwise, the order remains much the same.
9 Egypt merged with Syria in 1958 to form the United Arab 
Republic. Syria broke away in 1961 and resumed separate 
United Nations membership.
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States listed in Table 5 were not uniformly 
active over the 1946-63 period. Broadly speaking,
Latin American initiatives, marked in 1946-55» declined 
thereafter relative to those taken by new, particularly 
African, states. The following table, based like Table 5 
on all 181 proposals, distinguishes between incidence 
of sponsorship in the 19 +^6-55 period and the 1956-63 
period, during the latter of which many formerly colonial 
states entered the United Nations:
Table 6
INCIDENCE OF SPONSORSHIP OF 181 PROPOSALS ON COLONIAL ISSUES
1946-55
NumberC oun t ry 0 ,________ Sponsored
1 India 36
2 Cuba 28











14 Saudi Arabia 11
1956-63
C oun t ry NumberSponsored
1 Ghana 49
2 India 49
3 Egypt - UAR 42
4 I raq 4o
5 Indonesia 39











Thus, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
10the Philippines, Pakistan and Denmark, while s t i l l
active, were replaced in prominence by five African,
1 1two North African and another Asian state.
Australia 's  neighbours were prominent, whether 
one looks at the overall or short-term pictures. Burma, 
Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines 
were the most prominent of them, but Cambodia, Malaysia, 
Nepal and Thailand, too, were active - Thailand more 
in the ea r l ie r  years, the others in the la te r  years 
of the period when multi-sponsorship was common. The 
following table shows the Australian voting response 
to proposals sponsored by Asian states:
10 Denmark, like the United States at times, would 
sponsor proposals not altogether to the liking of her 
fellow administering Powers but preferable in their  
view to more extreme Afro-Asian proposals, that is ,  
she tended to provide compromise formulas.
11 Had the l i s t in g  in Table 5 been continued for a 
further ten places, the additional states in order 
would have been Ethiopia, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, 
Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria.
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Table 7
AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS ON COLONIAL ISSUES 
SPONSORED BY ASIAN STATES 1946-63
Australian Vote
Country N uinb e r Sponsored For Against Abstained
India 87 19 27 41
Indonesia 34 1 1 19 24
Burma 53 9 20 24
Philippine s 42 8 16 18
C eylon 38 8 10 20
Pakistan 35 6 13 16
N epal 27 5 7 15
Cambodia 19 6 1 12
Malaysia 16 4 1 1 1
Thailand 13 5 1 7
Japan 8 6 - 2
Laos 3 2 - 1
China 2 1 _ 1
III.
Of the 192 proposals so far considered, 137 were 
subject to committee or plenary session roll-call 
votes: that is, in 137 instances, it is possible to
indicate how present and participating delegations voted 
and thus to compare Australian voting with that of other 
member states. The illustration on the following page 
plots in chronological sequence the voting of Australia
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1 2and other selected states. This diagrammatic
representation allows an immediate appreciation of the
way in which these states voted and the trend in their
voting in what Rowe shows in mathematical terms to
be the development of an anti-colonial consensus in the 
1 3
Assembly. I t  can be seen that not only did Asian, 
African, Latin American and communist states (assuming 
that the states selected are representative) continue 
throughout the period generally to vote for proposals,14 
but that Australia and most other administering Powers 
tended increasingly from 1 9 5 9 - 6 0  to accept proposals 
or abstain in voting on them, a tendency also marked 
and evident earlier in the case of non-administering 
western Powers.
The following table compares the Australian 
voting record with that of other administering Powers:
12 The numerical headings in the diagram refer to 
Assembly resolutions by their official number, though 
without the customary suffix stating the annual session 
of i t s  adoption; the alphabetical headings refer to 
rejected proposals described in Appendix A.
13 Rowe, loc.c i t .
14 I t  may be observed that their few votes 'against' 




VOTES CAST BY ADMINISTERING PONERS ON 137 PROPOSALS ON
COLONIAL ISSUES 1946-63
Votes Cast
C ountry __________________ ____ For Against Abstained
Australia 30 57 50
Belgium 25 75 36
Denmark 71 38 28
France 22 59 42
Italy (voting from 1956) 27 22 20
N etherlands 41 55 41
New Zealand 45 50 42
Portugal (voting from 1956) 4 32 26
South Africa 2 75 19
Spain (voting from 1956) 1 1 17 38
United Kingdom 23 67 42
United States 66 46 25
One method for seeking to determine relative
intransigence or acceptance is by allotting point s for
votes cast by administering Powers so as to arrive at
comparable total ’scores’. Even restricting the analysis
to states members of the United Nations over the same
(whole) period, simple numerical summaries can be mis-
leading for at least two reasons: members do not always
register votes, whether because of the chance absence 
of delegates or lack of interest, or as a protest 
against proceedings of which they disapprove; there is
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immense variation in the importance and significance
of proposals to various states at various times and
to the historian, nowever, provioea i t  i s  Kept m
mind that, at least in the cases of France ^wnich failed
to vote on 14 occasions), South Africa (on 4l) and
Britain (on 5)» failure to vote reflected the extreme
nature of their  hos t i l i ty  to Assembly activity  on
the issues in question, so that had they voted they
would in most instances almost certainly have voted
’against* , and provided i t  is  realised that proposals
on which votes are counted did not have equal weight
in the eyes of voters, the compiling of scores would
seem to have some value as providing very rough
indications of relative attitudes. The following tables
are based on an allocation of + 2 for a ’fo r ’ vote,
1 5
-2 for a vote ’against’ and -1 for an abstention;
15 This is  at odds with the method of Rowe (op .c i t . , 
p.21l),  who includes abstentions in his calculations 
but with a numerical value of n i l ,  arguing that an 
abstention represents an intermediate position. This 
writer argues that in most cases i t  represents an 




VOTING SCORES OF NINE ADMINISTERING POWERS IN PERIODS OF 
____________________________________1946-63_________________________________________
1946-9 1950-9 1 9 6 0 - 3
Denmark 13 United S ta tes -6 Denmark 42
United S ta tes 6 Denmark -17 New Zealand 17
N e ther lands -8 New Zealand -57 United S ta te s 15
New Z e aland -12 France -69 Netherlands 8
A u s t ra l ia -15 Ne th e rland s -69 Belgium -2
France -20 United Kingdom -81 A u s t r a l ia -4
Belgium -27 A u st r a l ia -85 United Kingdom -17
United Kingdom -32 South Africa -85 France -27
South Africa -35 Belgium 1 0 7 South Africa - 4 5
Table 10
VOTING SCORES OF NINE ADMINISTERING POWERS FOR PERIOD OF 
_____________________________________1 946-63_________________________________________
Denmark 38
United S ta te s 15
New Zealand - 5 2
Netherlands - 6 9
A u st ra l ia - 1 0 4
F rance - 1 1 6
United Kingdom - 1 3 0
Belgium - 1 3 6
South Afr ica - 1 6 5
I t  can be seen tha t  A u s t r a l ia  tended genera l ly  to 
be considerably more h o s t i l e  towards the proposa ls  
involved than Denmark and the United S ta te s  and 
somewhat more h o s t i l e  than New Zealand and the 
Netherlands.  On the o ther  hand, A u s t ra l ia  i s  seen to
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have been somewhat less hostile than France, Belgium 
and the United Kingdom and, of course, much less hostile 
than South Africa. (it might be noted that Portugal, 
also prone to non-participation, would score -37 for 
the 196O-3 period, second only to South Africa at the 
bottom of the scale.) Given the fact of periodic 
French non-participation in the 1950s on issues involving 
North African territories, so that France’s place 
in the centre column of Table 9 is misleading, it 
may be seen further that Australia's intransigence or 
permissiveness relative to that of other administering 
Powers did not greatly vary throughout the whole period 
of 1946-63.
In writing of affairs in the United Nations,
it is possible to give a misleading impression of
constant solidarity among groups of members given a 
1 6common label. J In this work, there have been frequent 
references, in particular, to ‘the administering Powers’ 
and to ’Australia and her fellow administering Powers'. 
There can be little doubt that attitudes among the 
administering Powers have been sufficiently common
16 For work of key relevance here, see Thomas Hovet, Jr, 
Bloc Politics in the United Nations, Cambridge (Mass.), 
i960, and the same author's Africa in the United Nations, 
Northwestern, 19^3»
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Tor the group label to have adequate validity. A 
statement made by Chifley in 1948 in respect of the 
trusteeship system would in general hold good for the 
period at least to i960 in respect of colonial questions 
as such:
Trie have found it necessary...in common with 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United 
States and other administering powers to 
resist attempts, on the part of some non­
administering countries, to interfere uncon­
stitutionally with the primary responsibility 
of the powers administering trust territories.
In some areas, this administering Powers’ solidarity
and, in particular, the solidarity with them shown by
Australia, has been marked. Trusteeship Council
interrogations provide a useful illustration of this.
A feature of the trusteeship system is that the
administering Powers’ membership of the Trusteeship
Council involves them both as prosecutors of the
international interest and as defenders of their national
interests. If a bi-polar situation had not developed,
it is possible that Trusteeship Council representatives
of administering Powers, like some of their Permanent
Mandates Commission predecessors, might have played
the roles of prosecutor and defender, or even have
17 CPD., Vol. 200, P.3902 (Dec. 2, 19^8)
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concentrated on the former. Indeed, on rare occasions 
when communist and other anti-colonial representatives 
have been reticent, representatives of' administering
1 Q
Powers have tended to take over the prosecution role.
For the most part, however, Australia and her admini­
stering colleagues have disengaged from mutual 
prosecution and have reserved themselves for defence.
20
Australia seems to have been the most obliging of a l l .  
She has abstained very largely from the process of 
examination. The Council inherited from the Mandates 
Commission the practice of supplementing administering
18 Even of the early years of the system, this  w riter’ s
reading of the Council records would not support the view 
that ’ though off ic ia l ly  present as national representa­
tives, the members have consistently acted. . .as  
professional and objective students of the affairs  under 
consideration.. . ' .  (Sherman S. Hayden, 'The Trusteeship 
Council: I t s  F irs t  Three Years' in Po li t ica l  Science
Quarterly, Vol. 66 (1951), No. 2 (June), p .232).
19 During the 1953 examinations of Nauru and New Guinea,
for example, the Soviet member was a l i t t l e  quieter than 
formerly and the Assembly-appointees were relatively 
inactive so that the Belgian and French representatives 
emerged to behave rather like their Mandates Commission 
predecessors: courteous, frank, c r i t ic a l  (see TCOR, 12th
S., 470-3rd Mtgs., June 29-July 2, 1953, pp .148-217)•
20 This is  not to suggest that Australia was less than 
a conscientious member. She reported thoroughly; she 
played her part in Council committee work; and, to i 9 6 0 , 
she served on four v is i t ing  missions (to East Africa in 









Powers’ annual reports with oral examinations of delegates
and expert witnesses. Since 1949 this, in turn, has
been supplemented with submissions in advance of
written questions, but the oral examinations have
remained as significant opportunities for Council
members to probe, embarrass and express criticism.
The table comprising Appendix B to this work analyses
interrogations on three (different) trust territories
for each of the years 1948-60 and shows that, except
for Italy, Australia played the smallest part of any
administering Power and, of course, far smaller than
most non-administering members. Moreover, Australia
and most of the administering members have not merely
asked few questions; questions which they have asked
have tended to be harmless or positively supportive,
rather than embarrassing. This could reach almost
farcical proportions, as when Kelly for Australia in 1956
asked during examination of a Belgian report on Ruanda
Urundi ’whether the special representative agreed that
it was unrealistic to set any intermediate or final
target date for the reduction...of... cattle in the 
21territory’ . Or when Britain’s Sir Andrew Cohen
21 TCOR, 21st S. , 852nd Mtg., Feb.5» 1958» P«33
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asked during examination in the same year of’ a United
States report on i t s  Pacific Islands 'whether the special
representative would agree that programmes should be
adjusted in the l igh t of experience, rather than on
22the basis of theoretical cr i ter ia* .
I t  remains, however, that the solidarity of 
the administering Powers should not be exaggerated.
Not only have they varied in the number of proposals 
which they have accepted or rejected; they have varied 
in which proposals they have accepted or rejected.
The following table shows, for each of three periods 
of 1946-63 and for 1 9 ^6 - 6 3  as a whole, the number 
of proposals on which Australia and each administering 
Power were qualified to vote, the number of occasions 
on which votes of each Power were the same as Australia 's , 
and the expression of the l a t t e r  as a percentage of 
the former - that i s ,  actual common voting expressed 
as a percentage of possible common voting:
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I t  is  evident from th is  table that, while Australia
often saw her in terests  in the same way as most other
administering Powers saw theirs ,  she was not the echo
of any. Thus, of 137 occasions on which Australia
might have voted with the United States, her most
powerful friend, she in fact voted with her on only
89 occasions: on one vote in three Australia 's  vote
was not the same as that of the United States. Similarly,
on a l i t t l e  more than one vote in five, Australia did
2 6not vote in the same way as B r i ta in . '
Given that a great deal of western opposition 
to anti-colonial ac t iv i ty  in the Assembly has been 
expressed on legal grounds, on grounds of form and 
competence possibly reflecting a d is t inct ly  western, 
constitutional habit of mind, as well as on grounds 
of practical national in teres t ,  i t  is  interesting to 
compare the Australian voting record with that of 
Canada, Ireland and Norway:
2 6  The fact of non-participation tends to dis tor t 
some aspects of Table 1 1 , notably in the cases of 
France, South Africa and Portugal.
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Table 12






Score PCV CV *
Australia 30 57 50 -104
Canada 56 49 32 -18 137 94 68
I reland 46 7 14 64 68 24 35
Norway 71 4o 24 38 137 77 56
As one would perhaps expect, Canada, a fellow C omm onw e alt h
member, is closest to the Australian position; Norway, 
an uninvolved Scandinavian state, is seen to be in a 
similar position relative to Australia to that of 
neighbouring Denmark as seen above; Ireland, predictably 
and explicitly favourably disposed towards much of the 
anti-colonial cause, is furthest removed from the 
Australian position. It would appear that western 
group membership factors were of limited relevance, 
though of some, to attitudes on colonial questions.
The following table compares the Australian
27record with that of two Middle Eastern, two African,
27 In this work, states along North Africa's Mediterranean 
seaboard have been considered as falling within a 
Middle East - North Africa category, and South Africa 
has been consiuered as a western state.
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two Latin  American s ta tes  and a communist s ta te ;
Table 13
VOTING COMPARISON ; AUSTRALIA AND SEVEN MIDDLE EASTERN, 
AFRICAN, COMMUNIST AND LATIN AMERICAN POWERS 1946-63
Vote
C ountry For Against Ab stained Score PCV c v °!°
A ustra lia 30 57 50 - 1 0 4
L ebanon 105 7 8 188 137 28 20
Egypt - UAR 1 18 9 10 208 137 34 25
Ethiopia 107 6 17 185 137 29 21
Ghana 57 3 3 105 63 14 22
Poland 105 14 16 1 66 137 31 23
Guatemala 99 1 23 173 137 30 22
Chile 86 21 29 101 137 56 4 i
I t  i s  necessary here to comment only that the communist 
bloc, represented here by Poland, scores only moderately 
highly because of i t s  extreme intransigence. Whereas 
an indisputably an t i -co lon ia l  Power l ike  the United Arab 
Republic would at times accept compromise d ra f ts  in an 
e f fo r t  e i th e r  to achieve wide support or to avoid 
pushing administering Powers to a point of non-co- 
operation, communist Powers have tended to stand out for 
harsher d ra f ts .  Thus, a d raf t  occasionally would be 
opposed only by a small group of communist Powers 
in tran s igen t ly  declaring th e i r  h o s t i l i t y  to a too weak
468
draft and Australia and other administering Powers 
declaring their hostility to a too strong draft.
The following table compares the Australian record 
with that of her Asian neighbours:
T able 1 4
VOTING COMPARISON : AUSTRALIA AND THIRTEEN ASIAN POWERS 
___________________________ 1946-63___________________________
Vote
Country For Against Abstained Score PCV CV
Australia 30 57 50 -104
Burma 1 1 1 9 6 1 9 8 131 32 24
C ambodia 55 2 8 9 8 68 13 19
Ceyl on 62 3 6 1 1 2 73 13 18
China 92 6 36 1 3 6 1 3 7 47 34
Mai aysia 58 2 3 1 0 9 63 14 22
India 11 9 6 1 2 214 137 29 21
Indonesia 96 5 7 1 7 5 109 21 19
J apan 46 3 21 65 73 24 33
Laos 29 3 1 1 4 1 71 15 21
N epal 54 4 2 9 8 73 11 15
Pakistan 1 10 9 12 1 9 0 133 31 23
Philippine s 11 6 6 13 20 7 137 31 23
Thailand 100 9 18 1 64 133 3 2 24
Reference in the righthand columns of the table to 
proposals on which there has been identical voting allows 
a clear picture to emerge of the gulf between Australia and 
Asian Powers on colonial questions. Because of the
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infrequency with which the various Asian Powers have 
voted in the same way as Australia, it is useful 
also to note the number of occasions on which voting 
agreement between Australian and Asian delegations 
has occurred when agreement has been manifest in 'for1 
votes. In effect, it can be seen how agreement largely 
has occurred when Australia has accepted proposals on 
colonial questions, for the most part, that is, when 
Australia has accepted anti-colonial activity;
(Table 15 headings AaV - Australia also Voted - refers 
to the number of occasions on which each Power and 
Australia both registered votes; IV - Identical Votes - 
refers to the number of occasions on which each Power 
and Australia registered the same sort of vote;
CV’F* - Common Votes ’For* - refers to the number 
of occasions when identical voting occurred when 
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It can be seen that Australia tended to share common 
ground with Asian Powers lor the most part only when 
she was accepting their decolonialist activities.
¥hen Australia was voting against proposals on colonial 
issues or abstaining on them, she rarely enjoyed the 
company of most of her Asian neighbours - and, for 
the most part, she did vote ‘against’ and abstain.
The only exception to be noted would be China which, 
after the retreat to Formosa, tended to moderate her 
position.
IV.
At least until i960, Australia generally 
was hostile to proposals made in*»the Assembly on 
colonial issues, most of them anti-colonial in 
unmistakable terms. She voted against 34 of 38 
proposals rejected by the Assembly or its committees 
and voted for only 46 of 154 proposals adopted by 
majorities of members. In following this course, 
Australia expressed verbally and by her voting 
consistent opposition to the sponsors of these proposals 
and to their supporters. Prominent among the sponsors 
whose activities Australia opposed were India,
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Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Ceylon and Pakistan; 
their supporters comprised virtually all  Asian members, 
as well as most Middle Eastern, African, communist 
and Latin American members. Colonial questions 
clearly were an occasion for alienation of Australia 
to some degree from most of the United Nations' non- 
western membership, and especially from her Asian 
neighbours. I t  is ,  of course, d iff icult  or impossible 
to indicate just to what extent this alienation has 
mattered. In oversimplified hypothetical terms, what 
does an Assembly vote equal? Does India, for example, 
take pains to note a hostile Australian speech and 
vote in the Assembly in New York i f ,  at the same time, 
Australian aid reaches the docks of Calcutta or
Australian political support in her northern border
2 «
conflict reaches New Delhi?*' S t i l l ,  while nothing 
short of mass surveys could produce evidence for
28 This writers' impression, based on conversations 
with Australian and a few Asian diplomats and with 
United Nations Secretariat officials , is that Australia 
had paid a price for her stand on colonial questions, 
however various in place and time. I t  would seem 
that Burma, for one, saw Australia in the 1940s and 4-950s 
to a great degree in terms of Australia* s apparent 
devotion to the cause of colonialism. Other states 
seem to have been more inclined pragmatically to 
accept the Australian defence of her own colonial interests 
as inevitable and understandable.
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a certain answer, it may reasonably be supposed 
that constant opposition on not just another subject 
of Assembly debate, but a subject of tender and 
lasting sensitivity to recently dependent Powers, 
must have some effect on the opposed and some consequent 
effect on the national interest of the Power opposing - 
the more so if the opposing Power has (as Australia 
has) a proclaimed interest in friendly, neighbourly 
relations with the opposed.
It is evident, moreover, that Australia has
not merely to some degree alienated some Powers by
her own policies, but that she has also placed herself
in an identifiable western group alien on colonial
questions to the same Powers. Even anti-colonial
Ireland’s record falls short of the non-western anti-
29colonial Powers' records. Among the western Powers, 
the administering Powers, as one would have supposed, 
can be identified as in general the most hostile to
29 The one exception would be Greece which, very often 
alone among western members, in the 1950s supported 
anti-colonial states because of her involvement in 
the Cyprus question.
anti-colonial activity. Among the administering 
Powers, in turn, Australia seems to have been more 
hostile than Denmark, the United States, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand and Italy, if less than France, Belgium,
30Spain, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Portugal,
More will be said below of Australia’s motives, but it 
has been seen that solidarity as a motive in itself 
should not be assumed because of the appearance of 
solidarity. If it has been a factor, and undoubtedly 
it has, it has in Australia’s case been limited, as 
comparisons between Australian, British and United States 
voting records showed. Still, for whatever reasons, 
Australia on colonial questions, at least until i960, 
took a place among a small group of western, mainly 
administering Powers in opposition to what to an 
increasing extent became most members of most other 
groups in the Assembly.
30 For the period from their entry into the United 
Nations, until 1963, the records of Italy and Spain on the 
proposals analysed above was 27-22-20 and 11- 1/ —3°» 
Compared with the Australian record for the same period, 
and computing scores as above, the list would read 
Italy - 10, Australia -48 and Spain -50 (Spain 
several times failed to vote in contexts suggesting 
that had she voted she would have voted against or 
abstained).
C O N C L U S I O N
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At San Francisco in 19^5» Dr Evatt sought in
Australia’s name ’the economic and social advancement
of the dependent peoples... and... the development of
self-government in forms appropriate to the varying
circumstances of each territory'. That, he said, 'defines
broadly what is meant by trust and trusteeship...'.
It was significant that he went on to say approvingly
of the British draft chapter on trusteeship submitted
to the conference: 'Most of the words, or many of
the phrases, are derived from Article 22 of the
Covenant, dealing with mandates created under the League 
1of Nations'. Evatt had in mind a limited, humani­
tarian and paternal system, a mandates system applied 
much more widely, and not primarily a political system. 
Certainly, he sought machinery for compulsion to 
ensure that all appropriate dependent territories were 
brought within this system, but he specifically 
declared his desire not to interfere with the 
sovereignty of colonial Powers. Speaking of the great 
mass of territories outside the old mandates system 
and not numbered among the few territories to be
1 Verbatim Minutes, Vol.68, 2nd Mtg., Running No.12
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detached from vanquished World War II Axis Powers, 
he said:
The sovereignty in regard to these territories 
has never been in doubt, and no suggestion 
ox doubt will be thrown upon the sovereignty 
in any proposal suggested or contained in 
the Australian delegation's scheme/
In the event, it has been seen, the trusteeship system
was made more demanding than Evatt (at San Francisco,
at least) had envisaged, but submission to it was
voluntary, as he had not envisaged. For the territories
not submitted, there was the declaration of principle
in Chapter XI of the charter and a loosely worded,
limited reporting obligation, but there was no
provision for determination of which territories
these might be. Evatt had said at San Francisco:
’...let the Assembly...state in what territories.
3reports should be required...’.
Within a short time of the signing of the 
United Nations charter, situations arose to throw 
into conflict the Assembly, which Evatt had seen as the 
final arbiter, and the sovereign rights of colonial 
Powers, which Evatt has sought to guarantee. On the
2 Ibid., Running No. 17»
3 Ibid. , Running N o .21.
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one hand, he supported the Assembly;
...each member should faithfully observe the 
recommendations and decisions of United 
Nations bodies. The effective and just 
working of the Organisation depends on the 
aceptance of the wishes of the majority.
# • •
If every country felt itself at liberty to 
ignore or defy decisions of which it 
disapproved, the whole Organisation would 
rapidly break up.4
On the other hand, in what was clearly a case of the 
sort he tad had in mind at San Francisco, he, for 
example, defended the sovereign rights, and the 
sovereign dignity, of South Africa in the matter of 
South-West Africa. In legal terms, he was not 
necessarily inconsistent. As he later argued;
’...it was made quite clear at San Francisco that 
the bx'inging of territories under the trusteeship 
system was to be a voluntary act...'. Post-1945 
circumstances may well have made him relieved that the 
charter had emerged in as conservative form as it 
did rather than as he might at the time have preferred.
4 Herbert V. Evatt, The Task of Nations, New York, 
19^9, pp.39-^0.
5 Herbert Vere Evatt, The United Nations, Melbourne,
19^8 , p.3**.
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Evatt and his successors persisted with
efforts to implement the less political aspects of
trusteeship, but they found themselves under constant
6pressure on political questions, A multitude of 
proposals were made to have the Assembly draw tighter 
reins of supervision over non-self-governing territories, 
and virtually to establish the right to determine their 
political development and that of trust territories. 
Similar efforts were made in respect of areas such 
as Algeria and Southern Rhodesia, which most western 
Powers, including Australia, saw as not even being 
non-self-governing territories. Understandably, Evatt 
had anticipated the effects neither oi the Cold War 
nor of the phenomenon of post-war anti-colonialism.
The Cold War in the late 1940s and throughout 
the 1950s produced a bi-polar situation in which 
Australia identified herself with the West against 
the East in a conflict fought, in part, on colonial
6 Relevant to this writer’s contention that Evatt gave 
little thought to the political emancipation of dependent 
territories, it is interesting to note that when, three 
years later, he summarised Australia’s purposes at San 
Francisco, his reference to the colonial issue contained 
nothing expressly political; ’To lay down the principle 
that the purpose of administration of all dependent 
territories is the welfare and development of the native 
peoples of such territories, and to place a specified 
obligation on nations controlling particular dependent 
territories to report regularly to advisory bodies 
consisting of expert administrators’ (ibid., p»37).
48o
7grounds. Independent of the Cold War conflict, 
the rise of anti-colonialism pursued by new, non- z"- 
communist states also produced a virtually bi-polar 
situation in which, again, Australia identified 
herself with one faction against the other. Anti­
colonialism appeared as a novel factor early in the 
Assembly’s history and developed quickly into a 
fundamental point of division between members of the world 
community. By 1955» the twenty-nine Bandung Conference 
states were declaring that ’colonialism in all its 
manifestations is evil... the subjection of peoples 
to alien subjugation...constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights, is contrary to the charter
Q
of the United Nations...’. J In i960, the Assembly 
explicitly agreed with them and adopted the Declaration 
on Colonialism.
7 As an example of extra-colonial conflict, one might
note a Byelorussian attack on Australia as early as 
1946 on the Security Council veto question: ’It must be
said openly that the Charter of the United Nations is 
being turned upside down by the Australian delegation. 
The Australian delegation...comes forward as the 
protagonist of freedom and democracy.,.In reality
the opposite is the case’ (GAOR, 1st S., 2nd Pt,,
61st Pl.Mtg., Dec.13, 1946, p.126l).
8 From the text of the conference communique cited in 
full in Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung,
Chapel Hill, 1956, p.98*
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Until the time of the adoption of the 
Declaration, Australia generally and vigorously 
opposed the anti-colonial Powers. A number oi reasons 
may be advanced for this:
1. Australia administered virtually contiguous 
dependencies upon which she placed a high value: 
she saw her territorial security involved in her 
control of them. The anti-colonial Powers sought to 
interfere with her exercise of administrative control 
and, indeed, to end it.
2. It may be supposed that Australian governments,
like most others, felt what Perham calls 'the deep,
unexpressed distaste for the idea of abdicating 
9authority'. Besides this, Australia's estimate of
her long-term security interests and sense of moral
responsibility have dictated that, if she should
cease her administration, this should happen when
her territories have some hope of survival as democratic
and liberal states in her own image. As Plamenatz
has said of administering Powers generally:
9 Perham, op.cit., p.113.
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It may be that, if they could order the 
world to please themselves, they would keep 
their subjects in perpetual bondage; 
but this they know they cannot do, and 
therefore, since their subjects will get 
either independence or equality with them­
selves in some kind of union between them, 
it is clearly their interest that their 
subjects should adopt their moral and 
political ideals.^
This, it may reasonably be supposed, was the attitude 
behind a statement referring to Papua-New Guinea made 
by the then Australian Minister for Territories,
Mr Hasluck, in 196O:
In political advancement we would rather 
take each step too soon than too late, but 
we see no kindness in making human  ^
beings walk over cliffs in the dark.
If Papua-New Guinea had to exercise self-determination,
it was in Australia’s interest (and an Australian
could genuinely feel that it was in Papua-New Guinea's
interest) that New Guineans should first reach a stage
of development such that they would be able to make an
informed decision and then carry it through in a
presumably self-governing and probably independent state.
An anarchic or non-Australian dominated Papua-New
Guinea was undesirable for the territory and for Australia.
10 John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government, 
London, i9 6 0 , p.170.
11 London Times, June 28, i960.
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3. Enough has been seen of Australian attitudes for
it to be evident that Australia, like most administering 
Powers, deeply resented criticism and attempted inter­
ference from states regarded as poorly qualified to 
offer it or attempt it. Even Evatt complained in
141948 of ’constant and carping criticisms' and Menzies 
was pleased to report after his 1957 visit to Papua- 
New Guinea that he had 1 found the local people were no 
more enthusiastic about being told what to do by
1 5theoretical peoj^le 10,000 miles away than I am'.
4. The Cold War added to Australian hostility. Anti­
colonialism, necessarily anti-western in part, was made 
almost entirely and relentlessly anti-western by the 
Cold War and Australia, it is clear, saw herself as 
very much a western Power sharing the fate of the west.
5. Anti-colonialism, like the Cold War, threatened 
the interests not only of Australia but of her western 
allies and friends. She defended their interests as 
well as her own. In defending the one, of course,
she defended the other, and it has been seen that
14 Evatt, The United Nations, pp.129-30.
15 Sydney Morning Herald, April 30, 1957» Three days
earlier, it is appropriate to note, a leader in the 
same paper, had dismissed the 'vapourings of the United 
Nations Trusteeship Council...'.
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Australian governments, especially non-Labor governments, 
were not insensitive to attacks on the interests of 
alliance partners like Britain, the United States,
France and the rest. Even the Australian Labor 
Government defended South Africa and showed a feeling 
of common purpose with other administering Powers 
against the activities of the anti-colonial Powers.
It remains, then,to suggest explanations for the 
apparent Australian inconsistency on the Indonesian 
independence question and a change of policy in the 
1960s. The Indonesian independence issue represented 
the one major instance of an Australian government 
estimating an exercise in anti—colonial!sm to serve 
the Australian interest better than the usual defence 
of the rights of the administering Power: the stability
and friendliness of such a proximate area and 
acceptance of Asian nationalism were thought to matter 
more, in this case, than consistency on the principle 
of domestic jurisdiction, solidarity with a western 
colleague, or fears on account of Papua-New Guinea.
In the case of the latter, several points need to
be noted:
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1 . By 1960-61, the anti-colonial offensive in the
General Assembly had reached an advanced point.
The entry into the United Nations from 1 9 5 5  of a large
number of anti-colonial states and the disengagement
of some administering or formerly administering states
made for what has been called an anti-colonial
1 6consensus in the Assembly. Had she persevered in 
her former course, Australia would have joined an 
isolated company comprising South Africa and Portugal 
and, on occasion, Britain and Spain. I t  seems that a 
point was reached where Australia realised that 
‘the U.N. . . .  cannot be defied without involving 
some risk or damage to the national interest* and 
decided that this r isk  outweighed the benefits of 
continued intransigence. Just as, in the Indonesian 
independence case, extra-New Guinea in te res ts  seem to 
have been seen as out-weighing the New Guinea interest or 
alliance in terests ,  so from i960 i t  seems to have 
appeared to the Australian Government that less  was 
to be gained from defying the Assembly than in going
16 Fortunately for the administering Powers, the Latin 
American states, comprising the largest potential bloc 
unti l  the mid-1950s and 1960s, were neither solid nor 
consistent in their anti-colonial ac t iv i t ie s :  signi­
ficantly , Evatt praised their  ’ r e s t r a in t ’ and ’sense 
of responsibility ' (Evatt, Task of Nations, p . 3 ö)»
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some way towards meeting its demands and joining the
majority. As Beddie has said;
Australian security - or if not quite that, 
the ease with which it can live in its 
international environment, clearly requires 
the cultivation of good relations with at 
least the Asian part of the Afro-Asian block. 
Its established trade and communications and 
its immigration policy require good 
relations...1'
2. The departure from office at the beginning of i960 
of Casey, liberal in many ways but somewhat pre­
occupied at times with the Cold War, and the attitudes 
of a new senior Australian representative at the 
United Nations, Plimsoll, seem to have been relevant. 
Again to quote Beddie, there was from i960 ’a finesse 
and moderation not evident in the 1950s'. ° Plimsoll's 
speeches were much more conciliatory and his 
activities much more flexible than those of his pre­
decessors. Anti-colonial delegations noted the 
change and commented favourably on it.
3. Australia seems to have become resigned to a fairly 
imminent departure from Papua-New Guinea, or at least 
for an exercise of self-determination in the territory.
17 Brian Beddie, ’A Problem in Foresight' in 
New Guinea, Vol.1 (1965) No.2 (June-July), p.17«
18 Ibid., p . 18.
487
With her allies as it were weakening* and with the 
probable loss of Papua-New Guinea accepted, there was 
little real benefit in seeking to maintain a record 
of legal consistency.
To recapitulate: Australia in 19^ +5 sought
a new sort of world society in which, among other 
things, the exploitation of dependencies would cease. 
This would be effected by the surveillance over all
dependent territories of world society represented
1 9in the United Nations. The emancipation of
19 It has been commented that the ’net result of the 
evolution of United Nations practice with respect 
to non-self-governing territories has been to lead 
to the final acceptance of the views expressed by 
Australia, and some other States, at the San 
Francisco Conference, that all dependent territories 
should be under the surveillance of the United Nations 
There can be little doubt that some of the seeds of 
the post-war colonial revolution were sown at San 
Francisco, by our delegates’ (A.C. Castles, ’The 
United Nations and Australia's Overseas Territories’ 
in D.P. O'Connell, ed., International Law in Australia 
Sydney, 1966, p.399Y^  There is something to this 
view but, if surveillance means ’close observation' 
as practised under the mandates system and as 
Australia, it has been argued, had in mind in 19^5» 
there was an immense gulf between what Australia 
sought in 1945 and what other, anti-colonial states 
sought subsequently.
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dependencies, however, would involve a long, humani­
tarian effort to raise them to a position of eligibility 
for self-government or independence. The security 
of the world (and Australia in her region) demanded 
this. On the other hand, Australia sought explicitly 
not to endanger the sovereignty of the dependency- 
administering Powers. Almost immediately, there were 
demands for a very close surveillance of dependencies 
cui-d a short, intense effort to accomplish their 
emancipation, and eligibility for emancipation 
was not to be according to the criteria of Australia 
and other administering Powers. Australia reacted 
with hostility: the anti-colonial states’ demands
were unrealistic (some dependencies were not 
ready for self-determination), unfortunate (Australia 
was not anxious to lose control of a potential enemy 
bridgehead), unconstitutional (they went beyond the 
charter) and mischievous (a Soviet tactic, supported 
by misled, neutralist new states). When, by the 
end of the 1950s, the hostility of Australia and other 
administering Powers had proved to be unavailing, 
Australia realistically became more accommodating.
A P P E N D I C E S
4 9 0
APPENDIX « A ‘
NOTES ON CHAPTER 11
I .
T h e  1 9 2  p r o p o s a l s  o n  w h i c h  T a b l e s  1 , 2 ,  3 a n d  
4 a r e  b a s e d  c o m p r i s e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  1 5 4  r e s o l u t i o n s :
9 5 6 5 j 6 6  a n d  6 7 ( 1 ) ;  1 4 1 ,  1 4 3 ,  1 4 4  a n d  l 4 6 ( l l ) ;
2 1 8 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 , 2 2 2 , 2 2 4  a n d  2 2 6 ( l l l ) ;  3 2 0 , 3 2 3 ,
325, 326,  327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334, 336,
3 3 7  a n d  3 3 8 ( i v ) ;  433, 436,  4 4 o , 446, 449A a n d  4 4 9 B ( v ) ;
5 3 4 ,  5 3 6 ,  3 5 8 ,  5 6 0 , 5 6 2 ,  5 6 6 , 5 6 7 , 5 6 8 ,  570A a n d
5 7 0 B ( V I ) ; 611, 612, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648 a n d  6 5 3 ( v i l ) ;
7 4 2 ,  7 4 4 ,  7 4 6 ,  7 4 7 ,  7 4 8 ,  7 4 9 A ,  7 4 9 B ,  7 5 2  a n d  7 5 4 ( V T I l ) ;
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813,  844,  848, 849, 8 5 0 / 8 5 2 , 8 5 3 , 8 5 8  a n d  9 0 4 ( ix )  ;
9 1 1 ,  9 1 5 ,  9 3 2 , 9 3 3 ,  9 4 0 ,  9 4 1 ,  9 4 2 ,  9 4 3 ,  9 4 5  a n d  9 4 6 ( x ) ;
1 0 1 2 ,  1 0 4 9 ,  1 0 5 0 ,  1 0 5 5 ,  1 0 5 9 ,  1 0 6 0  a n d  1 0 6 4 ( X l ) ;
1 1 4 2 ,  1 1 4 3 ,  1 1 5 3 ,  1 1 8 4  a n d  1 2 0 7 ( X I l ) ;  1 2 4 3 ,  1 2 7 4 ,  1 2 7 6 ,
1 3 2 9 ,  1 3 3 0  a n d  1 3 3 2 ( X I I I ) ;  1 3 5 9 , : 1 3 6 0 ,  1 3 6 1 , l 4 l 0 ,
1 4 1 3 , 1 4 6 6 ,  1 4 6 7 ,  1 4 6 8 ,  1 4 6 9  a n d  1 4 7 0 ( X I V ) ;  1 5 1 4 ,  1 5 3 5 ,
1 5 3 6 ,  1 5 3 9 ,  1 5 4 1 ,  1 5 4 2 ,  1 5 6 4 ,  1 5 6 5 , 1 5 6 6 , 1 5 6 8 , 1 5 7 3 ,
1 5 9 3 ,  1 5 9 6 , 1 6 0 3  a n d  1 6 0 7 ( X V ) ;  1 6 4 4 ,  1 6 5 4 ,  I 6 9 9 , 1 7 0 0 ,
1 7 0 2 , 1 7 0 5 , 1 7 2 4 ,  1 7 4 2 ,  1 7 4 5  a n d  1 7 4 7 ( X V I ) ;  1 7 5 2 ,  1 7 5 5 ,
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1760, 1805, 1807, 1810, 1811, 1812, I8i7, 1818 and 
1819(XVII); 1883, 1889, 1899, 1913, 1948, 1955, 1970 
and 1979(XVIII)}
and the following 38 unsuccessful proposals:
1. Assembly election of information committee members
( 19^ 7 );
2. Submission of political information under Article
7 3 e  ( 1 9 4 7 ) ;
3. Provision for comparative information on non­
self-governing territories and metropolitan states 
(19^7);
4. Submission of territories to the trusteeship system
(19^7);
5. Three-year term far information committee (1948);
6. Permanence for information committee (19 -^8);
7. Obligation to report on development of and 
indigenous participation in political institutions 
in non-self-governing territories (1948);
8 . Secretary-General to incorporate in summaries 
information from non-official sources ( 1 9 +^8 ) ;
9. Information committee to examine communications from 
indigenous sources (19^8);




11. Elevation of information committee to status of 
subsidiary organ of the Assembly (19^9)5
12. Trusteeship Council bound, so to order its business 
as to assist the Assembly (1950);
13» Declaration of violation of the charter by South 
Africa on South-West Africa (1950);
14. Placing of Moroccan question on Assembly agenda (1951)» 
15* Permanence for information committee (1952);
16. Hearing for the Bey of Tunis (1952);
17» Establishment of U.N. good offices committee and 
call for restoration of civil liberties and for 
self-determination for Tunisia (1952);
18. Stationing of U.N. representatives in trust 
territories (1953) »
19» Appeal for reduction of tension and free political 
institutions in Morocco (1953);
20. Recognition of Tunisia's right to sovereignty 
and independence (1953);
21. Statement of Netherlands and Indonesian desire
to co-operate and call to them to negotiate and report 
on the West Irian question (1954);
22. Inclusion of Algerian question on the Assembly 
agenda (1955);
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23- Establishment of ad hoc committee to study application 
of Chapter XX of the charter to new members (1956);
24. Secretary-General to appoint good offices committee 
re ¥est Irian question (1956);
25. Call for end to bloodshed in Algeria and to French 
and Algerians to negotiate (1956);
26. Hope for solution to Algei'ian question (1956);
27. Secretary-General to report on opinions of 
application of Article 73e and ad hoc committee to 
consider report (1957)5
28. West Irian dispute parties asked to seek solution 
and Secretary-General to assist (1957)>
29« Recognition of Algerians' right to self-determination 
and call for negotiations (1957)5
30. Secretary-General to report on opinions on 
application of Article 73© and ad hoc committee to 
consider report (1958);
31. Declaration of Algerians' right to independence and 
call for negotiations (1958);
32. Call for Franco-Algerian pour parlers re Imple­
ment a tin of Algerian self-determination (1959);
33* ditto (milder version) (1959) »
34. Investigation of situation in South-West Africa
(1961);
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35* Call lor further Netherlands-Indonesian negotiations 
on Vest Irian question under aegis of Assembly- 
president ( 1 9 6 1 );
36. As in 35» but with reference to indigenes’ wishes 
and provision for commission to act i f  negotiations 
failed ( 1 9 6 1 );
37- Declaration of Oman’s right to self-determination 
and call for withdrawal of foreign forces and for 
Anglo-Oman negotiations ( 1 9 6 1 );
38. Recognition of Oman’s right to independence 
and call for withdrawal of foreign forces ( 1 9 6 2 )*
On a basis of registered votes, delegations’ explanations 
of votes, the texts of debates and authoritative 
information supplied p>rivately to this writer, i t  is 
possible to state with confidence that, on the drafts 
of the resolutions lis ted above, Australia voted in 
plenary session thusi
For 9, 144, 2 1 8 , 219, 2 2 0 , 221, 222, 224, 2 2 6 , 320,
323, 3 3 6 , 433, 440, 644, 646, 5 5 6 , 5 6 0 , 915, 933, 1042, 
1143, 1184, 1243, 1644, 1 6 5 4 , 1 6 9 9 , 17^2, 1752, 1 8 0 5 ,
1 8 1 0 , 1 8 1 1 , 1 8 1 2 , 1 9 1 3 , 19^8 and 1979  and, probably,
1 43, 1 46 and 5 6 7 .
Against 66, 6 7 , 1*M, 327, 334, 436, 446, 449B, 5 5 8 ,
647, 648, 742, 746, 747, 748, 7 5 2 , 8 5 2 , 943, 9 ^6 , 1049, 
1 0 6 4 , 1153, 1207, 1 2 7 4 , 1 3 3 0 , 1 3 6 1 , 141 3 , 1 4 6 8 , 1 4 7 0 , 
1 7 4 5 , 1 8 1 9 .
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Abstained 6 5 , 325, 337, 449A, 5 6 8 , 5 7 0A, 570B, 6 11, 6 1 2 , 
645, 6 5 3 , 7 4 4 , 7 ^9A, 7 ^9 B, 7 5 4 , 8 1 3 , 844, 8 4 9 , 8 5 1 ,
9 0 4 ,  9 1 1 ,  9 4 5 , 1142 ,  12 7 6 ,  1329,  1 3 3 2 , 1 3 5 9 , 1360 ,  
l 4 i o ,  14 6 6 , 1467 ,  1469 ,  1514,  1536,  1541 ,  1542 ,  1565 ,
1568 ,  1 5 7 3 , 1 5 9 3 , 1596 ,  1603 ,  1607 ,  1 7 0 0 , 1702 ,  1 7 2 4 ,
1 7 4 7 , 1 7 5 5 , 1 7 6 0 , 1807 ,  1817 ,  1818,  1 8 8 3 , 1889,  1 8 9 9 ,
1955, and 1970.
and in committee (First or Fourth or Special Political); 
For 328, 330, 331, 332, 5 6 6 , 1539, 1705.
Against 326, 848, 8 5 0 , 8 5 3 , 8 5 8 , 1059.
Abstained 329, 338, 554, 5 6 2 , 932, 940, 941, 942,
1050, 1055 ,  1060,  1 5 3 5 , 1 5 6 4 , 1566.
On the drafts of unsuccessful proposals (as listed  
above), Australia voted in plenary session thus:
For 36.
Against 1 , 2, 3, 4, 12, 14, 15, 1 8 , 1 9 , 22, 23, 24,
27 ,  2 8 ,  3 1 , 3 3 , 3 5 , 3 7 , 3 8 .
and in committee:
For 2 6 , 29, 34.
Against 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,  10,  11,  1 3 , 16, 1 7 , 20 ,  21 ,  2 5 ,
30, 32.
AGENDA NOTE: In the case of some votes on the inclusion
of an item on the Assembly’s agenda, the form of the 
vote has been reversed. The Assembly votes not on
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inclusion of an item, but on acceptance or not of a 
General Committee recommendation in the matter. Where 
the committee recommended rejection, Australia would 
vote for the recommendation and thus, in effect, 
against inclusion. In such a case, Australia has been 
credited with a vote against inclusion. It might be 
noted further that such a practice changes the 
significance of an abstention; if an abstention is 
regarded as a modified vote against, as this writer 
regards it, an abstention on a committeefs recommendation 
for rejection of an item would be a modified vote 
against rejection, not against inclusion as the practice 
just described would make it. However, the effect on 
tables and scores is too small to be regarded as 
significant.
II.
Sponsorship of proposals analysed in Tables 5»
6 and 7 encompasses more than formal sponsorship of 
draft resolutions. A Power has been treated as a 
sponsor when its amendment has radically altered the 
substance of a draft and when records show it to have 
been responsible for the initiation of a proposal 
sponsored in the Assembly by a committee. Alternatively,
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when a draft has been so amended as to have virtually 
no thing substantially in common with the original 
draft, the sponsors of the original draft have not 
been counted. In the case of Resolution 6 6 (l),  for 
example, this was sponsored by Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Britain and the United States so as to have information 
submitted under Article 73© of the charter dealt 
with by the Secretary-General. A Cuban amendment 
to have the Assembly call for the establishment of an 
ad hoc information committee to examine summaries and 
report on future procedure so radically altered, the 
content and significance of the draft, the original 
sponsors of which had sought precisely to avoid 
recourse to such a committee or the Trusteeship Council, 
that Cuba has here been considered the resolution’s 
sponsor rather than the original joint sponsors.
I I I .
Of the 192 proposals listed above, the following 
137 were subject to ro l l-call  votes used as the bases 
for Tables 8 to 1 5 s Resolutions 65, 66 and 6 7 ( 1 ) ;
l 4 l ( l l ) ;  2 1 8 , 2 1 9 ,  2 2 0  and 2 2 l ( l l l ) ;  3 2 0 , 3 2 5 ,  3 2 6 ,
3 2 8 , 3 2 9 ,  3 3 0 ,  3 3 1 ,  332, 3 3 ^ ,  337  a n d  3 3 8 ( i v ) ; 4 3 3 ,  **36 
4 4 o , 4 4 6 ,  449A a n d  4 4 9 B ( v ) , 5 5 4 , 5 5 8 , 5 6 6 , 5 7 0A a n d  
570B(VX); 6 1 1 , 6 1 2 , 6 4 5 ,  6 4 7 ,  648  a n d  6 5 3 ( V I l ) ;  7 ^ 2 ,
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7 4 8 ,  7 49A and  7 4 9 B ( V IX I ) ;  844, 848, 849, 850 and  
9 0 4 ( I X ) ;  933, 945, and 9 4 6 (x )  ; 1050, 1059 and 1064(X l )  ; 
1143 and 1 1 5 3 ( X I I ) ; 1274, 1276, 1329 and 13 3 0 ( X I I l ) ;
136o, 1361, 1410, 1413, 1466, 1467, 1468, 1469 and
1 4 7 0 (X IV ) ;  1514, 1535, 1536, 1539, 1541, 1542, 1564, 
1565, 1566, 1568, 1573, 1593, 1396, 1603 and 1607(XV) ;
1654, 1699, 1700, 1705, 1742, 1745 and 1747(XVX);
1 7 5 2 ,  1 7 5 5 ,  1 7 6 0 ,  1 8 0 5 ,  1 8 0 7 ,  1810 and 1 8 1 9 ( X V I I ) ;
1 8 8 3 ,  1 8 8 9 ,  1 8 9 9 ,  1 9 1 3 ,  1 9 4 8 ,  1970 and 1 9 7 9 ( X V I I I ) .
and u n s u c c e s s f u l  p r o p o s a ls  ( a s  l i s t e d  a b o v e ) ;  3 to  
38 ( i n c l u s i v e ) .
DIAGRAM NOTE: I n  th e  d ia g r a m  on Page 4 5 4 ,  num bered
h e a d in g s  r e f e r  to  r e s o l u t i o n s .  L e t t e r e d  h e a d in g s  
r e f e r  to  u n s u c c e s s f u l  p r o p o s a l s  f r o m  th e  Us t  g i v e n  
a b o v e :  A s t a n d i n g  f o r  3 ,  B f o r  4 ,  C f o r  5 to  Z f o r  2 8 , 
A 1 f o r  2 9 ,  B1 f o r  30  and so o n .
APPENDIX *B*
PARTICIPATION IN TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL INTERROGATION
The trust territories, Trusteeship Council
interrogations on the reports for which are analysed
in the table that follows, comprised the following:
1 9^8 : Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, New Guinea;
1949: French Cameroons, British Togoland, Western Samoa;
1950: Tanganyika, French Cameroons, New Guinea;
1951? Nauru, Pacific Islands, Ruanda-Urundi;
1952: New Guinea, French Togoland, British Cameroons;
1953s Nauru, Western Samoa, Pacific Islands;
1954; New Guinea, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika;
1955; Nauru, British Togoland, French Cameroons;
1956: New Guinea, French Togoland, British Cameroons;
1957: Nauru, Tanganyika, Western Samoa;
1958; New Guinea, Ruanda-Urundi, Pacific Islands;
1959; Nauru, Somaliland, French Cameroons;
i960: New Guinea, British Cameroons, Pacific Islands.
The method used in arriving at the figures
given in the table was the following: the number of
questions asked by each national on the Trusteeship
Council was expressed as a percentage of the total
number asked by all Council members on the report on a
territory. The figure given for each year in the table
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is the average of the percentage asked in each of 
three interrogations (or in each of two interrogations 
where a member’s own country was involved as the 
reporting trust Power in one of the interrogations). 
Figures for the administering and non-administering 
groups were arrived at in much the same way, that is, 
in each interrogation the questions asked by 
representatives of administering Powers and those of 
non-administering Powers were expressed as percentages 
of the total number asked; the average for the three 
interrogations covered for each year was then calculated. 
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y
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There is a large body of literature with some 
bearing on aspects of colonial questions discussed 
in this work. Secondary material listed below is 
restricted to publications actually cited in the text 
and to others which, while not cited, contributed 
significantly to the writer*s understanding of the 
subject,
DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Inter-State 
Commission of Australia, British and Australian Trade 
in the Sou th P acific , Repor t , Melbourne, 1918 (in CPP, 
1917-18-19, Vo 1, V) ,
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Selection 
of Papers Printed by the League of Nations Relating to 
the Mandatory System, 1920-1922, Melbourne, 1923.
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report of 
Colonel John Ainsworth on Administrative Arrangements 
and Matters Affecting the Interests of Natives in the 
Territory of New Guinea] Melbourne, 1924 ( in CPP,
1923-24, Vol.VI).
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